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This study of the foreign policy process of Nigeria explains 
how the country's foreign policy is made and the environmental 
setting in which it is made. It argues that in spite of domestic 
political crises and major changes in government, the process of 
making foreign policy has settled into discernible patterns and 
exemplifies a stable body of principles. Nigeria has an active 
environment (domestic and external) for policy making, as 
illustrated by the array of sources and types of input into policy 
making on virtually every external issue. The actual making of 
foreign policy is done by the executive: - the Presidency - Federal 
Executive Council - Ministry of External Affairs - etc., and it 
passes through the process from initiation to consideration, decision, 
implementation and evaluation, involving a series of consultations 
with both governmental and non-governmental agencies. Case studies 
are used to illustrate the argument that foreign policy making in 
Nigeria is a collective responsibility in the sense of the 
participation of many organs of government in the process and the 
outcome depends on the policy makers' perception of both the given 
issue and the prevailing circumstances in the domestic and external 
environments of Nigeria. 
Contrary to the impression about political processes in developing 
countries, it argues that Nigeria's foreign policy process is not 
very different from that of developed countries. If there is a 
significant difference, it lies in the amount of information and 
resources put into policy making, which reflect in the content of 
policy while the process is basically the same. Unlike the 
iv. 
capitalist and communist states, Nigeria's foreign policy is not 
necessarily based on pure calculation of advantages or how to 
exploit the weakness of friendly countries. It is rather a 
long term policy of mutual co-operation and assistance. Its 
practice, contrary to the views of its critica# has been of 
.a 
high profile and purposeful. 
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Relatively little has been written about the foreign policy 
of Nigeria and almost nothing on the processes of external policy 
making and the principles that guide foreign policy structures 
0 
in the formulation and execution of policies. Some of the writers 
on the subject have concentrated on some sub-areas or issues of 
the country's external relations. Even at that, most of such 
writings are concerned more with the attitudes of Nigeria's 
political leaders towards the country's external relations than 
the complexity of the national and international environment in 
Which policy is made. 
This is not to denigrate in-depth studies and researches by 
serious students of foreign policy in various world institutions 
of higher learning, some of which will be cited in this work. For 
example, Akinyami in his obviously captivating book, 
1 
analysed 
the impact of the Nigerian political system an selected foreign 
policy issues and argued that the ruling elite in the First 
Republic had a realistic perception of Nigerian foreign policy 
and "the interests they intended them to protect". Similarly, 
Gordon Idang2 examined the domestic sources of Nigerian foreign 
policy and argued contrary to Akinyemi that the Balewa government 
had no clear perception of the objectives and goals of foreign 
policy and that religious and moral sentimentalism led that 
government not only to ignore the vital interests of Nigeria and 
1. Akinyemi, A. B, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian 
Experience. Ibadan University Press, 1974. 
2. Idang, Gordon, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 
(1960-1966). Ibadan University Press, 1973. 
t 
2. 
Africa but also to present Nigeria "both as a (status quo' state 
and a stooge of the West". 3 
A further study of these texts may be salutary. However, 
the point here is that there is a conspicuous gap in both research 
and available literature on Nigerian foreign policy. Kirk-Greene 
noted that "The profound lacuna that characterises the literature on 
the foreign relations of African states and on international affairs 
as they involve African countries -a gap widened by a comparison 
with the rich corpus of literature on African civil services - is 
an indication of how much work still needs and deserves to be done 
on Africa's foreign service cadres". 
4 He pointed out specifically 
that "the structure and behaviour of foreign services" are the 
"heavily under-studied aspects of the foreign relations of African 
states". 
5 Also Professor Olajide Aluko has confirmed the paucity 
of literature on Nigerian foreign policy and attributes part of the 
difficulty in filling the gap to the inability of Nigerian Ambassadors 
and Diplomats to publish their account of the Foreign Service. 
6 
My aim in this study, however, is neither to give an historical 
account of the development of foreign policy, nor an examination of the 
pros and cons of particular policies. Nor is it to be judge- 
mental, in terms of praising or criticising Nigeria and its leaders 
3. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
4. Kirk-Greene, A. H. Q., The Formation of Foreign Service Cadres 
in Nigeria. Kenya and Uganda. Oxford University Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, April 1973. Reprint Series No. 819 P. 18. 
5. Ibid., p. 12. 
6. Aluko, Olajide, Organisation and Administration of Nigerian 
Foreign Service, in Journal of Ife International Relations, 
occasional papers, published by the Department of International 
Relational University of Ife, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, July 1981, p. 2. 
0 
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for whatever there is. Admittedly each of these perspectives 
has its merits and therefore deserves attention. Detailed 
historical study of the various stages in the formation of a 
nation's foreign policy is necessary both as a background to 
subsequent research and as a source of reference. Also an attempt 
to analyse and explain'policy outputs and effects is a worthy 
exercise, though it demands caution so as not to adulterate facts 
and misinform one's readers or to involve oneself in excess value- 
judgement and rationalisation. 
To decide on a topic for research in a wide subject. such as 
foreign policy is by no means an easy task, for a number of factors 
have to be borne in mind in choosing a topic. Most government 
activities do overlap, thereby posing the problem of defining 
the boundary of the subject. Some foreign policy decisions are 
the product of simple processes from the domestic environment and 
others result from complex and complicated activities within the same 
territorial jurisdiction. Many other foreign policy matters arise 
from the external environment - the world beyond a country's own 
sovereign jurisdiction. Some of such matters may be overt or 
covert, friendly or offensive and aggressive or defensive. No 
matter the source, it will require some decision. Some foreign 
policy decisions are based on known general principles or broad 
based guidelines. A number of decisions are based on tradition 
and precedence while yet some decisions cannot be traced to either 
of these. Most decisions too are ad-hoc which are later defended 
as being based on both general principles and precedents. This 
brings us to another problem that confronts students of foreign 
policy. 
4. 
The implementation of foreign policy decisions (that iss 
foreign policy actions) could be ad-hoc depending on the prevailing 
circumstances at the time. Some other foreign policy actions could 
be based on consistent principles or precedence while some cannot 
be justified. This tendency creates problems in trying to relate 
certain actions to known principles and practices. There is also 
the difficulty of making a distinction between foreign policy action 
and its effect. The foreign policy action of some states may 
succeed in achieving a measure of influence over other governments 
because of the magnitude of the economic and military resources at 
their disposal or their capacity and readiness to exploit the 
weaknesses of the lese privileged countries. But the action of 
relatively weaker states, no matter how well targeted may have little 
or no effect. In the latter cases observers may wonder if the weak 
state ever has a policy on the matter. 
The third dimension of the problem is the relationship between 
foreign policy Per je and foreign economic policy. Each tend to 
have different objectives, whereas they are indeed complementary, 
and the extent to which the same instruments of policy are used in 
their formulation and execution is difficult to determine. 
The fourth aspect of the problem is to define the link between 
national defence and security on one hand and foreign policy on the 
other. For example, both the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics believe that their "domestic tranquility depends 
on security and stability abroad" while security and stability abroad 
depend respectively on their "willingness and ability to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of other peoples".? Similarly there is a 
7. Gurtov, Melvin, The United States Against the Third World - 
Antinationalism and Intervention, Praeger Publishers. New 
York, 1974, pp. 4-6. 
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a common belief in Nigeria that its national security is 
inextricably linked with the security of the African continent 
and that its national faith and destiny is directly related to 
the faith and destiny of all black peoples of the world. These 
linkages inevitably widen the scope of foreign policy and therefore 
make analysis cumbersome. 
In this study, our investigation will focus on the making of 
Nigerian foreign policy. This will involve analysis and explanation 
of the underlying bases of foreign policy making, the environment and 
types of input from there, the structures that make foreign policy 
and how they make it. One intricate but stimulating aspect of 
the study is the differing attitudes toward policy-making. At 
every time and on every issue, some people - writers as well as 
practitioners - deplore the approach or method by which a policy 
is made because it lacks a scientific approach. These people 
want a substantial amount of information and analysis to be put 
into policy-making. They would want also a mechanism for verification 
and monitoring policy outcomes in order to ensure that the desired 
effects are achieved. Another group want policy-waking to be 
pragmatic and result oriented. In this cases they-would want to 
see policy-making determined by political considerations. A 
typical example of these differences in attitude towards policy-making 
occurred in Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs in 1974 and 
1980 leading to rifts between the Commissioner (i. e. Minister) 
for External Affairs and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry. 
In 1974 the Permanent Secretary succeeded in convincing the 
Commissioner and thereafter wielded considerable influence in many 
aspects of policy-making but in the 1980 episode the reverse was 
the case. The Minister claimed to be the Chief Executive of the 
6. 
Ministry and that he should have overall authority on all 
aspects of the policy - including the decision to post or 
reassign any policy-staff. 
a A . third group of people are those 
who believe that policy-making should be determined by economic 
considerations. Instances abound of people who question why 
diplomatic missions should be maintained abroad at such high 
costs when the state of the nation's economy is lagging. Others 
in the group argue that siting of diplomatic missions, or indeed 
any external involvement, should be in those countries and on those 
issues where it is possible not only to attain some political 
objectives but also achieve substantial mutual economic benefits. 
In Nigeria as perhaps many other countries, there is a deep 
conflict among the three groups. This conflict runs through the 
whole structure of government and affects the recruitment and 
placement of policy-staff. It also affects the type of. policy 
they produce. Consequently, it is difficult for an observer 
to understand who makes Nigerian foreign policy, how the policy 
is made, and why they prefer a particular policy and not the other. 
Given the situation, it is even more difficult to identify the 
origin and cause of lapses in policy-making. It also compounds a 
critical evaluation of Nigeria's-foreign policy output. It is my 
conviction that a study of the structure and processes of policy 
formulation will facilitate an understanding of policy outcome. 
This study therefore is an attempt to identify and analyse 
certain theoretical concepts and principles underlying the formulation 
and execution of Nigerian foreign policy and to examine the structure 
6. "Policy-staff" refers to all those designated as "External 
Affairs Officers" and who belong to the "branch All cadre of 
the service. 
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of foreign policy machinery and how it functions within its 
environmental setting. In so doing, we may contribute to the 
effort to fill the hiatus that characterises the literature on 
Nigerian international relations. 
It must be stated that the foreign policy process is a 
complex and sophisticated subject. Nevertheless it is fascinating 
and demands caution. According to Lincoln Bloomfield, the study 
of foreign policy making is about the "How? " and to some extent the 
"Why? " but not the "What? " of foreign policy, 
9 Similarly, William 
Jenkins, in his critical examination of analytical approaches to 
the study of public policy 'Opined that the analyst must try to 
separate policy content or the substance of policy from policy process 
- i. e. the given set of methods, strategies and techniques by Which 
a policy is made. This he argued, is because "process is a central, 
if not the central focus ...... that a conceptual understanding of 
the policy is fundamental to an analysis of public policy". 
10 This 
view is pertinent particularly as it will enable us to attain the 
objectives and goal of this work with minimum diversion and distraction. 
We will therefore try to concentrate on the process and not the content 
of foreign policy, except for the purpose of illustration. 
This study of the foreign policy process of Nigeria involves 
five basic tasks. The first is to trace the evolutionary process 
of Nigerian foreign policy. The second is to identify and define 
the principles of Nigerian foreign policy. Third, we will try to 
foster understanding of the environment, both domestic and external, 
9. Bloomfield, Lincoln P, The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer. 
Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1982, po xii. 
10. Jenkins, W. I. 9 Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational 
Perspective. Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., London, 1978, p. 16. 
See also Simon, H., Administrative Behaviour. Free Press, 1947 and 
Allison, Graham, The Essence of Decision. Little, Brown, 1971. Both 
share the view that a focus on the process of decision making is a 
key to understanding policy and administration. 
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of the country's foreign policy as well as to distinguish from 
the environment, the major sources of input into foreign policy 
making. Fourth, to try to identify who really makes Nigerian foreign 
policy and how it is made. The fifth objective is to create awareness 
of the factors that affect Nigeria's practice of foreign policy and 
to suggest solutions. If there exists a distinction between the 
aims and objectives, such a distinction could equally be made between 
objectives and goals. Thus, the ultimate goal, which ought to be 
borne in mind, is to contribute positively to improvement in the 
Nigerian foreign policy by fostering awareness, among its practitioners, 
of the mechanics and principles of their work, 
(ii) METH000LOGY: 
The approach in this study is analytical. By analysis we 
mean the breaking down of a phenomenon into component parts for 
description and explanation. A number of other theoretical models 
could be used for the explanation of political activities in general 
and foreign policy in particular. The choice, however, depends 
partly on the writer and partly on the kinds of questions that are 
likely to arise from the subject matter. In foreign policy process 
particularly, issues generate from both within the government and the 
environment to enter the policy machinery, information flows into 
the machinery, public expectations, anxieties and demands are 
directed to the government; these change to a series of decisions 
from which policies emerge and are implemented. These bits and 
pieces of events are no doubt fragmentary and therefore raise some 
questions. Are all the activities performed by one person (a unit 
or a structure) or by different persons (different units or structures) 
of the government? How can these fragmentary activities be linked 
9. 
so that such decisions and actions could be understood as the 
product (output) of a co-ordinated process rather than of different 
parts or personalities. These questions will lead to the adoption 
of a policy process model for a logical and consistent analysis of 
the way foreign policy is made. 
However, Professor Dudley 
11 has warned of the inherent danger 
of misrepresentation of African politics if the conceptual constructs 
designed for the political activities of the capitalist western 
states are not carefully employed to describe the African political 
scene. -He recognised _also that similar dangers also exist even 
in the use of the models to describe western politics. The same 
dilemma led William Jenkins to devote much of his profound book12 
"to explore theoretical developments in policy studies arising from 
different intellectual origins and to ask how complete is the 
explanation they yield? " These raise fundamental questions as 
to which approach or combination of approaches could be beat used 
to explain policy processes and outcomes. After examining some 
of the models on decision making, like the Rational Behaviour 
Approach, the Incremental Bargaining model and political and 
organisational perspectives, Jenkins posited that "there is no one 
best way"13 of analysing political behaviour in general and public 
policy in particular. Thus it is hoped that our choice of the 
analytical model will help in the explanation of the subject. 
(iii) SCOPE 
The making of foreign policy is not concerned just with govern- 
mental outputs in terms of policy statements and follow-up actions. 
11. Dudley, Billy J. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and 
Pol= ti. s, Macmillan Press Ltd., Nigeria, 1983, pp. 13-1?. 
12. Jenkins, W. I., Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational 
Perspective, Martin Robertson, London, 1978. 
13. Ibid., p. 20. 
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It involves much more than that. A number of individuals, 
groups, organisations and factors are involved in policy making. 
The processes are also complex and the requirements are varied. 
Many foreign policy-makers have often asked the question, Who 
makes Nigerian foreign policy? Even among foreign office staff, 
it is common to end discussions with the expression "that is left 
to our policy maker". To many, it may seem surprising to hear 
that the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC)9 the National Sports Commission, 
the Nigerian Medical Association-: and the ordinary citizens etc. 
are involved in varying degrees in foreign policy-making. The 
fact of their involvement is obscured by the complexity of the 
policy-making processes. 
To understand the scope of the policy-making process 
requires a consideration of how issues generate and the series 
of bargaining, concessions and compromises involved in harmonising 
them. According to Lindblom, the study of policy making begins 
with a consideration of 
"how policy problems arise and appear on the 
agenda of government decision makers, then how 
people formulate issues for action, next how 
legislative or other action. follows, how 
administrators subsequently implement the 
policy, and finally at the and of the process, 
how policy is evaluated". 14 
Also there are other factors involved which must be considered 
if one is to understand the scope of policy making. These are 
factors like resource competition and national economic capacity, 
public demands and expectations, socio-cultural idiosyncracies, 
personal interests of the elite, national expectations and goals, 
14. Lindblom, Charles E., The Policy-Making Process. Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980, p. 3. 
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all combining to form a fraction of the factors that come into 
play in foreign policy making. The scope includes a consideration 
of another group of factors such as 
"the characteristics of the participants, what 
parts or roles they play, what authority and 
other powers they hold, and how they deal with 
and control each other". 15 
Finally by a stretch of imagination, one could appreciate the 
multiplicity of other international factors in the formulation of 
policy to govern relations between one country and others of diverse 
interests, having their peculiar internal competitions, economic 
problems and security threats, real or imagined. In which case, 
the making of foreign policy would necessitate some knowledge or 
assumptions of the other actors' background, objectives and modus 
operandi. Since such policies will result in both action and effect 
on the interacting partners, the making of the policy will neither 
be unmindful of the overall implications and capacity to absorb. 
the effect by the receivers nor ignore their retaliatory capability. 
All these mean that the scope of foreign policy process of any 
country, be it Brazil, Britain, China or Niger, embraces numerous 
elements and political processes that are internal to the country 
and those that are external to it but internal to the other countries 
with which it maintains interaction, directly or indirectly. We 
have tried to reflect these broadly in the design for this research 
but all cannot be examined in detail because the scope of our work 
must of necessity be limited. 
This thesis is divided into five parts with each part consisting 
of two chapters. Chapter one states the aims, objectives and goals 
as well as the scope and methodology of the research. The second 
15. Ibid., p. 2. 
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chapter provides an overview of Nigeria, its political background, 
and the genesis of its foreign policy. In part Two, while chapter 
three tries to explain the meaning of the concept "foreign policy" 
and to provide a working definition, chapter four will attempt to 
determine what constitute the principles of Nigerian foreign 
policy. Part Three is concerned with the environments of 
foreign policy, which for analytic reasons have been classified 
into two - the internal and the external. environments. ' Chapter 
five analyses the inputs from the internal environment while 
chapter six identifies and examines the external sources of 
input into foreign policy decision-making. Chapter seven 
of part Four deals with the examination of the components of 
foreign policy machinery while chapter eight analyses the 
functional processes. In part Five, chapter nine examines the 
factors affecting Nigeria's practice of foreign policy and chapter 
ten reviews the practice of foreign policy and tries to determine 




(i) A SYNOPSIS 
A few observations about Nigeria will help not only to form 
a general background to the study but also will set the criteria 
in terms of which the elements and process of foreign policy as well 
as its output and effects may be understood, assessed and objectively 
applied in comparative analysis. Such observations hopefully, will 
help correct certain erroneous impressions about Nigeria. For 
instance, Shaw and Fasehun contended that despite .a shift 
in both 
the sub- and super-structure of Nigeria since independence and 
the fact that the basis of its greatness has been seen to change, 
"there is a near unanimous consensus amongst Nigerian leaders and 
scholars that their country is destined to lead Africa, due mainly 
to Nigeria's continued and expanded incorporation within the global 
economy because of oil-based interaction and industrialisation .l 
This view gives two impressions - that Nigeria is engaged in a 
leadership contest in Africa and that Nigeria's position in the 
global system is because of oil. There are also attempts to 
represent Nigeria as a peripheral state, by applying dependency theory 
to interpret her external behaviour. 
2 Contrary to these viewer 
we argue that Nigeria can be presented in a better perspective as 
an international actor in its own right, like any other sovereign 
1. Shaw, M. T. and Fasehun, 0., "Nigeria in the World Systems Alternative 
Approaches, Explanations and Projections" in Journal of Modern 
African Studies (1980), pp. 552-553. 
2. See Sonni, Tyoden, Development Strategies and Foreign Policy in 
peripheral states: The Political Economy of Nigeria's External 




In the first instance, the notion of its economic dependency 
with the West ignores the fact that international relations generally 
are based on interdependence of states. As Nigeria needs the 
Western market to buy their products and sell its own too, so does 
the West need Nigerian markets to sell its products and buy 
materials for its industries. In actual tact, the West is 
more eager to sell to Nigeria than Nigeria is to buy from the 
West. If, therefore, Nigeria is said to be dependent on its imports 
from the West so it has to be said that the West is dependent on 
its exports to Nigeria. Dependency in international relations is 
reciprocal. To apply the dependency theory to the one and not the 
other is a misrepresentation of the phenomenon of interdependence. 
Moreover, in an objective sense Nigeria's economic relationship with 
the West cannot be seen as that of dependency because Nigeria pays 
for what it buys and also retains the freedom to buy from any other 
market elsewhere. The issue of dependency arises when a country cannot -- 
buy or sell elsewhere or is unable to pay for its imports and is 
therefore subject to blackmail by its trading partner. Furthermore, 
in terms of investment in capital development and industrialisation, 
attempts have been made since 1960 to diversify investment in 
Nigeria. There is a measure of diversification also in the export 
of Nigerian products (see chapter 9, table 4). The argument is 
that Nigeria cannot be seen as a peripheral state to any other. 
Second, on the assumption of its claims to leadership in 
Africa, the view overlooked the distinction between "leadership" - 
the act or right of control and influence, and "role" - the performance 
of one's duty or function that is either self-conceived or assigned. 
is. 
A-corollary of this is the lack of distinction between international. 
or continental leadership and national role. If the distinctions 
are made it will become clear that Nigeria has not acted in any 
way or arrogated to itself the right to control or dictate and 
direct the affairs of any African country. In the absence of 
hegemonistic ambitions, it is inappropriate to interpret the 
country's role to mean assumption of leadership. The conception 
of Nigeria's national role in the world as a result of several 
factors, some of which are to be discussed here, is often mis- 
construed as its "claims to leadership in Africa: 
It is difficult to identify any Nigerian action on major 
African issues that reflects a hegemonistic stance in Africa. 
The fear of pax-Nigeriana or pax-Africana was allayed on 
independence by the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
when he declared before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in New York that Nigeriag"though a large and populous 
country, has absolutely no territorial or expansionist intentions". 
3 
Nigeria's respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of all African states was amply demonstrated between 1962-63 by its 
opposition to the proposal of the radical Heads of States and 
governments in Africa for a political fusion of all African 
countries as the most practical measure to achieve African unity. 
Even with the advent of the military in Nigerian politics, 
the then Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, 
demonstrated the consistency which characterises Nigeria's 
3. Balewa, A. T., Mr. Prime Ministers A selection of speeches made 
by Alhaji the Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1964, p. 50. 
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inter-African relations by reiterating "that Nigeria-has no 
territorial ambition and no desire to dominate any other country 
or force her leadership on any other country or group of countries". 
4 
Arikpo explained that Nigeria's pragmatic approach to the develop- 
ment of African unity succeeded, "without assuming a blustering 
posture and without any attempts to force our views on the rest 
of Africa", because of our policy of quiet diplomacy, of dialogue 
and persuasion. But, he continued, "while we work for consensus 
whenever possible, we never ever compromise on our established 
basic principles and always refuse to be pushed around by any 
country or group of member countries within the OAU whatever their 
claims to leadership, economic or military strength". 
5 
Third, on the impression that Nigeria's activities and posture 
in world affairs is basically dependent on her oil economy, it 
would be plausible and acceptable if it can be said that oil 
revenues have boosted her economy and added impetus to Nigeria's 
activities. Because of these misconceptions, a brief view of 
the country's economy is necessary. 
THE ECONOMY 
Before the production of petroleum on a significant commercial 
scale, Nigeria was a major producer and exporter of a range of other 
primary products, notably palm oil and kernel, groundnuts, cocoa 
and cotton. It has the best quality tropical timber. In terms of 
minerals, Nigeria is also rich in mineral resources most of which 
form the basis for the industries in the country, e. g. limestone, 
iron ore and coal. Between 1960 and 1965, agricultural products 
4. Lecture given by Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner for External Affairs 
at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs on 31st July, 
1974. From Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 1. no. 
1. July 1975, p. 2. 
5. Ibid. 
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accounted for some two-thirds of Nigeria's gross domestic 
product at factor cost. 
6 The above facts of the Nigerian 
economy prior to the advent of oils shown in the table below. 
Table 1 
Extract from Gross Domestic Product at 1962-63 Factor Cost (NL Million)7 
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Agriculture, 




14.9 21.7 27.0 29.4 39.8 
Petroleum alone 3.8 9.9 14.5 16.4 25.9 
Other Minerals 11.1 11.8 12.5 13.0 13.9 
Sources Federal Office of Statistics; Annual Abstract of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1972, p. 146 
Thus, in the first five years of independence, Nigeria's 
growth and international status derived more from its human and 
other resources than from petroleum. Perhaps a comparison of 
Nigeria with some other countries within the same continent will 
shed more light on the point. 
6. Federal Office of Statistics; Annual Abstract of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1964, p. 143. 
7. The value of the products have been estimated in Nigerian 
pounds because at that time the country's monetary unit was 
the Pound (NL). 
is* 
Table 2 
Gross Domestic Product at Current Factor Cost 
of Selected African Countries in Millions of US Dollars 
Country 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
TUNISIA 541.1 607.8 623.8 665.9 713.0 815.2 
MOROCCO 1,628.3 1,612.5 1,908.9 2,130.2 2,262.6 2,395.0 
UGANDA 425.9 437.9 438.6 492.5 546.3 625.7 
ETHIOPIA N/A 948.0 976.0 1,020.8 1,162.8 1,326.8 
IVORY COAST 493.8 550.1 563.1 654.2 785.1 804.5 
LIBERIA 206.4 N/A N/A N/A 259.7- 278.0 
ZAMBIA 560.0 541.2 534.2 558.6 650.9 768.0 
KENYA 631.4 629.2 683.5 851.2 915.9 929.9 
LIBYA N/A N/A 428.4 632.8 1,058.4 1,414.0 
EGYPT 3,136.1 3,245.5 3,594.4 4,001.1 49542.5 4,885.4 
NIGERIA 3,142.4_ 3,322.8 3,683.1 4,080.0 4,629.0 4,912.8 
Source: UN - Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1968, volume 
1: Individual country data, New York, 1969. 
Nigeria's prominence in Africa pre-dates the petroleum era. The 
bases of such prominence and role lie on a variety of factors, of 
Which petroleum is just one, whose impact has been mainly on tempo 
and dynamics. 
However, apart from the "oil impression" and the differing 
interpretations of statements' of Nigerian leaders and scholars, 
Henry Bretton justifies the attention Nigeria receives on the 
ground that it is the largest and most populous African state, which 
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in terms of its potential power and influence may become 
"the most important country in the African continent" as well 
as "a political anchor for a system of free African states, and the 
fate of all Africa may hinge on its survival". 
8 In many other 
textbooks, newspapers and journals, Nigeria has been variously 
described as "the Giant of Africa", "the stronghold of democracy- 
in Africa", "the worldta largest independent black nation", "the 
epitome of Renascent Africa", "a unique meeting place of the black 
race", etc. Whether these are apt descriptions or not, they are 
bound to lead to some misconceptions and assumptions if the reader 
is not made to gain a correct idea of the country's natural endowments 
and what distinguishes it from other state-actors, including its 
historical and goo-political circumstances as well as socio-cultural 
and economic characteristics. = -It_i s also-important 
for-the reader to know' that the behaviour of an international actor 
is a reflection of both its cultural idiosyncrasy and historical 
circumstances as well as the prevailing conception of its geo- 
political position. 
In this chapter, therefore, I would like to begin by discussing 
the relevance of Nigeria's strategic location on the continent, 
its physical size, population and historical experience, national 
economy, demands of international politics etc. to the conduct 
of its inter-African relations and international relations today. 
I believe this approach is important for an understanding of the 
basic facts about the country will provide the necessary background 
for appreciating and interpreting Nigeria's. external relations 
in better perspective. 
8. Bratton, Henry L. 9 Power and Stability in Nigerias The Politics 
of Decolonisation. Frederick A. Praeger Inc., New York, 1972, 
p. 3. 
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SIZE AND LOCATION 
Nigeria occupies a total land area of 913,072,64 square 
kilometres. It is thus one of the largest sovereign 
territories in Africa and about four times the size of Britain. 
Lying entirely within the tropics and almost in the centre of 
the curve made by the continent of Africa, Nigeria occupies a 
place that is nearly equidistant from the extreme corners of the 
continent. In addition to its physical size and location, 
Nigeria is by far the most populous country in Africa and the 
world's largest country of black people. With a population of 
about 100 million9 Nigeria ranks as the fifth largest state in 
the world. Classical political theory as exemplified by Hobbes 
ascribes to governments the duty of providing order and security 
to its people. In effect the defence and protection of citizens 
is the primary responsibility of governments. This responsibility 
looms high where there exist high population, large size of 
territory and the consciousness of a strategic location. The 
contention is that the geographical location, size and population 
of a country, amongst other things, not only constitute its 
immediate environment but also form the basis of its own 
assumption of self-image as well as the conception of its national 
obligation and role. 
Generally, Nigeria's size, location, population and natural 
endowments within the continent dictate for it certain roles in 
Africa. They at the same time set certain limits upon its 
achievements. That these factors have a great influence on 
9. West Africa, no. 3443 of 8 August 1983, p. 805. 
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Nigeria is argued by Thurston Shads 
"geographical factors which persist over 
long periods of time are likely to assert 
and reassert themselves in a manner which 
helps to give a constant 'personality' to 
a country". 10 
Norman Pounds also wrotes 
"in international politics, power is basically 
related to the area, population, resources and 
industrial potential of the state, as modified 11 
by geographical location and level of technology". 
He argued that the primary objective of the decision maker in any 
state is to achieve the well-being and prosperity of the state 
itself and that since "territory" is an inherent part of a state, 
self-preservation means "defending its control over territory". 
Thus, "the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states 
is the preservation of territorial integrity and political 
independence". He stressed that the security of the state is 
the dominant objective of policy vie-a-vis other states, whatever 
may be the political strategy employed to attain it. 
12 
HISTORY 
Nigeria is a conglomeration of various Empires and Kingdoms 
and Community Republics, with each possessing a distinct history, 
culture, language, religion, economy and government. They include 
the Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Edot Fulani, Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv, Itsekiri, 
Ijaw, Urhobo, Efik, Igbirra and Ogoni etc. These were distinct 
political units of considerable antiquity. They were heterogeneous 
10. Shaw, Thurston, Nigeria: Its Archaeology and early History, 
Thames & Hudson Ltd., London, 1978, p. 15o 
11. Pounds, Norman J. G., Political Geography. International Student 
Edition. McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1963, p. 17. 
12, Ibid. 
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in culture (different in their values, beliefs and mores), 
political attitudes, structures and processes, characteristics 
which have persisted up to the present moment. Among Nigerians 
today, people who belong to the same culture group regard 
themselves as offsprings of a common ancestry. Within each 
cultural group, therefore, there is a sense of community and 
collectivity Which, in the event of external issues, necessitate 
coming together for collective action to protect and preserve the 
integrity of the community. This is a feature of the cultural 
diversity which fosters tribalism and nepotism in Nigeria. Each 
cultural group had its system of law and order, and differing 
forms of government, based on radically different conceptions of rule, 
from theocracy to a form of republicanism. 
Under British colonial administration, Nigeria went through 
a number of structural institutional and cultural changes. The 
first and most noticeable of these is the amalgamation of the 
heterogeneous political units to form one political entity by 
1914. The amalgamated territory was divided into two provinces 
(the northern and southern provinces) administered by separate 
Lieutenant Governors who were responsible to the Governor General, 
13 
Later, for administrative convenience, there was a division of the 
southern provinces into two, namely the western and eastern provinces, 
with the River Niger as the boundary while the northern province 
rather than being divided was enlarged through merging with the 
autonomous republics in the middle-belt zone (i. e. which could 
have been a central region) of Nigeria. As a result, the northern 
13. Coleman, James S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. 
University of California Presev Berkeley, 1960, p. 46. 
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province (later region) took up three quarters of the total 
land area and about half the population of the whole country. 
Efforts to correct the imbalance, as reflected in the demands 
for the creation of more regions, were resisted by the colonial 
administration. 
14 This left the impression among some Nigerian 
leaders that the British government deliberately decided to keep 
the backward northern region so large as to dominate the country, 
as the surest means to make Nigeria remain for a long time pro- 
British and dependent on the British government. However, it is 
not yet clear what were the actual position and action of the 
British colonial officials on this issue. But according to John 
P. Mackintoshi 
"It is quite possible and indeed probable that 
the British officials serving in the north may 
have wished not only to preserve the unity of 
Nigeria but to preserve the unity of the north 
within Nigeria .... While Dr. Azikiwe and Chief 
Awolowo ... at times indulged in wordy Warfare, 
accusation and challenges, ... Sir Abubakar Tafawe 
Bdlewa always had easy and confidential relations 
with Sir Bryan Sherwood-Smith, the Governor of the 
north. They discussed the problems of self- 
government and the line to be taken by northern 
representatives at the various. conferences. Sir 
Bryan was quite clear that an subdivision of the 
north would be disastrous". 1' 
This type of political structure established by the colonial 
administration tilted dangerously the goo-political balance of the 
country. Post and Vickers' view is that "the colonial political 
frame inherited from the British at Independence served not to hold 
the country together, but rather to reinforce conflicts which 
14. Post, K. W. Q., and Vickers, Michael, Structure and Conflict in 
Nigeria 1960-65. Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1973, 
pp. 41-42. 
15. Mackintosh, John P., Nigerian Government and Politics. George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1966, pp. 32-33. 
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together were to exert massive stress threatening the persistence 
of the political system", 
16 
with obvious implications for foreign 
policy making. 
Nigeria's socio-cultural background and history produce some 
side effects that have a bearing on this study. First, the amalgamation 
of such a large territory and its peoples into one political unit 
or country ascribes to Nigeria its unique size and potentials as 
well as a giant role in Africa and the World. Second, the 
interactions among the heterogeneous groups within this larger 
entity generate friction and tension on the political system, due 
to diversity in their unity. Such diversity and friction help to 
undermine the effectiveness of policy making in Nigeria. Every 
successive government in Nigeria spends much time and resources 
trying to convince the diverse groups that its. policies are in 
the national interest. Although every nation in the world has 
its peculiar diversity, the Nigerian case was complicated and 
compounded by the unequal treatment given to the different provinces 
by the colonial government. While European religion and culture 
were imposed upon the southern provinces, the northern provinces 
were allowed to perpetuate cultural separateness. In the northern 
part of the country, the colonial government decided "not to interfere 
With the Islamic religion and customs in return for pledges of 
loyalty", 17 a decision that encouraged "innate Islamic conservatism ... 
and reinforced natural parochialism". 
18 These factors are sources of 
political instability and crisis which affect policy-making in Nigeria. 
16. Post and Vickers, op, cit., p. 43. 
17. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria: The Political 




At the time Nigeria emerged on the arena of international 
politics in October 1960 to play "The Game Nations Play", the 
rules of the game had already been determined by the older actors 
in conformity with their socio-cultural norms and national 
preferences. The rules were therefore alien and some I shall 
argue were incompatible with the norms of the new nation. Moreover, 
the techniques of international politics remain the secret of each 
actor while the principle is the preservation of the actor's interest. 
These no doubt are at variance with an altruistic society, accustomed 
to being their brother's keeper and used to communal life as well 
as to collective action for the general good of all. Having found 
itself on this tanomolies' arena, Nigeria was thus like a newly 
recruited player into an old club of professionals. As experience 
shows, moat newly recruited players on the field tend to display 
much energy and enthusiasm, seeking to make their mark within a 
record time. Sometimes amidst burning enthusiasm and attendant 
illusion, the player is dribbled out of the way by the older and more 
seasoned player. Such is the predicament of Nigeria, like other 
new nations in international politics. This leads to the final 
observation here that many observers and critics of Nigerian foreign 
policy have tended to overlook the simple fact of Nigeria's 'newness' 
as a foreign policy actor in comparison with more dominant actors 
like, say, Britain, France, USA and USSR who have been in the game 
for more than a century. Given the factors of its newness, historical 
antecedence, economic circumstances, the imperialist constraints of 
its external environment and the anomalous international system, 
it shall be argued, contrary to the views of for example Arnold and 
Idang, 19 that Nigeria has risen within twenty five years to a 
19. Arnold, Guy, Modern Nigeria. Longman Group Limited, London, 1977, 
p. 133; Idang, Gordon J., Nigerias Internal Politics and Foreign 
Policy 1960-1966, Ibadan Univeraity Press. Ibadan. 1973. o, 13. 
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prominent position in the community of nations. It has made 
an outstanding impact on the global system and its foreign 
policy has been of a high profile, dynamic and purposeful. 
27. 
(ii) THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
Nigeria is made up of nineteen states (at the moment) and 
has a federal system of government. Constitutionally the powers 
of the federal government are provided in the Exclusive Legislative 
List while those of the state are in the Residual List. There 
are also certain matters in the Concurrent List which both the 
federal and state governments can act upon but in the event of 
conflict, the federal legislation will take precedence. In 
1960 the federation consisted of three regions - the north, east 
and west* By 1963 a fourth region - the mid west - was created. 
Nigeria was thus a federation of four regions and had a 
parliamentary form of government. The political parties 
include the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the 
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU) and the Action Group (AG). All contested the 
elections of 1959 and 1964 in which NPC Won. In the first 
Republic, there was a President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and a Prime 
Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. 
A number of forces 
l_(to be explained) combined to produce tension 
and stress within the Nigerian political system. These resulted 
in both weakening the government and total breakdown of the 
electoral process. Consequently, parliamentarianism was 
overthrown in a military coup on 15th January, 1966. A new 
military government emerged, headed by Major General Aguiyi 
Ironsi but the forces of destabilization in the Nigerian 
federation remained at work under the military regime. They caused 
1. These include forces arising from the structural imbalance of 
the federation, regionalism, ethnic minority revolts, unhealthy 
rivalry between political parties and rigging at elections. 
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a breakdown of law and order leading to another military coup 
on 29th July, 1966 with Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu 
Gowan becoming the head of the federal military government. 
Under Gowan Nigeria had three years of civil war (1967-70). 
The civil war necessitated certain structural changes like the 
abolition of the regions and the creation of a twelve states 
structure (north six, south six, with east three and west three). 
These changes corrected the structural imbalance in the Nigerian 
political system inherited at independence. It was hoped that 
the established balance in the political structure would, after 
the civil war, usher in a stable political system and workable 
electoral process. The twelve states structure was also aimed 
at reducing some of the ills of the first Republic such as ethnic 
domination, cut-throat competition for political power, and denying 
of the minorities equal access to power. 
After the War, some of the forces persisted and were reinforced 
by another set of forces2 thereby producing a chain reaction that 
culminated in the third military coup on 29th July 1975. 
The third military government was headed by Brigadier (later 
General) Murtala Muhammed, who quickly reintroduced imbalance in 
the structure of the federation through the creation of more states. 
Seven new states were created (north four, south three - with one 
in the east and two in the West). The federation thus came to 
have nineteen states, with north ten and south nine. Another 
major change in the structure of the federation was Muhammad's 
transfer of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja in the north. 
2. The additional forces became. prominent after the war and includes 
large scale corruption, increased interest of the military in 
politics, the rise of the 'Mafia' groups (Kaduna and Ikene 
Mafias) etc. 
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However, the contradictions produced by the underlying forces in 
Nigeria exposed the government perhaps to other external forces, 
Which combined to bring about the attempted military coup on 
13th February, 1976 and the death of Murtala Muhammad. Brigadier 
(later General) Olusegun Obasanjo then became the head of the 
federal military government. After the attempted military 
coup, most Nigerians became tired of military rule. The military 
rulers themselves became auspicious of each other. The leadership 
was fearful of another coup. Ultimately the military voluntarily 
returned the country to the democratic political process. On 
let October, 1979 (after thirteen years of military rule) an 
elected civilian government headed by an executive President, 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari came to power in Nigeria after protracted 
electoral and legal contests. 
In the second Republic, Nigeria retained its federal structure 
but changed the form of government to the Presidential type. There 
were five recognised political parties - the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples Party 
(NPP), Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) and Peoples' Redemption 
Party (PRP) - that contested the 1979 elections. 
At this time there appeared to be lese regionalism and ethnic 
minority problems. Instead, there were: cut-throat competition 
for electoral victory by the five parties; large scale corruption; 
and influence of the enlarged Mafia groups in the alliance with 
the military oligarchy. The second Republic lasted for four 
years and was overthrown by a group of army officers on 31st 
December, 1983 - Nigeria's fifth military coup. Thus the 
federation came again under military rule, with Major General 
Muhammadu 8uhari at the head of the administration. Dissatisfaction 
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and discontent grew in the military among two distinct groups. 
The first group were those concerned that the military administration 
was controlled by the same people of the previous military regime 
that surrendered some four years earlier. The second group were 
those who felt sympathetic to the ousted civil government of 
President Shagari. By Z? th August, 1985 the sixth military 
coup occurred in Nigeria and Major General Ibrahim Babangida took 
over as head of the federal military government but unlike his 
predecessors has assumed the designation of "President". 
Despite changes in regime and regime leadership, the federal 
structure of government has persisted in Nigeria. However, the 
political system is obviously characterised by instability and 
crisis, which are likely to affect foreign policy-making in 
Nigeria. To understand in some detail, Nigeria's political 
system and its impact on foreign policy-making, we will now 
examine the outstanding features of the Nigerian federation. 
These include: regionalism; politics of ethnic minorities; 
politics of political parties; and military coups. 
Regionalism 
Regional consciousness was a main feature of the Nigerian 
federation. This was encouraged by the initial federal structure 
of Nigeria, with three large regions - the north, east and west, 
One of the regions, the north, was larger in both size and 
population than the rest of the country put together, giving 
rise to what we have described earlier as the structural 
imbalance of the federation. Proposals both before and after 
independence to give the country a balanced structure by 




The three regions were each dominated by a distinct 
ethnic group as follows - the northern region by the Hausa-Fulani 
peoples, the eastern region by the Igbo and the western region 
by the Yoruba. -Within each region and alongside the dominant 
ethnic population were minority ethnic groups who relentlessly 
demanded recognition as regions separate from the three dominated 
by larger ethnic groups. For example in the north, there was the 
demand for a Middle Belt Region, in the east for a COR (Calabar- 
Ogoja-Rivers) Region and in the West for a Mid-West Region. These 
demands were in the form of protests and demonstrations, generating 
tension and stress on the political system. By 1963, the Mid-West 
Region was created out of the Western Region, while the agitation 
by the minorities in the other regions remained suppressed, leaving 
the impression that the northern and eastern based parties 
collaborated to dismember the western region, thereby reducing 
its political weight in the federation, while retaining the 
preponderant weight of the regions where they had their political 
bases. The obvious implication was that the north, with its 
predominant population,. voting along regional lines, would at all 
times win every federal election to produce the head of government 
and also have enough majority to determine every national policy 
with or without the acquiescence of the three other regions. 
This condition was apparently unacceptable to political leaders 
from the east, west and mid-west regions. 
3. Northern Region of Nigeria; "Memorandum to the Minorities 
Commission from the Government of the Northern Region of 
Nigeria", Government Printer, Kaduna 1958. See also "Decision 
of His Excellency the Governor on the claim for a revision of 
the inter-regional boundary between the Northern and Western 
Regions"; signed by Governor J. S. Macpherson at Government House, 
Lagos on 28th August, 1952. Refer Nigeria Gazette Extra-ordinary, 
No. 46g vol. 39 of 3rd September, 1952. 
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Associated with regionalism was the problem of unequal 
development, with its several implications. The disparity 
in educational development, in particular between the regions 
led to disparity in interpretation and application of national 
policies. There was divergent interpretation of the relationship 
between the regions in a federation on one hand and between the 
regional governments and the central government on the other. 
This disparity gave rise to fears and animosity which made it 
difficult for Nigerians from one region to secure employment 
in another. It became a matter of the north for the northerners, 
the east for the easterners and the west for the westerners. 
Regionalism as it existed in the first five years after independence 
fostered regional hostility instead of amity. 
Another implication of the unequal development of the country 
is the desire by the lese developed north to catch up with the south. 
Therefore northern leaders wanted more federal government investment 
in developing programmes in the north. This demand was seen by 
southerners as robbing Peter to pay Paul, or Obi to pay Oba. Due 
to the shortage of resources for development, demands were not met 
and the gap in regional development became conspicuous. As a 
result there began intense competition and rivalry among the 
component units in the federation. In fact, the consciousness 
of the inequality of opportunity has been the major source of 
acrimony in Nigerian political life, of which foreign policy is 
an aspect. 
The disparity in development and notion of inequality of 
opportunity preoccupied the minds of the operators of the system 
so much that they were at every time experimenting with different 
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formulae in order to reduce discontent. For example, the 
populous but least developed northern region expounded the 
principle of "federal balance and federal character"4 and has 
insisted on its application to correct the negative attributes 
of the disparity and to ensure a better distributive, not 
extractive, political system. The other regions in the south 
that are less populous and more developed, stress "merit based 
on educational qualification, experience and productivity" as 
the necessary criteria for recruitment and placement of all -- 
groups in the political system. Both principles reflect the 
desire by every region to have a fairer opportunity to participate 
in the political and economic process. As a result of the 
differing principles and the attendant demands, the federal 
government has always been confronted with the problem of how 
to reconcile the different units for the purpose of achieving 
national integration and as such little time and resources are 
given to broad policy matters. 
Politics of Ethnic Minorities 
The Nigerian political setting and the functioning of 
the system had been affected by the undefined position of the 
various minority ethnic groups that were left more or less like 
the appendages of the larger ethnic groups that dominated the 
regions. These minorities detested their position and therefore 
adopted various attitudes ranging from opposition to the regional 
government, to flirting between major parties and even sabotaging 
4. For detailed explanation, see Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., "The Federal 
Character of Nigeria: Boom of Contentment or Bone of Contention? " 
See also Olajunju, Tunji, "Federal Balance and Federal Character", 
both conference papers in Nigerias The First Year of Civilian Rules 
The operation of the constitution. The University, Keele, North 
Staffs, September 1980. 
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the efforts of their regional governments, thereby generating 
tension and confusion that helped to compound the operation of 
federalism in Nigeria. Post wrote at the time: 
"They formed not only an internal opposition 
within society but external oppositions rep- 
resenting societies peripheral to the main one 
in each Region. Their aim was to sever the 
political connection between the minority 
societies which they represented and the larger 
one. For their parties then there were no rules 
of the game. They were free to adopt any tactics 
or arouse any passions which they felt would help 
them to attain an autonomous position for the 
minority societies which by and large they 
represented". 5 
The actions of the minorities and their peculiar relationship 
with the majorities here described as the politics of ethnic 
minorities were further demonstrated by the Tint riots (1959-65), 
the Isaac Boro rebellion (1964), the agitations by various minority 
ethnic groups for their own regions within the federation and 
the insistence that the distribution of both political offices 
and social amenities must be done on the basis of equality of 
the component groups. The demands of the minorities were 
neglected throughout the colonial period but received only partial 
attention after independence and this was in 1963 when the minorities 
in the western region were carved out to form the Mid-West region. 
The demands for the right to separate regional government by the 
minorities in the eastern and northern regions remained suppressed 
and ignored up until 1967. 
Politics of Political Parties 
The growth of political parties and their activities represent 
another feature of Nigerian politics which has had considerable impact 
on public policy making and implementation. The struggle at the 
5., Post, K. W. J., The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959: P 
Administration in a Developing Political System. Oxford 
Press, London, 1963, pp. 68-69. . 
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1959 federal elections to win public support and catch votes, 
as the only condition for a party to control the federal 
government, led the parties and their leaders to embark on a 
grass-root campaign during which tribal and ethnic sentiments 
were invoked. By 1960 the major political parties were 
identified with the regions where they won a majority of the 
votes and formed governments which coincided with the respective 
regions (of origin) of their party leaders. Thus the NPC formed 
the government in the northern region, the NCNC controlled the 
east and the Action Group the west. There were a number of 
other minor parties identified with various ethnic groups and 
interests in Nigeria, some of which have been referred to above. 
A vivid account of the development and activities of the major 
political parties in Nigeria up to 1965 has been provided by 
Sklar, Post and Mackintosh t a1.6 Nevertheless, we must quickly 
but briefly review the parties as essential features of the Nigerian 
political background, so as to highlight their role in and impact 
on foreign policy. 
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIAN CITIZENS (NCNC) 
The NCNC was the dominant force in Nigerian nationalism 
from its foundation in 1944 until 1960 when Nigeria became 
independent.? The first President of the NCNC was the father 
of Nigerian nationalism, Herbert Macaulay and its secretary was 
6. Sklar, Richard L. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an 
Emergent Afsican Nation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1963; Post, K. W. J., The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: 
Oxford University Press, 1963; and Mackintosh, J. P. _t 
Nigerian Government and Politics. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1966. 
?. Poet, K. W. J., opo cit., p. 27. 
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Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (who later became the President). As 
Akinysmi has Saids 
"The NCNC was-the first and for a long time, 
the only national political organisation in 
Nigeria. It was national in the sense that 
it had branches all over the country and that 
it was not identified with any particular 
region or ethnic group". 8 
However, in the late 1950s and in the post=independence 
eras the NCNC did not win enough seats at the federal 
elections and therefore could not form the government at the 
national level. It won the elections in the eastern region, 
dominated by the Ibos. It formed the government of the region 
and established its stronghold there. Thus between 1959 and 
1966, the NCNC was seen as a party of the easterners. Its 
activities and views on national issues were regarded as those 
of the dominant tribe in the region -a factor that largely 
undermined the nationalist zeal and effort of-the party even 
when offering its co-operation with the other parties as a junior 
partner in alliance to preserve the unity of the federation and 
achieve inter-regional harmony in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the 
NCNC remained notable as the most powerful Nigerian organisation 
in the awakening of political consciousness and demand for 
independence. 9 In the first Republic, it became a major 
exponent of Nigerian unity by playing the role of a balancer 
in the almost hostile relationship between the Government and 
Opposition. 
On foreign policy the NCNC advocated the following positions 
for Nigeria in world affairs: 
S. Akinyemi, A. 8., Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian 
Experience. Ibadan University Preset 1974, P. 29. 
9. Coleman, James S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University 
of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, p. 265. 
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(a) Commitment to the liberation of all peoples of the 
world from colonisation and imperialism. 10 
(b) The promotion of inter-African relations and co-operation. 
The NCNC viewed Pan-Africanism as a desirable philosophy 
but opposed the suggestion for uniting all African states. 
(c) Abhorrence of racial discrimination and the elimination 
of apartheid. 
(d) Non-alignment in world politics. 
(e) Peaceful co-existence and cordial relationship with all 
nations of the world irrespective of religion, geographical 
position or ideology. 
(f) Mutual economic co-operation with other nations. 
Generally, the NCNC emphasised the need for dynamism and effective- 
ness in the conduct of Nigeria's international relations. We shall 
see (in the section below) to what extent its views prevailed in 
the foreign policy of a contemporary Nigeria. 
THE NORTHERN PEOPLES CONGRESS (NPC) 
With the growth of nationalism and development of political 
consciousness, some educated Nigerians in the northern region felt 
the need to form an organisation through which they could (a) 
participate in the shaping of the emerging political and economic 
structures in Nigeria; (b) prevent the NCNC from extending its 
influence and control on the people in the northern region; and 
(c) reform the system of native administration which they regarded 
as autocratic. They formed a political association, the Jam'iyyar 
Mutanen Arewa (JMA)11 in 1948, which became the NPC in 1950, shortly 
before, the first federal elections. 
The dominant personalities in the NPC in later years, Alhaji 
Sir Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna of Sokoto) and Alhaji Sir Abubakar 
Tafewa Balewa were not founder members of the party. They joined 
10. See. Azikiwe, Nnamdi, A selection from the speeches of Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, Cambridge University press, 1961. 
U. See Sklar, Richard L., op. cit., p. 91. 
38, 
after it had won the regional election of 1951.12 It Was, 
however, through their membership that the NPC secured the full 
support and co-operation of the Sultan and the Emirs who were the 
most respected traditional rulers and representatives of the 
Fulani aristocracy. In later years, Sir Ahmadu Bello became 
the President-General and Balewa the Vice-President. Their 
influence in the party coincided with a shift within it from 
the mild reformism of the OMA and the associated Northern 
Elements Progressive Association (to which most OMA leaders belonged) 
to a conservatism well expressed by the Sardauna: 
"We were never militant nationalists as some 
were. We were sure that in God's good time 
we would get the power. The British had 
promised this frequently and we were content 
to rest on these promises". 13 
This conservatism protected the NPC leadership from the 
fate of NEPA (whose mainly civil servant leaders were dismissed 
or transferred for engaging in overt political activity). Indeed, 
too, it gained them favourable treatment from the colonial 
authorities. It yielded in the long run higher political dividend, 
as for example it enabled the NPC to retain control of the largest 
region from where it secured the highest votes at every federal 
election and enjoyed the privilege of forming the government and 
leading the federation. In the first Republic, the NPC was the 
dominant party in Nigerian politics and by virtue of being the 
ruling party, it became the leading nationalist party in the 
country. 
The NPC like the NCNC had its own foreign policy preferences 
although foreign policy first featured in the party's programme only 
12. Bello, Ahmadu (Alhaji Sir), My Life: The autobiography of Sir 
Ahmadu Bello. Sardauna of Sokoto. Cambridge University Press, 
1962, p. 85. 
13. Ibid., p. * 86. 
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in 1959. The broader motives of the demand for self-government 
include the desire for Nigeria to take its place in the community 
of nations and to assume the responsibility and obligations thereof. 
The specific foreign policy proposals of the NPC were: 
(i)* Membership of the Commonwealth seen as a "unifying 
factor in a troubled world". 14 
(ii) To become a member of the United Nations Organisation 
and to abide by its principles and obligations. 
(iii) To maintain very close ties with the United Kingdom 
and friendly relations with all countries having 
common interests with Nigeria and respecting 
Nigeria's sovereignty. 1 
(iv) To demonstrate interest in developments in the 
Islamic World. This led the party leader to 
advocate a Pan-Islamic organisation to include 
Nigeria and the Muslim states of North Africa, 
Middle East and Asia. 16 
(v) To maintain friendly relations with all countries 
in the African continent. The NPC Was, however, 
opposed to Pan-Africanism and condemned any attempt 
at a political union of African states whether on a 
regional or continental level. It insisted on the 
maintenance of the territories as inherited from 
colonial powers and urged that leaders of each 
African country should direct their energies to 
developing the potentialities latent in their 
respective countries. 
(vi) To adhere to a policy of military alignment with 
Western powers. The Party's 1959 election 
manifesto stated that the NPC would "rule out 
completely any idea of adopting a policy of 
neutrality in international affairs". 1? It 
acted accordingly and agreed to a proposal for 
military defence pact between Nigeria and 
Britain. 
NORTHERN ELEMENTS PROGRESSIVE UNION (NEPU) 
The Northern Elements Progressive Union was founded in 
14. Northern Region of Nigeria; Extract from an address by Sir 
Ahmadu Bello, in "Report of the Special Meeting of the Northern 
Regional Legislature", held on Wednesday 12th October, 1960, to 
mark the Nigerian Independence celebrations. 
15, Akinyemi, A. B., op. cit., p. 19. 
16. Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
17. Claude, S. Philips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy. 
North Western University Press, 1964, p. 18. 
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August 1950 by the more radical members of the OMA purposely 
to facilitate the political socialisation and mobilisation of 
the common people in the northern region; to break away from 
the conservative circles in which the NPC was enmeshed; to 
secure a reform of the aristocratic emirate political 
institutions used by 'British imperialists' to rule the people; 
and to provide effective representation of the north in the 
constitutional review conferences. The leader of the party 
was Malam Aminu Kano, a teacher and devout muslime the NEPU 
leaders attempted to retain their membership of NPC but were 
forced out by the conservative NPC leadership, thus underlining 
the hostile relationship that subsequently existed between the 
parties. 
However, many of the educated class and common people 
embraced NEPU and became members. NEPU declared in its manifesto 
that its mission was "to secure the freedom of the '7alakawat (common 
people) from the vicious system of administration by the family- 
compact rulers supported by the British Imperialist Government". 
18 
The party's criticisms of and opposition to the northern social 
system earned it the disfavour of the Emirs and chiefs who worked 
against the possible victory of the party at any election, with 
considerable effect. 
19 
NEPU's foreign policy preferences were as follows: 
1. Nigeria should adhere to Pan-Africanism and work towards 
"a great African union". 20 
2. Nigeria should maintain fair and balanced relations with 
all countries, irrespective of ideological stand, religion 
or goo-political axis. 
18. Sklar, Richard L., opo cit., p. 95. 
19. See Jalingo, Ahmadu Usman, "The radical traditions in 
northern Nigeria". Ph. D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, 1981. 
20. House of Representatives Debates, January session 1960, pp. 77-8. 
Quoted in Akinyemi, A. B., op, cit., p. 21. 
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3. 'Nigeria should be non-aligned. Malam Amino Kano 
denounced any form of military alliance with any of 
the super powers and was vehemently opposed to the 
Balewa government's proposed Angles-Nigerian defence 
pact. 
4. The liberation of all African countries from colonial 
rule. 
5. Contrary to the views of the NPC on relations with 
Muslim states, NEPU urged that Nigeria's relationship 
with any muslim country should be based on the 
objective criteria of national interest and not on 
the sentiment of religion. It was opposed to any 
special treatment of Muslim countries and denounced 
the idea of Pan-Islamism. 
THE ACTION GROUP (AG) 
The Action Group came into being on 26th March, 1951 at 
Ibadan as a specifically "Western Regional Political Organisation" 
under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The aims of the 
party Were, among others: 
i. To provide a regional political force to participate 
actively in the nationalist ferment and to be able to 
hasten the march to self-government in Nigeria. 21 
ii. To counter the growing influence of Azikiwe and the 
NCNC in the Western Region22 in order to pave the way 
for political ascendancy of the elite in that region. 23 
iii. To weld together the sixteen divisions of Yorubaland 
to form a strongly organised unity so that it might 
be difficult for other tribes to break through them. 24 
The Action Group from its inception was determined "to win 
popular mass following in the West" and to control the government 
in that region. To achieve this goal, leaders of AG decided, as 
a matter of strategy to enlist popular support in Yorubaland, to 
declare the Action Group a "political wing" of the Yoruba cultural 
21. Awo, The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Cambridge 
University Press, 1960, p. 219. Also, see Coleman, 3. S., op, 
cit., p. 350. 
22. 'Akinyemi, A. B., op, cit., p. 21. 
23. Coleman, J. C., op. cit., pp. 350-351. 
24. Sklar, op. cit., p. 104. 
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society known as "Egbe Omo Oduduwa". This strategy was 
necessary too, to avoid conflict with the traditional rulers 
who otherwise could have thought that the party's existence 
would be inimical to their positions. 
From this regional base the party hoped to expand into 
a national force. From 1951 to the and of Nigeria's first 
Republic, the Action Group was the dominant party in the Western 
Region and controlled the government of that region. In addition, 
in 1960 it became the official opposition party in the federal 
legislature. It was, therefore, one of the tripods of Nigeria's 
federation. The Action Group had its own views on what Nigerian 
foreign policy should be. Unless these views coincide with those 
of the ruling party, otherwise, whatever policy position adopted 
would be subjected to severe criticism, a situation that would make 
policy-makers adopt a conscious, sometimes slow approach to policy 
decision. However, foreign policy was not a major concern of the 
AG until 1959 because it had to devote much of its time to 
mobilise support internally and design strategies to contest 
the appeal of the older national political parties that had more 
nationwide followers. Apart from its opposition to colonialism 
as a foreign instrument of exploitation, other statements bordering 
on external policy were those of a faction of the party described 
by Akinyemi as "the Left". 
25 Hei however, acknowledged that those 
were not the official position of the AG. It was at the 1959 
federal elections that the Action Group officially advocated some 
foreign policy positions for Nigeria, as-follows: 
25. Akinyemi, A. B., ope cit., p. 26. 
43, 
L. To eradicate colonialism. 
ii. To encourage regional integration in Africa. The 
AG advocated a political union of West African states 
as an alternative to Pan-Africaniem. 
It must be observed that while the AG opposed Pan-Africanism 
as being impracticable, it advocated "co-operation with black 
Africans and those nationals of Africa whatever the colour of 
their akin who believe in the absolute equality of all races". 
26 
The AG also denounced the idea of Pan-Islamism or any special 
relations with the Arab countries of North Africa, both as a 
matter of opposition to the ruling NPC government and the fact 
that Nigeria's foreign policy should not be determined by religious 
sentiments. 
iii. To accede to membership of the Commonwealth. 
iv. To adopt a policy of alignment with any of the power 
blocs. The AG condemned "non-alignment" as being 
"disreputable and dangerous" and "a sign of an 
inferiority complex" but vascilated between alignment 
with the western and eastern blocs. At the 1959 federal 
elections, the Action Group advocated that Nigeria should 27 
align itself with the Western bloc or "Western Democracies". 
Then in 1961 the party opposed vehemently the proposal for 
Anglo-Nigerian military alliance. 
v. Finally, the Action Group urged that Nigeria should 
maintain cordial relations with all nations of the 
world and seek to promote peaceful co-existence between 
the Western and Eastern bloce. 28 
LOOKING AT THE PROBLEMS 
While the earliest Nigerian political parties emerged 
between 1922 and 1944 out of a common feeling and desire to 
arouse national consciousness and nationalist movement against 
British imperialism and colonialism, the later ones came into being 
26. Awot The autobiooraohy of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, op. cit., pp. 312-313. 
27. Ibid., p. 310. See also Akinyemi, op, cit., pp. 28,151. In 
Awolowo, Obafemi, The Peoples Republic. Oxford University Preset 
Ibadan, 1968, P. 337. It advocated the external policy of 'world 
socialism'. 
28. Awe: The autobiography, op, cit., p. 313. 
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as a result of dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
existing parties, 
29 
regional nationalism30 and perhaps personal 
ambition. These gave rise to another set of problems in 
addition to those arising from the political amalgamation of 
diverse nationalities and those emanating from the regional 
imbalance in the Nigerian political structure. The third 
set of problems arose from the proliferation of political 
parties along ethnic lines and without generally accepted 
definite rules of the game. The method of operation and 
differences between political parties gave rise to sharp 
conflict, competition and rivalry among them. For example, 
in 1959 elections the NPC won in the northern region and also 
won a majority of the seats in the federal legislature. The 
NCNC won in the east while the AG won in the western region. 
31 
The parties that failed to win their desired majority in the 
Federal House accused the NPC of rigging the election. The 
same situation repeated itself in 1964. Each time the level 
of self-delusion and disappointment matched that of bitterness 
and hostility. Little did the losers at the elections realise 
that, given the population of northern Nigeria, its religious 
loyalties and cultural conservatism, the popular party in that 
29. Ibid., pp. 216-217. Explaining why the Action Group was 
formed, Cbief Awolowo said there was no political party in 
existence dedicated to operating in the manner he wished, 
i. e. "with the utmost despatch". According to Awo, the 
NNDP was for all practical purposes a Lagos organisation 
and was not therefore suitable for the and in view. The 
NCNC was not sufficiently organised to present an effective 
programme. As for the. NYM, its activities and following, 
like those of the NCNC were confined to urban areas and 
the working class only. 
30. Coleman, J. S., opo cit., p. 351. 
31. Claude S. Philips, opo cit., p. 23. 
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region would win the majority in the elections. The outcome 
of the elections and the attitude of political parties heightened 
disagreement and rivalry in Nigerian political life. The parties 
proceeded to harness the differences in attitude, religion and 
culture which prevailed in their respective regions and used 
them for political mobilisation aimed at maximising regional 
support for the party. The outcome was the bolstering of 
regional and ethnic nationalism which sometimes worked at 
cross-purposes with both the other regions and the federal 
government. -- 
A fourth set of problems that confronted the Federation were 
those arising from inherent weaknesses and operational faults of 
the federal constitution. Events during the period (1960-1966) 
pointed to the fact that the regional governments assumed more 
power than a modest constitution would permit. The obvious 
implication was that the federal government became weak and 
the Federation became loose. The regional governments remained 
undeterred to the extent that some of them tried to project their 
party polities on matters within the exclusive schedule of the 
federal government, notably external affairs. For example, all 
the regional governments had offices (approximate to the status of 
a diplomatic consulate) in Britain and the United States, in 
addition to the federal governmentts High Commission or Embassy 
in these countries. The northern region had regional offices 
in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while the western region planned a 
liaison office in Ghana. Reference could also be made to the 
foreign policy statements of the regional Premiers of the north, 
east and west. Contrary to the official stand of the federal 
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government at that time on the proposal for a Pan-Islamic 
solidarity with the Arab States, the leader of the NPC and 
Premier of the northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello continued 
in accordance with his party's policy to involve Nigeria 
in the politics of the Arab States. He went on tour of 
some Muslim states in the Middle East and Asia during which 
he called for a summit conference of all Muslim states. 
32 
Similarly, Dr. M. I. Okpara, the Premier of the east, and Chief 
S. L. Akintola, the Premier of the West, became partisans in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
33 Both visited Israel in 1961 and 1962 
respectively and declared the support of their regional governments 
for Israel, notwithstanding that foreign policy was and still is 
the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. 
It is clear from the foregoing that between 1960 and 1966 
the federal government headed by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was 
confronted with numerous problems arising from the "administrative 
individuality of the former separate territories "34 that were 
amalgamated, the faulty regional structure, the loose federal 
system of government, rivalry among political parties, and the 
election crisis in the Western Region in which hundreds of people 
were killed and properties destroyed, leading to a state of 
emergency there. These problems were quite substantial and 
threatened the persistence of the Nigerian political system. The 
consequence was the overthrow of the first Republic in a military 
coup leading to thirteen years of military rule in Nigeria. 
32. Akinyemi, op, cit, p. 101. 
33. Ibid., p. 104. 
34. Coleman, J. A., opo cit., p. 45. 
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MILITARY RULE 
THE GOVERNMENT UNDER AGUIYI-IRONSI (January 15-July 29,1966) 
The coup, 
35 
planned and executed by a group of army officers - 
mainly Majors in rank with a majority being of Ibo origin - led 
to the appointment of the most senior army officer, Major-General 
Aguiyi-Ironsi as Head of State. Ironsi's regime became a victim 
of the forces of regionalism and was short-lived, being overthrown 
in July 1966 by army officers of northern Nigerian origin. 
However several of the regime's actions have lasting significance. 
It established the main organs of the subsequent military governments: 
the Supreme Military Council, drawn from the senior military officers, 
and the Federal Executive Council, designed to establish links 
With civilians, and including mainly civilian members, notably 
the federal Commissioners. 
Ironsi's regime saw its immediate and main political task 
as restoring political order and national unity. It attempted 
to secure these goals by constitutional reforms - the creation 
of a unitary state, including a single police force, judicial 
system and civil service. These reforms were interpreted as 
threatening Northern domination of Nigeria, by many northern 
officers, 
36 
already aggrieved by the deaths of the Sardauna and 
35, For a participant account of the first military coup, see 
Ademoyega, Adewale, Why We Struck: the story of the first 
Nigerian Coups Evans Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Limited, 
1981, and Gbulie, Ben, Nigeria's Five Majors - Coup d'Etat 
36, 
or lz)tin Januar 1y00 rirsz Lnsiae Account, Arrican 
Educational Publishers (Nig. ) Ltd., Onitsha, Nigeria, 1981. 
Panter; Brick, S. K. (ed. ), Nigerian Politics and Military 
Rules Prelude to the Civil War. University of London. The 
Athlone Press, 1970, p. 26. Also Valerie P. Bennett and 
Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., "Back to the Barracks: A Decade of Marking 
Time" in Panter Brick, Keith (ed. ), Soldiers and Oils The 
Political Transformation 
-of 
Nigeria. Frank Case and Company 
Ltd., London, 1978, p. 15. 
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Balewa in the 15th January coup. Consequently anti-Ibo 
rioting occurred during May and June (1966) in the north, and 
late in July a group of northern officers (including Murtala 
Muhammad and Yakubu Danjuma) overthrew the first military 
government and General Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed, as well as 
many hundreds of Ibo civilians. 
37 
In spite of these circumstances, General Ironsi made 
significant contributions to Nigeria's foreign policy. He gave 
Nigeria "one voice" in its external affairs - an achievement that 
eluded the country in the first Republic. General Ironsi also 
abolished the establishment of regional offices abroad. This 
enhanced the status of Nigeria's diplomatic missions and symbolised 
a unity of purpose in foreign policy. It is also remarkable that 
the first reorganisation exercise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
since Nigeria achieved independence in 1960 was done in June 1966 
on the orders of General Ironsi. 
38 He summoned a meeting in Lagos 
of Nigeria's principal representatives for a comprehensive review 
37, Panter Brick, S. K. (ed. ), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: 
Prelude to the Civil War. opo cit, p. 24. Akinysmi, A. B. has 
indicated that northern opposition to the Ironsi Administration 
was not a question of not accepting a southerner (or an Ibo 
for that matter) as the Head of State, but a continuation 
of the resistance to any form of division of the north 
into autonomous provinces. Such a division would 
"endanger the north" which the elite believed was a 
"monolithic whole" from where they derived substantial 
political and economic advantages vis-a-vis other regions 
of Nigeria. See Nigerian Opinion, Magazine of the Nigerian 
Current Affairs Society, vol. 8, nos 1 b-2(no date given), 
p. 14. 
38. Stremlau, John J., 
Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey, 1977, p, 3, 
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of the country's foreign policy. It was at this conference 
of Nigeria's Ambassadors that the national interests of the 
country were reviewed and its African policy re-evaluated and 
given definite import. 
In February 1966 the government of General Ironsi protested 
to the U. S. government for allowing the rebel regime of Ian Smith 
to open an information office in Washington. Ironsi urged the U. S. 
government not to collaborate with the Smith regime and made it 
clear that his government's attitude to Western powers would be 
largely influenced by their relationship with South Africa, 
Rhodesia and Portugal. 
39 In May 1966 General Ironsi declared 
the Portuguese and white South Africans prohibited immigrants, and 
banned entry into Nigerian ports and airfields of Portuguese and 
South African ships and aircraft, 
40 
Finally'the government introduced a broader dimension to 
Nigeria's external economic policy by establishing a trade 
association between Nigeria-, and the European Economic Community, 
a matter on which the Balewa government had dragged its feet at a 
time when Britain was not a member of the Market. The Agreement 
was signed in Lagos and expected to boost Nigeria's trade with the 
EEC through extension of the Common Market's external tariff to 
cover some of Nigeria's major exports and imports. Though the 
Agreement allowed only a few of Nigeria's exports - oil, tin, 
timber etc. to enter the Common Market duty free as against twenty- 
six Common Market industrial exports to Nigeria41 yet it represented 
a significant step in Nigeria's external economic policy. 
39. Aluko, 0. (ed. ), The Foreign Policies of African States, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1977, P. 
40. Ibid. 
4l. West Africa, no. 2563 of 16 July 1966, p. 789. 
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THE GOVERNMENT UNDER YAKUBU GOWON (August 1966-3uly 1975) 
Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon assumed office 
as Head of State on August 1,1967, after three days of uncertainty 
and vacuum in the national leadership. Gowan faced immediate 
problems of establishing his authority within the army and the 
state. First, as a non-Muslim, there was obvious difficulty in 
making his leadership acceptable to the predominantly conservative 
Muslims of the far north, that were his erstwhile rulers. Second, 
as a relatively junior officer (e. g. to Brigadier Ogundipe) who 
had emerged from what was seen as.. a coup against an Igbo-lad 
government, it was difficult to make himself acceptable to his 
(especially senior) colleagues in the military. Gowon's appoint- 
ment-was thus met with reserve or hostility among some northern 
and southern military officers and political]eaders. Gowan dealt 
with this pragmatically, trying to balance concessions between 
competing regional pressures, and relying on a relatively secure 
base among Middle-Belt Officers and rank-and-file within the 
army. While it proved convenient to come to terms with northern 
demands and to placate the westerners by releasing from prison the 
Action Group leader Chief Awolowo and other popular politicians who 
had been in jail since 1963 on charges of treasonable felony, the 
demands from the east were not satisfied. 
This was symbolised in the failure of delegates to the 
September 1966 constitutional conferences to reach agreement on the 
future structure of Nigeria, beyond that it would not be a unitary 
state. But what made agreement impossible was the renewed series 
of murderous attacks on Igbos in the north that followed the conference 
51. 
and the resultant alienation and then secession of Eastern 
Region from the federation as 'Biafra'. From July 1967 to 
January 1970 there was civil war, ending in the reunification 
of Nigeria. 
Shortly before the civil War, and to some degree taking 
advantage of it, Gowan was able to restructure the Federation, 
replacing the four regions by twelve states, and thereby dividing 
the north into six parts. However, - he played on divisions within 
the northern elite, especially between regional and local politicians 
and between older and younger generations. In so doing, Gowan 
used his military backing too. According to Akinyemi "at the 
first constituent Assembly meeting in 1967, the northern delegation 
opposed the creation of states and demanded confederalism. It 
took the intervention of Middle Belt military officers to force 
the northern delegation to change its position"* 
42 
According to Panter Brick: "Just as the country had earlier 
been surprised by Ironsi's abolition of the regions in favour of 
unitary government, so was it again a year later, almost to the 
day, by Gowon's division of Nigeria into 12 states in place of the 
Regions" 43 Though the decision was unilateral, the division was 
not entirely arbitrary and was said to be provisional. Again 
haunted by the fear of giving the impression of regional or tribal 
domination, Gowan like Ironsi, appointed a military governor from 
each state to form the government in collaboration with civilian 
appointees in that state. Even in the Ibo heartland of the 
42. Nigerian Opinion: Magazine of the Nigerian Current Affairs 
Society, vol. 8, nos. 1 and 2, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
43. Panter Brick, Keith (ed. ), Soldiers and Oil: The Political 
Transformation of Nigeria. Frank Case, London, 1978, p. 18. 
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secessionist eastern region, then carved out as East-Central 
State, an Ibo civilian (in the absence of a senior Ibo military 
officer supporting the Gowan government) was appointed the 
Administrator of the State. 
An account of the Nigerian government under Gowan would be 
incomplete without a brief mention of the 1970 programme for the 
return of the country to civilian rule. When Gowan took over 
the government in 1966, he promised to hand over to a constitutionally 
elected government in 1969, the date set by Ironsi. The civil war 
made that date impossible, but by October 1970, Gowan declared 
1976 as the new target date for civilian rule. He also listed 
a number of activities which the military government was to complete 
before that date. These included the National Development Plan 
covering 1970-749 aimed at laying the foundations for self-financed 
development-and reconstruction of war damages; the reorganisation 
of the armed forces after the civil War; conducting a population 
census; creation of new states; establishing a new revenue 
allocation formula; provision of a new constitution and the 
organisation of elections. It was and has been difficult to 
estimate the extent to which the programme was implemented. 
However, it was evident that Gowan was unable to carry out any 
reorganisation of the Army. Like the civilian government before 
it, the military failed to provide acceptable population figures 
for Nigeria. The failure of the 1973 census was a clear symptom 
of the endemic political illness of the country - namely "the 
centrifugal pull of rampant ethnicity" of the kind which brought 
down the First Republic. 44 The Gowan government neither created 
44, Ibid,, -p. 21. 
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the new States nor took any discernible step to that effect. 
Corruption in public places became rampant. Towards the and 
of 1974, expectations gave way to disappointment and to dis- 
illusionment. The outcome of these was the frequent demands 
for the military to lift the ban on political activities and 
to return to barracks. Gowan ignored the demands and was 
removed with his state governors from office in July 1975. 
Foreign policy under Gowan may be classified into two 
phases. The first was the wartime policy of (a) containment 
of Biafra's penetration into the international system; and (b) 
securing international political support for Nigeria. The second 
phase was the post war policy of (a) promoting regional solidarity through 
maintaining closer economic and political ties with the countries in 
the West African region and the-formation of the Economic Community 
of West African States - ECOWAS; and (b) maintaining a good inter- 
national political stature for Nigeria. Usually when a country 
is engaged in war, it receives more international publicity and 
attention, but the end of the war and its outcome do not only 
affect the country's prestige and national honour, they also 
influence future policy. As in the Nigerian case, the lessons 
of the civil war diplomacy were believed to have had a substantial 
effect on Nigeria's post war foreign policy especially under Gowan* 
It reinforced the need for a more purposeful regional and continental 
policy, which though had been accepted principles of the Balewa and 
Ironsi governments. 
THE GOVERNMENT UNDER MURTALA MUHAMMED (July 29,1975 to February 
139 1976) 
The announcement of the third military coup in Nigeria was 
received with a mixed feeling of welcome and scepticism among Nigerians 
54. 
of varied walks of life. To many Nigerians the coup was 
welcomed not out of a preference of another military officer 
in place of Gowon but of a desire to be rid of the State 
Governors/Administrator, as well as some Federal and State 
Commissioners who had not only overstayed their welcome but 
had also become insensitive, arrogant and corrupt. Secondly, 
there were many other Nigerians who were worried that the 
interjection of another set of military rulers meant a prolongation 
of the regime that had failed like the first Republic before it. 
There were yet another group of Nigerians (mainly from the Middle 
Belt, Eastern and Western zones) who*saw the emergence of Brigadier 
Murtala Muhammad as Nigeria's Head of State to represent the 
eventual success by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims of the far north 
in their bid since 1966 to regain political control of the 
country, 
45 
There is some support for this in the regional bias shown 
in appointments to the existing main organs of government - the 
5MC and FEC, and to state governorships. Muhammad, unlike his 
predecessors, appointed only northerners and westerners to the posts, 
46 
45. Despite being a close relation of Alhaji Inuwa Wada -a former federal Minister of Defence and Treasurer of the NPC, Muhammed 
was "the most aggressive of the northern army hawks ... who was the NPC'e instrument among the military" and "the spokesman for northern officers in 1966 at meetings of officers and 
civilians of Northern origin regularly called at Lugard 
Hall for the dual plan of revenge upon the East by the 
North and a break up of the country". See Ruth First, 
The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the 
Coup d'Etat, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1970, 
pp. 313-319. West Africa, no. 3032 of 4th August 1975, 
p. 887. Obasanjo, Olusegun, My Command: An Account of 
the Nigerian Civil War. 1967-1970_ Heinemann, Ibadan, 
1980, pp. 6-9. 
46. With the exception of Lt. Commander Godwin Kanu, all twenty- 
two members of SMC were from the North and West. Governors of 
then three Eastern states were also from the North and West. See 
Muhammad Murtala, A Time for Actions Collected Speeches of His 
Excellency General Murtala Muhammad, Department of Information, 
Lagos, 1980, pp. 3-5. 
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as he did with the National Council of States, a new organ. 
Far more significant, however, in forming popular attitudes 
to the new regime was the swiftness and range of its early actions. 
Some issues which lay behind Gowan's declining popularity were 
confronted: the new states$ issue, the termination of military 
rule, the question of a new capital and accountability. Panels 
on the creation of new states and a new capital were set up within 
a month, and within six months their reports had been made. The 
government acted on them through the establishment of seven new 
states (with majority in the north) in addition to the existing 
twelve and the decision to transfer the federal capital to Abuja 
in the north. Both decisions reflected also some regional bias, 
which resulted in again tilting the goo-political balance in Nigeria 
with longer term de-stabilising effect on succeeding regimes. 
. Other significant actions were the setting up of a Panel to 
draft a new constitution - implying that civilian rule would be 
restored, and of investigative bodies concerned with corruption, 
and administrative injustices (i. e. the Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau and the Public Complaints Commission). These were appreciable 
innovations of that government. 
The regime's foreign policy showed similar dramatic element, 
though on a single issue, namely Angola,, Muhammed rejected both the 
OAU stand on a government of national unity in Angola and the USA's 
attempt to influence his government's position on the civil war in 
Angola; describing the U. S. role in Southern Africa as "unedifying", 
47 
he chose to recognize the MPLA Government in Angola, an action of 
considerable importance to the MPLA. 
48 
47. Ibid., p. 55. 
48. For details, see below, chapter 8-iisb. 
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The tempo and dynamism that characterised government 
actions during the six months of Murtala Muhammad's rule 
overshadowed both the lapses of the administration and 
internal problems within the army, especially over the threat 
of substantial demobilisation and the injustice of the 
"Generalts" promotion at a time of promotion blockages for 
middle rank officers. These factors contributed towards the 
attempted coup of February 1976, in which Murtala Muhammad was 
killed. Once the attempt was suppressed, the next moat senior 
officer, Lt. General Obasanjo became Head of State - the first 
Yoruba to occupy the position since independence. 
GOVERNMENT UNDER OLUSEGUN OBASANJO (Feb. 1976-Sept. 1979) 
General Obasanjo assumed office with a consciousness of 
the perennial factor of regional rivalry in Nigeria, as shown 
by the northern origin of the bulk of the conspirators against 
Ironsi, a southerner, as well as by the Middle Belt/Southern 
Zaria origins of the conspirators against Muhammad. He was 
therefore determined to placate northern fear by appointing 
several officers to posts49 albeit with Yoruba 'assistants' to 
monitor activities and exert necessary influence on major issues. 
49. Lt. Colonel Yar' Adua, from the far north and a Muslim, 
who for instance was a subordinate officer to Colonel 
Joe Garba in the Brigade of Guards, was appointed the 
Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters (second in command 
to the Head of State). Other relatively junior officers 
from the far north and a few others from the Middle Belt 
described by Ian Campbell as "graduates of Bids Middle 
School" were promoted to top positions in the Army - like Adjutant-General, Director of Military Intelligence, 
Commander of Lagos Army Garrison and Commander of the 
Brigade of Guards etc. See Ian Campbell, "Army Re- 
organisation and Military Withdrawal" in Panter-Brick 
(ed. ), op, cit., p. 89. ' 
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Obasanjo assiduously cultivated regional support by allocating 
the spending of Nigeria's massim oil revenues to balance regional 
gains and losses for the north and west, Thus, despite the 
moving of the capital to Abuja, there were more visible federal 
investments in Lagos than perhaps in the entire nine previous 
50 
years of military government. Continuity With the Murtala 
regime was stressed, and symbolised in the joint displaying of 
Murtalats portrait with that of Obasanjo's in public buildings 
for 24 of the 42J months of the latterts leadership. 
Discontent, however, crept in and tensions began to rise 
with the rumours of high level corruption. It became known that 
the "politicians in military uniform" were making unscheduled 
overseas trips and on each trip they would go personally to collect 
travel allowances plus the amount supposedly to be used for the 
stated objectives of the trip. 
sl Top military officers became 
involved in the award of government contracts which in many cases 
attracted kick-backs. For instance, sources close to the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company (NNPC) revealed that decisions about 
the sale of the country's crude oil to any agent were made at the 
50. Examples of the military regime's acts motivated by tribalism 
and regionalism include the location in Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna 
and Kano of FESTAC infra-structures costing several millions 
in Naira; the building of NET in Kano, Lagos, and Abeokuta; 
the reconstruction of federal roads, building of highways 
and fly-avers. There are other examples of imbalance in 
the distribution of amenities like siting steel industries 
in Katsina, Jos, Ajaokuta, Oshogbo and Aladja in Warri; 
building agricultural projects like dams and irrigation 
schemes mainly in the north; establishing in Kaduna the 
country's biggest refinery made up of two plants, one for 
regular or light crude and the other for heavy crude, and 
another refinery in Warri. The military regime also built 
a petrochemical industry in Kaduna and Warri. The neglect 
of the Eastern states - secessionist Biafra - by the military 
regime was seen as a policy of economic reprisals. 
51. From interview with some staff of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. 
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the "top level of government" and that the Company was merely 
carrying out directives. Rumours of improper dealings with 
Nigeria's crude oil sales were rife* 
At the beginning of the second quarter of 1978 the govern- 
ment decided that soldiers holding certain political offices 
would be expected to retire from the Armed Forces after the 
hand-over to civilians. It asked those who wished to continue 
in military service to relinquish their political posts. for others 
who would be retiring thereafter. This was seen as an attempt 
by the top military rulers to offer other senior military officers 
the opportunity to have a share of the national cake. This might 
not have been the intention, but every Minister and Governor or 
Administrator in office usually ended up getting richer than 
before. 
There were rumours of coup attempts in 1978 and 1979, the 
last occurring in early September when post-election petitions 
against irregularities were pending in the courts. The coup 
attempts were quietly suppressed and Obasanjo cautiously paddled 
through the leadership of the military government. Like his 
predecessors, it was difficult for Obasanjo to depoliticise the 
Army through reorganisation and_demobilisation. A number of 
barracks were built under the Obasanjo administration for housing 
the soldiers but beyond that, other necessary considerations of 
discipline, deployment and effectiveness were neglected. Most 
of those who had been associated with previous coups like 
Babangida and Buhari etc. and those who had tdsted power during 
the thirteen years of military rule like the former Military 
Governors/Administrators and Commissioners as well as those 
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brought into the army by political patrons to represent 
regional or ethnic character and interest, were allowed to 
remain in uniform. In effect# Obasanjo sent the soldiers 
back to the barracks, but without a carefully planned programme 
of activity to engage them with. A large and politicised 
army, full of expectations and unengaged, would no doubt 
constitute a threat to political stability. 
It is to General Obasanjo's credit that he worked 
assiduously to implement the programme for the return of 
government to civilians on let October, 1979; the date proposed 
by Murtala Muhammad. Under Obasanjo, local government was 
reformed (1976) despite objections from the northern ruling 
families, and a Constituent Assembly of 200 members, all but 
10% elected, was convened in 1977. The Assembly spent a year 
discussing and amending the draft constitution. Once. its task 
was completed, the ban on political parties was lifted, leading 
to a period of intense organisational activity. 
There were over 89 political associations but only 5 parties 
qualified for registration by the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO), These were (1) the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari (2) the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) 
headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo (3) the Nigerian Peoples Party 
(NPP) led by Dr. Nnamdi Awikiwe (4) the Peoples Redemption Party 
(PRP) led by Mallam A$rnuKano and (5) the Great Nigerian Peoples 
Party (GNPP) headed by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. In a keenly 
contested election, the NPN won in seven states, the UPN in five, 
the NPP in three, while the PRP and GNPP had two states each. 
The electoral decree stipulated that. a candidate shall be deemed 
601, 
to have been duly elected President if "he has the highest 
number of votes cast at the election; and ... not less than 
one quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at 
least two third of all the states in the Federation". 
52 
Meanwhile the NPN Predential candidate Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
scored "the highest number of votes cast at the election" and 
not less than one quarter of the votes in 12 out of 19 states. 
His votes in the 13th state was disputed as less than one quarter. 
FEDECO decided "in the absence of any legal advice"53 to assume 
that only J of 25% was required in the 13th state, and therefore 
declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari to have been duly elected President 
of the second Republic of Nigeria. The Unity Party of Nigeria 
(UPN) led by Chief Awolowo who had the second highest number of 
votes at the election but mainly from his Yoruba tribal group and 
the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) led by Alhaji Waziri 
Ibrahim, who had the least votes at the election but secured "a 
majority of votes in the highest number of states" sued FEDECO 
in court challenging the declaration. The Supreme Court upheld 
the decision of the FEDECO and on October 1,1979 General Obasanjo 
ended the 13 years of military rule and ceremoniously handed over 
the mantle of office to Alhaji Shehu Shagari. 
Foreign policy under the Obasanjo government acquired 
additional tempo and dynamism. The government hosted high level 
international conferences like the "First World Black and African 
Festival of Arts and Culture - FESTAC", the World Conference for 
Action against apartheid and ECOWAS Heads of State Summit etc. 
52. Federal Electoral Decree (FEDECO), 1979. 
53. FEDECO announcement of the result of the Presidential election, 
August 1979. 
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By far the most significant actions of that government in 
external affairs were in Zimbabwe and Chad. Through 
+nationalisationt of the assets of British Petroleum in 
Nigeria, it compelled the Thatcher Administration in London 
to reverse its proposed recognition of and support for the 
minority racist government in Zimbabwe. General Obasanjo's 
government also took a bold initiative to mediate between the 
warring factions in Chad and to send Nigerian peace-keeping 
force there to manage the crisis and preserve peace. 
GOVERNMENT UNDER SHEHU SHAGARI (Oct. 1979-Dec. 1983) 
The government under Alhaji Shehu Shagari Was constitutionally 
elected. It was essentially a presidential form of government, 
unlike the parliamentary type in Nigeria's first Republic. The 
President was an executive one, unlike the first Republic President 
without executive powers. There were two legislative houses: 
Senate and House of Representatives, commonly called the National 
Assembly. Each state in the federation, like the regions in the 
first Republic, had a legislature known as the State Assembly'. 
There was absence of institutionalised opposition and leaders 
of the parties were not automatically members of the legislature. 
Parliamentary debates were not a means of scoring points against 
the government but as an opportunity to make constructive con- 
tribution to the national political process. 
The principal executive organs of the government were provided 
by the Constitution (1979) which also provided for strict adherence 
to 'federal characters in appointments into the bodies. Thus 
Shagari's government was fairly representative, including many 
62. 
outstanding-political figures in Nigeria. It started with 
a marriage of convenience with NPP which lasted for two years, 
and helped the government to overcome the initial obstacles 
arising from alteam-upl of the other parties against NPN in 
protest of FEDECO's interpretation of 3 of 19 states. 
The main programme of the Shagari government was to effect 
early transfer of the federal government to Abuja, the new capital 
city. Shagari had in fact promised his northern supporters to 
start conducting government business from there from October 1982. 
To achieve this, many development projects were neglected and 
Nigeria's huge revenues from oil were diverted to Abuja for the 
provision of offices, residential accommodation, infra-structures 
and social facilities etc. This resulted in the growth of a 
large number of 'Abuja contractors', 'sub-contractors' and 
'contract agents' ostensibly to help complete in three years the 
building of the federal capital originally earmarked to be completed 
in fifteen years. 
54 The government unwittingly poured more money 
into circulation and encouraged excessive importation of materials 
and equipment especially in connection with Abuja. Both of these 
actions resulted in very high inflation in Nigeria and exhaustion 
of its foreign reserves. 
55 By early 1982 Abuja became known as 
54. The rush to transfer the capital was motivated by the 
regionalism that lay behind Murtala Muhammad's decision 
to move it to the northern heartland despite popular suggestions 
for a geo-political centre as evidenced in the reluctance to 
commence work there from 1976, when the decree establishing 
Abuja was promulgated, to 1980 when actual work started. It 
was feared that another President after Shagari might reverse 
the decision. 
55, In December 1980 the external reserve was N. 5.5 billion but 
by December 1983 it fell to N. 885.2 million - barely sufficient 
to finance one month's import bill. 
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"a child of waste and corruption". 
56 It is not yet known 
the amount of money spent each year on Abuja between 1980 and.. 
1983 but according to Mohammed Haruna over N. l billion was 
spent in the first half of 1982, much of it for goods not 
delivered or jobs not done. Nigeria was plunged into economic 
crisis. 
57 The cause of this was obvious; the undue haste to 
move to Abuja. 
This economic condition was aggravated by the oil glut in 
the world market since 1982. Nigeria's crude oil export dropped 
substantially and the total revenue collected by the Federal 
Government also fell from N. 14,745.7 million in 1981 to N. 11,748.8 
million (1982) and N. 10,947.4 million (1983). Although the Shagari 
government had a programme of 'Green Revolution', agriculture was 
neglected. Industrial output declined and no investment in new 
industries was made. Unemployment was very high with the 
attendant social problems. There was obvious discontent. At 
the elections in August 1983, it was hoped that the NPN government 
of Alhaji Shehu Shagari would be changed but it was re-elected, 
perhaps due to malpractices at the election. On 31 December 1983, 
the government was overthrown in a military coup. 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC 
The five registered parties were to some extent different 
from the political parties of the first Republic. They were broad 
56, Haruns, Mohammed, "Abuja: a capital in waiting" in West Africa, 
No. 3554 of 7 October, 1985, pp. 2089-2090. 
57. The internal public debt of the Federal Government increased very 
sharply to N14.8 billion (1982) and N22.2 billion (1983) while the 
external debt of the government also increased from N4.8 billion in 
1982 to N5.4 billion in 1983, both in comparison with the total 
public debt of N9,785.3 million at the and of 1980. See Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December 
1981-83, pp. 2-3. 
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based national parties, as was evident in their nameat objectives, 
emblems, motto and in the fact that each party's headquarters were 
located in the federal capital of Nigeria. Each had to reflect 
the federal character of Nigeria in its membership, structure 
and organisation. 
58 Membership of each party was open to every 
Nigerian citizen. Every party had membership from all the states 
of the Federation, their governing bodies consisted of persons 
drawn from at least two thirds of the states, and they had registered 
offices in at least 13 of the 19 states. 
However, leading members of the political parties in the first 
Republic re-appeared to become leaders of the parties in Nigeria's 
second Republic. For example, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former leader 
of the NCNC in the first Republic became the presidential candidate 
of the NPP in the second Republic. Chief Abafemi-Awolowo, leader of 
the Action Group (first Republic) became leader and Presidential 
candidate of the UPN in the second Republic. Malam Aminu Kano 
leader of the NEPU (first Republic) became Presidential candidate 
of PRP in the second Republic. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, NPC Federal 
Minister (first Republic) became the Presidential candidate of NPN 
in the second Republic, While Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim also an NPC 
Federal Minister (first Republic) became leader and Presidential candidate 
of the GNPP in the second Republic. These men (popularly referred 
to in Nigerian politics as "the old brigade politicians") were the 
dominant personalities in Nigerian politics during the second 
Republic. Their involvement and leadership tended to give the 
impression that nothing has changed in Nigerian politics after 
13 years of military rule. This impression wee reinforced by 
58, Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette. Decree No. 73 - 
Electoral Decree 1977, Lagoa, December 29,1977, pp. A 349-A 352. 
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(1) the cut-throat competition for electoral victory in both 
1979 and 1983; 
(2) bribing of the electorate; 
(3) rigging at the polls and; 
(4) hostile relationships between losers and winners at 
the elections, just as in the first Republic. 
The extent to which the activities of these parties helped to 
undermine the government in the second Republic is yet to be 
determined. Corruption was rampant especially among members of 
the ruling National Party of Nigeria and has been known to be 
one of the major factors that led to the demise of that regime, 
59 
Political parties in the second Republic accepted the foreign 
policy of the country as inherited from the military regime but 
differed in emphasis as follows: 
The GNPP declared that it would reinforce the dynamic foreign 
policy of the previous military government and stressed that: 
1. It would pursue a policy of strict non-alignment; 
2. it would be committed to fight racism and other forms 
of discrimination; and 
3. its foreign policy would be guided by Nigeria's own 
declared interests in the world, 
There is apparent similarity between the party's options and the 
existing foreign policy of Nigeria. Perhaps the difference was in 
emphasis rather than substance. 
The NPN declared that its foreign policy would be to ensure 
the following: 
1. The protection and defence of Nigeria's independence and 
territorial integrity; 
2. the defence, preservation and promotion of our ways of life, 
especially our democratic values and our cultures; 
3. the enhancement of Nigeria's image and status in other 
countries especially in Africa; 
59, Daily Times, National Concord, The h- various issues, 
January 1984. 
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4. the promotion of ECOWAS and adherence to the Charters 
of the OAU and the United Nations; 
5. the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and cordial 
relations with all friendly countries; and 
6. the promotion of world peace through international co-operation 
and understanding. 
These options, while more elaborate than those of the GNPP are 
again essentially similar to the foreign policy objectives of 
Nigeria as declared by General Obasanjo on 29 June 1976.60 
In the conduct of foreign policy, the NPP said it would make 
the pursuit of Nigeria's declared interests a sine qua _. It 
declared that: 
1. The consolidation of the independence of the already 
independent African States would be a priority; 
2. the liberation of the African countries still under 
colonial and apartheid regime must be pursued with 
great vigour; 
3. Pan-Africanism would be pursued most energetically; 
4. Nigeria would continue its active role in ECOWAS, OAU, 
the Commonwealth and the United Nations Organisation. 
5, it would uphold the policy of non-alignment. 
The NPP, like the NPN, highlighted the prevailing foreign policy 
of Nigeria. 
The foreign policy options of the PRP were by contrast more 
'revolutionary' in tone than any other party's. Its "General 
Programme" observed that "Nigeria is in the process of far-reaching 
social transformation. Two great forces face each other and are 
locked in a grim struggle for survival and ascendancy. ... This 
constant and ever-deepening struggle between the forces of conservatism 
on the one hand and those of progress on the other is the prime 
moving force of contemporary Nigerian life. It is taking place 
60, Following the recommendations of the Adedeji Foreign Policy 
Review Panel, the Federal Military Government redefined the main 
objectives of the country's foreign policy. 
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in every facet of our national life". In foreign policy, 
the Party declared its commitment to continue with the foreign 
policy of the Military government and would place emphasis on: 
1. The preservation of the independence and sovereignty 
of all African states. It stated that "imperialism 
makes use of reactionary African and Arab states to 
subvert radical and nationalist African states as well 
as prop up anti-populist and puppet African regimes". 
Therefore, "the defeat of imperialism in all its forms 
on the African Continent is a necessary condition for 
the victory of a people's regime in Nigeria". 
2. The complete liberation of Africa from colonialism, white 
settlers minority rule, apartheid and neo-colonialism. 
3. The political unity of Africa and the emancipation of 
the black man all over the world. 
4. General disarmament. 
5. The promotion of world peace. 
Apart from couching its ideas in revolutionary terms reminiscent 
of the nationalist slogans in the pre-independence era, the Party's 
ideas were - once more - in line with the already existing foreign 
policy of Nigeria. 
So also were the foreign policy preferences of the UPN: 
1. to promote Nigeriats and Africa's interests-in the world to 
the best advantage; 
2. to carry forward the building of a virile Community of West 
African States; 
3. to intensify Nigeria's moral and material contribution to 
the liberation struggle in Southern Africa; 
4. to strengthen the Organisation of African Unity; 
5. to maintain friendly relations with all friendly countries 
irrespective of political systems; 
6. to support the United Nations. 
61 
Thus, there were no major differences between the parties in 
their foreign policy preferencea, unlike the first Republic when 
substantial differences existed between them. Also there were 
no differences between the parties position and that of the previous 
61. UP Nigeria; A Manifesto of the Unity Party of Nigeria, 
Lagos, December 1978. 
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government. In effect, all the political parties and their 
leaders endorsed the foreign policy of Nigeria as evolved over 
the years. 
GOVERNMENT UNDER MUHAMMADU BUHARI (Jan. 1984-Aug. 1985) 
Nigeria's return to military rule was welcomed with some 
enthusiasm in January 1984 with the hope of a change from the 
inept leadership and economic mismanagement of the previous 
Administration. The leaders of the coup - mainly Middle Belt 
and far north in origin and Brigadiers in rank - appointed Major 
General Muhammadu Buhari as Head of State, though he was neither 
the moat senior army officer nor the most qualified in terms-of 
formal educational qualification and experience in government, 
because he was likely to be accepted by the Northern ruling 
families with some stake in the ousted civilian government. 
Buhari's regime professed to revive the Nigerian economy 
but started with mass. sacking of public officers in order to 
reduce budget deficits. This action only worsened unemployment 
in the country, with several other economic and social implications. 
The government was also determined to achieve early transfer of the 
Federal Government to Abuja and continued to divert its meagre 
resources there. The economy continued to deteriorate. The 
level of oil production continued to fall from its peak of 2.3 million 
barrels per day in 1979 to the level of 1 million barrels per day in 
1984. The average daily export of petroleum slumped from 2.1 million 
to 0.97 million barrels, and the export price fell from an average 
of %37.77 per barrel in 1981 to %30.35 per barrel in 1983 and %29.71 
per barrel in 1984/5.62 To accumulate foreign exchange, the 
62. West Africa, No. 3559 of 11 November 1985, p. 2350. 
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government declared austerity measures and banned importation 
of several goods. It achieved some success in this but the 
deplorable economic condition within the country remained with 
the government. Many industries were shut down and workers 
laid off because of lack of equipment. There was an acute 
shortage of industrial products and inflation rose very high. 
The government did not invest in any new industrial project. 
It stressed the need to revive agriculture but spent more money 
in its propaganda programmes War Against Indiscipline - WAI. 
Early in the administration, it had promulgated Decree No. 4 
Which sought to protect public officers against false accusations 
in the press. This was interpreted as interference with press 
freedom which is so much valued in Nigeria. There was the 
notorious Decree No. 2 which empowered the Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters to detain for three months at the first instance, any 
one whose actions were considered by him to be against state 
security. Many citizens were detained under the two Decrees. 
Criticisms were suppressed. Students and Doctors' Associations 
were proscribed for opposing government measures and their leaders 
detained. Many politicians from the civilian Administration accused 
of corruption and abuse of office, were detained for 20 months without 
trial. These actions of the government offended Nigerians' sense 
of justice and disenchantment grew rapidly at every level up to 
the ruling Supreme Military Council where there was persistent 
friction about government actions. 
63 On August 27,1985, the 
government was overthrown in Nigeria's sixth military coup. 
The regime's foreign policy was a bungle. This is shown in 
the "retirements with immediate effect" of many experienced and very 
63. Private briefing. 
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good External Affairs Officers, with a scandalous impression 
of job insecurity and consequent low morale among those not 
affected. After sacking some of the Ministry's best officers, 
the appointment of their successors influenced by regional 
bias, "were not always in the best interest of the service, 
which perhaps accounts for the incompetence and confusion of 
Nigeria's stand in several international meetings". 
64 The 
other prominent fiascos were the Dikko kidnap affair; the 
unpatriotic campaign against Or. Peter Onu of Nigeria - 
assistant Secretary-General of the OAU who stood a good 
chance of being elected the Secretary-General, 
65 
and the 
inadequate support for Professor Adebayo Adedeji, executive 
secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in an 
election to become the head of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO). 66 Generally, with the 
exception of the support given to Sarahawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (Western Sahara) though in less refined style, the 
Buhari regime's foreign policy performance fell below average 
in comparison with the policies of other Nigerian governments 
since 1960. 
64, West Africa, No. 3558, of 4 November, 1985, p. 2298. 
65. At the OAU summit in July 1985, at Addis Ababa, several 
African leaders, e. g. President Kaunda, had approached 
the Buhari regime to allow them draft Dr. Peter Onu of 
Nigeria - assistant Secretary General - to become the 
Secretary General because they had been impressed by 
his performance in an acting capacity over two years. But 
Nigeria. was supporting the Niger foreign minister for the 
post. External Affairs Minister, Or. Ibrahim Gambari, 
spent his time in Addis Ababa campaigning against Dr. Onu. 
When many African countries insisted on drafting him, the 
Minister announced that Nigeria was recalling Or. Onu from 
the OAU. The government had hoped to appoint another 
Nigerian to his post but were unaware that an officer of 
that seniority has to be elected. See West Africa, No. 3558 
of 4 November, 1985, pp. 2298-9. 
66. Ibid., p. 2299. 
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GOVERNMENT UNDER IBRAHIM BABANGIDA (August 1985 -? ) 
At present Nigeria has a new military government formed on 
August 28,1985 and headed by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida - 
a northerner, who is known to be friendly and well connected with 
the major ethnic groups, and above all has concern for the common 
people in Nigeria. He possesses some experience in government 
having been a member of the Supreme Military Council since 1975. 
The indication so far is that he is resisting regional pressures 
and has declared the whole country as his government's constituency. 
This is reflected in his appointments into the main organs of 
government - Armed Forces Ruling Council - AFRC (formerly SMC), 
National Council of Ministers (formerly FEC) and State governorships. 
Hoteverg, it is too early to assess the actions of the government. 
Having thus reviewed the political background of Nigeria, attempts 
will be made in the next sub-section to trace the origin and 
development of foreign policy in"Nigeria. 
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(iii) THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN NIGERIA 
Foreign policy is a dynamic process and its origin cannot 
be pinned down to a particular period or event. As issues arise, 
new ideas generate about how to tackle them. At the same time 
positions are taken and corresponding responses are formulated. 
Each major issue makes its own impact on the policy machinery 
and sometimes tend to overshadow others before it. For example, 
the colonial period of Nigeria tends to overshadow the past long 
history and political life of the Nigerians. Hence many writers 
on Nigerian foreign policy have tended to take 1960 as their 
starting point. Yet foreign policy activity by 'Nigerians' 
dates back to the earliest times of the groups of people inhabiting 
the territory now called Nigeria. It therefore entered the world 
with an inherited set of diplomatic links, treaties and international 
relations, practices from its past political relationships. 
The argument here is that foreign policy in its broad sense 
is a continuous process in the political life of a nation or a group 
of people. Indisputably every state whether traditional, colonial 
or sovereign has both internal and external environments. Activities 
in these environments have the tendency to affect directly or 
indirectly inter-state relations, which in turn elicit responses. 
Such responses may be in the form of co-operation and friendly 
relations or opposition and resistance or enmity and war toward 
another state or actor in the external environment. The activities 
involved may have economic, political, military, religious or 
cultural objectives but all may affect another state. These 
imply that every state at whatever stage has its external 
relationships and all states make foreign policy, which may be 
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latent or manifest depending on the predisposing circumstances 
of the state and the attitude of its elite. It therefore seems 
improper to limit the search for the roots of Nigerian foreign 
policy to events in the colonial or post independence period. 
A study of the evolution and development of Nigerian foreign 
policy requires examination of events, dating from the earliest 
times to the present, that have some bearing directly or 
indirectly on external relations. - That would be a stimulating 
task for the diplomatic historian. For now, we will identify 
some of the sources from which Nigerian foreign policy has evolved 
and developed. These includes 
1. Traditional diplomatic practices and techniques, 
2. Inter-state relations in Africa, 
3. Afro-European relationa, 
4. Nationalism and nationalist movements, 
5. Independence and demands of statehood, 
6. National economic necessities, and 
7. The civil war. 
0 
We shall now try to show how the above-mentioned factors contributed 
to the emergence of Nigerian foreign policy. 
TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES 
Before we assert the existence of traditional diplomatic 
practices and techniques in Nigeria and their relevance to external 
relations today, we would note the view of one of the most admired 
African historians, Professor Basil Davidson, a British author, who 
wrote that: 
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"Africans have a long history of their own. This 
African history is part of the history of the world. 
Nothing large or lasting in the general story of 
mankind can be fully understood without the African 
side of the story. .... Many imperialist historians 
of Africa, during the colonial period wrote bad 
history. Their prejudices and personal feelings 
made them write that Africans had no history of 
their own. It is part of the modern rebirth of 
Africa that we know this view-to be entirely 
false". 1 
The above views, it is believed, help to support the point that 
Nigerians had made foreign policy'and practised foreign relations 
in the pre-colonial period. What do we mean by traditional 
diplomatic practices and techniques and how relevant were they 
to foreign policy evolution? We can begin to answer the question 
by first stating that foreign policy primarily originates from 
those general principles of good sense and experience that prevail 
in all human societies and which govern the relations among 
themselves and between them and others in separate independent 
states. Such "general principles", "good sense" and "experience" 
Which exist, with or without written conventions or treaties of 
universal or bilateral import, are referred to here as traditional 
diplomatic practices and techniques. Foreign relations and 
foreign policy, in the sense of the system of actions and interactions 
between one group of human beings and another group alien to 
themselves, have existed from the beginning of human societies. 
Thus, like its essential instrument - diplomacy, -"it is neither the 
invention nor the pastime of some particular political system, but 
is an essential element in any relation between nation. -and nation 
or state and state". 
2 There had existed such practices and techniques 
1. Davidson, Basil at sl, The Growth of African Civilisation, History 
of West Africa 1000-1800, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1965, p. 1. 
2. Nicolson, Harold (Sir), Dia= y, Oxford University Press, London, 
1964, pp. 4-6. 
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in the conduct of relations among and between the component 
states of "Nigeria". These practices and techniques have 
relevance to the general attitude of Nigerian elites toward 
external affairs. 
3 
To illustrate the type of diplomatic practices and techniques 
used in the conduct of relations in traditional Nigeria, we could 
draw evidence from the translation of Arabic letters found in the 
House of the Waziri of Sokoto, Bohari, in 1903, regarding relations 
between the Fulani kingdom, the various states of Hausaland and 
the Bornu Empire. In a letter from Sarkin Gobir Ibrahim, 61st 
chief of the Gobirawa to the Sultan Sarkin Musulmi Abderrahman, 
calling for peace between Sokoto and Gobir, the chief wrote thus - 
"From Sarkin Gobir Ibrahim, son of Sarkin Gobir 
Maiyaki to the Sarkin Musulmi Abderrahman, Greetings. 
After greetings to inform you of what is between 
me and you. My desire is for the trust which was 
between me and thee before. May Allah bring peace 
and prosperity and increased friendship and love between 
us and you and permission for our people to pass between 
our kingdom and yours in peace and security without 
dispute. May you sit in the place of your fathers 
and prosper. That is what I say to you. Peace. May 
Allah grant your approval of this affairs of ours. We 
have seen our messenger Dan Kerra Kerre. Again may 
Allah cause goodwill between us and our countries". 4 
Another letter from Alhaji Aminu El Kanemi to the Fulani rulers 
in the reign of Sorkin Muslimi Shehu, also illustrates a high 
degree of rational diplomatic practice and method in pre-colonial 
Nigeria. This particular letter was an attempt to halt hostilities 
and to resolve problems through dialogue and negotiation. The 
letter read: 
3. Awolowo, Obafemi (Chief), The People's Republic. Oxford 
University Press, London, 1968, P. 329. 
4. B-. ackuell, H. F. 9 The occupation of Hausaland, 1900-1904. 
Frank 
Case & Co. Ltd., 1969, p. 22. The date of the letter is not 
indicated. 
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"From Alhaji Aminu son of Mohamadu El Kanemi, to 
the Mallama and principal men of the Fulani, 
greetings and friendship. 
After greetings the reason why I am sending 
this letter to you is that when the Will of God 
brought me to the land of Bornu, I found the fire 
of discord had broken out between you and the 
people of this land. I enquired the cause of this. 
Some persons informed me that oppression was the 
cause, others again that it was religion. We were 
therefore perplexed by this matter and I wrote a 
letter to your brethren who are my neighbours. I 
besought them to explain to me their reason and 
pretext for making war on Bornu. They sent me in 
reply a poor sort of answer; such as would not come 
from a wiseman, much lese from a learned one and least 
of all from one who is reforming religion. They wrote 
me a list of titles of books and said that in these 
books they saw the reason of the war. Now we have 
examined these books and we do not see in them what 
they have seen. Thus we remained in our perplexity... 
In truth we have heard news of the character of 
Shehu son of Usman son of Fodio and we have read his 
books. - Your actions are at discord with what is in 
his books... I wish to inform you we are on Shehu's 
side if Shehu is for the truth. If he is departing 
from truth, then we leave him and follow the truth". 5 
These two examples shall suffice, although there are many 
other such letters warded like diplomatic "note verbale" and 
"Aide Memoirs" of today. The examples illustrate that-general-- 
principles and practice of external relations had been evolved 
by generations of Nigerians and must have been carried from the 
early time to the present. Such ideas and patterns of behaviour 
may help to explain some of the attitudes and behaviour of present 
day Nigerian foreign policy elite. 
INTER-STATE RELATIONS IN AFRICA 
The contemporary foreign policy of Nigeria, like other African 
states, owes much to inter-African relations in both pre-colonial 
5. Muhammad Bello, Sultan of Sokoto, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani 1837; 
Published in Kanö by Emirate Printing Department in 1922. Reproduced 
by E. J. Arnett. Source: National Union Catalogue pre-1956 Imprints, 
vol. 400, p. 495. 
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and modern times. We will discuss such relationship not 
simply to show that the foreign policy of modern African states 
has a history of its own but primarily to establish a correlation 
between the past and the present, as a possible guide towards 
understanding the country's African policy. 
(a) Pre-Colonial Relations in Africa: 
Relatively little is known about the conduct of relations 
other than trade relations among African states in pre-colonial 
times but recent studies in African diplomatic history reveal 
that before the advent of colonialism, the African ruling elite 
"carried on activities of a diplomatic nature in so many 
situations, in such a large variety of ways and at all periods 
of their history". 
6 The studies indicate that traditional 
diplomatic practices and techniques were employed to resolve 
inter-state conflicts and to promote peaceful relations. Though 
detailed knowledge is not yet available aft the specific issues of 
the external relations of these early state-systems and their 
diplomatic procedures, Professor J. F. Ade-Ajayi has argued that 
African experience of diplomatic activities in pre-colonial times 
has relevance-to modern international relations in general and to 
inter-African relations in particular. He made reference to the 
relationship between the Benin Kingdom and the Ibo Republics in 
the east, and between Benin and Igala, Nupa and Yoruba Kingdoms. 
There were also similar relationships between the Oyo Empire and 
Dahomey on one hand and between Dahomey and Asante on the other. 
6. Ade-Ajayi, J. F., "Recent Studies in West African Diplomatic 
History", in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 1, 
no. 1 of July 1975, p. 40. 
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These and other similar relationships bear testimony to the 
existence among traditional African states of a measure of 
inter-state relations guided by diplomatic practices and 
techniques. ? 
The Kanem-Borno Empire by 1250 AD under the rulerahip of 
Mai Dunama Dibbalemi had established relations with Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia, and was known to have sent Ambassadors 
to these countries. 
8 Thomas Hodgkin has examined in more 
detail the relations between Bornu and Egypt. 
9 He made 
reference to the correspondence between the King of Bornu 
and the Sultan's court in Egypt. In one of the letters 
addressed to the ruler of Egypt, according to Hodgkin, the 
King of Bornu complained of the Judham Arabs (from neighbouring 
state of Bornu) who captured a group of Bornu people and sold 
them abroad - likely in Egypt or other Mediterranean countries. 
The king of Bornu therefore wrote and sent emissaries to the 
friendly kings of Egypt and Syria urging them to prohibit the 
sale of Bornu captives in their countries. The emissaries 
delivered the letter along with suitable gifts of mercury and 
other things* 
10 A part of the letter read: 
"After greetings we have sent you as ambassador 
my cousin, Idris Ibn Muhammad, because of the 
calamity we suffered. The Arabs who are called 
Judham and others have taken captive our free 
subjects - women and children and old people, and 
our relatives and other Muslims ... and are selling 
7. Ibid. Similar arguments are found in Ray Ofoegbu's Foundation 
Course in International Relations for African Universities. George 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1980, p. 25. See early inter-African trade 
relations in Onimode, Bade, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in 
Ni eria. Zed Press, London, 1982, p. 15; also in Fage, J. D, 
Introduction to the history of West Africa, Cambridge University 
Press, 1962, p. 9. 
8. Onimode, Bade, op, cit., p. 19. 
9. Hodgkin, Thomas, Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology. 
2nd edn, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, pp. 102-104. 
10. Ibid, p. 103. 
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them to the slave-dealers in Egypt and Syria and 
elsewhere, and some they keep for themselves. 
Now God has placed in your hands the Govern- 
ment of Egypt, from the Mediterranean to Aswan, ... 
send messengers to all your lands, to your Emirs, and 
your Wazirs, and your Qadis and your Governors, and 
your men of learning, and the heads of your markets, 
(that) when they have found our people, let them 
remove them from the hands of those who hold them 
captive, and ... release them, and let them return 
to their liberty and to Islam". 11 
The tone of this note confirms there was already an important 
friendly relationship between the two rulers. It also shows that 
the practise of foreign policy then was advanced and akin to 
contemporary foreign policy practices. There were, in fact, 
similar practices in the conduct of external relations between 
the "Hausa Bakwai" (the Seven Hausa states) and the Empires of 
. 
Mali and Kanem-Bornu since the 16th century. 
12 Professor 
Ada-Ajayi therefore seems justified in arguing thats 
"It is clear from the general historical literature 
that most African states devised all the apparatus 
and procedures adequate for conducting negotiations 
for peace or ware negotiating trading conditions, 
arranging treaties and sealing them, and sometimes 
for conducting arbitrations and parleys. There 
were arrangements for sending missions to neighbouring 
courts either for specific business or even for periods 
of study of court etiquette and procedures. There were 
symbols of authority carried by such ambassadors or 
messengers corresponding to the modern letters of 
credence or accreditation or diplomatic passports. 
Similarly various communities observed rules for 
the safe passage of messengers and for their 
immunity from harm van when they carried hostile 
or bad messages". is 
From the foregoing, it is clear that in traditional African 
states there was- some system of external relations usually accorded 
necessary recognition and privileges as in the Greek-city states 
U. Ibid., p. 104. 
12. Onimode, Bade, op. cit., p. 19. 
13. Ade-Ajayi, op. cit., p. 43. 
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to which references are usually made. It was recognised 
among African states that the relations between states could 
not be conducted by the use of force and that force or violence 
could only be used in exceptional-circumstances and as a last 
resort. There were great considerations for peaceful relations 
between states and there were some implicit laws which were above 
narrow state interests or momentary expediency. These were 
accepted princj. ples to facilitate trade with and through 
neighbouring states particularly at a time when people trekked 
or rode on horse back across several territories for trade. In 
many instances auch inter-state relations and laws guiding them were 
complemented by inter-state marriages between members of the ruling 
families and by exchange of gifts between sovereigns. These inter- 
state relations, as we have noted earlier, were essentially 
international relations of which each of the states in the 
interaction had its own policy for the conduct of such external 
relations. 
(b) Inter-African Relations after 1900* 
Continued inter-African relations after 1900 AD gave impetus 
to the development of national foreign policies of African states. 
Such relationships during the colonial period and after helped to 
perpetuate and propagate a sense of common historical antecedents, 
geographical contiguity of all African states, their social affinity 
and common dependent status in world politics, all of which combines 
to foster a regeneration of the spirit of African brotherhood and 
the idea of a new Africa. This 'spirits and (ideal encouraged 
* The year 1900 is, perhaps arbitrarily, chosen as indicative-of 
Approximately the-date when African states lost their freedom and 
mere known to have become colonised effectively. 
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the intensification of inter-African co-operation and relations 
(during and after colonisation) for the ultimate realisation of 
the hopes and aspirations of the $new Africa'. Considering 
the importance which African leaders attach to the ideals of 
a new Africa, one would say that the consciousness of African 
freedom, African unity and African rights, were in part 
responsible for the early formation of the ideas of foreign 
policy in a modern African state. The idea of a new Africa 
widened the scope of inter-African relations and co-operation. 
It fostered consciousness among Africans of their rights to 
freedom, equality and justice. It encouraged the establishment 
of inter-African movements and organisations for the realisation 
of these rights. The idea of a new Africa was significant in 
the promotion of inter-African relations and in the awakening 
of the consciousness of international intercourse. - 
Ipso-factog the idea influenced the development of Nigerian 
foreign policy. 
One of the major movements that emerged from the whole idea 
of a new Africa Was the Pan-African Movement14 which had a, significant 
impact on virtually all African countries. The movement triggered 
off a pragmatic stop towards African brotherhood and a momentum 
for African solidarity and inter-state relations. Pan-A? ricanism 
called for African freedom and role in the world* The realisation 
of these objectives became central issues in the foreign policy of 
Nigeria and other African countries. What is Pan-Africanism? 
14. For details of Pan-Atricanism, see Imanuel GeLaa, The Pan 
African Movement, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1974. Also 
Langley, Ayodele J., Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in Was, 
Oxford University Press, 1973. See too the five dimensions 
of Pan-Africanism by Mazrui, All A. q Africa's International 
Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Changes Westview 
Press Inc., Colorado, 1977, P. 68. 
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The term as we use it'here refers to that moving spirit 
for the realisation of the place and role of the African 
continent in world affairs. It was both an idea and a 
movement. Pan-Africanism as an idea aimed at arousing the 
consciousness of being African, created the feeling of 
Africanness or African image and questioned the role of the 
African continent vis-a-vis other continents in the world. As 
a movement, Pan-Africanism sought to secure for Africa an equal 
place among the other continents in the global system, to demand 
what is African, to take and hold it, and to contribute meaning- 
fully to international peace and concord. Pan-Africanism brought 
closer African countries and leaders, who began to conceptualise 
on the object of the movement and finally arrived at various 
conceptions of it. According to Ali Mazruil5 some saw Pan- 
Africanism as the clarion call for the unity of all black peoples 
and countries of Africa while others interpreted it as an invitation 
for solidarity of all black peoples in the world irrespective of 
the country to which they belong. In real terms, Pan-Africanism 
succeeded in eliciting the growth of self-confidence of the elite 
in their demand for the right and responsibility of Africa in the 
global system. In the process, various conferences of continental 
and extra-continental significance were held to which Nigerian 
leaders attended and exchanged views with other leaders on the 
prevailing issues of international relations. 
16 The discussions, 
acquaintance, and feelings of common colonial problems generated at 
these conferences contributed in no small measure to the evolution 
of the sentiments of African freedom and unity which today, form the 
15. Mazrui, Ali A., ibid. 
16. Imanuel Geiss; op. cit., pp. 176,192-3. 
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centrepiece of Nigerian foreign policy. 
AFRO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS 
Foreign policy development in Nigeria as in the rest of 
Africa owes much to relations with Europe. Such relationships 
could be discussed in two phases in order to highlight the impact. 
The Early Contact: 
Details of African international relations become clearer 
When we study closely the interactions between the Europeans and 
Africans from the 15th century, as well as the treaties of friendship 
and trade entered into then. 
Nigeria/Portuguese Relationss 
It has been noted in the earlier section that contact between 
Nigeria and Europe started. when the first Portuguese visited Benin 
(1472). The account of the visit by Joan d'Avairor who in 1485 
negotiated and successfully opened up trade between Portugal and 
the Kingdom of Boning 
17 indicates a long period of bilateral trade 
relations between the Benins and the Portuguese, which was regulated 
by some form of agreement. In order to further the trade as a 
result of the mutual benefits arising from its the Kings of Benin 
and Portugal exchanged Ambassadors as far back as 1486. Thomas 
Hodgkin wrote about the presence of "the Portuguese Embassy at the 
court of Benin" and drew his evidence from a letter dated 20th 
October 1516 to King Manuel of Portugal from Duarte Pires, who 
Was the Portuguese representative in Benin. 
18 However, according 
to Onimode, it was in the reign of King John II of Portugal (1481-95) 
17, Onimode, Bade, op. cit., p. 20. 
18. Hodgkin, Thomas, op. cit., pp. 127-8. 
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that the first Benin Ambassador, Captain Cwato, was sent to 
Portugal. To explain how Benin-Portugal relationship developed, 
Bade Onimode said when the Portuguese arrived on the coast of 
West Africa and met extensive trade that had existed for long, 
they started by buying from middlemen and gradually turned the trade 
to an African-European axis. Later they made it directly 
dependent on Europe, thereby destroying the inter-African trade 
and its manufacturing technology base. 
19 A similar relationship 




Treaties between the British government and the kings in the 
Niger area in the eighteenth century illustrate early development 
of Africa's international relations and-foreign policy. For 
example, both Kings George Pepple of Bonny and Jaja of Opobo 
entered respectively into bilateral commercial treaties with 
Her Britannic Majesty's Government by the 1870s. One such 
treaty is reproduced hereunder. 
21 
Commercial Treaty with King Jaja, January 4,1873 
In the name of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, 
we hereby acknowledge Jaja King of Opobo and fully 
entitled to all considerations as such. 
The British traders in River Opobo shall pay the same 
amount of "comey" as British traders in Bonny. No 
tax or import shall be placed on them. Any disputes 
which occur between them and King Jaja's peoples are 
to be referred to Her Britannic Majesty's consul for 
settlement. 
19. Onimode, op. cit., p. 15. 
20. Hodgkin, op. cit., pp. 156-7. 
21. Nwabara, S. N., Iboland -A century of contact with Britain 1860-1960. 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1977, p. 83. This author wrote that 
George Taubman Goldie and his Central African Trading Company con- 
cluded thirty-seven treaties with various Kings and Chiefs in 
Nigeria, which made it possible to establish commercial relations 
between Nigeria and Britain (pp. 79-93). 
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After the 5 April 1873, the King of Opobo shall 
allow no trading establishment or bulk in or off 
the town of Opobo or any trading vessel to come 
higher up the. river*than the White-Mans-Beach 
opposite Hippopotamus Creek. If any trading 
ships or steamer proceeds further up the river 
the the creek above mentioned after having been 
duly warned to the contrary, the said trading 
ship or steamer may be seized by King Jaja, and 
detained until a fine of 100 puncheons (large 
casks of palm oil) be paid by the owners to 
King Jaffa. 
Signed on board Her Britannic Majesty's ship 
Pioneer, off Opobo Town, 4 January 1873. 
Signed 
King Jaja 
John E. Commerell, Commodore 
Charles Livingstone, consul 
Jaja's treaty is illustrative of the practice of external 
relations by 1873. It recognised the authority of the King and 
his right of control of all activities within the area. It also 
acknowledged the King's right to determine the scope and direction 
of external trade, hence the movement of foreign trading ships 
was limited to "White Man's Beach". According to Nwabara, in 
subsequent years when British merchants invaded Jaja's oil markets 
in Opobo and sought to proceed further inland, the King relied 
on the treaty of 1873 to resist inland penetration and thereafter 
made several representations to both the British Foreign Office 
and the Marquis of Salisbury pointing out, that his territory and 
trading rights were being violated. 
22 
Not satisfied with the 
Foreign Office reply, King Jaja and the chiefs in council decided 
to send a delegation to London to protest against the actions of 
British merchants and officials in Opobo. The delegation consisted 
of the King's son, Sunday Jaja and three chiefs, high ranking 
members of the King's ruling council comparable to Ministers or 
22. Ibid., pp. 84-86. 
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Secretaries of State in contemporary President's or Prime 
Minister's Cabinet* 23 
Reference could also be made to treaties between Britain 
and the Delta states of Nigeria, 
24 
which were purely consular 
in nature, aimed at protecting the interests and commerce of 
both Bonny and British citizens. According to Professor Awa, 
the British-Bonny treaty specifically 
"forbade the imprisonment, detention or 
maltreatment of a British subject by the Bonny 
authorities, stipulated that disputes between 
the two parties be settled by a committee 
composed of English traders and the King and 
gentlemen of Bonny, warned the government of 
Bonny that any infringement of the terms of 
the treaty would bring them under the displeasure 
of the King of England, and that English men-of- 
war would, on any complaint come up the Bonny 
River to protect English vessels; and any 
English seaman guilty of ill-treating a Bonny 
man would be punished by the captain of his 
vessel". 25 
Most of these Nigerian scholars have impressed that the 
treaties illustrate that Nigerians have had some experience in 
foreign relations practice, prior to colonial rule. The view is 
that the earliest official representatives of the Crown went to 
Nigeria as commercial officers and diplomatic consuls to provide 
expert advice and consular assistance to, Staff of the Royal 
Niger Company. Although Afro-European relationship subsequently 
changed to that of "the ruler and the ruled", due in the main to 
covert activities of consular officers, the "gradual supplanting" 
of host governments and later the application of superior military 
might of the colonialists, the interactions that existed were in 
essence of a diplomatic nature. 
23. Ibid., p. 86. 
24. Dike, K. O., Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885. 
Oxford University Press, London, 1959, Chapter IV. 
25. Awe, E. O., Federal Government in Nigeria, p. 260. 
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The impact of African-European relations on the development 
of foreign policy was also felt in the northern states of Nigeria. 
As early as 1824 friendly relations had been established between 
Great Britain and the Empire of Bornu, leading to the sending of 
a British diplomatic consul. 
26 In 1851 a commercial treaty between 
Bornu and Great Britain was arranged by Dr. Barth and Overweg. 
Before this time, the shehu of Bornu had had an envoy in 
Tripoli - Libya, who incidentally became friendly with the 
British envoy there, through whom in 1853 specimens of Bornu 
manufactures were sent to England. In the same year (1853) 
Dr. Barth concluded on behalf of the British government a treaty 
with Sokoto, to enable a British merchant to establish himself 
at Kano. Similar reports from Gerhard Rohlfs of Germany who 
journeyed from Tripoli to Lagos and another report from Dr. Gustar 
Nachtigal who took presents from King William of Prussia to Shehu 
Omar at Kukawa, as an appreciation for his (Omar's) assistance to 
German explorers, 
27 
confirm the scope and significance of African- 
European relations to the development of interest in extra-African 
affairs. They also confirm that, before the "scramble for Africa" 
came to the minds of European Powers at the and of the Franco-German 
War in 1870, Nigerians had had experience in diplomatic activities 
and international intercourse from which foreign policy practices 
of today could be said to have derived their origin. 
Later developments between the Fulani Empire and Britain also 
point to a tradition in the conduct of relations between one state 
and another. A few of the correspondence- (reproduced below) between 
26. B"jackwell, H. F., op. cit., p. 1. 
27. Ibid., pp. 1-5. 
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the Sultan of Sokoto and the High Commissioner to Nigeria 
illustrates this tradition and also show how African-European 
relationship changed, after four hundred years, to overshadow 
its import. These diplomatic exchanges are revealing: 
"Letter from High Commissioner to the Sultan of 
§okoto. re-Bauchi 
In the name of the most Merciful God. Peace be 
to the generous Prophet. Salutations, peace, and 
numberless honours. 
To the Emir of Mussulmans in Sokoto, whose name is 
Abdul-Lahai, the son of the late Emir of Musselmans, 
Whose name is Atiku. I desire to inform you who are 
head of the Mohammedans and to whom the Fulani rulers 
in this country look for advice and guidance that ... 
I have heard that you sent a letter to the Emir of 
Bauchi warning him to desist from oppressing his 
people, but he does not obey your instructions nor 
listen to your words of wisdom. I have, therefore, 
been compelled to send my troops to compel him to 
act properly. I do not know whether he will oppose 
them and fight. If he does so, he will probably 
lose his place. But I do not wish to drive out the 
Fulani and the Mohammedans, I only wish that they shall 
rule wisely and with humanity. If therefore the Emir 
is driven out because he himself attacks my troops, I 
shall endeavour to find his proper successor and shall 
install him as king if he is a man who will rule well. 
So also in the matter of Kontagora, I hear that he and 
Abubakar will not listen to the words of your messenger 
or desist from raiding the towns of Zaria. So Zaria 
has appealed to me for help, and I have sent troops to 
support him and to drive out these marauders. 
Peace be to those who seek peace and trouble on those 
who make trouble. 
Since I wrote this letter I have news that Ibrahim of 
Kontagora and all his people and following have been 
captured by my troops. I am restoring all the people 
to their places but Ibrahim and his chiefs will be sent 
to me to be judged. " 28 
(Signed) F. D. Lugard 
March 1902 
On receipt of this letter, the Sultan of Sokoto issued a reply 
as follows: 
28. Ibid., p. 13. 
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(A translation of Arabic letter) 
"From Sultan of Sokoto to the High Commissioner of 
Great Britain. 
In the name of God. Blessing and Peace, contentment 
and increasing honour to you. Salutations. After 
salutation, I have to inform you that we do not 
invite your administration in the Emirate of Bauchi 
and if you have interfered, we do not want support 
from any one except from God. You have your religion 
and we have ours. We seek help from God, the Best 
Supporter, and there is no power except in him, the 
Mighty and Exalted. Peace. " 29 
On another occasion the representative of the High Commissioner 
addressed a letter to the Sultan as follows: 
"From Colonel T. L. N. Morland to the Sultan of Sokoto. 
From Colonel Morland the representative of the High 
Commissioner. Salutations. After salutations know 
that the cause of our fighting with Aliu is that Aliu 
received with honour Mogaji, the murderer of a whiteman, 
when he came to Kano, and that he also sought war between 
us. For those two reasons we fought him and are now 
sitting in his house. 
We are coming to Sokoto and from this time and for ever 
a Whiteman and soldiers will sit down in the Sokoto 
country. We have prepared for war because Abdu Sarikin 
Muslimin said there was nothing between us but war. But 
we do not want war unless you yourself seek war. If 
you receive us in peace, we will not enter your house, 
we will not harm you or any of your people. 
If you desire to become our friend you must not receive 
the Mogaji. More, we desire you to seek him with your 
utmost endeavour and place him in our hands. If you are 
loyal to us, you will remain in your position as Sarikin 
Muslimin, fear not ... 
My present to you is five pieces of brocade. 30 
(Signed) T. L. N. Morland 
February 1903 
The Sultan of Sokoto replied to Colonel Morland'e letter, 
thu a: 
29. Ibid., p. 14. 
30, Ibid. 
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(Translation of Arabic letter) 
"From Sultan of Sokoto to Colonel T. L. N. Morland. 
From us to Colonel Morland. All salutations to you. 
Know that I have seen your messenger with your letter, 
the purport of which I understand. I have sent to 
call in my councillors from every district, but now 
that I see they are taking some time to assemble, I 
am sending you back your messenger. When we have 
assembled and have agreed on our decision, I will- 
write to you what is enjoined on me by them for the 
settlement of this affair. Salutations. " 31 
(Signed) Attahiru Emir E1 Musslimin 
The Sultan of Sokoto 
February 1903 
These correspondences, their contents and style of presentation 
no doubt portray substantial experience in the conduct and manage- 
ment of relations between one state and another. In other Words, 
foreign policy as the set of decisions, actions and reactions of a 
state towards the others, has been practised for a long time in 
Nigeria and therefore has a tradition and precedence upon which 
certain subsequent practices could be based. 
African-European Relations in Colonial Times: 
Colonial relations between Nigeria and Britain made a 
significant contribution to the development of contemporary Nigerian 
foreign policy. In fact the period of colonisation was the time 
for political rejuvenation and external policy modernisation. That 
period gave the people of Nigeria the time to prepare and to 
participate actively in contemporary international relations. 
Nigerians had the opportunity to learn about the activities of 
other sovereign nations and the existing opportunities in many 
distant countries. This was made possible by the growth of mass 
31. Ibid., p. 14. 
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communication and transportation. Through these lessons, 
nationalists were able to set the pattern and order the priorities 
of Nigeria in external relations. Moreover, the widening 
dimension-of international conflict and the changing pattern 
of power distribution gave rise to a series of treaties and 
conventions governing relations between and among nations. 
Nigeria was then represented by Britain at many international 
conferences and several treaties and agreements were signed on 
its behalf by the British government. 
32 Copies of these were 
deposited in government ministries, departments and public 
libraries. Nigerians who worked in these places, as well as 
others who had interest or were being prepared for the foreign 
service, were granted access to the documents, from which they 
might have acquired some knowledge of the technicalities of 
foreign policy. 
Another important element that influenced foreign policy 
development was the colonial education system. By its design, 
education from the primary school through the secondary and even 
University levels, was concerned with teaching the people about 
the way of life and events in Europe. Those who were interested 
in history, for example, learned about the numerous European wars 
and the various treaties that ended them. Having studied say 
the treaty of Utrecht, the Concert of Europe, the Congress of 
Vienna and the activities of distinguished European statesmen 
and diplomats like Castlereagh, Metternich, Hardenberg and Alexander, 
32. Federal Ministry of Justice: Nigeria's treaties in Force, vol. 1, 
for the period let October 1960 to 30th June 1970; Federal 
Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1971. See 'Part 1- Treaties 
and other international Agreements recognised as binding on 
Nigeria by virtue of United Kingdom's signature or ratification'. 
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and Talleyrand, Nigerians were thus equipped for the prectice 
of foreign policy. Added to this, was the flow into Nigeria 
of newspapers, magazines and journals containing information 
about the foreign policy of other nations. Apart from education 
within the country, there were other Nigerians educated in Europe 
and the United States, who came back to become the most dynamic 
and articulate leaders that Nigeria had. It was therefore a 
matter of putting into practice what they learnt. We have noted, 
in the preceding section while examining the place of political 
parties in the Nigerian setting, some of these Western-educated 
nationalists that led the country to independence. They made 
significant contribution to the development of Nigerian foreign 
policy. 
Finally, Nigeria's colonial relationship with Britain -a 
country that had world wide empire and an influential role in world 
politics - gave Nigeria greater international exposure and wider 
scope of relations in the world. It was considered desirable 
by Nigerian leaders to maintain friendly relations with all the 
erstwhile members of the British Empire. Apart from the bilateral 
relations with the respective countries, Nigeria had automatic 
membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, by virtue of its 
colonial relations. A record of the number of messages of 
goodwill and friendship received at independence would show that 
the majority came from Commonwealth countries and the Western 
Alliance. 33 Also the admission of Nigeria as the 99th member 
of the United Nations was sponsored as it were, by Australia, 
Canada, Ceylon (Sri-Lanka), the Federation of Malaya (Malaysia), 
33. Federal Ministry of Information records. 
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Ghana, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Tunisiaq* South Africa 
and the United Kingdom, 
34 
again reflecting the same club-tie. 
The opening of diplomatic missions in Nigeria followed the same 
pattern. The earliest missions were from Africa and Western 
capitalist countries. 
Indeed the British connection and influence cannot be ruled 
out of the pattern of external relationship that Nigeria had 
at independence. The British colonial administration's co- 
operation with Nigerian leaders in implementing the first training 
programme for the earliest corps of Nigerian diplomats, was an 
important factor in the shaping of the country's foreign policy. 
In 1956, the Nigerian government designed a programme for the 
recruitment and training of personnel for the future diplomatic 
service of Nigeria. 
35 Accordingly the government submitted a 
proposal to the effect to the House of Representatives and secured' 
L10,000 that year and a further L20,000 the following year for the 
training of foreign service officers. 
36 To implement the 
programme, the government decided to train some of the recruits 
at oxford University for one year while some others "underwent 
a short course for young diplomats at the Foreign Office". in 
London. 37 Thereafter the later group were attached to British 
* The only sponsor without a Commonwealth link. 
34, United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fifteenth 
Session, 893rd Plenary Meeting, New York, Friday 7 October 1960. 
Of the twenty-six representatives who inscribed their names to 
welcome Nigeria to the UN on the floor of the General Assembly 
two were communist countries, others were non-aligned and Western 
alliance nations. 
35, Mr. Prime Minister; A Selection of Speeches made by Alhaji the 
Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Federal Ministry of 
Information, Lagos, 1964, p. 21. 
36. Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., Diplomacy and diplomats: the formation of 
foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa. Butterworth: Scientific 
Publications, London, 1973, p. 283. 
37. Mr. Prime Minister, op, cit., p. 22. 
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Embassies at the Hague, Bonn, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, 
and the British High Commission in Canada, to enable them gain 
experience in the field. 38 It must be noted also that the 
earliest Nigerian missions in Khartoum and Jeddah as well as 
in Fernando Po and Libreville were under the aegis of the 
British Embassies in those countries. In appreciating the 
assistance of the British government, the Prime Minister told 
the House of Representatives - 
"I know that the house will recognise with me 
the great debt which we owe to the British Foreign 
Office and to the proud and ancient University of 
Oxford for their most willing help in fitting our 
young men for their new career, " 39 
NATIONALISM AND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 
Nationalism was a major factor in the development of interest 
in foreign policy, for its primary aim was to regain lost freedom so 
as to assert and project Nigerian personality in the international 
system. Certain events and activities associated with the growth 
of nationalism can be said to have contributed to the development 
of Nigerian foreign policy. These include the role of nationalist 
movements and political parties, the impact of the Second World War; 
the ideological rivalry between the super powers for spheres of 
influence in Africa etc. 
Nationalist movements and political parties in Nigeria 
made a tremendous contribution to the development of the country's 
foreign policy. Among the nationalist movements that made 
substantial impact on the development of Nigerian foreign policy 




the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), the 
West African Students' Union (WASU) both with important 
centres in England and USA, the Nigerian Progress Union in 
London (1924) led by Ladipo Solanke and other Nigerian students 
in Britain, the Zikist movement etc. For example, the NCBWA 
consisted of representatives of all four British West African 
colonies and carried its anti-colonial campaign outside the 
West African region. It sent several petitions to the colonial 
office in London demanding greater political rights for Africans. 
It criticised the division of Togoland between Britain and France 
without any consultation of the Africans in West Africa. 
40 The 
Congress encouraged the formation of local newspapers and journals 
and a West African Press Union for the purpose of fostering 
collaboration among West African countries as well as disseminating 
information about events in other lands which affect them. Like 
WASU, it performed Pan-African functions which contributed to the 
awareness in Europe of demands of West African colonies. The 
Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) had as early as 1938 stated in its 
charter that its goal was to free Nigeria completely from British 
colonisation and to secure "a position of equal partnership with 
the other member states of the British Commonwealth of Nations. n4l 
This was a profound foreign policy statement at a time when the 
idea of self-rule or independence for a country of black people 
was neither imagined nor contemplated. This idea survived the time 
and emerged as a foreign policy objective in post-independent 
Nigeria. 
40. Imanuel Geiss, op, cit., p. 285. 
41. Awos The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Cambridge 
University Prosa, London, 1960, p. 121. 
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By far, political parties in Nigeria made the most 
remarkable contribution toward the development of the country's 
foreign policy. However since some of the parties have been 
discussed in the preceding section, we need not repeat the 
discussion here, but we must recall that every Nigerian political 
party tried to initiate and express ideas about what the foreign 
policy of the country ought to be. 
The impact of the Second World War on foreign policy 
development is another factor. Just as the war influenced the 
growth of nationalism and the emergence of new nations, so also 
did it influence the formation of foreign policy by the new 
nations. African involvement in the war-theatres of the world 
could be said to have induced crucial changes in African initiatives 
and reactions toward colonial politics and economics, resulting in 
new dimensions in African politics. 
Many Nigerians who fought in the War had the opportunity of 
interacting with people from Asia, Europe and America. They 
exchanged ideas on a variety of issued chanted slogans of 
freedom, equality and democracy for all. They learnt of the 
promises of the Allied nations and the Atlantic Charter which 
declared: 
"to see sovereign rights and self-government restored 
to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; .. * 
and to further the enjoyment by all states, great or 
small, victor or vanquished, of'accessv on equal terms, 
to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which 
are needed for their economic prosperity; to bring about 
the fullest collaboration between all nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing, for all, 
improved labour standards, economic advancement and 
social security. " 42 
42. Staff of the Committee and the Department of State; A Decade 
of American Foreion Polices Basic Documents, 1941-49. United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950, p. 1. 
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Consequently, at the and of the war, these ideas were 
translated into action. Some of the discharged soldiers 
joined the nationalist movement, while some engaged in various 
services through which they contributed to the emergence of a 
new Nigeria and all that it stands for. Secondly, the weakness 
of Europe due to the war and the emergence of new centres of 
attraction in the world necessitated new outlooks and new 
expectations. In fact the war fostered a realisation of the 
tenuous political and economic strength of the colonial powers, 
whose weakness both during and immediately after the hostilities 
caused fundamental shifts in the world's political and economic 
power centres and encouraged the search for other competitive 
markets for African products. On the other hand, the war- 
stimulated'African economy sought new sources of raw materials 
and wider markets. This led to increased American involvement 
in the economic and political activities of African states. 
Africa therefore ceased to be the preserve of the European 
colonialists and with the advent of transport revolution, the 
continent became more accessible and every African state was linked 
to the other and to the wider world. 
Another closely linked factor in the nationalist ferment 
which influenced the thinking on foreign policy was the emergence 
of bipolarity in world politics. The apparent division of the 
world into two opposing military-cum-ideological camps gave 
leaders in the emergent nations much cause for deep thought 
about the best possible foreign policy posture to adopt. With 
the realisation that the rivalry between the super powers has 
-. _ 
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precipitated another struggle for Africa, both directly and 
through the agency of their allies, 
43 there was the general 
anxiety of a possible movement from one form of colonisation 
to another. This anxiety gave way to critical debate and 
sometimes division among nationalists and political parties as 
to whether to align or not with any bloc. We have noted the 
division of opinion among Nigerian leaders and parties regarding 
relations with the power blocs. Although Nigeria eventually 
decided against partisan involvement in the east-west rivalry, 
the government appeared to have been haunted for a long time by 
the twin desires to preserve the friendly ties established through 
long association with the Western countries, and to demonstrate 
its non-aligned stand by maintaining similar friendly ties with 
the communist countries. When the government overcame the anxiety 
about the implications of the infiltration of communism and the 
dangers of neo-colonialism and imperialism, it proceeded to establish 
relations with both Western capitalist and Eastern communist countries. 
Simultaneously policies were formulated to guide the conduct of those 
relations so as to eschew partisanship. In effect the decision to 
be non-aligned in world politics which is a cardinal attribute of 
Nigerian foreign policy was the result of the emergence of bi-polarity 
in world politics. 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ATTRACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION 
Independence is a major factor in the evolution and development 
of Nigerian foreign policy. The attainment of independence brought 
With it the responsibilities of nationhood. It called for a national 
43. Chaliand, Gerard, The Struggle for Africa: Conflict of the 
Great Powers. Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982. 
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mobilization of resources and initiative for the management 
of the country's domestic and external affairs. In so far as 
foreign policy is concerned, Independence created a challenge 
for both leaders and followers, who then, at least in principle, 
accepted the urgent need to fashion a national policy, as distinct 
from their individual and party views for the conduct of the 
country's external relations. It offered to Nigeria the 
sovereign right to decide on principles, formulate policies and 
adopt its own style for the conduct of its external relations. 
Apart from the inherent rights of independence and the 
provisions of the constitution in respect of the country's 
external affairs, the agreement among political parties on a 
number of essential issues of external policy was an important 
element in the emergence of a national foreign policy. We have 
noted earlier the foreign policy proposals of the major political 
parties in the first Republic of Nigeria. These proposals were 
at the initiative of the parties based on the convictions of the 
majority of the leaders. There were both similarities and 
dissimilarities in the foreign policy positions of the parties 
as follows: 
(i) the NCNC and NEPU foreign policy positions were 
much closer to each other. 
(ii) the NPC and AG shared similar views on many foreign 
policy issues but differed on two issues regarding 
the degree of: 
(a) relations with Arab countries advocated by NPC and 
(b) relations with West African states preferred by the AG. 
(iii) the NCNC and NEPU differed substantially from the foreign 
policy positions of NPC and AG. Thus while NCNC and NEPU 
advocated closer economic and political ties with all 
African countries, the NPC wanted closer ties with the 
Arab countries and the AG Wanted a Union of West African 
states. Second, the NCNC and NEPU advocated a policy 
of "non-alignment" with any particular axis of geo- 
politics, be it NATO or Warsaw Pact; the NPC and AG 
instead preferred Nigeria to join one military bloc. 
ýý.,. 
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A further breakdown of the party positions will show the following: 
Agreements Disagreements 
1. Liberation of Africa and 1. Union of West African states., 
opposition to colonialism 
elsewhere in the world. 
2. Membership of UNO and 2. Alliance with Arab-League. 
Commonwealth. 
3. Major role in continental 3. Alignment with one of the 
affairs (by implication an Power blocs* 
acceptance of Pan-Africanism). 
Amidst the agreements and disagreements, Nigerian leaders met several 
times at independence to review the differences in the foreign policy 
positions of their respective parties. There were meetings of all 
party leaders, debates on foreign policy in the parliament, 
44 the 
"All Nigeria Peoples' conference" of August 196145 etc. Through 
these meetings, major differences were harmonised and essential 
agreements reached became adopted as the country's foreign policy 
position. Consensus was possible on foreign policy for several 
reasons, the first being the realisation that Nigeria had become 
independent thereby having the obligations of a sovereign state, 
and therefore it was not a time for quibbling on its external 
policy. Other factors included the Prime Minister's open-mindedness 
which made possible the aggregation of enlightened views; the 
establishment of the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth 
Relations" as it was then called; the appointment of a foreign 
policy adviser in the person of Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe and foreign 
minister Or. Jaja Wachuku, from among well educated and articulate 
44. Debates in the House of Representatives, Lagoa, 1960, Jan., 
March, April, May, August, September and November Sessions. 
See also Mr. Prime Minister - Speeches of Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
8alewa, op, cit., pp. 21-22,35-37,41-42,61-85. 
45. Philips, Claude S., Jr, The Development of Nigerian Foreign 




Nigerian politicians as well as the effective role of the 
opposition led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the federal 
parliament. The resulting consensus on a national foreign 
policy, Was spelt out in one of the sessional papers as 
follows$46 
1. Foreign policy must be geared to defend and promote the 
interests of Nigeria and its citizens anywhere in the 
world. 
2. To oppose colonialism, racism and apartheid both in 
Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
3. Nigeria would play a major role in continental affairs 
by working to bring about closer understanding and 
co-operation among the countries of Africa "while 
respecting the sovereign equality of all African states, 
big or small". 
4. Nigeria would be a member of the UNO and Commonwealth as 
well as other international organisations through which 
"we will help to preserve world peace and promote the 
happiness of mankind in general". 
5. Nigeria would not align with any power bloc. 
6. Nigeria would remain on friendly terms with every nation 
in the world which recognizes and respects Nigeria's 
sovereignty. 
7. Nigeria would encourage foreign investment and create 
conditions necessary for the acquisition of scientific 
and technological know-how from the more advanced countries 
in the world. 
These foreign policy positions adopted at independence have 
persisted till today despite the changes in regimes and governments 
of. Nigeria. 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
The attractions of international organisations like the 
Commonwealth and the United Nations were yet other factors which 
46, "Proposals on Nigerian Foreign Policy - Summary Records", 
May 1960. See also Debates in the House of Representatives, 




inspired Nigerian leaders in forging the foreign policy of 
the country. Many leaders saw membership of the United 
Nations and Commonwealth as the golden symbol of the sovereign 
equality of states and a major opportunity for the developing 
nations to draw attention to the injustices of colonial 
exploitation by the imperialist nations. In one of his earliest 
foreign policy statements in the parliament, the Prime Minister, 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, expressed Nigeria's interest to belong 
to existing international organizations, when he said, inter alias 
"we have already declared our intention of a 
plan to join both the Commonwealth and the 
United Nations. In regard to the former, it 
is important to understand that all members of 
the Commonwealth are autonomous communities 
equal in status and in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic or 
external affairs. While therefore benefiting 
greatly from the free interchange of ideas and 
consultation between the members of the Common- 
wealth and from their experience within the 
framework of the United Nations, we shall, 
nevertheless, have a free hand to select those 
policies which we consider to be most advantageous 
for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in the 
principles of the United Nations". 47 
Nigerian leaders were unanimous that the country would accede 
to the membership of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations 
Organisation. The unanimity was motivated by the desire to belong 
to the community of independent nations and the fact that some 
African countries like Ethiopia and Liberia, and other erstwhile 
colonies that became independent were seen to take their places 
in these organisations on the basis of equality with the more 
advanced nations including the former colonial rulers. This 
seemingly elevated position of former dependent states was much 
admired by Nigerian leaders, one of whom commented thus, 
47. Debates in the House of Representatives, August session 19609"°&d 
in Philips, Claude S. # Jr, op, cit., p. 40. 
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"Liberia and Haiti and Ethiopia have an 
opportunity to espouse the cause of freedom 
for the black races. There is no doubt 
that India, Pakistan, Egypt, USSR and the 
Arab States would support them .... Whilst 
the Republic of Liberia may be proud that, 
in the last hundred years, she has been the 
'Lone Start in the firmament of Africa, she 
should not rest on her oars, but she should 
make it possible for other African communities 
to join her as free and sovereign states in 
the family of nations". 48 
The fascination which membership of international organisations 
had for Nigerian leaders at independence was not limited to the 
United Nations and the Commonwealth. It would be recalled that 
in 1955 when the "Colombo Powers and certain Asian countries" 
convened a conference of Asian and African states at Bandung but 
failed to invite Nigeria, all Nigerian leaders, and most vocal 
of them being Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, expressed disappointment and 
outrage at the omission of Nigeria. Although there were economic 
motives for joining international organisations, 
49 
the desire to 
belong to the family. of nations and to demonstrate the emergent 
sovereign rights of the nations were important factors that gingered 
the impetus to Nigeria's internationalism and the formation of 
corresponding policies. 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC FACTOR 
Economic necessities are vital factors of all nations) 
external policy. The urgent need to build a healthy society 
upon a self-reliant national economy was one of the major driving 
forces in the formation of Nigeria's foreign policy. Having 
been for several decades under a capitalist colonial system and 
Nna. rº, J) . 
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49. Mr. Prime Minister, op. cit., pp. 36-37. The economic reasons 
for acceding to international organisations. 
ý: ý 
104. 
having gained independence as a sovereign nation-state at 
a time when national economic capacity was a major determinant 
of political power, Nigerian leaders decided to adopt such 
external policies that would facilitate and not hamper the 
chances for, economic co-operation and collaboration with the 
wealthier' nations of the world. According to Prime Minister 
Balewa, 
"The reason why I personally want to see Nigeria 
taken into the Commonwealth is this: I know very 
well the immense opportunities and the great need 
for development in our country and I want to ensure, 
so far as is possible, that the development is on 
sound lines. At present we are an under-developed 
country. In order to expand our economy we must 
seek investments from the richer and more developed 
countries, investments both of money and technical 
skill. It is going to be very difficult sometimes 
to sift the genuine from the self-interested, and 
that is one reason why I should warn that Nigeria 
must be careful in recognising her real genuine 
friends". 50 
It is obvious that every Nigerian leader was aware of the 
economic necessities of the country. There was, however, no 
doubt about the economic potentialities of Nigeria but at 
independence the country needed earnestly technical assistance 
to transform its potentialities into-a resourceful modern 
national economy. It was realised that the traditional method 
of economic transformation would be inappropriate for the 
required rapid changes in a contemporary economic mode. In 
considering therefore what external policy options the country 
should adopt, the parties were in effect thinking about what had 
to be done in order to attract friends who were capable and 
willing to lend their expertise for the transformation of a rural 
50, Ibid., pp. 3C-3V 
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and dependent economy into an industrial and self-sustaining 
national economy. An economic motive was at the base of the 
consideration of a national external posture. Chief*Obafemi 
Awolowo tried to expose the economic motives of Nigerian foreign 
policy when he opposed NCNC's proposal of "non-alignment with 
any axis of goo-politics". He condemned the idea as 
"disreputable and dangerous tactics of playing the East against 
the West in the quest for foreign aid. " However, what Nigeria 
wanted most was not aid but co-operation and collaboration for 
industrial take-off. The first option was to seek the 
collaboration of the more industrialised nations mainly from Western 
Europe and the USA, understandably because of Nigeria's capitalist 
orientation and affinity with these countries during the decades 
of colonisation. When later the need for diversification of 
collaboration arose, the policy was broadened and Nigeria began 
to seek trade and technology from Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin 
America etc. 
The importance of economic factors in the formulation of 
foreign policy could be explained by the effort of every nation 
to link trade policy with the foreign policy and political goals. 
Moreover the pattern of power distribution in world politics 
corresponds with national (or regional) economic and military 
capacity. Put in another way, the weight and influence of a 
country today are roughly commensurate with its economic capacity 
and military strength. We are not however trying to involve 
the traditional arguments on political or economic determinism 
for it has often been argued that as "the political systems shape 
the economic systems so economic factors shape political outcomes". 
51 
51. Spero Edelman, Joan, The Politics of International Economic 
Relations. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1977, p. 4. 
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It is however obvious that the emergence of new international 
patterns of production and system of economic relations have 
added new dimension to the structure and operation of political 
relations among nations. This applies to the developed nations 
as well as to the developing ones. Spero underlined the 
economic motives of the foreign policy of new nations thus: 
"The major political concerns of these countries 
are economic: development, aid, trade, foreign 
investment and ultimate independence. Their 
demand is for no less than a restructuring of 
the international relations between the haves 
and have pots. " 52 
It is thus obvious that to further these objectives would necessitate 
the development of an integrated foreign policy for the conduct of 
both political and international economic relations. 
THE CIVIL WAR 
Another factor which contributed greatly to the evolution of 
Nigeria's foreign policy was the civil war. We have already 
discussed briefly the role of the military governments in 
Nigerian politics and noted the specific adroit decision to 
give Nigeria "one voice" in international affairs by centralising 
foreign policy decision-making processes, abolishing regional 
representations abroad and eliminating the interference of 
regional governments in the country's external policy. With 
the outbreak of the civil war, Nigeria's foreign policy acquired 
a new dimension and impetus. The civil war exposed the foreign 
policy-making machinery, for the first time, to war-time decision 
making, usually characterised by a state of emergency, ad-hoc 
changes in strategy, conference diplomacy, external propaganda, 
expansion and intensification of relationships etc. Apart from 
52. Ibid., p. 3. 
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giving the country's foreign policy a unified outlook which 
it hitherto lacked, the civil war gave the foreign policy 
machinery the simulation or conditioning which one would say 
was a departure from the routine practice and a desirable test 
of its ability to cope with emergency situations in world 
politics. 
The civil war was the first practical illustration of the 
strategic importance of Nigeria's immediate neighbours and indeed 
the entire continent of Africa. It became obvious that to maintain 
closer friendly ties with neighbouring countries were prerequisites 
of evading easy vulnerability. If this had not been realised 
and followed with vigour, perhaps some close neighbours of Nigeria 
could have offered their territory to be used by Biafra to launch 
attacks on Nigeria. In Nigeria's bid to curb the collaboration 
of African countries with Biafra and its penetration into the 
international system, the strategic importance of Africa became 
quite glaring. The series of peace conferences that were 
convened in Africa, most being under the auspices of the 
Organisation of African Unity, helped to make Nigeria's African 
policy become deep rooted. 
It was also the civil war that widened and intensified 
Nigeria-Soviet relationships. At the time when Nigeria needed 
arms desperately to prosecute the war, its traditional friends - 
Britain and the United States - adopted "a wait-and-see attitude". 
53 
Then Nigeria turned to the Soviet Union where it obtained some 
ammunition and jet fighters to conduct the war against Biafra. 
Ever since then Nigeria and the Soviet Union have had very cordial 
53. Stremlau, John 0.9 The International Politics of the Nigerian 
Civil War. 1967-1970. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1977, p. 65. Also in Cervenka. 
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relations, which has been extended to all East-European 
countries. Thus disappears the anxiety, which hitherto 
existed, of the dangers of importing communist revolution 
through increased bilateral relations with the communist 
countries. The civil war did not only enhance Nigeria's 
relations with the Eastern communist countries, it also, 
according to Stremlau, made Nigerials non-aligned status acquire 
new credibility. 
54 It also enabled the Federal Government to 
and the interference of regional/state governments in external 
affairs and to have exclusive authority to determine Nigeria's 
foreign policy. To these ends, the civil war is a watershed 
in the country's foreign policy. 
54. Ibid., p. 80. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY 
It is important at this juncture to try to explain the term 
"foreign policy" because it has been used by many people on many 
occasions to portray many different things. As a result, the 
meaning of the term is sometimes not understood, at other times 
confused, while many just assume that "foreign policy" is one 
of the slogans used by politicians to demonstrate their versatility. 
The need for explanation of our concept is the more important to 
provide a working definition appropriate to the subject under 
discussion and to minimise possible ambiguity in our use of the term 
"foreign policy" in the context. A few examples will help to 
illustrate the ambiguity in the use of the concept. A foreign 
firm while trying to secure a contract with the National Supply 
Company said in the course of a discussion that "the foreign policy 
of our two countries are identical in their opposition to the 
apartheid policy of South Africa. " Similarly, after a military coup 
in Nigeria, a senior Army Officer told the Press that "what took place 
was only a change of leadership but our foreign policy will remain 
unchanged. " In the two contexts, the term theoretically refers to 
two different things. While the former reflects foreign policy as 
an attitude, the latter presents it as an institutional position. 
A senior government official while advising a group of newly recruited 
foreign Service Officers, told them "you must always remember that 
how you conduct our foreign policy abroad will determine how our 
country will be judged by other nations of the world and also your 
behaviour will reflect the type of foreign policy you project. " 
Among the many meanings of the concept as used in this statement is 
f 
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the impression that foreign policy is a kind of doctrine to be 
preached abroad and which demands a good example from the preacher. 
It also implies a mode of behaviour by diplomats abroad and gives 
the impression that diplomats are exclusively responsible for the 
nation's foreign policy, contrary to our argument below that a 
number of factors determine a country's foreign policy and diplomats 
make up one of the organs of government responsible for foreign 
policy. See chapters 7 and 9 on "The Machinery" and "The factors 
that affect the practice of foreign policy. " 
As a result of the various uses of the concept in speeches, it 
seems necessary in any study of the subject to provide a clear 
definition. But with the realisation that the scope of foreign 
policy is ever widening to include a great many activities of 
government and citizens of a nation across their territorial 
boundaries, thereby warranting variations in the usage of the term, 
it is considered by some scholars that to begin a study of foreign 
policy with an-attempt at an acceptable definition of the nature 
of foreign policy would be to invite ridicule. 
l This appears to 
be so because there can be no generally acceptable definition of 
"foreign policy" since virtually every student of foreign policy 
would have a particular blend of the definition. Moreover, in a 
contemporary world of inter-dependence and conflict of interests, 
coupled with mutual mistrust, foreign policy is like a vehicle 
carrying various things or a shield covering all the external 
objectives of the state, be they of security, economic, political, 
cultural or ideological nature. Thus foreign policy becomes wide 
in scope and complex. This ever widening scope and complexity of 
1. Jones, Roy E., Analysing Foreign Policy - An introduction to 
some Conceptual Problems. Routledge & Kogan Paul Ltd., London, 
1970, p. 1. 
111. 
foreign policy and international relations in general make 
the subject appear grandiose and difficult to define briefly. 
Despite this apparent difficulty if we agree that foreign policy 
is not among the subjects too generally comprehended to require 
definition, then it becomes necessary for us to provide a working 
definition. 
What, therefore, is foreign policy? To begin With, there 
are only two words involved here, these are "foreign" and "policy". 
We will now try to explain them separately. 
THE CONCEPT OF "FOREIGN" 
The word "foreign" according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
means among other things, "outside the country", "not of onets own 
land". "Foreign" is synonymous with the word "external". If one 
refers to something, say an event or goods as "foreign", it means 
that thing'is taking place outside the country or going to or coming 
from outside one's own country. When, therefore, we think of 
"foreign policy", we are contemplating a policy that perhaps 
originates from country A but is directed towards activities in 
another country. It refers equally to a policy that originates 
from another country and directed towards country A. Again, when 
we think about "foreign policy" we are making a distinction between 
domestic or internal policy and the policy about things or events 
outside the country. Thus we can talk of "Nigeria's policy towards 
Zimbabwe", "the United States policy towards the Middle East crisis" 
or "the Soviet policy towards Cuba" etc. By these we are referring 
to the policy of a country about some events or activities of other 
countries and their outcome. For instance, if country X has a civil 
strife and another country Y decides to adopt a policy of involvement 
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in the internal strife of country X, then the policy of country Y 
is an external one.. A second example is necessary. If a 
country, say Newingtonia offers a. large market for the purchase 
of raw materials and the sale of industrial products while another 
country, called Portisbury, is in need of the large market and 
makes a policy of trade with Newingtonia, the policy of Portisbury 
in this respect is an external one, for it is about something 
outside its territory but within the territory of another country - 
Newingtonia. Similarly, if Portisbury is an industrialised country 
and possesses high technology needed by Newingtonia and the latter 
adopts a policy to acquire industrial know-how and technology 
from Portisbury, then the policy of Newingtonia is an external 
one, dealing with some other country - Portisbury. In a nutshell, 
a policy that cuts across the national territory, 'directed towards 
activities and things in another territory outside of its own is an 
external policy. 
Perhaps in the interest of the newcomer to this discipline (not 
the political scientist to whom this is obvious or well known), 
specific illustration may be helpful in further explaining what is 
"foreign". Within Nigeria, any trading between two states (e. g. 
Imo and Niger or Bauchi and Bendel) or companies or private individuals 
will be classified as domestic or internal trade. But if such 
trading is carried on between a Nigerian State or Company or private 
citizen and another non-Nigerian outside the territorial borders of 
Nigeria, then it becomes foreign trade. Finally, a dispute between 
two communities or organisations or individuals in Nigeria is an 
internal dispute, usually resolved according to the existing law 
in the country. On the other hand, a dispute between a Nigerian 
. r- v. 
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community or a Nigerian organisation or a Nigerian citizen and 
that of another country outside Nigeria, will be regarded as 
an external dispute. Even where such a dispute occurs within 
Nigeria or at its borders and one of the parties involved is 
the subject of another sovereign, the dispute will still be seen 
as having some external elements. Although it will be settled 
by the laws of Nigeria (i. e. the country where the dispute 
occurred), consideration will normally be given to the possible 
reaction of the other sovereign. A typical example occurred 
recently when Nigerian fishermen were attacked at its South- 
Eastern borders by Cameroon Patrol Troops. The Nigerian 
government immediately mobilized its forces ready for a combat 
operation. Negotiations started between the two governments 
and peace was later restored. Some might wonder if every 
private quarrel between two people of different nationalities 
would require the intervention of their governments. The fact 
is that if it becomes known that a foreign government (or its 
official) has intervened in the private dispute involving its 
citizen and say a Nigerian, it will be expected that the Nigerian 
government (or its official in that country) should take commensurate 
interest to ensure equitable resolution of the dispute. 
In effect therefore, any issue that arises in another country 
or outside the territorial borders of Nigeria which has or is 
likely to have some effect on Nigeria or its citizens, will be 
regarded as a "foreign" issue and the decision and action taken 
by the Nigerian government in respect of such issue will be within 
the context of its foreign policy. Also an issue arising from 
within Nigeria which has or is likely to have some effect on 
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another country or organisation outside Nigeria, will to the extent 
of its effect be a foreign issue. For instance, in the recent 
expulsion of illegal aliens in Nigeria (1983), an action taken 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the immediate effect was on 
the governments of the neighbouring countries who had to grapple with 
the problem of refugees. The implication had some unsavoury impact 
on the relations between Nigeria and the countries affected. 
Without referring to the unquantified effects of the expulsions 
on the global image of the country, the action created problems 
for Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs who had to do more 
work in order to mend fences and to restore normal relations and 
confidence. In fact, many actions of a state, considered to be 
its internal matter, have often crossed the territorial borders 
to exert substantial implications on other countries, and rightly 
come within the ambit of foreign policy. 
THE CONCEPT OF "POLICY" 
What is'Policy"? Among the common dictionary definitions 
of "policy" is that it is "a course of action" guided by interest 
and principle of governments, organisations or even individuals. 
Other definitions of the term by most policy analysts tend to 
focus on the behaviour of political authorities and government 
officials, thereby ignoring the varying types of policy and 
levels of formulation. An example is the view that "policy is 
the action and inaction of political authorities". 
2 Jenkins was 
quick to point out that this definition is inadequate because 
"policy" is made in a variety of contexts and different contexts 
2. Jenkins, W. I. 9 Policy Analysis -A Political and Organisational 
Perspective. Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd., London, 1978, p. 13. 
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produce different policies. There is also a growing recognition 
of the link between the policies of an individual and the organi- 
sation, as well as between them and those of the government. 
Moreover, since all modern political systems are pluralistic 
in the sense that many organs and agencies of both government 
and society like the cabinet, the parliament, the local 
governments, the pressure groups and the press, are usually 
involved at certain stages in the formulation and implementation 
of policy - some times as a necessary counterweight to the power 
of the government, policy can no longer be seen purely from a 
legislative aspect3 or the bureaucratic politics perspective. 
4 
Although the level of government involvement or its legislation 
is a major contextual variant of any policy, other factors like 
the national economic context, military capability and national aspirations 
(general expectations of the people) may cause substantial 
changes in policies. As already noted, it is clear that policy 
is made at different levels of both government and society and 
different sectors of society too. The definition of "policy" 
will therefore vary according to the subject in a given context. 
In an issue (1956) of the US Foreign Affairs Magazine the 
then Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Nitze (recently'-Reagan 
Administration's Chief Arms Control Negotiator) was quoted as 
giving two different meanings of the word "policy" as follows: 
3. Foreign policy is defined as "the legislative aspect of 
managing foreign relations" - Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy 
Co Macridis, "The comparative study of foreign policy" in 
Roy C. Macridis (ed. ), Foreign Policy in World Politics. 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1962, p. 18. 
4. Jenkins, W. I., op, cit., pp. 32-33. 
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"In one sense, the action sense, it refers to the- 
general guidelines which we believe should and 
will in fact govern our actions in various 
contingencies. In the other sense, the dec- 
laratory sense, it refers to policy statements 
which have as their aim political and psycho- 
logical effect. 5 
Aldridge explained further this definition with reference to 
the United States' defence policy. He said the United States 
government has designed a general guideline for the development 
of a first strike nuclear capability, which in the event of a 
nuclear war against the Soviet Union would be used to dismember 
the USSR in a first strike, but in the bid to appease the many 
Americans opposed to the enormous expenditure on weapons develop- 
meet, the government parades such policies like "deterrence" and 
"detente" which it believed would elicit the desired political and 
psychological effects on the American public. 
6 The above views 
raise an important observation that the speeches of political 
leaders are not always reliable indicators of the actual policy 
being pursued. It is clear from the definition that "policy" 
means a general guideline for action and from the second part of 
the definition, it is inferred that any "policy" must be discerned 
to achieve particular aims. Thus we could state from Paul 
Nitze's definition that a "policy" is the general guidelines for 
action aimed at achieving certain objectives. The type of objective 
mould, however, vary with the type of policy and the ambitions of 
its makers. 
A closer examination of the foregoing definitions will be 
salutary. It is apparent that the phrase "general guidelines" is 
more akin to "principles". than to "policy". In fact, "general 
5. Aldridge, Robert C., FIRST STRIKE! The Pentagon's Strategy for 
Nuclear War. Pluto Press, London, 1983, p. 26. 




guidelines" form only a part of policy and not the whole of it. 
In our vier, "policy" has to do with the broad things to do, 
available means and possible direction to follow in order to 
attain definite goals. It consists of a series of decisions, 
the actual functions performed and the goals achieved while 
"general guidelines" consist of the set of principles that come 
into play at various stages in the attainment of the defined goals. 
Therefore, the scope of "policy" is broader and-includes general 
guidelines or principles, the plan of things to be done or actions 
to be taken, the styles of procedure or methods of implementing a 
course of action, and the definite goals pursued. All these 
combine to form policy. 
THE MEANING OF "FOREIGN POLICY" 
We have tried to explain the two words "foreign" and "policy" 
separately in perhaps quite a simplistic fashion. The explanations 
no doubt will help one to understand our concept, While the question 
as to what is foreign policy could be-explained further from the 
views of some eminent scholars in the discipline. According to 
Frankel, 
"Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions 
which involve to some appreciable extent, relations 
between one state and others". 
He went further to explain the terms used in the definition. By 
"decision" is understood, he said, to be the determination of a 
course of action, following a more or less deliberate consideration 
of alternatives, while "action" is a thing done, a deed, or the 
process of acting or doing. 
8 Noting that decision and action 
7. Frankel, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy - An Analysis of 




require an agent and an environment, Frankel explained that 
"State decisions" are not made by states but on their behalf 
by individuals and groups of individuals who in most cases are the 
incumbents of official positions as determined by constitutions 
and legal systems, while the environment of foreign policy decision 
embraces the whole universe (i. e. limitless) but only restricted 
by the range of interests and scope of national capability of each 
state actor9 at a given point in time. 
A definition closely related to the above is provided by 
Wilkenfeld who wrote thats 
"Foreign policy may be viewed as those official 
actions which sovereign states initiate for the 
purpose of altering or creating a condition outside 
their territorial sovereign boundaries". 10 
This definition is quite precise and revealing. It emphasises the 
Word "official" to differentiate it from private views and actions 
on external matters. Thus the attitudes and actions of private 
citizens to external issues cannot be regarded as part of their 
country's foreign policy. For it is only when such actions are 
fed into the political system and the authorities recognise and 
accept them as deserving of government reaction that those attitudes 
and actions become foreign policy issues. 
The next important inference from there is the fact that for 
any foreign policy to be meaningful, it must have definite purpose 
and target. For instance, in deciding to enter into any bilateral 
agreement with a country, the costs and benefits must be calculated 
in advance. Each party should be able to know the possibility 
of attaining those objectives that prompted its entry into the 
9. Ibid., pp. 2-9. 
10. Wilkenfeld and Associates, Foreign Policy Behaviour. Sage 
Publications, Inc., London, 1980, p. 22. 
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agreement. This notion of "purpose" in foreign policy is 
very significant particularly for some countries that enter 
into various bilateral and multilateral agreements or open diplo- 
matic missions just because the government at the time could afford, 
or thought it could afford, to maintain a given position. Wilkenfeld's 
definition therefore, makes it clear that the purpose of foreign 
policy must be to maintain or alter a condition in any external 
relationship. The rate at which some countries for example open 
diplomatic missions in friendly countries only to have them closed 
after a few years is indicative of the lack of purpose that 
characterises some foreign policy decisions and actions. The 
essence of "purpose" in foreign policy has equally been underlined 
by Wolfram when he defined foreign policy-as: 
"a co-ordinated strategy with which institutionally 
designated decision makers seek to manipulate the 
international environment in order to achieve certain 
national objectives". 11 
The above definitions are clear and precise enough to facilitate an 
understanding of the meaning of foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to draw attention to the 
distinction between the terms foreign policy, international 
relations and international politics, because they are sometimes 
used interchangeably, thereby giving rise to confusion and to 
beclouding of the phenomenon one tries to explain. Holsti noted 
that the distinction between the terms may be more academic than 
real, 
12 but Rosenau held that the distinction is necessary in order 
11. Wolfram, F. Handrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus -A proposal 
for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of 
Foreign Policy", in American Political Science Review, vol. LXI, 
No. 4 (December, 1967). P. 971. Quoted in Idang, Gordon, op* cit., 
P. 5. 
12. Hoisti, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Third 
edn. ), Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1977, p. 21. 
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to achieve clarity and knowledge of the boundary of the subject, 
which will facilitate valuable insights and findings. 
13 If we 
are to accept the latter view, then a digression is necessary. 
From one perspective, we have seen foreign policy as the decisions 
and actions of a state towards other states (or the external 
environment). In addition to "decisions and actions" Holsti 
extended the definition to include "the conditions - usually 
domestic - under which those actions are formulated". 
14 Both 
Frankel and Hoisti give the impression that foreign policy is 
attributable to the state as distinct from non-state actors 
which could be said to be involved in international relations 
and politics. This is so because multi-national corporations 
and stateless organisations have no definable territory and no 
sovereign authority. Moreover, as the activities of non-state 
actors may be conditioned by the legislative actions of the 
sovereign within whose territory the actor is based, the latter's 
decisions and actions could be seen in the context of those of 
its sovereign host. 
In the light of these, it is safer to restrict foreign policy 
to state-actors while the non-state actors could be better seen to 
engage in international relations and politics. Now, what is 
international relations? The term refers to all forms of interaction 
between actors and the members of different nation-states, be they 
government sponsored or not. The scope of international relations 
according to Holsti includes the analysis of foreign policies or 
political processes between nations, membership of international 
13. Rosenau, James N, International Politics and Foreign Policy. 
The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 1961, p. 3. 
14. Holsti, op* cit., p. 21. 
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trade unions and associations, international trade, transportation, 
communications and other activities involving relations between 
separate organisations and societies. 
15 On the other hand, 
international politics is the set of actions, reactions and 
interactions among states in quest of higher advantage in the 
international system. Rosenau said it is concerned with the 
condition of the international system at any moment in time, the 
recurring pattern of balances and imbalance in the interaction 
of states, the formation of alliances and coalitions to achieve 
military or political objectives, and the development of supra- 
national organisations to influence changes in the international 
system, 
16 
The distinction between the three terms could be briefly 
stated that, in foreign policy we look at the state's behaviour 
as a component unit of the international system; and in international 
relations we are concerned with the pattern of interaction or 
relationship per . 29 
(not impinging upon official government desire 
to achieve unilateral objectives) among governments, organisations 
or even individuals of different nationalities; while international 
politics is concerned with the pattern of power distribution and 
the factors which precipitate changes in the international system 
as a whole. Despite this distinction, it is not uncommon to find 
in books on foreign policy some explanations which tend to incorporate 
the three terms. The problem of differentiation is compounded by 
the differing orientations and interests of many scholars in the 
discipline. 
15. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
16. Rosenau, James N. opo cit., p. 3. See also the article in the 
same book by Fred A. Sondermann on "The Linkage between Foreign 
Policy and International Politics", pp. 8-17. 
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The definitions cited above have presented foreign policy 
from a mutual interest perspective of being about the course 
of interaction that usually exists and has to continue to 
exist between one country and the others. Some writers prefer 
to explain foreign policy from an ideological perspective while 
others define it in conflict terms. For instance, Hugo while 
examining the principles of British foreign policy wrote that 
foreign policy could be defined as: 
"that general conception of national aspirations, 
interests and capacities which influence the 
government in the identification of disputes with 
other governments and in the choice of methods 
for the prevention, determination or limitation 
of such disputes". 
17 
Explaining the definition, Hugo said British foreign policy is 
essentially concerned with disputes between British subjects, 
British organisations and British governmental agencies, on the 
one hand and those of foreign states on the other. He argued 
that if the world is free from disputes or there is an acceptable 
international authority to settle disputes enforceably, there would 
then be no need for Britain to maintain foreign relations or to make 
policy for their conduct. Hugo noted that his definition may seem 
a depressingly negative view of foreign policy because some would 
argue that the essence of contemporary international relations 
(bilateral and multilateral) and the attendant policies are to 
perpetuate, propagate and promote international co-operation and 
peace among nations but Hugo dismissed such views as more "fine 
phrases" and "cynical conclusion"18 in a world of conflict. This 
conflict approach to the explanation of foreign policy might have 
17. Hugo, Grant, Britain in Tomorrow's World; Principles of Foreign 
Poli _. Chatto & Windus, London, 1969, p. 27. 
18. Hugo, Grant, ibid., p. 24. 
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been derived from a related notion of politics being about 
conflict and conflict resolution. In which case, the author 
assumed that the terms "foreign policy" and "international 
politics" can be used interchangeably. We have referred to 
the distinction between them earlier. 
Closely related to this conflict perspective is the power 
resource approach19 to the explanation of foreign policy. It 
examines, among other things, the multiplicity of conflicts arising 
from relations among nations and the role of power in the determination 
of such conflicts; the extent to which one actor controls through 
exercise of power the decisions and actions of another, and the 
degree of acquiescence of the lese powerful and weak countries 
to the controlling influence of powerful actors. This approach 
assumes that disagreement and conflict are bound to arise in any 
relationship, that conflict is closely associated with the exercise 
I 
of power which itself involves punishments or negative sanctions20 
and that in any relationship the actor with preponderant power has the 
tendency to seek to carry out its own will at a cost to the other 
partner. As a result, the making of policy for the conduct of 
foreign relations must be concerned with how to limit conflict, 
deter aggression or the threat of it and prevent possible punishments 
or negative sanctions. It presupposes therefore, that power base 
and power resources are vital ingredients of foreign policy, which 
could be relied upon to secure equitable resolution of a conflict 
in the event of any rupture in the relations between nations or used 
19, Korpi, Walter, "A Power Resource Approach to the Power 
controversy; the Pluralist-Elitist Debate Revisited". 
Swedish Institute for Social Research, University of 
Stockholm, 1983. 
20. Ibid., p. 4. 
.. Wl-. 
124, 
as an influencer in any arrangement for the continuation of 
relations. 
This is not to say that foreign policy is about power 
relationships but that dependable power resources are essential 
for the maintenance of equitable bilateral relations, negotiation 
of fair treaties and agreements and the limitation of sedulous 
exploitation. In sum, the effectiveness of a country's foreign 
policy depends to a great extent on its mobilisable power resources 
and the will to use them to promote, maintain and stabilize its 
external relations, not necessarily to advance the selfish 
objectives of its foreign policy as is usually said of exploitative 
relationships. However, the power resource-approach to the 
explanation of foreign policy is just another way of looking at 
the concept. 
THE SCOPE OF FOREIGN POLICY 
The scope of activities between nations in interaction has 
Widened over the years and as such a precise definition of the 
policy for their conduct may have too narrow a scope. Some 
writers therefore opt for an explanation of the scope of 
activities involved as a better means of fostering an understanding 
of the subject and the appreciation of its essence. In his work 
on the "Issues of Irish Foreign Policy", Keatinge maintained that 
foreign policy is "composed of a range of issue areas, reflecting 
a variety of motivations, objectives and actions and which almost 
amount to a microcosm of the whole range of public policy". 
21 
He pointed out that the diversity of interests, attitudes and issues 
involved in foreign policy, its overlap with almost every activity 
21. Keatinge, Patrick, A Place among the Nations: Issues of Irish 
Foreign Policy. Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 
1978, p. 193. 
ý- 
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of a modern state and the varying instruments (some of which 
are diabolical) used by states to further the ends of their 
policies, all combine to defy any near or simple definition. 
Both practitioners and scholars alike would no doubt appreciate 
the problem posed by the ever-widening scope of foreign policy, 
hence there is a shift from the search of a precise definition 
to the description of the scope of foreign policy. Keatinge 
quoted a former Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Patrick 
Hillary as describing foreign policy as: 
"the sum of $ whole series of actions and 
decisions at Government level in a wide 
variety of exchanges - political, trade and 
economic, social and cultural. These 
exchanges take place with a variety of 
other nations and th y vary widely in their 
importance to us". 21 
This description is true of a practitioner, having imagined 
the variety of functions performed by diplomats in various parts 
of the globe and the flow of reports as well as directives in the 
foreign office. It highlights the almost limitless scope of 
activities that come under foreign policy, and like the others 
cited above, confines foreign policy to government, acting on 
behalf of the state. Hillary's definition makes it clear that 
social and cultural exchanges between nations are also aspects of 
foreign policy. These include education exchange programmes, 
the dissemination of information about one country in another, 
exchange of visits by citizens of different countries, the 
treatment and privileges accorded to such aliens, usually on a 
reciprocal basis etc. The extent to which these activities are 
carried on between countries in interaction varies and the degree 
22. Ibid. 
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of variation determines the importance of the relationship. 
It is understandable from there that foreign policy is not just 
concerned with only maintaining mutual political relations or using 
such relations to bring pressure on friendly governments to support 
a particular line of action on certain international issues. The 
nation's economic and cultural objectives are usually reflected 
in its foreign policy. 
It therefore suggests the necessity in foreign policy formulation 
to identify the economic and cultural needs of the country, to 
determine which countries are more likely to offer opportunities 
for those needs and to decide the plan or strategy for securing 
the opportunities. The countries that offer these opportunities 
at equitable exchange rates would become more important than the 
countries which do not offer the opportunities. If, therefore, 
a country is in need of industrialisation, it should consider as 
a matter of priority which countries will be willing to establish 
the required industries and start proposals with such countries. 
If this is done, the proposals, the responses and the eventual 
agreement and building of the industry, will form part of the foreign 
policy exchanges. In this cases as already noted, the country that 
offers the least opportunity for those needs will certainly go down 
in its importance to the needy country. 
In a similar approach, Padelford and Lincoln explained that a 
state's foreign policy comprises (i) a general assessment of the 
state's economic, military and international position with relation 
to other states - neighbours, rivals, allies; (ii) an appraisal of 
its capabilities in advising bold action, caution, self-reliance, 
isolation, economic ties, or military or political alignments with 
127, 
others; (iii) the broad principles of conduct which the state 
holds and its government advocates with respect to international 
affairs; (iv) specific objectives and national interests which 
the state seeks for itself in foreign relations and for the course 
of world affairs generally; and (v) the strategies, commitments 
and tactics which are undertaken for the realisation of its 
objectives and interests. 
23 
Similarly Ofoegbu stated that 
foreign policy deals with defence, security, international political 
relations and international economic relations, as well as cultural, 
scientific and technical co-operation between one actor in the 
international system and other actors in the international system. 
24 
It also includes, he noted, the set of objectives which direct, 
shape, regulate and govern these relations. 
25 
A CONCEPTION OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
The question could still be asked as to what is the Nigerian 
conception of foreign policy or whether the above definitions and 
explanations conform with the notion of foreign policy in Nigeria. 
Basically, foreign policy as a concept is the same for every 
country but the scope and importance of the component issues vary 
with each country. This is so because the priorities and emphasis 
of countries differ according to their respective traditions, 
historical experiences, political institutions, geographical 
circumstances, economic necessities, national aspirations, power 
resources and the beliefs and values held by each state. All 
23, Padeltord, Norman J. and Lincoln, George A., International Politics: 
Foundations of International Relations. The Macmillan Company, New 
York, 1954, p. 306. 
24. It must be noted that the term "Actors in the International System" 
refers to states, international organisations, some types. of 
individuals and corporate or legal entities within the environment 
of the system. 
25. Otoegbu, Ray, Foundation Course in International Relations for 
African Universities. George Allen nW nt London# 19009 pp. 3 6, 
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these combine to influence the ideas and proposals of those 
who formulate and implement policies in every country whether 
a democracy or a dictatorship, a developed or developing state. 
The same factors also condition the attitudes and thinking of 
the general public in that country to make them tolerate the 
actions or inactions of their policy makers. These conditioning 
factors in every country generate the idea of national interest 
and national objectives which become the framework for decisions 
and actions. Moreover, foreign policy decisions and actions in 
every country are targeted to the external environment, with the 
primary objective to secure the existence, security and well-being 
of the country and its people. Nevertheless, these underlying 
traditions, experiences, circumstances and beliefs, bring about 
variations in the foreign policy scope and priorities of the 
different countries, hence we are concerned here not with foreign 
policy as a general theme but with the foreign policy of Nigeria. 
The subject matter of Nigerian foreign policy has both a 
general character and distinguishing peculiarities. Its scope 
and importance are wide and varied. In terms of scope, Nigerian 
foreign policy encompasses aspects of all Nigerian relations with 
foreign countries or governments and other actors in the international 
system. Indeed, it is not limited to the activities of the Ministry 
of External Affairs. To understand the scope of Nigeria's foreign 
policy requires cataloguing of the number of government departments 
and public agencies and organisations which have a section or unit 
that deals with international transactions or matters. of international 
affairs. There has been no such compilation and it is not part of 
our task here to compile one. However, a look into the Business 
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Directory of the country shows thousands of companies and 
firms involved in imports and exports with foreign countries. 
Also the archives of the Passport Office in Lagos from 1970 to 
1980 reveal the presence of Nigerians, many of whom are students, 
in all parts of the world. The government does not take for 
granted that these people are engaged in private endeavours, 
rather every possible effort is made to protect and provide for 
them. For example, when former President Shehu Shagari addressed 
in 1981 the newly appointed Ambassadors, he charged them, as part 
of their primary responsibility with protecting the interests of 
Nigerian students, businessmen and visitors in the countries of 
their deployment. 
26 
Although these Nigerians abroad may not 
realise the interest of government in their wellbeing and as such 
refuse to report their presence to the Nigerian Mission in that 
country, until perhaps they encounter serious difficulties or 
problems with some persons or law enforcement authority in that 
country, the fact remains that their stay, safety and activities 
in a foreign land constitute a vital aspect of the objectives of 
Nigerian foreign policy. 
We have already stated that foreign policy is not the exclusive 
business of the Ministry of External Affairs. Other departments of 
government and public organisations are involved at different 
levels and in various ways in the formulation and administration of 
foreign policy. For instance, in determining the criteria for 
admitting foreigners into the country, how long they may stay and 
under certain circumstances how they shall be expelled, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs is directly taking decisions and actions which 
26. From a discussion with one of the Ambassadors present at the 
occasion. 
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involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state 
(Nigeria) and others. Since 1980 the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs has been responsible for the issuance, refusal or 
withdrawal of passports to Nigerians who travel abroad. The 
activities of these Nigerian citizens abroad, who travel with 
the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, affect 
Nigeria's image abroad and its relations with other countries. 
We can include the state governments who award scholarships to 
their indigenes to study abroad, send economic delegations abroad to 
negotiate joint ventures, and award contracts to foreign firms. 
These actions of state governments are undoubtedly in the realm 
of "external affairs", which constitutionally is in the portfolio 
of the Federal Government. We are not pointing out any infraction 
of the constitution for there are or should be established procedures 
for states in a federation to realise their external interests within 
a co-ordinated federal framework, but experience has shown that on 
several occasions and in various countries, Nigerian state delegations 
have arrived in a country without advance notification having been 
received by the Nigerian Embassy in that country. It is only when 
the host-officials wish to ascertain the identity of the visiting 
delegation that a telephone call will be made to the Nigerian Embassy 
to intimate the arrival of such a delegation. 
Many other departments of government and public agencies are 
also involved in decisions and actions on matters of External 
Affairs. The Ministry of Aviation takes an active part in devising 
and negotiating Air-Services Agreements with various countries. 
The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) undertakes several 
contract arrangements with foreign countries and agencies. The 
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Central Bank of Nigeria and Federal Ministry of Finance 
formulate and implement policies on the remittance of funds 
abroad in order to honour the obligations of government and 
citizens of Nigeria. A further survey will reveal the extent 
of overlapping of foreign policy and the ever-widening scope 
as well as the involvement in its making of virtually every 
government department or public agency. Perhaps we could recall 
the Ministry of Sports, Youth and Culture spearheading the 
discussion and negotiation about the exclusion from the Montreal 
Olympics of New Zealand for having sporting links with apartheid 
South Africa. 
Similarly, professional associations like the Nigerian 
Medical Association, the Nigerian Bar Association etc, who belong 
to the World Medical and Bar Associations, attend international 
conferences and participate in discussions and negotiations to 
adopt resolutions of importance. At the World Medical Association 
Conference held in Lisbon, Portugal in April 1982, which this 
researcher attended as the diplomatic representative from the 
Nigerian Embassy, the Nigerian Medical Association delegates led 
the criticism against the apartheid policy of the South African 
government, accused the South African Medical Association of 
collaborating with that government in its apartheid policy and 
therefore urged other members to vote against the admission into 
the World Body of the South African Medical Association. All 
this goes to show (contrary to the impression held by many, 
including a senior official of one of the Federal Ministries 
who asserted during a discussion that foreign policy is the business 
of the Ministry of External Affairs) that it goes beyond the functions 
of one Ministry or department of government. 
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Ifs however, we must narrow the scope to provide a 
precise definition of the concept within the Nigerian 
context, one way of arriving at such will be by identifying 
the unique features of Nigerian foreign policy. It seems 
appropriate to describe the Nigerian foreign policy as 
altruistic. Its outstanding features have been reflected 
thust 
"Our policy is one of friendship with all 
the nations of the world. We do not wish 
to identify ourselves as a matter of routine 
with the policies of any particular country 
or group of countries. We will continue to 
base our attitude to the problems of the 
world on an unflinching respect for truth 
and the desire to find out and strive to 
support what is right. It is our determination 
in all our dealings within our own country and 
with the outside world that we uphold the dignity 
of man everywhere. We shall endeavour with every 
means at our command to make certain that in our 
own country the freedom which we have and which 
we so dearly cherish shall extend to all who are 
still under the domination of other people. 27 
It is thus clear that Nigeria maintains a foreign policy of "live 
and let live"q which is a feature of altruism. It values friendship 
with every country without discrimination and believes in the dictum 
that "if the right hand washes the left and the left hand washes 
the right, the two hands would become cleaner". It advocates a 
common endeavour by "all nations, big or-small, to really preserve 
world peace by doing everything they can to atop armed conflict". 
28 
It emphasises the need for a common striving for a just world 
economic order designed to improve opportunities for those countries 
who are poor and to raise the living standards of all peoples of the 
world. A vital. element of the foreign policy is to ensure the 
27. Mr.. Prime Ministe 
Hon. Sir Abubakar 
Lagoa, 1964, P. 5 
28. Ibid., P. 60. 
a selection of speeches made by Alhaji the Rt* 
fawa Belewa, edeallM Ministry of n orma on, 
0 
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survival and maintenance of relationships through genuine 
co-operation and collaboration. Unlike the capitalist 
and communist foreign policies, the Nigerian foreign policy 
is neither imperialistic nor hegemonistic. It is not geared 
to exploit the political and economic weaknesses of other 
friendly countries. It is not designed to undermine foreign 
governments either directly or indirectly through subversive 
elements or any other variety or combination of carrot and 
stick. It is devoid of ideological rivalry and military 
alignment. It is not hypocritical in the sense of covertly 
supporting a party in conflict while openly calling on both 
parties to make peace. These are the standards by which a 
country's foreign policy can be judged as being ideal or not. 
The absence of these pretensions in the Nigerian foreign policy 
make it ideal. We can illustrate the ideal-type policy further 
by pointing to the fact that Nigeria is perhaps the only country 
in the world today that gives aid and various kinds of assistance 
to other countries without the least string being attached. However, 
these may be said to be moralistic and it may be argued that a 
foreign policy should not be based on morality. Whatever may be 
the merit of such argument, there is perhaps no doubt that Nigerian 
foreign policy has been unequivocal in articulation and consistent 
in objective, despite the absence of imperialist motives and 
pretensions. Moreover, it has all the time had the popular 
support of the Nigerian public and the various governments 
(civilian and military) and it has made significant successes in 
the world so far, due to the conviction that the ideals are noble, 
just and immutable. 
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The foreign policy of Nigeria should therefore be 
conceived in terms of those ideals of general relevance and 
validity which Nigerians believe are essential for the 
advancement of the independence, security and well-being of 
their country, their continent and the world. At this 
juncture, one easily recalls the statements of some Nigerian 
leaders who conceive the destiny of their country to be 
inextricably linked with the destiny of all peoples of 
African descent as well as the other oppressed peoples in 
the world. In a speech, Or. Nnamdi Azikiwe (first President 
of Nigeria) warned that Africa has emerged at a critical 
juncture in world politics and as experience of the last two 
world wars ha. shown, if sufficient wisdom is not employed, 
Africa could be used for the third time and made a battle ground 
in the war of the elephants. He drew attention to the fact that 
in the first and second world wars, "Africa played a leading role 
not only as supplier of men, materials and money, but as a theatre 
of war" and African peoples were inveigled into participating in 
the destruction of Kaiserism and Hitlerism in order that the world 
should be made safe for democracy. Now, he said, "the peoples 
of Africa are being told again that it is necessary in the interest 
of peace and the preservation of Christianity, that they should be 
ready to fight the Soviet Union, which the war buglers allege is 
aiming at world domination. "29 Stressing that in Nigeria, we 
Pace the inescapable reality that the blood of our sons has been 
shed in two world ware in vain, Zik said, "Peace is indivisible. 
29. Iik, A selection from the speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe, op. cit., 
p. 62. 
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One half of the world cannot enjoy peace while the other half 
lives in the throes of war. " 
30 
Similarly, foreign policy statements by other Nigerian 
leaders have reflected the same concern for peace and order 
in Africa and the World. Thus, Prime Minister Balewa 
underlined that: 
"Next to safeguarding and promoting the interests 
of the Federation and its citizens, the Federal 
Government is committed to preservation of peace 
and tranquility in Africa and the World, without 
which the whole idea of independence is meaning- 
less and human progress will be hampered. " 31 
On another occasion he also said: 
"We in Nigeria fully realise that mutual co- 
operation between nations for the preservation 
of peace and the development and progress of 
society is inevitable. Hence Nigeria's cardinal 
policy is one of friendship with all nations of 
the world and closer associations of peoples at 
all levels. " 32 
The foreign policy of Nigeria, therefore, could be seen not in 
terms of the actual power possessed by the country and its 
readiness to apply such for coercion and exploitation of 
others; or in terms of the magnitude of the economic and 
military resources it commands relative to another country or 
group of countries; nor in its capacity to establish hegemony 
continentally or globally, but in the terms of the degree of 
peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between it and other 
actors in the international system. Thus Nigerian foreign policy 
can be defined as: the general guidelines and plans of action 
which the state adopts for the conduct of relations with other 
30. Ibid., p. 63. 
31. Mr. Prime Minister, op. cit., p. 63 
32. Ibid., pp. 62 and 84. 
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actors in order to enhance co-operation and collaboration 
in the attainment of certain national and international 
objectives. 
The components of this definition are self-explanatory 
and need not take our time here. Nevertheless, it must be 
stated that the objectives of Nigerian foreign policy described 
here as "national and international objectives" could be 
classified into three parts. First, the interests of the 
nation-state which are to ensure the security and independence 
of Nigeria as well as the welfare of its citizens by encouraging 
peaceful relationship and mutual co-operation that will facilitate 
collaboration in the attainment of those ends, including economic 
growth, educational advancement, scientific and technological 
development; Second, the continental interest, manifested in 
the determination to maintain close co-operation with the other 
African states with the aim of fostering better understanding and 
a realisation of identity of interest among them. The attainment 
of such aim, it is believed, would promote solidarity and advertise 
the importance of Africa in world affairs. Third, the global 
interest which is to further the cause of world peace and co- 
operation through urging universal respect for freedom, equality 
and justice, while at the same time refraining from alignment with 
any military bloc in world politics, as such encourages antagonistic 
relationship and rivalry. Other components of the definition which 
may need explanation include "general guidelines" which we will 
discuss in detail in a subsequent chapter dealing with the 
principles of Nigerian foreign policy, while the "plan of action" 
could be understood from the activities of the "foreign policy-making 
machinery to be examined in chapter seven. It must be reiterated 
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that the purpose of formulating both "general guidelines" and 
"plans of action" is to achieve definite objectives, which as 
already stated, are part of the policy. 
To appreciate this conception of foreign policy is to admit 
that in the global field of human relations, all is relative to 
one's needs, position, dangers, objectives and goals. These 
determine the priority of each actor. Although the cliche 
exists that foreign policy is founded on egocentricity and 
therefore "must be fundamentally self-seeking to be politically 
and logically tenable", 
33 it would be misleading to assume that 
the purpose of foreign policy is simply the pursuit of the 
selfish interests of the state. Foreign policy is not bound 
to be self-seeking all the time, for certain vital national goals 
can be better attained through mutual interdependence and co- 
operation. Moreover, sines the needs, positions and goals of 
states vary in relation to one another and in an era of greater 
awareness, no state will tolerate being placed in a disadvantageous 
position for too long. Continuous and uninhibited display of 
selfish interest could mar relations between nations and foreign 
policy will be meaningless if it ruptures existing relations or 
fails to meet the acceptance of the other actors. It is only 
when a policy is designed to further mutual co-operation and 
promote reciprocal advantages that it becomes acceptable and 
durable. Reciprocity is the basis of any reasonable relationship 
and if it does not exist, the relationship will not endure and 
the policy governing it is short-sighted. 
33. Vital, David, The Making of British Foreign Policy. George 
Allen & Unuin Ltd., London, 1966, pp. 18-19. 
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Thus, while foreign policy must be calculated to advance 
and defend the realisation of the external objectives of the 
state, whatever that might be to each state, it must also 
maintain and advance the relationship of the states concerned 
for it to be reasonable and lasting. A policy that is 
fundamentally self-seeking usually ignores the relative 
needs and expectations of the others with which it is in 
interaction. The resultant effect will be conflict which 
will sometimes break up existing relations or create stress 
and tension in the relationship. Such a policy is founded 
on error and likely to destroy itself. A policy that does 
not secure and maintain order in the system while advancing 
the objectives of the state in whose name it is founded may be 
judged a failure; one which does is successful. This is the 




PRINCIPLES OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Having tried in the preceding chapter to explain the meaning 
of the concept of foreign policy and in particular Nigerian- 
foreign policy, some questions immediately emerge. Are there 
any principles of Nigerian foreign policy? If so, what are they? 
In effect, this chapter will be concerned with the identification 
and explanation of the principles that guide the formulation and 
execution of Nigeria's foreign policy. Just as we argued earlier 
that every nation state has a foreign policy, so also we would 
argue and uphold here that every foreign policy has some theoretical 
bases. These are those perhaps common but indispensable rationale 
and assumptions for most decisions and actions of the country in 
external affairs. If the bases of policy have not been 
explicitly organised and articulated - as perhaps in the case 
of Nigeria - it might be assumed that the principles of foreign 
policy are non-existent or questionable. Sometimes the style 
and direction of policy might be mistaken for principles and at 
other times the idea of principle i$ ignored in the examination 
of foreign policy. 
There is also apparent overlap in scope between "principles"t 
"objectives" and "goals" of foreign policy. As a result of this 
overlap, there is the tendency to use the terms synonymously. It 
is possible to distinguish the three terms. 
The Goal 
The goal of a policy is the ultimate aim/object to be realised. 
Few would dispute, for instance, that one of the goals of all 
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national policies is to secure the survival of the nation. 
Others include the welfare of the citizens and the economic 
wellbeing of . the country. A goal is the sum of objectives. 
It is the end point which, when attained, consumates the 
endeavours. For example, one of the goals of Nigeria's 
economic policy is to build "a united, strong and self-reliant 
nation". 
1 This embraces the objectives of its "green revolution"# 
trading activities, industrialisation etc. Similarly when the 
Nigerian government declared its commitment to the total liberation 
of all oppressed black people in Africa, the goal is to secure 
the independence of all African countries from colonial and 
apartheid regimes. 
2 In pursuit of the same goal, the Federal 
Military Government took the decision to recognise the MPLA 
Government of Angola (see chapter 8 (iib). In the decision to 
send Nigerian peacekeeping troops to Chad Republic, the goal was 
to maintain political stability in the region. This includes 
stability in Nigeria, for violence in a neighbouring African 
country is considered a possible source of threat to Nigeria. 
There are a number of other goals. 
3 Based on item one of its 
foreign policy objectives below, one can say that one of the primary 
L, The Four Year National Development Plan 1970-749 Federal 
Ministry of Information Lagos, 1970. 
2. Obasanjo, Olusegun, A March of Progress - Collected Speeches 
of General Olusegun Obasanio. Federal Ministry of Information, 
Lagos, 1980, p. 49. 
3. For a classification of the goals of foreign policy see (a) 
Northedge, F. A. The International Political System. Faber, London, 
1976, pp. 194-7; (b) Legg, R. K. and Morrison, J. F. Politics and 
the International System: An Introduction. Harper & Row, New 
York, 1971, pp. 143-4; (c) Wolters, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: 
Essays on International Politics. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
19629 pp* 73-9. 
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goals and indeed the most vital goal of Nigeria is the 
preservation of its territorial integrity, independence and 
sovereignty as well as the security and wellbeing of the 
citizens wherever they may be. In effect national survival 
is a primary goal of the country. These goals can be 
achieved incrementally through attaining relevant objectives. 
Perhaps we can describe a goal as the "What" of foreign policy. 
It is only when goals are clearly identified that the objectives 
can properly be matched to particular goals. Similarly, if 
goals are clearly defined, then decisions and actions will be 
better appreciated and applied towards a given target. 
The Objective 
The objective of a policy is that which if achieved, adds 
to the realisation of the goal. In other words, objectives are 
the other. points or things that variously are not the goal but 
part of it. Collectively, they form the goal. It can be 
understood from the examples above that the objectives of 
Nigeria's African policy include encouraging nationalist leaders 
in dependent African countries to struggle for their independence. 
In the Angolan case, the recognition of the MPLA Government was 
an objective of policy while the goal as already noted, is to 
ensure the independence of Angola (as part of the total independence 
of Africa) and political stability in that region, in the long run. 
Similarly, in the case of Chad, part of the objectives include 
preventing the involvement of extra-African military force and to 
encourage the Chadian leaders to resolve their differences amicably. 
These are not the ultimate aim or goal, as indicated above. They 
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are, of course, closely related because the objectives exist 
to attain the goal but to make sure that each objective is 
achieved, it must be clearly distinguished from both goal and 
principle. 
Broadly, the objectives of Nigerian foreign policy have 
been declared time and again by various Nigerian leaders. There 
has been a number of reviews of these objectives. The last 
review exercise was done in 1976. It outlined the objectives 
of the country in foreign policy as follows: 
(i) the defence of our sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity; 
(ii) the creation of the necessary political and 
economic conditions in Africa and the rest of 
the world, which will facilitate the defence 
of the independence and territorial integrity 
of all African countries while at the same 
time fostering national self-reliance and 
rapid economic development; 
(iii) the promotion of equality and self-reliance 
in Africa and the rest of the developing 
world; 
(iv) the promotion and defence of justice and 
respect for human dignity, especially the 
dignity of the black man; and 
(v) the defence and promotion of world peace. 
4 
These are broad objectives and are not likely to offer 
definite guidelines to the practitioner when confronted with 
several global issues like the Arms control and disarmament, 
the use of outer space and seabed, the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the East-West rivalry or an event like the British-Argentine 
claims over the Falkland Islands. Anyone involved in the 
consideration of these issues may have difficulty relating them 
4. Obasanjo, 0. t A March of Progress. Collected speeches of 
General Oluseoun Obasan_io, Federal Ministry of Information, 
Lagos, 1979, p. 49. 
143, 
to the declared objectives of government in external affairs. 
The same type of difficulty may be encountered in negotiating 
a bilateral commercial agreement, determining what Nigerian 
interest is involved in particular activities of a foreign 
government, or in making decisions to vote one way or the other 
on certain international issues. It is contended that the 
objectives would be more meaningful if redefined in the simplest 
and most generally valid terms that can be used for assessment 
and practical decisions on particular problems that confront 
Nigeria's foreign policy practitioners. One of the ways of 
lessening the difficulty is to distinguish between objectives and 
the essential guidelines (principles) of foreign policy. 
The Meaning of Principles 
By "principles" we mean the motive force or the underlying 
guidelines/bases of all foreign policy decisions and actions. 
As a matter of fact, principles guide the realisation of-. objectives 
and goals of policy. They also form the set of reasons and 
justifications for the behaviour of a state. It would be ludicrous 
for a state to involve itself in say a war or peace settlement at 
some cost to its citizens without having substantive reasons for 
doing so. The government that acts without reasonable cause 
and plan will become unpopular and would likely face a revolt from 
its citizens. For every policy, there must be the underlying 
reason and conviction that make it acceptable to the people and 
for which they give support by allowing the use of their human 
and material resources for its pursuit. Such underlying reasons 
and convictions constitute the motive force of principles of 
foreign policy. Generally "principles" provide the rationale or 
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explain the "Why? " of foreign policy. To the bureaucrat, this 
means the laid-down guidelines or directives which define what 
should be done in order to achieve certain objectives or goal. 
Thus, principles of foreign policy constitute a component part 
of the purposive elements that regulate the external behaviour 
of an actor in the international system. 
To many politicians and statesmen, "national interest" is the 
shorthand expression for principles of foreign policy. For instance, 
the US invasions of Cambodia (Vietnam) and Grenada (1984) as well 
as similar Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan, 
which were in other terms cases of violation of the sovereign and 
territorial rights of these states, were defended on grounds of 
"national interest. " Nigeria's failure to intervene in the 
arrangements to establish foreign bases for military operations 
and missile trials in neighbouring African countries, 
5 
a failure 
due to military weakness, is rationalised on the basis of national 
interest. 6 While answering a question from reporters on what 
principle would guide Nigeria's foreign policy under the new 
military regime, the then (1975) newly appointed Commissioner 
for External Affairs, Joe Garbs, said "... we must always see to 
it that in our policy Nigeria's interests would be dominant. " To 
elucidate the point, he said the government will be guided by the 
5. Imobighe, T. A., "African States and Defence Agreements with 
Foreign Powers: The negation of Non-Alignment" in Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. ?, nos. 1 and 2.1981, 
6. Brigadier Alabi Isama (Rtd. ) in an address to foreign service 
officers on Induction course 1978, said that the government has 
watched with concern the increasing foreign military presence 
in Africa but is guided by the advice that to prevent such foreign 
bases will ultimately involve intervention in the internal affairs 
of those African countries and will be misconstrued as exhibition 
of territorial ambition -a point which the Imperialists will use 
contrary to our objectives in external affairs, to consolidate their 
domination of Africa in the guise of providing military assistance. 
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principle of national interest in its foreign policy. Similarly, 
When the British Government decided to get involved in the Suez 
crisis of 1956, the decision was justified on the grounds of 
"national interest". 7 Again in 1982 the British Government 
went to war to defend the Falkland Islands against Argentina 
for reasons of national interest but any close observer of 
British politics knows the reasons were much more than the 
British national interest alone. These examples go to show 
that, to some people, all the principles that guide a country's 
policy in external affairs - be they on economic, defence, technical, 
ideological or cultural issues - are classified as "national interest". 
This makes the concept ambiguous and creates problems of interpretation 
and application of appropriate principles to particular issues. The 
more vague a principle is the more the difficulty of its application. 
As a matter of fact, practical decisions cannot be taken on the 
basis of sentiments or vaguely worded principles. In taking any 
foreign policy decision or action, the basic consideration should 
be on the relevance of such to specific principles. It is therefore 
our contention that the principles that guide decisions and actions 
in external affairs should be clearly defined in simple terms. 
Principles too should be distinguished from the objectives whose 
realisation they are supposed to guide. 
Classification of Principles 
The principles of Nigerian foreign policy have not been spelt 
out like the objectives which virtually every Nigerian Head of 
State has tried to restate. However, the principles can be 
7. Hugo, Grant, Britain in Tomorrow's World: The Principles of 
Foreign Policy. Chatto & Windus, London, 1969, pp. 94-96. 
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deduced from some statements and actions of the Nigerian 
government as well as the declared objectives of its foreign 
policy. Accordingly we can identify the principles of 
Nigeria's foreign policy as follows: 
1. National protection. 
2. National economic growth. 
3. Cultural identity. 
4. National aspiration. 
5. African security and co-operation. 
6. Non-alignment. 
7. Promoting international peace and co-operation. 
We will endeavour here to explain in the simplest terms possible 
the meaning of these principles that guide the formulation and 
execution of Nigeria's foreign policy. 
NATIONAL PROTECTION 
The principle of national protection is concerned first and 
foremost about the security and wellbeing of the state, its citizens 
and resources. According to an External Affairs Officer, the 
principle demands the protection and promotion of the country's 
national interests. For practical purposes, we need to explain 
the component parts of this expression. By "protection" it implies 
the responsibility and obligation of every citizen, especially the 
official incumbents of relevant posts, to make sure that the 
country's valued possessions, needs, desires and expectations are 
guarded jealously to prevent violation, exploitation, misuse or 
misdirection. It means a deliberate effort to defend and protect 
the territory, the resources, the government, the citizens and their 
property wherever they may be and under any circumstance. For 
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example, if it is known that a Nigerian citizen or company or 
ship or aircraft has been detained in a foreign country for some 
alleged offences, the government of Nigeria or its representative 
is bound to see not only that the accused receives fair trial but 
also to secure the release and repatriation, if possible, of such 
citizen, company, ship or aircraft. Instances abounds of 
Nigerians detained in foreign countries for months and when the 
Nigerian Embassy is asked what it has done to safeguard such 
persons, the reply would be that a report has been sent to Lagos 
on the matter and the Embassy is waiting for directives as to 
what to do. Such "waiting" is due to lack of comprehension of 
the meaning and scope of the duties and obligations involved in 
"protecting the national interest". Without trying to put the 
blame squarely on Nigerian Missions, the problem arises from the 
vagueness of the directive principles of the country's foreign 
policy. Such vagueness militates against initiative and prompt 
action on matters that demand them. 
If the principle of "protecting the national interest" is 
clearly understood, then the Nigerian Embassy/High Commission in 
a country will not wait for directives from Lagos but it would 
invoke this principle as a basis for taking every necessary measure 
to secure the release of such detainees. This principle broadly 
8. These include students that have immigration problems in USA, 
UK9 Italy and Greece. There are also Nigerians reportedly denied 
licenses/permits to do business or work in countries whose nationals 
do business and work in Nigeria. In Greece a Nigerian was wrongly 
arrested for alleged drug offence and when it was reported to the 
Embassy, there was divided opinion between those who felt that 
consular assistance should not be extended to him because of the 
more mention of drug offence and those who felt strongly that the 
allegation was influenced by prejudice. The latter was proved 
correct in the and, From interview. 
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applies to defending Nigeria and everything Nigerian - be it 
a Nigerian industry, artifact, house, culture, value system or 
the national flag. It includes liaison with the appropriate 
authority and taking any steps to prevent any attempt to cause 
injury to the territory or citizen of Nigeria. 
By "promotion"'of national interests, is meant the encourage- 
ment and support given towards achieving the needs, desires and 
expectations of the government and people of Nigeria. It includes 
any activity or duty performed and indeed all efforts made to 
realise or attain desirable objectives that are beneficial to the 
country. Such effort could be made individually or collectively but 
must be aimed at achieving or enhancing the achievement of definite 
benefits for the country. The promotion of national interest is 
not limited to government projects. Rather it extends to assisting 
and encouraging Nigerian private business people abroad like 
industrialists, traders, students and tourists. It also includes 
encouraging foreign entrepreneurs to invest in Nigeria and to do 
business with Nigerians. Others include advertising Nigerian 
products, and made in Nigeria goods and upholding a good image 
for the country abroad. By "national interest" we mean the 
valuable possessions, needs, desires and expectations of the 
country and its citizens. A'country's valuable possessions 
include its territory, citizens, sovereignty economy and other 
endowments. The needs of a country are many and varied. So 
are the desires and expectations. They include as of necessity, 
the protection of these possessions and the creation of conducive 
environment for their existence and growth. In a nutshell, national 
interest is the sum of a country's objectives and goals. 
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From the above explanations, the meaning of the principle 
of national protection becomes perhaps clear and its essence 
apparent. The principle emphasises that the territory, the 
citizens and their institutions are vital to the existence of 
a state and must be protected. It affirms that the--essence 
of government is to defend the existence and promote the 
wellbeing of these vital elements of the state. Hence, 
officials and representatives of the government must recognise 
this principle as a guide in all their decisions and actions. 
This principle is underlined by the dictum that "the instinct 
of self-preservation is natural and inherent in human activities 
and relationships. " Therefore, every person or group of persons 
or state owes itself a natural obligation and responsibility to 
ensure its own survival. For a state's other objectives and 
goals can only be or hope to be realised if that state exists. 
A non-existing state has neither objectives nor goals. This 
confirms our view here that the primary purpose of any national 
policy is and must be, among other things, to safeguard the 
nation-state. In other words, the non-negotiable interests 
(core goals) of a country are its security and wellbeing. 
9 
The government acting on behalf of the state has the inescapable 
responsibility to protect the physical territory and its natural 
resources, the citizens and their property, and the sovereign 
rights of the state. In formulating external policy, government 
is guided by the rule to protect the state and its possessions 
against external forces. 
I 
9. Northedge, F. S., ope cit., pp. 194-5. 
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It was thus the principle of national protection that led 
Prime Minister Balewa in the early sixties to reject the proposal 
by the Casablanca bloc to forge African unity through political 
union of the various states in Africa. 
10 The Balewa government 
was not prepared to surrender the country+s independence and 
security in the hands of radical African leaders. The principle 
of national protection is a fundamental and immutable guide in 
making decisions on external affairs. This is so because of 
Nigeria's past experiences of external conquest and exploitation; 
the nature of the international environment especially the tendency 
for external interference, aggression or conflict; and the amazing 
growth of Nigerian population living and working/studying in many 
countries all over the world. Some of these, for various reasons 
ranging from colour prejudices or nationality differences to serious 
offences, have become victims at the hands of their host authorities. 
If the international environment were without conflict, there would 
have been no such principle or at least there would have been less 
emphasis on the need for protection. But because of international 
rivalry, exploitation, conflict and aggression, the rule has become 
ordained for every country to defend itself against external. - 
aggression. How this defence is maintained by each country is 
a matter of method and does not change the meaning and essence of 
the principle. A country can choose to defend itself by developing 
weapons of mass destruction. Another can do so by allying itself 
with a more powerful country. Yet another can do the same, by 
adopting such external policies likely to create favourable 
10, Balewa, A. R., Mr. Prime Minister; A selection of speeches made 
by Alhaji the Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1964, pp. 94-95. 
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conditions abroad that would minimise the chances for external 
aggression or that would win for it more friends than enemies. 
Whatever method a country chooses is based on this principle 
of national protection. 
Many Nigerian leaders have underlined the principle of 
national protection as an essential guideline for the realisation 
of the country's vital national interests. Writing on Nigeria's 
external affairs, Chief Awolowo drew attention to the point that 
"one of the purposes for which a state is ordained is the 
protection of its citizens against external aggressions" and 
that "it is the primary obligation of the state to cater for and 
promote the welfare of its peoples to the end that they may live 
a full and happy life". 
11 
Prime Minister Balewa also underlined 
this principle when he told the House of Representatives: 
"In formulating its policy for the conduct of 
foreign affairs, the federal government recognises 
that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote 
the interests of the federation and its citizens". 
12 
In the decision to establish diplomatic missions in the early 
sixties, the Balewa government gave priority to countries in which 
there were many Nigerians. 
13 This was in consideration of affording 
them possible protection and assistance. The concern for the 
security and welfare of Nigeria and its people remained a major 
consideration of foreign policy under the military regime. Receiving 
students and faculty members of the US War College who visited 
Nigeria in March 1966, General Ironsi told them that Nigeria would 
11, Awolowo, 0., The Peoples Republic. Oxford University Press, 
Ibadan, 1968, p. 330. 
12. Balewa, A., T., in Claude S. Philips Jr., The Development of 
Nigerian Foreign Policy. North Western University Press, 1964, 
p. 40. 
13. Balewa, A. T., Mr. Prime Minister, op, cit., pp. 35,37. 
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maintain the friendliest of relations with all countries that 
recognise the corporate existence of Nigeria and respect her 
sovereignty. 
14 Similarly, General Gowon acted on the basis 
of the principle of national protection in his government's 
enhancement of relations with Nigeria's immediate neighbours. 
During the civil war, the government successfully got these 
countries, namely Cameroona, Chad, Dahomey, Niger and Togo etc* to 
support the Federal Government against the dismemberment of 
Nigeria. The government is thus aware that the security of 
Nigeria is tied to those of its neighbours and so declared the 
neighbours its priority area of diplomacy, 
15 
The Adedeji Review 
Report (June 1976) placed the principle of national protection 
as the first and foremost guide to the country's foreign policy. 
In a bid to explain the principle, the former Commissioner for 
External Affairs, Major General Adefope stated that: 
"The promotion of the material, psychological and 
moral welfare of our people, which is the central 
purpose of government, calls for the maintenance 
of national unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Nigeria. This objective forms a 
cardinal principle of both our domestic and 
foreign policies. " 16 
We have noted also President Shagari's advice to his principal 
envoys to give special attention to the protection and welfare of 
Nigerians in their host countries. All these illustrate that 
this principle has been in existence, recognised by all Nigerian 
leaders and reflected in decisions on external affairs. 
14. West Africa, March 24,1966, p. 359. 
15. Aluko, 0., The Foreign Policies of African States. Hodder and 
Stoughton, London, 1977, pp. 263-266. 
16. An address at the 17th Induction Course for newly recruited 
foreign service officers, Lagos, 1979. 
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NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The principal of national economic growth guides decisions 
and actions towards the realisation of the country's economic 
objectives. It demands a consistent and co-ordinated effort 
for the preservation of the economic base of the country; 
the attainment of self-sufficiency in food production; the 
promotion of investments, scientific/technical co-operation and 
trade. It also demands a constant check against foreign economic 
exploitation. Few attempts have been made recently to explain 
the basis of Nigeria's economic policy abroad. In the second 
half of 1978, public opinion in Nigeria rose to question 
government's foreign policy objectives and measures. There was 
in particular alleged "neglect of economic consideration in the 
formulation and execution of our foreign policy". 
17 
This 
caused concern in some government quarters especially in the 
Ministry of External Affairs where an attempt was made to explain 
the economic considerationsýof the government in foreign policy. 
The Commissioner for External Affairs, Major-General Adefope in 
a reply circulated to the critics of Nigeria's foreign economic 
policy said: 
"On the point made in your letter about the lack 
of economic consideration in formulation and execution 
of our foreign policy, I can agree with you that all 
countries seek, first and foremost, to promote their 
economic interests in the formulation and conduct 
of their foreign policy objectives. I also agree 
with you entirely that the appropriate emphasis must 
be placed on economic considerations in the conduct 
of our foreign relations. But I would like to add 
that we have been doing this. What has not been 
happening is that sufficient publicity has not been 
given to this aspect of our work. " 18 
17, A letter to the Commissioner for External Affairs from A. A. 
Akwesa & Company, Onitsha, Nigeria, July 22,1978. 
18. Adefope, H. E. O. (Commissioner) in reply to "Alleged selective 
application of our foreign policy measures". Ministry of External 
Affairs, Lagos, October 1978. 
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It explained that government activities in the economic sphere 
have been confined mainly to providing the international infra- 
structural arrangements which make international business 
possible. For example, he said, no"one cares to know how it 
is that Nigeria Airways planes can fly to a number of countries 
in the world and pick up cargo or passengers; how the flow of 
the River Niger, on which the lives of millions of Nigerians 
depend, is maintained uninterrupted by the Riverine States; why 
are the efforts being made to link our country with all neighbouring 
states with a network of first-class roads as for instance it is 
now possible to drive from Lagos to Accra, Kano to Naimey/Njamina, 
on a relatively good road; how it is possible to attract foreign 
experts to participate in our development programmes etc. The 
Ministry said "much work goes on behind the scenes to make these 
things possible and in much of the work, the essential motive 
is to promote business intercourse with the outside world in 
the interest of our nation as a whole but particularly in the 
interest of our business community to which, I believe, your 
goodselves belong". 
19 
"... our role in the conception of ECOWAS, the 
Chad Basin Commission, River Niger Commission, 
our role in monitoring activities in the oil 
world which enables us to sell our oil in time 
and at a good price etc. re all motivated by 
economic considerations". z0 
A year later (1979) the Director of International Economic 
Co-operation in the Ministry of External Affairs reaffirmed that 
national economic considerations are an integral part of Nigeria's 




role of his Department which is the co-ordination of all 
bilateral economic relations between Nigeria and all other 
countries of the world and between Nigeria and international 
economic and financial organisations of which Nigeria is a 
member. 
21 
In addition to the Department of International 
Economic Co-operation in the Ministry of External Affairs, there 
are the Ministries of Economic Development (which in the Second 
Republic was renamed National Planning), Commerce and Industry, 
each having an International Division with all co-operating in 
the formulation of both guidelines and foreign economic policy. 
There is also in every Nigerian Embassy/High Commission a 
section that deals with economic matters, albeit seeks to 
promote economic co-operation between Nigeria and the Mission's 
host country. The setting-up and financing of these institutional 
organs reflect government's considerations and commitment to 
national economic growth. Although the expected rate of economic 
growth is not yet attained it does not mean the absence of guidelines 
or economic considerations in the country's foreign policy. A 
few examples of government's economic activities abroad will help 
to illustrate the application-of the principle of national economic 
growth in the conduct of foreign policy. 
BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
An important aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy that is 
directly influenced by this principle of national economic growth 
is the conduct of bilateral economic relations. The need for 
rapid economic development through co-operation encourages the 
21. Ijewere, G. O. (Dr. ), "The Role of the Department of International 
Economic Co-operation, Ministry of External Affairs", lecture, 
Induction Course, Lagos, June 1979. 
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Government to enter into bilateral agreements, on economic,, 
scientific and technical co-operation between Nigeria and 
several countries. Air Services and Trade Agreements have 




Some Economic and Technical Agreements reached 
by Nigeria between 1971 and 1979 
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Type of Aoreement 
Technical Co-operation 
Memorandum of Co-operation 
Memoranda of Understanding, 
Economic Co-operation and 
commercial relations 
Trade Agreement 
Educational and Cultural 
Co-operation 
Economic Agreement 
Air Traffic Co-operation 
Air Traffic Services and 
Cultural Agreement 







Formalisation of Existing Air 
Agreements 





Bilateral Economic Agreement 
Health Agreement 
Economic and Technological 
Co-operation 
Bilateral Trade Pact 
Trade Agreement 
Economic Agreement 
Sources Sonni, Tyoden G., Development strategies and Foreign 
Policy in peripheral states: The Political Economy of 
Nigeria's External Relations, 1960-1975. Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of Lancaster, Lancaster, 1980. 
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The government does not only encourage and sign these Agreements, 
it also monitors their operation to ensure that the objectives 
are not defeated. 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSIONS 
One trend which has developed from Nigeria's bilateral 
economic relations with other countries is the creation of 
Joint Economic Commissions between Nigeria and such countries 
like Niger, Benin, Ghana, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, etc. 
22 The 
Joint Economic Commissions hold meetings annually to take stock 
of economic co-operation activities between the respective countries 
with a view to identifying any anomalies for rectification and 
exploring other areas of mutual co-operation. Obviously governmentls 
interests in these commissions are economic. 
The same principle of promoting economic growth is the motive 
force Of Nigeria's effort to foster regional economic co-operation 
through the River Niger Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These 
will be discussed in chapter six. Generally Nigeria's membership 
and role in the Community and Commissions indicate that its economic 
motives are not narrow or shortrun in terms of immediate gains to 
Nigeria, to the exclusion of other-states in the region. Rather 
the motives extend to promoting economic growth of the region. 
EXTERNAL INVESTMENT 
The principle of maintaining economic growth is concerned also 
with promoting investment. By investment we mean the deployment 
22. Ijewere, G. O. (Dr. )q Induction Course lecture, Lagos, June 
1979, ope cit., p. 7. 
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of resources in productive enterprises for the generation of 
capital resources and provision of the essential needs of the 
people, both of which would bring about improvement in the living 
standard of the citizens. There are domestic and external 
investments, and in either cases the same consideration for 
national economic growth applies. All governments of Nigeria 
have tried to encourage internal investment and in doing so they 
invite foreign entrepreneurs to invest in the country. The 
government recognises the need for overseas capital experience and 
skills in Nigeria's effort to industrialise. It encourages 
foreign investment especially when such gives Nigerians the 
opportunity of acquiring technical and managerial skills. The 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 end Amendment Decree 
of 1977 reflect government's determination to secure greater 
Nigerian ownership, control and participation in Nigeria's 
industrial growth, while at the some time encouraging foreign 
participation and investment by offering generous incentives to 
foreign investors. 
Among the "Investment Incentives" provided by the government 
include (1) "The Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act, 
1957", 1 which permits the repayment of import duties on materials 
brought into Nigeria for use in the manufacture or processing of 
goods, (2) "Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Decree, 
1971" which gives exemption from income tax during the early years 
to Companies engaged in "pioneer"23industries approved by the 
government; and (3) "Remittance of Dividends" which allows a foreign 
investor to repatriate a maximum of 60% of the Company's after-tax 
23. The government grants pioneer status to certain industries, 
e. g. those involved in processing of food crops, vegetables 
and fruits. 
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profit. Also expatriate workers in Nigeria are allowed to 
remit up to 50% of their annual income from Nigeria under 
their annual personal remittance quota. In providing these 
conditions and incentives, government is inspired by the belief 
that such investments will accelerate national economic develop- 
ment. Whether the investments and incentives have been in the 
right direction and making the desired contribution to development 
remain a different issue. 
As regards investments abroad by the government and people 
of Nigeria, it can be said that the government has not been so 
enthusiastic. Although a few investments are made here and there 
like joint projects with some neighbouring African countries, 
having equity share in African Industrial Development Bank (AIOB) 
and perhaps the purchase of buildings abroad for use by Nigerian 
Government Agencies, they have been motivated by other considerations 
(i. e. assistance to African countries and in the latter desire to 
reduce costs of rentage) rather than the desire to make profit 
that could be repatriated in 'support of the national economy. 
Many Nigerian entrepreneurs have tried to invest abroad but have 
been constrained by various factors including shortage of foreign 
exchange and comparative lack of government incentives, similar 
to those offered by say the governments of the USA and UK to 
their nationals interested in overseas investments. For 
instance the promotion of investments is a major objective of 
United States foreign policy and according to Stephen 0. Krasner, 
US officials work assiduously to create a favourable world-wide 
climate for the direct investment of American private capital 




American policy makers, he explained, have over 
the years adopted general policies that facilitate foreign 
investment. A typical example is the tax structure which 
does not discriminate against overseas activity but rather 
actively encourages overseas investment. Krasner addsds 
"... with the Economic Act of 1948, the United 
States ... Investment Guarantee Programs insured 
US Companies against some of the risks of foreign 
investment, such as currency inconvertibility 
and nationalisation. ... The United States 
Government even gave direct financial assistance 
to American Companies to eataYlish foreign mining 
and processing facilities". 
2 
Basically While the United States government encourages 
investments abroad, the Nigerian government tries to encourage 
investments within its own territory. The reasons are obvious 
especially because of the differences in the level of development 
and the amount of foreign exchange available in the two countries. 
However, a few Nigerians have some investments abroad and these 
range from setting up private companies to buying shares in large 
companies. and multinational corporations. The investments are few 
and are yet in their infancy. It is hoped that in the future they 
will be sources of foreign exchange earning for the country. 
Generally, the idea of contributing to national economic growth 
and the development of a national economic capacity that could be 
self-reliant spurs foreign policy makers and practitioners alike 
when negotiating agreements on trade, scientific and technical 
co-operation between Nigeria and other countries. The same 
principle underlies the offer of incentives to foreign investors 
24. Krasner, D. Stephen, Defending the National Interest 
Materials Investments and US foreign policy. Prince 
University Press, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 10-11. 
25. Ibid., pp. 94-99. 
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being attracted to invest in Nigeria as well as any assistance 
afforded to Nigerian businessmen in their dealings with foreigners. 
The underlying philosophy is that benefits accruing to a Nigerian 
from such activities are untimately for national development. 
CULTURAL IDENTITY 
One of the underlying motives of Nigeria in external affairs 
is to regain the "lost glory" of Africa and the black people in the 
World through cultural "risorgimento"26 and the projection on to 
the international plane of the image of the black man and his ways 
of life. By "lost glory" we mean the displacement of African 
heritages of culture and humanism, degradation of African personality 
and independence and suppression of the pride of Africa as the 
birthplace of world civilisation. The Nigerian elite, including 
the most conservative is apparently agitated by the predominance of 
foreign culture not only in the general practice of international 
relations but also in many faces of Nigerian life. In international 
relations, the style, language, dress etc. of diplomatic practice 
are foreign to Nigeria. The predominant culture which prevails in 
international discourse is that of' urope, leaving the impression 
that Nigeria like other new nations is politically independent 
but culturally dependant. As a result, efforts are made, as part 
of the decolonisation process, to project the Nigerian heritage of 
humanism, arts, music, dresses, food, wine etc, in the conduct of 
international relations. A number of events (referred to below) 
highlight the principle of cultural identity in Nigeria's foreign 
paLicy . 
26. See Azikiwe, N., Renascent Africa. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 
London, 1968, p. 25. 
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The rationale for the adoption of this principle can be 
further explained. . 
First, in our background study of evolution 
of Nigerian foreign policy, we noted that there were traditional 
diplomatic practices and techniques for conducting negotiations 
for peace or war, negotiating trading conditions, arranging 
treaties and sealing them, and sometimes for conducting 
arbitrations and parleys. Nigerians also have their languages, 
mode of dressing and concept of the family, or to be specific, 
membership of a diplomatic household. All these combine to give 
meaning to the way of life (culture) of a people and provide the 
basis for identification and incorporation. But with the super- 
imposition of alien culture there was displacement of these value 
bases of identification and incorporation. 
The implications of such cultural displacement are obvious 
for example, while Nigeria's traditional method of conducting 
relations was characterised by open diplomacy, the prevailing 
international relations practice is characterised by secret 
diplomacy -a device which places the newcomer to the game at 
a disadvantage. In terms of method, the Nigerian (or African) 
has a frontal approach to discussions and negotiations. This 
implies presenting a matter in a manner that will aptly reflect 
the speaker's feeling and idea on a given subject. If one is 
opposed to a particular act or policy of a partner in interaction, 
he registers the opposition directly. If one is angry, he says 
so directly. If one requires an obligation from a friend, he asks 
for it directly from the friend, who in turn could grant or refuse 
the obligation, giving reasons in clear terms for his decision 
even when such reasons are sentimental. On the contrary, the 
prevailing culture in international relations lacks such "frankness" 
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id discourse and rather employs various nuances and indirect 
expressions to make complex an otherwise simple matter. This 
displacement of one method by the other creates the problem of 
continuous adjustment and remind practitioners of the need to 
uphold a national identity and procedure for the conduct of 
relations with the other nations. In terms of language, the 
official language of Nigeria is English - which is a foreign 
tongue and it is the language with which Nigeria conducts its 
foreign policy. Being a foreign language there are bound to 
be problems in the usage. Such language problems and the 
implications on effective communication sometimes remind 
practitioners of their lost cultural identity and the need to 
regain it. 
Second, the principle of the cultural identity or the need 
to project and assert the image and values of Africa and the black 
man in the world derives from the intellectual reactions that 
characterised African nationalist movement in the 19th century. 
Without the intention at this point to discuss the nationalist 
movement, it may be necessary to recall briefly such themes in 
African political thought like "African Nationalism", "Back to 
Africa", "Africa for Africans", 
-"African 
Personality and Negritude" 
etc. 
27 Great A? ricanists like Marcus Garvey, Edward Blyden, 
Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe,. Leopold Senghor etc. wrote and 
spoke on these themes. They talked about the contribution of 
Africa to world civilisation and considered as imperative the 
rejuvenation of African culture. This would project on the world 
27. For details read Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or 
Africa for the Africans, vols. 1 and 2, Universal Publishing 
House, New York, 1923 and 1926; Or. Abiola Irele, "Negritude 
or Black Cultural Nationalism", Journal of Modern African Studies, 
vol. 3, no. 4, Cambridge, October 1965, pp. 321-48; Nkrumah, Kwame, 
I Speak of Freedom. Heinemann Ltd., London, 1961, pp. 125-134 and 
also Africa Must Unite (1963), pp. 132,140. 
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scene the distinct personality of the black race and would 
facilitate the expression and assertion of that personality 
anywhere in the world. The philosophy of African personality 
involves proving to the oppressors of Africa that Africans are 
human beings like themselves and that the differences between 
races are the result of other factors than innate or biological 
circumstances. The philosophy urges a sort of cultural revival 
and unity of all black people and a united African voice in the 
world community. This strand of African political philosophy 
made a tremendous appeal to Nigerian leaders who from independence 
have been working for the African unity and solidarity and above 
have linked the destiny of Nigerians with that of other black 
people in the world. 
There are identifiable activities that underline the importance 
to Nigeria of upholding its cultural identity and values in the 
conduct of relations with other nations. Since this decade, it 
has become a tradition to offer some state guests Kola nuts on-their 
arrival in Nigeria. In typical Nigerian tradition, to offer Kola 
nuts to a visitor is a symbolic gesture of Welcome, appreciation 
for the visit and an assurance of good faith. This traditional 
symbolism has been invoked in many international celebrations in 
Nigeria. Similarly, it is now a convention among Nigerian 
dignitaries, including diplomats at home and abroad, when arranging 
parties for their foreign counterparts to provide Nigerian food 
and palm wine (the latter it possible as it is not exported) and 
less English food. The government encourages this cultural 
nationalism in food and drinks. Part of the grand design for the 
expression and assertion of the African personality is selected in 
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the mode of dressing of many Nigerian officials during international 
gatherings. Prime Minister Balewa and his Foreign Minister Joja 
Wachukma were leading Nigerian personalities in the vanguard of 
the revolution in the diplomatic dressing. They mostly wore 
Nigerian national clothing as diplomatic or official dress. This 
earned the Foreign Minister the accolade of being a "flamboyant 
Ministern. The Nigerian national dress is different from the 
European official dress, which prevailed up to the early sixties 
in all international and diplomatic circles. In the early seventies 
the Ministry of External Affairs in a circular included Nigerian 
national dress among the official dress which could be worn by 
officials while on duty. Hitherto, suit and tie were the official 
dress while on duty. Since then, many Nigerian leaders and officials 
have continued to wear national dress to offices and diplomatic 
functions. In pursuit of this principle, therefore, Nigeria has 
made its cultural nationalism in dressing acceptable on the 
international scene. 
For the same reasons of upholding the identity and values of 
the black person, the Nigerian government has been relentless in 
its effort to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racism. These 
are the evils that robbed Africa of its glorious image and contri- 
bution to worldwide civilisation. The importance attached to this 
principle of "cultural resorgimento" is evidenced by Nigeria's 
role as chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, 
since its inception. Records of the proceedings of the committee 
indicate efforts by its members to restore respect for the black 
person and revive the image of Africa through the elimination of the 
apartheid system in South Africa. It could be said that the principle 
of cultural identity is a moving force in Nigeria's global role. 
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NATIONAL ASPIRATION 
The principle of "national aspiration" is that which influences 
the government in the determination of the scope of relations or 
arees'of collaboration that would enhance the realisation of 
certain desires, expectations and hopes of Nigerian citizens, 
organisations and agencies. National aspiration is essentially 
concerned with what Nigerians want as distinct from their basic 
needs. To distinguish between these two terms, a brief explanation 
may serve. In Nigeria certain non-negotiable national interests, 
such as the independence and authority of the nation-state, national 
security, economic and cultural survival, are basic needs of the 
state. There are still other things the country wants which include 
honour, prestige, power etc., and these are the wants of Nigeria. 
The first category of "needs" (i. e. the core interests) is guided 
by the principles of "national protection"; "national economic growth" 
and "cultural identity", while the second category of "wants" (i. e. 
specific or negotiable interests) is guided in its realisation by 
"national aspiration". 
In 1962, Prime Minister Balewa called for a restructuring of 
the UNO to provide for an African permanent seat in the Security 
Council. 28 Such a call was motivated by national aspiration, for 
it has been the desire of all Nigerian leaders "to secure for 
Nigeria ... an effective voice in international affairs" so 
as "to advertise the importance of Africa in world affairs", 
29 
To secure a seat in the Security Council is a desirable objective 
that will mean honour to the country and a boost to its power and 
influence in world affairs, but the failure to realise it will not 
affect the existence of Nigeria as an independent and sovereign 
28. Mr. Prime Minister, op. cit., p. 60. 
29. Zik - Selected Speeches, op, cit., pp. 70,314. 
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nation nor will it affect the welfare of Nigerian citizens. 
Another example will help to explain "national aspiration". 
In one of the bizarre episodes in Nigerian-British relations, 
when the British government refused to repatriate General Gowan 
to Nigeria to be tried for alleged involvement in the military 
coup of 13 February 1976, many Nigerians wanted the government 
" 
to sever relations with Britain, whereas they require British 
technology for their national advancement. Both the demand 
for the repatriation of Gowon and the decision at that time 
to decrease the level of diplomatic representation between the 
two countries were based primarily on public opinion and sentiments 
against Gowon's regime. Government reaction therefore was 
motivated by "national aspiration". 
Basically, "national aspiration" is derived from public opinion, 
the demands of trade unions, student organisations and other interest 
groups in the country. This then raises the question as to what 
makes an aspiration "national" and when is it relevant to foreign 
policy? An exponent of this principle, Grant Hugo, wrote30 that 
an "aspiration" becomes "national" when it is so regarded by the 
government of the day. Such aspiration must also be able to 
command sufficient popular support to constitute a national 
aspiration. Drawing a distinction between "aspiration" and 
"interest"g he wrote that "aspirations" have ethical or sentimental 
character and aim at meeting the emotional needs of the people while 
"interests" have early material advantages and seek to provide the 
material necessities of the people. He said, when supporters of 
a particular course of action base their arguments on ethical or 
sentimental considerations of justice, honour, obligation, gratitude, 
30. Hugo, Grant, Britain in Tomorrow's World - Principles of Foreign Policy, Chatto & Windus, London, 1969, pp. 31-53. 
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democracy, the interests of humanity etc., they are expressing 
an aspiration. 
"To put it in simpler and more arbitrary terms, a 
government endeavouring to satisfy national 
aspirations is concerned with the emotional needs 
of the people, a government considering national 
interests with their more material necessities". 
31 
On the relevance of national aspiration to foreign policy, 
Hugo said an aspiration is relevant to foreign policy when it 
suggests to the government which of the various courses reasonably 
open to it in foreign policy most closely corresponds to popular 
wishes. 
32 This means that national aspiration should help the 
government to determine popular expectations and which issues the 
people consider it worthwhile to become involved in. Nevertheless, 
it is the duty of government officials to define the national 
aspirations and extent to which decisions can be modified by national 
aspiration. Based on the foregoing explanations, efforts and" 
activities of the government towards enhancing Nigeria's stature 
and power in world politics generally are based on the principle 
of national aspiration. 
AFRICAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION 
The need for African freedom and security is the underlying 
basis of Nigeria's African policy. A senior government official 
said that Nigeria's African policy is based on the'principle of 
African unity"33 but in explaining the principle he said Nigeria 
has no territorial ambition in Africa and is not interested in 
amalgamation or unification of the countries in Africa. Rather, 
31. Ibid., pp. 36-7. 




he said Nigeria is determined to secure the independence of 
freedom of African countries from external domination and to 
ensure solidarity of the countries in the continent on world 
issues. To avoid ambiguity in the use of the term "African 
Unity" it is preferable to refer to general guidelines of 
Nigeria's African policy as the principle of African security 
and co-operation. This principle tells Nigeria when its 
interests in Africa are threatened or violated and suggests to 
it possible actions which could be taken to remedy the situation. 
The question can be asked as to what constitutes Nigeria's 
interests in Africa. To put it simply, Nigeria has an interest 
in the security of Africa, in the independence of African countries 
and in their progress, without which Nigeria's independence, 
security and progress cannot be guaranteed. The principle of 
African security and co-operation is thus concerned with the 
defence of African freedom and independence as well as the promotion 
of the welfare of African people through the functional co-operation 
with the African countries in economic, technical, cultural and other 
fields. 
Four components of the principle can be identified briefly. 
They are (1) the defence. of the right of all countries in Africa 
to self-determination, independence and freedom from colonial rule. 
Based on its own colonial experience Nigeria's leaders have come to 
accept that colonial exploitation is to a great extent responsible 
for the backwardness of Africa in world affairs. Therefore, for 
Africa to come to prominence and to be respected, it is necessary 
to liberate all its countries from colonial domination. According 
to Balewa, "our own freedom can only have meaning to the extent that 
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we utilize our efforts and goodwill to achieve the same for all 
Africans". 34 Thus, there is a national commitment to the 
total liberation of Africa. To this end, the apartheid system 
in South Africa is seen as "colonial rule in its worst form"35 
which must be dismantled according to Nigerian sources. (2) The 
fostering of functional co-operation of African countries in world 
affairs. With the belief that African countries would enhance 
their position in world politics, if they present a united front 
in their dealings with the other more advanced countries in the 
world, Nigeria has been relentless in the effort to encourage 
mutual understanding among African countries and their coming 
together from time to time to review African problems and examine 
possible means of solving them. (3) The promotion of economic 
growth through mutual inter-dependence and assistance among all 
African countries. (4) The promotion of collective effort for the 
security of Africa. This includes preventing extra-African 
intervention in internal affairs of the continent and preventing 
the use of Africa as the arena for super power rivalry. 
Every post-independence government in Nigeria has invoked and 
applied the principle of African security and co-operation in the 
country's foreign policy. It was the underlying principle in 
Prime Minister Balewa+s initiatives for the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity in 1963. According to Stromlaus 
"Eighteen months before the OAU was formed, 
the federal Government invited all independent 
African states to send their foreign ministers 
to a meeting in Lagos. In Ghana's absence, 
reached a tentative agreement on the formula 
for OAU Charter. 
34, Mr. Prime Minister, op* cit., p. 59. 
35. Harriman, L. O., Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations, New 
York, and Chairman of UN Special Committee Against Apartheid 
(1975-79) while addressing other members of the Nigerian delegation 
to the UN9 October 1978. 
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When the federal delegation left for the 
first Pan-African summit in May 1963, it 
carried a brief prepared by the Ministry 
of External Affairs that outlined the basic 
objectives .... With the exception of 
principal (f) which was replaced by a 
plank affirming "a policy of non-alignment 
with regard to all blocs"q the seven points 
in the Nigerian brief reappear almosý6verbatim 
in Article III of the OAU Charter". 
In pursuit of this principle, Nigeria has been contributing 
substantially to the organisation's funds. Nigeria is the largest 
contributor to the OAU Liberation rund and has singly carried out the 
Organisations peace-keeping function in Chad. In all these, 
Nigeria is motivated by the need to promote African brotherhood 
and solidarity. In early 1966, Nigeria hosted the first-ever 
Commonwealth Conference outside London, ostensibly to mobilise 
international opinion against Ian Smith's apartheid regime in 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In 1971,, at the Commonwealth Conference in 
Singapore, the principle of African freedom, security and co- 
operation was the basis of General Gowon's rigorous lobby for 
Commonwealth pressure to prevent the conservative government'of 
Edward Heath from selling arms to the Ian Smith regime. Similarly, 
Nigeria's role in Angola (1976), in Zimbabwe (1979), and its 
assistance to Liberation Movements in South Africa as well as 
other fraternal assistance to many African countries, have all 
been dictated by government0s commitment to the principle of 
African security and co-operation. 
The principle has been elaborated and stressed by several 
Nigerian leaders. Chief Awolowe, as leader of the Action Group, 
said, "our primary objective will be the promotion of all measures 
for ensuring self-determination and democratic freedom for all 
36. Stromlau, John J., The International Politics of 
_the 
Nigerian 
Civil War. 1967-1970. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1977, pp. 15-16. 
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peoples of African descent and for all subject or oppressed 
peoples". 
37 
Also, Or. Azikiwe as leader of the NCNC hammered 
on the essence of African freedom and security in Nigeria's 
foreign policy, when he said, "We are not prepared to take 
counsel with transgressors of Africa or to bind Nigeria to 
undertake to protect the interests of those who do not respect 
the dignity of man either in Africa or in the World"38 Similarly, 
General Gowan in his address to the nation on 1 October 1975 
stated, 
"Our policy has been one of upholding the dignity 
of the African, safeguarding his interests and 
promoting his wellbeing, and protecting him from 
all forms of oppression and exploitation.... The 
support which Nigeria gives for the struggle for 
human dignity and eradication of racialism and 
colonialism in Africa and our determination to 
pursue these goals will continue-to be intensified 
until the whole 
C$ 
Africa is free from the strain 
of degradation". 
Thus, one of the obvious reasons for Nigeria's interest in 
Africa is the belief by the leaders that the national security and 
economic interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are inextricably 
tied up with the security, the stability and the economic and social 
well-being of other African countries. This explains the importance 
of the principle of security and co-operation in Africa to the foreign 
policy of Nigeria. 
NON-ALIGNMENT 
The principle of non-alignment is the basis of Nigeria's 
association with each of the ideological power blocs and military 
alliances. It suggests to Nigeria not to align itself as a matter 
37, Epelle, Sam, The Promise of Nigeria. Pan Books Ltd., London, 1960, 
P. 146. 
38. Ibid., p. 146. 
39. Quoted from Usman, Bala Yusufu, Towards the Liberation of Nigeria. 
New Beacon Books Ltd., London, 1979, P. 165. 
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of routine with any "axis of goo-politics", 
40 
not to allow 
the establishment in its territory of a military base by any 
foreign power; not to take sides with any of the parties in 
the cold war in the event of a dispute; to view all political 
issues arising from the cold war with the independent objectivity 
and in the interest of world peace; to guard against military 
and ideological commitments in its association with the blocs; 
and to use its relationship with the rival powers wherever possible 
to bring about relaxation of tension in the world. These 'dots and 
dont's' are the components of the principle of non-alignment that 
guide Nigeria in its approach to both world politics and relations 
with the USA and USSR. 
Some factors in contemporary world politics account for Nigeria's 
adoption of non-alignment as a principle of its foreign policy. The 
factors have given rise to various explanations of non-alignment. 
Nigeria's former President, Dr. Azikiwe, once argued that "the 
Eastern and Western blocs did not give the world the moral leadership 
which the African nations envisaged". Therefore Nigeria would not 
align with either but would opt to be non-aligned. By non-alignment 
in foreign policy, he said, "We shall be independent and not be 
neutral or partisan, in the conduct of our international relations 
and we shall not be aligned to any axis of geopolitics. Alignment 
in foreign policy would entangle Nigeria in military alliances which 
are not in our national interest and which would endanger our 
corporate existence". 
41 Another great African statesman Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah explained "non-alignment" in a similar way. He said, 
40. The expression was used by former President of Nigeria, 
Dr. Azikiwe. 
41. Extract from 1959 Election Manifesto. Also in Epelle, Sam, 
. 
ope cit., p. 145. 
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non-alignment does not mean keeping aloof from burning 
international issues of our day; it does not imply isolationism.; 
it is in no way anti-Western nor is it anti-Eastern. Rather it 
means a positive stand on the great issues of our day based on 
our own convictions completely uninfluenced by any of the power 
blocs. 42 Nkrumah further said that by non-alignment, we do not 
intend to entangle ourselves in the cold war by lining up with one 
side or the other - either with the East or with the West. It 
would be suicidal to involve ourselves in the disputes of the 
great powers by taking sides. Our aim, therefore, he said, is to 
maintain friendly relations with all countries and to be enemy to 
none. It is our belief, he added, that international blocs and 
rivalries exacerbate and do not solve disputes and that we must be 
free to judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that 
are just and peaceful, irrespective of the Powers involved. 
43 
But another African statesman, President Julius Nyerere, 
represented non-alignment as an active policy of solidarity with 
the peoples fighting for their independence. Pointing out that 
colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their 
manifestations still deny freedom to peoples and nullify the 
independence of small and weak nations. President Nyerere argued 
that the attainment of African nationalist goals of independence 
and freedom leading to the and of liberation struggles, will bring 
about a substantial reduction of international tension. Speaking 
at the Non-Alignment Conference in Cuba (1979), Nyarere said, 
"We are not a bloc. Our movement is an assertion of the right 
42. Nkrumah, Kuame, Axioms of Kuame Nkrumah, Thomas Nelson and 
Sons Ltd., London, 1967. 
43. Ibid., p. 65. 
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of small nations to stay outside all power blocs and to develop 
according to their own interests as they see them. Our function 
is to press for the political freedom of all colonies, and 
ensure that the post-independence governments have the power to 
develop their country along lines determined by their own 
people". 
44 
Apart from the anti-colonialist view of non- 
alignment, there is yet a third perspective which links non- 
alignment with not just political independence but with the 
freedom of every nation to pursue its own economic, social and 
cultural development without intimidation or hindrance. This 
perspective is furthered by Nigerian scholars like Ikenna Nzimiro 
and Bala Mohammed who have insisted that the economic independence 
is more important for the development of non-alignment foreign 
policy. 
45 
However for in-depth understanding of the meaning of 
non-alignment, one needs to combine the pure political perspective 
of Nkrumah with Nyerere's anti-colonialist view as well as the 
economic aspects of the Movement's objectives. In this way a 
more balanced conception of non-alignment, reflective of the 
dynamics of the Movement and changing perception of world politics 
will be achieved. 
As a principle of Nigerian foreign policy, non-alignment was 
adopted as a result of the perception by Nigerian leaders of: 
1. Big power rivalry for spheres of influence in Africa; 
2. Past experience of "people deprived for too long 
of their resources and rights" by European 
colonialists; 46 
3. The cold war rivalry between the USA and USSR; 
4. The need to reject capitalist as well as Communist 
intervention in future conflicts, in preference for 
"African solutions to African problems". 
44. Speech at Non-Alignment Conference in Cuba, November 1979. See 
Nigerian Statesman. November 269 1979, p. 12. 
45. Bala, Mohammed, Africa and Non-Alignment. A Study on the foreign 
Relations of New Nations, Triumph Publishing Co. Ltd, Kano, 1982t pP. 
l-2 
46. Gavshon, Arthur, Crisis in ft. 
Penguin Books, England, 1981, p. 15. -a 
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The global political events that gave rise-to these perceptions 
have been discussed in Gerard Chaliand, The Struggle for Africa - 
Conflict of the Great Powers, and Arthur Gavshon's Crisis in 
Africa - Battle Ground of East and West. Generally since the 
emergence of nuclear power, the US and USSR have engaged in fierce 
contest for spheres of influence in the world leading to the stage 
of no war, no peace (proxy-wars) in their relations with one 
another. As a result, international relations have been 
characterised by tension and anxiety. It is observed that since 
1945, the two super Powers have carefully avoided direct confron- 
tation while persistently engaged in crisis management outside their 
sovereign territories. This strategy generated a consciousness 
among African nationalists of the dangers of committing their 
governments to any form of alliance. In keeping with a Nigerian 
popular proverb that in the war of elephants, -the loser is the owner 
of the farm where the fight occurred, Nigerian leaders have decided 
not to offer their territory as a battle ground for the super powers. 
Nigeria is therefore guided in its relations with these powers by the 
idea of non-alignment. It must be noted that despite the anxiety 
about transferring super power rivalry into Africa, events in Angola, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Egypt, Chad, Zaire, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Morroco, Sudan etc. show that Africa is fast 
being transformed into an arena of East-West confrontation. The 
obvious implication of these events in the countries reaffirm 
Nigeria's non-aligned stance in world politics. 
Another reason for the adoption of the principle of non-alignment 
is that Nigeria would want to remain independent of any foreign 
control, as to do otherwise would remind the people of the decades 
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of colonial rule. Moreover, Nigeria's desire for world peace 
demands objectivity and non-partisanship in any international 
conflict. This principle has guided Nigeria both in its 
relations with the super powers and in voting on major issues 
at the United Nations and other international conferences. 
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND CO-OPERATION 
The Nigerian government has demonstrated interest in the promotion 
of international peace and co-operation. Nigerian leaders see the 
maintenance of order and peace in the international system as the 
greatest problem facing the world community. Moreover, with the 
realisation of the newness of their country and its relative weak 
position vis-a-vis the big-power actors, coupled with the determination 
to preserve their newly regained independence and territorial 
sovereignty, they were unanimous in the agreement that Nigeria would 
play an important role in world affairs by promoting international 
peace and co-operation. The acceptance of this principle as a 
guide in foreign policy has been reflected in speeches and actions 
of Nigerian leaders. For example, extract from the Action Group 
election Manifesto (1959) concluded the Party's foreign policy with 
an emphasis on the promotion of international peace and co-operation. 
It noted that the pursuit of the course of international co-operation 
"should enable us to exercise a friendly influence in the direction 
of world peace and social justice throughout Africa and the rest of 
the world". 
47 
Similarly the NCNC stated that it will use Nigeria's 
membership of the Commonwealth of Nations to persuade any of its 
members to adhere to the principles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and "shall maintain friendly relations with the family 
47. In Sam Epalle, op, cit., p. 146. 
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of Nations and co-operate with them and the United Nations in the 
maintenance of world peace and the collective security of mankind". 
48 
This principle has been pursued since then and it has influenced 
consideration of many foreign policy issues. 
Recently, all political parties in Nigeria (2nd Republic) 
upheld the principle of international peace and co-operation. 
For example, "the foreign policy of the NPN will be guided by the 
following considerations ... (vii) the promotion of world peace 
through international co-operation and understanding. 
49 
The UPN 
said, "we will ... maintain friendly relations with all friendly 
countries irrespective of political systems, and support the United 
Nations". so Similarly the NPP, PRP and GNPP declared their 
commitment to general disarmament and world peace. These show that 
the principle is as valid today as it was in the sixties. 
Briefly we have tried to identify, classify and explain some 
of the principles that guide the formulation and execution of 
Nigerian foreign policy. Generally, whether in political or 
economic terms, Nigeria is not motivated by narrow state interests 
or short term gains. Rather its interests include that of other 
states, especially within its region and continent. Therefore one 
of the distinguishing features of Nigerian foreign policy arising 
from its principles is that it puts long-term interests in place 
of short term gains. In other words, it is devoid of narrow state 
interests and cherishes fair and balanced relations among nations. 
In the next chapter we are going to examine the environments of Nigerian 
foreign policy as the roots of such principles but especially to identify 
the major sources of input into foreign policy making. 
48. Ibid., p. 145. 
49. National Party of Nigeria (NPN): Election Manifesto, Lagos, 1979. 
50. Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN: Election Manifesto, Lagos, 1979. 
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CHAPTER 
THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In this chapter we are going to examine the domestic 
environment of Nigerian foreign policy with the aim of 
identifying the major sources of input into foreign policy 
making. Then we will analyse the types of input from 
the environment in order to appreciate the policy process 
and its output. The assumption here is that policy making 
has an environment, from which are derived inputs (ingredients) 
used in formulating foreign policy. Like David Easton said, 
the environment consists of all the social, physical, biological 
and economic etc. sub-systems of the society. 
1 It includes 
numerous socio-cultural agents and organisations, economic 
institutions, geophysical and biological factors, local interest 
groups, associations and parties. It is in the midst of all 
these that the machinery of foreign policy is situated and 
functions. The whole idea of environment is to illustrate 
the relationship between the sub-systems in the society and the 
structures responsible for foreign policy making and execution. 
The relationship is such that the environment influences the 
functioning of the policy machinery while the functions of 
the machinery influence the pattern of behaviour in the 
environment. Influences from the environment are described 
as inputs and for analytical convenience are classified into 
demands and supports. The former are in the form of societal 
needs and expectations that are communicated to the policy makers. 
1. Easton, David, A Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, pp. 69-71. 
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The latter includes resources, co-operation or non-co-operation, 
threats, exchanges etc. directed to policy makers to facilitate 
their processing of societal demands. The institutions and 
agents through which such demands and supports emerge are 
regarded as sources of input. The questions to ask here 
include: what constitutes the domestic environment of Nigerian' 
foreign policy?; what are the main sources of input in this 
environment? 
THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT 
The domestic environment of the country's foreign policy 
consists of the entire society of Nigeria. This embraces the 
people and their culture, social institutions (churches, mosques, 
schools), the economy (farming communities, markets, trade unions, 
industrialists), the political system (local government councils, 
state structure, the government's public services, political 
parties etc), and the system of relationship between the component 
units/states in the. federation. All these make demands of one 
sort or another and give support in one form or another to the 
government. That is to say, the citizens and their socio-political 
and economic structures and institutions constitute the environ- 
ment of foreign policy making. There is a constant interaction 
between these environmental structures and institutions on the 
one hand and the government on the other. 
In making foreign policy, the government receives from 
the environment demands and support which it converts into 
decisions and actions about the conduct of the country's external 
relations. 
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SOURCES OF INPUT 
Inputs are generated from every facet of the 
environment (society), ranging from chieftaincy institutions 
to town (improvement) unions, religious organisations, trade 
unions, the press and student associations. But some demands 
and support (inputs) are communicated to the foreign policy 
machinery directly while others are made indirectly. For 
example, when some Christian organisations petitioned the 
then East Central State Government in 1970 urging it not to 
expel the European Missionaries in the state, they were 
really making demands on the Federal government's foreign 
policy machinery, of which the Immigration Department is a part, 
as noted earlier. Also when traders in Kano and Maidugliri 
complained of the menace of refugees from Chad, even though 
the complaints were made to the Emirs and Councillors, the 
traders were in fact making demands through their local leaders, 
on the foreign policy machinery to devise means of controlling 
the crisis in Chad and ameliorating its impact on Nigeria. 
In effect, therefore, inputs come from various sources in the 
environment but some demands or support are latent while some 
are manifest. Put simply, some inputs are more effectively 
communicated than others. When inputs from a particular 
source are effectively channelled consistently, the impression 
grows that such sources are about the only ones in that 
environment. 
In actual fact there are many sources of input into 
foreign policy making in the Nigerian environment. However, 
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it will be difficult in a modest chapter to try to examine 
all of them. It is therefore necessary to identify only 
the major domestic sources of input into foreign policy 
making in Nigeria and these includes 
(i) traditional institutions, political 
culture and socialisation process; 
(ii) public opinion; 
(iii) the National Assembly; 
(iv) political parties; 
(v) the economy. 
We will try to explain below the type of inputs from these 
sources. 
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL 
CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION PROCESS 
The most notable traditional institutions of political 
relevance in modern Nigeria aieýperhaps the Chieftaincy and 
Council of elders. The head of a chieftaincy is the traditional 
ruler, whose official name varies from place to place in Nigeria. 
For instance, among the Fulanis, the most senior traditional 
ruler is the Sultan of Sokoto. In BornO there is the Shehu 
and in many northern states, the traditional ruler is called 
the Emir. In southern parts of Nigeria, they are variously 
called Eze and Obi among the Ibos, Obe among the Yorubas and 
Edos and Obong among the Efiks, etc. Each traditional ruler 
and members of his council constitute the chieftaincy. It 
is a highly respected institution. In this era of frequent 
military coups, each succeeding leader tries to secure the 
support of some prominent traditional rulers. The ordinary 
citizen on his part looks upon the traditional ruler to determine 
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whether or not a particular military leader is for the masses. 
As a result, traditional institutions have become so elevated 
that their advice on certain issues cannot be completely 
ignored. Their influence in foreign policy is significant. 
In the Chadian case under reference, the Shehu of Bornu was 
among the personalities who call 6d on the federal government 
to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis in Chad 
Republic. 2 There was a similar call on the federal government 
by the Obong of Calabar When Cameroun soldiers attacked Nigerian 
fishermen at the south-eastern borders of the country. Many 
traditional rulers are interested to see that the principle 
of federal character is applied in the appointment of Nigerian 
representatives abroad. They like to see qualified people 
from their chiefdom employed in the foreign service. 
Political culture is the prevailing political values 
and beliefs in a society that determine for the people their 
attitudes, forms of political action and expectations, while 
political socialisation is the process by which people learn 
to play political roles in the society. Both provide the 
basis of political orientation and education as well as-the 
avenue through which people are recruited to participate in 
political decision-making, of which foreign policy is a part. 
The agencies of both political culture and socialisation are 
2. From the Shehu's address to foreign service officers 
who visited his palace while on tour of Bornu state. 
In 1984, the Oni of Ife and Emir of Kanu visited Israel, 
when the government has not formally changed its policy 
towards that country. The two visits were considered 
embarrassing and the federal government denounced them. 
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closely related and include tradition, mores, the family, 
the school, the Churches (Mosques), the peer group etc. through 
which a person grows and which ultimately influence his/her 
behaviour. Joseph Frankel has observed that the decision- 
makers in foreign policy are influenced in their considerations 
by the prevailing cultural values and beliefs in their domestic 
environment. He said that because 
"Decision-makers in foreign policy are much 
more intimately connected with their domestic 
environment, they easily acquire such 
influences, through internalising its values, 
through partaking in the national culture and 
characteristics, through being constantly 
exposed to influences and pressures in the 
play of domestic politics". 3 
Thus among the ways in which political culture and socialisation 
influence foreign policy-making is through the individual policy- 
maker who having imbibed these cultural values and orientations, 
has the tendency to manifest them as part of his/her perceptions, 
assumptions and proposals in given issues. 
The influence of political culture and socialisation on 
policy-making is perhaps too pronounced in Nigeria. First, 
Nigeria is a conglomerate society in which political culture 
and socialisation processes are characterised by primordial 
levels of identification, attachment and loyalty. 
4 These 
3. Frankel, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy - An Analysis 
of Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 70. 
4. Post, K. W. J. and Vickers, Michael, Structure and Conflict 
in Nigeria. 1960-65, Heinemann, London, 1973, pp. 11-35. 
Explaining primordial loyalty, the authors said "at certain 
times and in certain situations it meant something funda- 
mental and overriding to individuals that they were Yoruba, 
Hausa, Tiv or whatever, So important were these identifi- 
cations that at times they could override loyalty to Nigeria 
as a whole or to one of its regions, dedication to the 
parliamentary process, respect for law and order and even 
for the sanctity of human life. It is in this sense that we 
would speak of a primordial loyalty here as something demanding 
a total commitment transcending those to any other groups". 
Ibid., p. 12. 
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characteristics transmitted to the people - (products of the 
political culture and socialisation) - tend to mould their 
personality and world view. These too influence the people 
in determining their political values and type of demands and 
support they give to the political system in general and 
foreign policy machinery in particular. Instances in which 
these varying cultural orientations are brought into play 
include the introduction of federal character and federal 
balance, the quota system of representation and contests for 
positions in Nigeria's foreign Ministry. Other aspects are 
reflected in the prevailing notion of "son-of-the-soil" and 
the practice of "godfather relationships" by which certain 
conversion from branch 8 to A, as well as some promotions 
and postings are not based on merit but on some relationship 
with the responsible authorities. Thus, primordial loyalties, 
nepotism and social affinity are among the elements of the 
political culture that influence foreign policy making. 
Another element of Nigeria's political culture which 
influences decisions and actions in foreign affairs is its 
altruistic tradition. To understand the influence of 
altruism on the behaviour of Nigerians demands the explanation 
of altruism. According to Azikiwe, "socially speaking, 
Nigerian social ideology is altruistic. It is devoted to promote 
the well-being of all the members of Nigerian society. The 
extended family system regards Nigerians as offsprings of a 
common ancestry". 
5 Altruism as a way of life like capitalism 
or communism permeates every institution of the society. There 
5. Azikiwe, Nnamdi, Ideology for Nigerias Capitalism. Socialism 
or Wslfarism? Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd., Lagoa, 1980, 
p. 8. 
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is altruistic interpretation of the essence of the society, 
the role of the individual, history, law, economics and 
politics. We will limit our explanation to what is immediately 
relevant, i. e, its influence on policy makers and other sources 
of input into foreign policy making. 
Altruism underlines the value of the individual in the 
family and the society. It establishes the relationship of the 
individual, the family and the society with the other. Altruism 
is also a source of norms and mores that determine right or 
wrong behaviour. It explains that an individual belongs to 
the family and the family owns the individual. What the . 
individual owns is part of what belongs to the family. Similarly, 
the family can only exist in a society and there can be no society 
without the families. Apart from onets position in the family, 
the individual is valued as an individual in the society and occupies 
a position according to his role in the society. The relationship 
between the individual and the family is by analogy similar to the 
relationship between the family and the society. The same-, 
relationship exists between one society and the other. There is 
a permanent relationship and reciprocal obligation of the 
individual, the family and the society to each other. The 
same obligation exists in the relationship between one society 
and the other. Human affairs in the society are ordered in a 
pattern to reflect the interdependence of the individuals in 
the family as well as the interdependence of the families in the 
society etc. The system of relationship and interdependence in 
aggregate leads to the strengthening of the feeling of community 
and collectivity. It also gives rise to some sentiments of 
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shared responsibility, for the conduct of a common life and 
such sentiments influence their system of relations. Thus a 
member of the National Assembly in Nigeria's second Republic 
had to -says 
"In my mind all Africans are brothers whether 
they live in Namibia or Somalia, Gambia or 
Egypt. We cannot pretend that all is well when 
our brothers are suffering. We owe them both 
moral and material support just as we owe to 
brothers of the nuclear family". 6a 
He further said: 
"If God is gracious enough to bless us with 
abundant resources and power and keep us in 
the midst of deprived relations, it would be 
unwise to abandon such relations. The proper 
thing will be to accept as a challenge and 
responsibility the deprivations of our 
relations". 6b 
In the altruistic society the people believe in being 
their brother's keeper. 7a They believe in being a "friend- 
?b in-need" and a "friend indeed". They believe in giving 
assistance and in sharing with relations and friends their 
joys and sorrows. The problem of any member of the family 
is the problem of the entire family. If a person is 
successful in life, it is the success of the family. Among 
Nigerians if one is rich he or she is obliged to help other 
relatives and friends. If one is poor, he expects assistance 
from his wealthy relations and friends. The society equally 
expects a rich person to help the less privileged and needy 
relations. Basically, wealth is conceived as a blessing from 
6a. Interview information. 
6b. Ibid. 
7a. To be a "brother's keeper" is a main feature of the extended family 
. system, in which a wealthy/privileged person assists and protects 
the interests of the less privileged relations or'friends, without 
necessarily expecting a reward. 
7b. This explains the altruistic basis of Nigeria's foreign aid without 
strings and the liberal character of the country's foreign policy. 
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Above bestowed on the society through certain individuals and 
groups. There is therefore a divine obligation for the individual 
or group to apply the wealth for the benefit of others in the 
family and society. With these beliefs, the average person in 
Nigeria tries, according to his/her ability to assist the less 
privileged or needy relations and friends. There'is also a 
philosophy that if through communal help many members of the group 
are benefited or become rich, then the group will improve more than 
if only one individual is rich and holds tight to his riches amidst 
mass poverty. Thus altruism lessens selfishness and exploitation. 
These values and beliefs influence the making of foreign aid policy 
and general African policy especially. 
Finally both Opposition and the Alliance in the Federal House of 
Representatives listened with equanimity when on August 5,1958 the 
Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa announced that the Federal 
Government had donated to the United Kingdom Government land and money 
to build its High Commissioner's Office in Lagos. He told the Parliament: 
"We have given the land and we have also agreed to 
put up the building or to give some money worth a 
certain type of building standard. I think altogether 
we said we would be prepared to pay for a house which 
would cost not more than 840,000. Now, hon* members 
will agree that it would be very good on the part of 
Nigeria to show the United Kingdom that we appreciate 
all that they have done for us". 8a 
One easily observes from the records of the House on this issue that there 
was virtually no mention or demand for a reciprocal gesture from the 
British Government. At that time, the Federal Government had two 
consular offices in the UK - London and Edinburgh, for which it hired 
accommodation there and was paying rent/rates on them. Government's 
decision to grant land and cash to the British Government was a demon- 
stration of altruism in its pure form. 
Be. Mr: Prime Minister: a Selection of speeches made by Alhaji the 
Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos. 1964, p. 20. 
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Closely related to the altruistic tradition is the 
influence of religion on the people. The predominance of 
religious conscience in public life has tended to characterise 
Nigerians as generally moralistic or should we say religiously 
sentimental. There appears to be a widespread belief in 
divine providence and predestination, reinforced by three main 
religions. in Nigeria - Christianity, Islam and Paganism, which 
emphasise the existence of a Supreme Being who rewards and 
punishes people for their acts. The belief in "heavenly reward" 
matches well with the inherent traditional ideas and practices 
discussed above and therefore combines to provide a basis of 
behaviour. 8b Thus Nigerians are usually generous with the 
hope of heavenly reward. They disapprove generally of 
reciprocity or 'tit for tat' which is an acceptable act of 
bilateral relations among nations in the prevailing system of the 
world. Just as the tradition and custom encourages assistance 
to less privileged rslationL/friends without asking for repayment 
or attaching strings, so also these religions demand from adherents 
to be kind and generous without expecting reward except from 
heaven above. As a result, the decisions and actions of most 
Nigerians, both in their private and public lives, are almost 
always constrained by the underlying cultural and moral 
possessions. The emerging attitudes from such possessions 
are carried forward by the country's leaders in the conduct of 
their external relations, usually at variance with the pursuit 
of expediency and narrow self-interest by other actors in the 
international system. 
8b. See Nnoli Okwudibal, Dr.,, "The Place of Morale in African Foreign 
Policy" in Africa Quarterlyq vol. XV, Nos. 1 and 11# pp. 48-70. 
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Religious belief has been auch an important factor that 
Nigeria spends several millions of Naira annually on pilgrimages 
to Mecca, despite economic austerity measures of the government. 
It has also established a Pilgrimage Affairs Unit in the Ministry 
of External Affairs, and enhanced Nigeria's relations with 
Arab countries for religious rather than economic, political 
or strategic interests. For example, Saudi Arabia comes 
next to African countries in importance to the Nigerian 
government. Both countries are members of OPEC but their 
bilateral economic activity is infinitesimal and so are areas 
of political/strategic co-operation. In fact, if they were 
based on economic, political or strategic interests, Nigeria- 
Saudi relations would be at a very low level but'the interests 
of Nigeria's Moslem communities have enhanced the relationship. 
Other examples of religious influence on foreign policy abound. 
In 1975, the first official visit outside Nigeria by Murtala 
Muhammad soon after coming into office as the Head of State, 
was to Saudi Arabia, on a combined pilgrimage and state visit. 
In 1980, Alhaji Shehu Shagari ordered the opening of a second 
Nigerian consular office in Saudi Arabia and a substantial 
increase in the staff strength to cope with demands of Nigerian 
pilgrims to that country. In 1983, Shagari moved to transfer 
the Pilgrimage Affairs Unit from the Ministry of External 
Affairs to the President's Office and to designate it as the 
Department of Islamic Affairs. 
9 This implied elevating relations 
9. The transfer was not effected because that government was 
overthrown in December 1983, i. e. a few months after 
initiating the proposal. 
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between Nigeria and Islamic countries. These examples 
help to illustrate the extent of religious influence on 
Nigeria's foreign policy. 
Generally, Nigeria's political culture emphasises 
friendship, mutual co-existenceg peaceful settlement of 
disputes when they arias, moral consideration, respect for human 
person etc. It denounces violence and war. These values 
underlie almost all decisions and actions in external affairs. 
For instance one of the major principles of Nigerian foreign 
policy is the promotion of international peace and co-operation. 
There is also hardly any foreign policy statement of Nigeria 
that does not contain appeal to universal moral principles 
and terms like world peace, order and justice. 
10 Similarly 
the consideration for world peace and the abhorence of violence 
and war led the Gowon government in 1971 to sign the Nuclear 
non-proliferation Treaty despite its realisation "that the 
treaty is discriminatory in favour of the nuclear powers*. 
11 
Officially the government was advised that "NPT was discriminatory 
and served the interests of the few haves and held no advantage 
to the non-nuclear weapon countries*. 
12 The same moral 
consideration (to avoid shedding the blood of innocent citizens) 
partly led that government not to take any retaliatory action 
against Equatorial Guinea in 1974-75 when several Nigerian 
citizens in that country were attacked and injured. Also in 
10. For example, see UN General Assembly Record of Proceedings 
for Nigeria's statements 1960-1984. Also noted in Idang, 
Gordon J., Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 
Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1973, p. 13. 
11. West Africa No. 3260, of 14 January 1980, p. 61. 
12. Interview information. 
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1983 during the border conflict between Nigeria and 
Cameroun, the Shagari government was to some extent 
influenced by the consideration of inflicting injury 
on a sister-African country and so did not submit to 
some domestic pressures for action against Cameroun. 
Thus, in deciding whether or not to go to war on a given 
issue, the policy-makers* moral considerations as well as 
their understanding of the general attitude of Nigerians 
towards war and its consequences, are brought to bear on 
such decisions. 
The same sentiments also influence decisions to offer 
assistance to friendly countries, hence Nigeria's aid is 
without strings. From observation, the common concern of 
Nigerian decision-makers on foreign aid is about whether a 
given proposal is just or unjust. If a particular proposal 
cannot be morally justified, that proposal is rejected. Thus 
the moral and religious elements inherent in the culture 
influence the thinking on foreign policy. 
The attitude of Nigerian politicians towards government 
is another source of influence on policy making. This attitude 
is the product of perhaps ethnic hostility and lack of patriotism, 
attributable to political culture and socialisation. For 
example, while in Britain there is respect for the patriotic 
requirement to uphold the national interest in the face of 
foreign opposition and to subordinate domestic quarrels to 
the dictates of national honour, it can be impolitic to oppose 
the government in times of crisis because of the possible charges 
of disloyalty; and most British politicians try to abstain from 
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criticising government policy while travelling abroad*13 
The contrary is the case in Nigeria - where politicians and 
even academics use various platforms abroad to criticise 
government policy and even to plan the overthrow of the 
government. This means that while in Britain, government 
leaders can employ the full weight of their political and 
moral authority in dealing with issues in foreign policy 
without having to worry very much about pressure from the 
opposition at the time, in Nigeria every government is not 
only concerned about internal opposition to external policy 
but also, because of unbridled ambition for power and 
perquisites of office, domestic opponents can possibly 
collude with external forces to bring down. the government. 
Such unpatriotic acts form a part of the negative inputs 
into foreign policy making and also undermine the image of 
the country. 
Essentially, all individuals in policy making positions 
bring to that office their experiences and orientations, to guide 
them in the consideration of various alternatives open to govern- 
ment on given issues. It is difficult to separate the individual 
orientation, biases and sentiments from the official actions. 
It is in this light that societal values and influences are 
believed to influence policy makers' decisions and actions. 
PUBLIC OPINION % 
Public opinion is perhaps the most common societal source 
of imput into foreign policy making. Public opinion may reinforce 
13. Vital, 0. g The Making of British Foreign Policy. George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1966, pp. 74-75. 
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government's pursuit of a given policy or cause a reversal 
of policy. In Nigeria, there are many ways by which the 
public express their opinion on issues that are of interest 
to them. The most popular of these are the media - which 
include the press, radio and television. Influences from 
these sources are assumed to reflect more of the desires and 
expectations of the majority of the citizens, although such 
influences are often moderated or exaggerated depending on 
the predispositions of the owners/editors. But the contentious 
issue about the media as a source of public opinion is that 
only a small percentage of the Nigerian population could 
avail itself of the media for expressing opinion on a number 
of issues. This implies that the views usually expressed 
in the media are those of the articulate minority of the 
population - mainly the elite. The media are widely 
circulated throughout the country and are accepted by many 
as a source of authentic information. Thus the media are 
one way of selling to the people the ideas of the elite and 
making them seem widely hold ideas in the country. It is 
also a very important source of input (influence), as media 
criticism or praise of a government Minister or policy could 
hardly be ignored. Reference has and will continue to be 
made to West African Pilot, Daily Times, New Nigerian, Tr_, 
Punchq Nigerian Statesman, The Observer, Guardian West Africa 
magazine etc. for their editorials and lead-articles on foreign 
affairs, that make an impression on foreign policy makers. (See 
here below and chapter 7 (iii) for specific examples). 
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Another way, perhaps more forceful and direct, of 
putting across demands and support by the public is through 
organised interest groups such as business organisations, 
trade unions, student associations, the Universities etc. 
Other ways are through such actions as strikes, petitions, 
protests, demonstrations and revolt. By whatever means 
chosen at any time to register public disapproval or support, 
for the conduct of any given foreign business, the fact remains 
that the Executives are sensitive to shades of adverse opinion. 
However, the government has the discretion to take its foreign 
policy decisions in secrecy and according to its choosing but 
the domestic political implications of such a decision may not, 
in the nature of things, be secret or concern the government alone. 
In a radical Nigeria where everybody feels interested and involved, 
directly or indirectly, in the activities of the government, public 
demand for adjustment on the part of the decision-makers are usually 
vehement and could hardly be ignored. Nigerians are neither 
conservative nor so patient as to wait for election time to vote, 
out unresponsive governments and some governments have been 
overthrown for allegedly being "insensitive to the true feelings 
and yearnings of the people". 
14 
The importance of public opinion rests an the fact that the 
people of Nigeria are so very politically aware and active that 
hardly any government activity could pass unnoticed. Margaret 
Pail has noted that "we are told that nationalism, democracy, 
socialism, Christianity are not comprehended by the ordinary 
14. Murtala Muhammed's statement on the overthrow of Gowonts 
government, 29th July 1975. A similar reason was advanced 
by Major General Ibrahim Babangida for the overthrow of the 
Buhari government on 27th August 1985. 
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Nigerian (Bretton 19621 44-5), that-most people's understanding 
of the political process is very limited and in general the rural 
population was below the threshold of political awareness at which 
it might be mobilized for effective mass political action 
(Luckham 1971: 271), that national politics were still very 
remote to most people.... (Post 1963s 383)". 15 However, 
she continued, "such paternalistic views are unwarranted"16 
for "the Nigerian general public may not be well informed 
about all the details of Westminster Parliamentarianism (neither 
is the British general public), but they have a shrewd understan- 
ding of their political needs and how to fill them". 
17 In 
effect,, theretorev public opinion in Nigeria is quite enlightened 
and articulate for policy-making. 
To buttress the effectiveness of public opinion in Nigeria, 
the former President (1963-65) Or. Azikiwe underlined the 
importance of the media especially the Nigerian press as a 
significant force in the country's national development. 
le 
James S. Coleman also wrote about the notable role of the 
nationalist newspapers in the awakening of nationalist spirit 
and political consciousness. 
19 Writing over a decade later, 
Guy Arnold said the Nigerian press is among the most outspoken, 
volatile, witty and from in the world. Its criticisms of 
15. Peil, Margaret, Nigerian Politics - The People's View, 
Cassell & Company Limited, London, 1976, p. 3. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid. 
18. A lecture delivered in honour of the first graduating student 
of the Jackson College of Journalism, University of Nigeria, 
Nsukka, on 31st May 1964. West African Pilot, 3 June 1964. 
19. Coleman, J. S., Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University 
of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, pp. 184-186. 
19 8. 
government and establishment are far-ranging and pointed; its 
coverage can be exceptionally wide. 
20 
There never seems to 
be any inhibitions like government's control of the major sources 
of precise information on its external behaviour by means of 
say the Official Secrets law, the Privy Councillor's oath, 
the 0-notices system or the system of press controls that 
obtain in communist countries. In Britain, for example, there 
is the Foreign Office system of 'trusties' among the diplomatic 
correspondents and the subtle but very powerful pressure put 
on journalists who cause embarrassment i. e. adopt a critical 
attitude to the conduct of British foreign policy or draw 
heavily on other sources of information beyond the Foreign 
Office and a handful of Western embassies. 
21 In Nigeria, 
the contrary is the case. There are wide press criticisms 
of all aspects of government as well as persistent calls for 
changes. A few examples will illustrate the role of Nigerian 
public opinion in foreign policy-making. 
In the early sixties, during the proposal for Nigeria- 
British defence pact, public opinion in Nigeria was mainly 
responsible for the eventual abandonment of the proposal. 
Several Nigerian newspapers at the time criticised the 
government for attempting to commit the country to a defence 
alliance with the United Kingdom. The most prominent 
newspapers on this issue were the Nigerian Tribune, the 
West African Pilot, The Daily Express and the Eastern Outlook. 
In addition there were protests from the Nigerian Trade Union 
20. Arnold, Guy, op, cit, pp. 163,172. 
21. Vital, David, op. cit., pp. 80-81. However, by 1984, the 
Buhari military government introduced decree NO. 4 on press 
censorship, for a different purpose. Perhaps it was to suppress 
the exposure of corruption by members of his government, like 
the alleged disappearance of Naira 2.8 billion when he was the 
Commissioner for Petroleum, 1978-79. 
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Congress, the Labour Congress, the Nigerian Youth Congress 
and the National Union of Nigerian Students, 
22 
all against 
the Defence Pact. Akinyemi (1974) drew attention to 
"public demonstrations against the government's foreign 
policies" organised by the Nigerian Youth Congress and said 
that some of the demonstrations were virulent and violent. 
23 
Similarly the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS) 
opposed travel restrictions to the Soviet Union, called for 
Nigeria's military involvement in the Algerian War of 
Independence and also demonstrated against the Defence Pact. 
The West African Pilot, like some other Nigerian newspapers, 
contributed significantly to the shaping of Nigeria's foreign 
policy. In one edition, the Pilot wrote: 
"LET US AIM AT WORLD PEACE ANO FREEDOM. 
Lot every nation know, whether it wishes us 
well or ill, that we shall pay any price, 
bear any burden, most any hardship, support 
any friend or oppose any foe in order to 
assure the-survival and the success of 
liberty. This much we pledge and more. 
We pledge our word that one form of 
colonial control shall not have passed 
merely to be replaced by a far more iron 
tyranny". 24 
In another issue, under the headline "RHODESIA BRINGS CRISIS 
TO AFRICA", it called on the British government to intervene in 
Southern Rhodesia and to establish a democratic constitution 
in order to preserve security and peace. It also called for 
the lifting of the ban on ZAPU, the release of prisoners, the 
freeing of the exiled and the restricted in that country. The 
paper finally called on 32 Afro-Asian countries including 
22. Akinyemi, A. B., Foreign Policy and Federalism, ope cit., pp. 33-4. 
23. Ibid., p. 33. 
24, West African Pilot, Tuesday, 9 October, 1962. 
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Nigeria for solidarity with the African peoples in Southern 
Rhodesia. 2S These two issues - the preservation of world 
peace and freedom and the liberation of African countries 
from colonial and apartheid rule - have remained the 
dominant themes in Nigeria's foreign policy. Such press 
opinions could have influenced, to some extent, subsequent 
decisions of Nigeria on these issues, such as to mobilise 
world opinion to support the imposition of sanctions against 
Rhodesia and South Africa and the former's expulsion from the 
Commonwealth. 
Public opinion continued to be effective under the military 
governments in Nigeria. for instance, after the 1973 Yom Kippur 
war in the Middle East, significant public opinion in Nigeria 
was in sympathy with the Arabs as perhaps with Israel. The 
National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS), University lecturers 
and Nigerian newspapers like the Daily Times, New Nigerian, The 
Obsý_, The Renaissance, The Chronicle etc. debated the 
events in the Middle East and severally urged the federal 
military government to decide one way or the other as Nigeria 
must not remain neutral in a conflict that had threatened 
international peace and security. The government then could 
not take an early decision on what should be Nigeria's stand, 
because of competing pressures and considerations. It was 
not until the OAU (of which the Nigerian Head of State, General 
Gowon, was the Chairman at the time) voted in favour of its 
members severing diplomatic relations with Israel, that the 
Nigerian government eventually announced its decision to sever 
25. West African Pilot, October 11,1962, p. 4. 
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links with Israel. 
In 1975, the U. S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
wanted to visit Nigeria, but public opinion especially by 
the media was to a great extent responsible for influencing 
the government in the decision to turn down the proposal. 
In early 1976, after a military coup that led to the 
assassination of Murtala Muhammad, there was alleged 
involvement of the U. S. and U. K. governments. Public 
opinion in Nigeria (the press, student organisations, 
trade unions) urged the government to break relations with 
both countries. Placard-carrying students marched to the 
British High Commission in Lagos and the United States 
Embassy to demonstrate their displeasure with the two 
countries. Finally the Federal Military Government responded, 
albeit partially, to public demands by expelling the British 
High Commissioner in Nigeria and reducing the level of its 
diplomatic representation in London, to that of a deputy 
High Commission. Similarly in 1977 when Britain's Foreign 
Secretary, Or. David Owen, proposed to visit Nigeria to discuss 
proposals for settlement of the racial conflict in Zimbabwe, 
the proposed visit became a subject of debate in Nigerian 
Universities and on the pages of newspapers as to the need 
for such a visit. In a paper by Ebow Mensah on "The Struggle 
in Zimbabwe", he wrote "Two shuttle visits to Southern Africa, 
the first by Or. Henry Kissinger, the second by Mr. Ivor 
Richard, have produced the remarkable result of pushing "a 
peaceful settlement" in Zimbabwe much farther out of reach than 
ever before while at the same time affording the rebel regime 
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in Zimbabwe time and opportunity to consolidate and 
strengthen its position. On the basis of this experience 
it seems that some kind of stock-taking and a fresh re- 
appraisal of the situation must be done on the African 
side ... A third shuttle diplomacy should not be necessary 
in order that the real content of the intentions, orientations 
and objectives of the shuttles can be recognisedn. 
26 The 
Nigerian Observer, writing on Dr. Owents proposed visit, had 
one of its editorials captioned "ENOUGH OF THIS HOLLOW DIPLOMACY". 27 
The New Nigerian also wrote in a similar manner in its editorial 
captioned "UNNECESSARY JOURNEY". 
28 However, the Ministry of 
External Affairs and its Commissioner Joe Garba did not submit 
to public pressure and so Or. Owen made his visit to Nigeria. 
Soon after the visit, some Nigerian newspapers like The Nigerian 
Observer called on the FMG not to rely on 'cosmetic diplomacy 
with its flamboyant vanity and deception' but to step up 
"MEANINGFUL SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION WAR". 29 This newspaper 
urged that "there can be no going back on the Federal Military 
Government's commitment to alleviate the suffering of our African 
brothers undergoing draconian punishment in Southern Africa ... 
for the liberation of occupied lands in Southern Africa has become 
an open challenge from which Africa cannot retreat" 
30 
Such 
explicit demands by the press constitute part of the vital 
input into foreign policy-making in Nigeria. 
26. New Nigerian, April 4,1977, pp, 5,7 and 11. 
27. Nigerian Observer, April 15,1977, Editorial, p. 3. 
28. New Nigerian, April 19,1977, p. 1. 
29. The Nigerian Observer, April 18,1977, Editorial. 
30. Ibid., p. 3. 
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As we have noted, the Nigerian press is very articulate and 
daring. It is generally undaunted in its coverage of events 
and in demands for attention to various issues. Between 1979 
and 1981, the crisis in Chad was at its peak and with a 
spill-over effect on Nigeria due mainly to the influx into 
Nigeria of Chadian refugees. Nigerian newspapers were relentless 
in calling on the Federal Government to assist in reconciling 
the warring factions in Chad. These newspaperaq most prominent 
in this case being the New Nigerian, highlighted, in various 
editions, the security implications to Nigeria of the crisis 
in Chad and on many occasions warned of the dangers of delay 
in halting the escalation of the conflict. The radio and 
television were simultaneously highlighting the events in 
Chad and their implications. The pressure of the media was 
no doubt a factor in the Federal Government's decision to 
mediate in Chad by inviting to Nigeria the warring factions 
for the first, second'and third "Conferences on the Chadian 
Crisis~31 and by sending a peace-keeping force to Chad. 
On 16 May 1981 during a border patrol, Camerounian 
forces fired at and killed five Nigerian soldiers inside 
Nigeria's territory. The incident generated sustained 
public debate, some of which deplored the Camerounian action, 
while others urged Nigeria to revenge, and yet others 
questioned Nigeria's conception of its foreign policy priorities 
in Africa. The radio, the television and all Nigerian 
newspapers, without exception, called on the Federal Government 
31. The Federal Government organised at Nigeria's expense, 
the first and second Conferences on the Chadian crisis 
in Lagos and the third in Kano. 
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to take one form of action or another. The Daily Times and 
Now Nigerian were among those that called on the Nigerian 
government to exercise restraint over the issue. 
32 The 
different views of the Nigerian public were carefully 
examined by the National Security Council and the National 
Defence Council respectively. Both advised the government 
accordingly and it eventually decided not to take military 
action against Cameroun for the obvious act of provocation. 
One of the reasons put forward by the National Security Council 
in its advice to the government was "evidence from intelligence 
sources that Western alliance countries would exploit war 
between Nigeria and Cameroun to divert Africa's attention from 
the liberation struggle in Southern Africa". 
33 In fact the 
"intelligence sources" were merely newspaper speculations on 
the likely expectation in the event of a war against Cameroun. 
The following week, an article in Thy h written by Dr. A. 8. 
Akinysmi dismissed the so-called "intelligence sources" as 
more "security blackmail" , 
34 The point here is that the press 
is a very important source of input into foreign policy decision- 
making and sometimes can be regarded as a source of intelligence 
information upon which foreign policy decisions are based. 
In 1982, the Federal Government applied for a loan from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). When the conditions of the 
loan were made knounmg the Nigerian public, especially the press, 
denounced the IMF as an imperialist instrument and urged the 
32. Daily Times, New Nigerian, various issues, May-June 1981. 
33. The Punch, 8 June 1981, p. 16. 
34. Sunday Punch, 14 June 1981, p. 2. 
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Federal Government to reject the loan. Since then three 
successive governments (Shagari, Buhari and Babangida) 
have been faced with the IMF saga. None of them have been 
able to submit to the IMF demands, despite the economic 
problems of the country, because of unrelenting public 
pressure against the loan. Major General Babangida who took 
over the Administration on August 27,1985, has formally called 
for further public debate on the implications of the IMF loan. 
He also set up a special task force to co-ordinate the debate 
and analyse the views of the general public to enable the 
government to act according to the wishes of the Nigerian 
public. An observer of the public debate so far has noted 
that"it is more of a shouting match in which it is more important 
to have a loud voice... ". 
"Thus we have had students declare that they 
will go on strike if an IWF loan is taken; 
traditional rulers caution that it is unwise, 
and Church leadere, confessing that all they 
know about IPIF conditionalities is what they 
have heard members of their congregation say, 
nevertheless declare that nothing good will 
come of it. It now remains for the prophets 
to take over, quoting suitable passages of the 
Bible, and Koran of course, to show how it was 
foretold that disaster would follow the taking 
of a loan. " 35 
These show how lively and involved public opinion has been in 
Nigeria on foreign policy matters. In the final analysis, the 
government will make the decision but whether or not its decision 
will be in line with the 'views of the majority, will remain a 
different point. However, public opinion in Nigeria cannot be 
completely ignored by the government without being accused, like 
others before it, of being insensitive to the demands of the majority. 
35. West Africa, No. 3555,14 October 1985, p. 2141. 
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Generally, public opinion is an important source of influence 
on foreign policy machinery. 
Foreign policy-makers also value public opinion as a 
necessary ingredient for their work. In front of Nigeria's 
Ministry of External Affairs, vendors of various newspapers 
and magazines gather every morning to sell their papers. 
Very many foreign service officers buy at least two and often 
as many-as six papers each morning. These are in addition 
to official supplies of newspapers, usually to Heads of 
Departments. Relatively junior officers try to read these 
newspapers early enough so as to be able to draw the attention 
of their senior colleagues to issues that have bearing on the 
work of their department or section. To policy-makers generally, 
newspapers help to define for them the current political universe 
and also are important sources of political intelligence, i. e. 
they often turn to the press for general information about the 
international political environment in which they operate - a- 
view equally held by Rosenau, 
36 
The media are obviously a very important source of vital 
information. There are, however, official channels of information 
gathering such as the Embassy reports and despatches, which the 
media supplement. Outlining the importance of the media, which 
equally applies to Nigeria, Bernard C. Cohen said: 
(1) Policy makers turn to the media for information 
and for analysis, evaluation of developments, 
proposals and sometimes even for new ideas on 
how to deal with the range of problems that 
confront them. 
(2) They also draw from the press some measure of 
the importance of events. 
0 
36. Rosenau, J. N. (ed. ), International Politics and Foreign 
PoliCV, The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., New York, 1961. 
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(3) Newspapers represent an informed and 
articulate segment of public opinion 
which foreign policy officials can 
regularly and continuously tap. 
(4) Newspapers offer foreign policy-makers 
some insight into the way foreign policy 
issues are perceived and assimilated by 
others in the domestic environment and 
in the international arena. 37 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Political parties are important factors in the domestic 
environment of Nigeria and constitute significant sources of 
input into foreign policy-making. Parties contribute ideas 
to policy formation directly as the government-party or 
indirectly as the opposition. In Nigeria, political parties 
existed in the first (1960-65) and second (1979-83) Republics 
but were officially non-existent during the military rule. 
Since the military has ruled Nigeria for 15 out of the 25 years 
of the country's sovereign existence, it means that contributions 
to foreign policy making by political parties have been limited. 
Nevertheless, their contributions, as earlier noted, have been 
quite substantial. 
The background of political parties in Nigeria in both 
the first and second Republics has been examined in Chd ptQr 2. 
We noted the effort of every party to formulate and articulate 
its foreign policy objectives if elected into office and we 
highlighted the differences and similarities in the proposals. 
We shall not repeat the analysis here. Our concern in this 
section is to situate political parties within the domestic 
environment of Nigeria and to show that the parties are either 
37. Cohen, Bernard C., in Rosenau, ibid., pp. 222-6. 
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actively involved in or influence the making of the country's 
foreign policy. In the first and second Republics each of 
the parties put forward in their manifestos substantive ideas 
about the country's foreign policy. Initially such ideas 
seemed a means of convincing the electorate to win votes. 
But after the elections, the successful party forms the 
government and also sets up a party committee on foreign 
affairs. The committee will remain a major source of advice 
to that government on foreign policy, and sometimes become 
more influential than other official advisory organs. Then 
the other parties that have not joined in forming the government 
will then be in the opposition. Usually the Opposition Party 
watches curiously the government's foreign policy activities 
and in the event of faltering, will unleash severe criticism of 
such government action. Characteristically the Nigerian opposition's 
criticisms are pointed, savoury and unsavoury, with the tendency 
to cause the policy-maker to re-evaluate policy decisions or to 
provide ready rationalisation for such. Indeed, the nature of 
Nigerian politics (especially the institutionalisation of 
opposition and cut-throat competition for power) and the 
inherent radicalism of the society (the ease of mobilising 
public opposition, demonstration in Universities against 
government policy and the ease of overthrowing governments) 
make Nigerian governments and politicians reluctant to ignore or 
take lightly the views of opposing political parties. Thus, 
Nigerian political parties, whether in government or opposition, 
exert commensurate influence on policy-making. 
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Perhaps specific-incidents will help to portray the 
influence of political parties in foreign policy-making. 
We may recall, against the risk of repetition, the issue 
of France's atomic bomb test in the Sahara Desert in the 
early '60s. All Nigerian political parties were relentless 
in calling on the government to explore all avenues of 
preventing the test from being carried out in Africa. 
Again during the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact, the opposition 
party led by Chief Awdowo exposed the secret deal to the 
Nigerian public. While the other parties criticised the 
Pact, it was the tenacity of the opposition party leadership, 
supported by the media, student organisations and trade unions 
that forced the Nigerian government to withdraw from the Pact 
in 1962. During the second Republic of Nigeria, political 
parties equally exerted influence on foreign policy-decisions. 
In the already cited dispute with the Republic of Cameroun in 
1981, all five political parties unanimously condemned the 
"murderous aggression committed by Cameroun against Nigeria", 
38 
The NPP stalwart, Chief Ume Ezeoke, who was also the Speaker 
of the Federal House of Representatives, made a clarion call 
on television for a declaration of war on Cameroun. Leading 
members of other parties (except the ruling NPN) also demanded 
that government should take action against Cameroun Republic. 
Chief Awolowo at a radio interview recalled several incidents 
in which Nigeria had been slapped in the face by African countries 
and said the only way to deter such hostile acts was by demonstrating 
that Nigeria can bite. Although, despite these party pressures, 
38. The Punch, June 14,1981; Daily Times. May-June 1981; 
National Concord, May-June 1981. 
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the government decided to the contrary, there is no doubt 
that the views of the parties were considered before reaching 
a final decision. 
As indicated earlier in this section, another way by which 
political parties contribute to the foreign policy process is 
by forming the government. The structure of Nigerian political 
parties show that within each party are various research groups 
or committees responsible for specific areas of government 
activity. The party's committee on foreign affairs advises the 
party leadership on various issues of foreign policy. Often 
the committee members bring their experience and influence to 
bear on the bureaucrats in the Ministry of External Affairs. 
If they fail to change the views of the bureaucrats, they 
might use their influence as the ruling party td pressurise 
the Executive to accept the party's point of view. 'For 
instance in the Cameroun incident, public opinion in Nigeria 
at that time was charged with demand for a retaliatory measure, 
the ruling party's Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs, 
Dr. Chubs Okadigbo, made through the Press a call on "Nigerians 
to contain their emotions over the current misunderstanding 
between this country and Cameroun"39 From these instances, it 
is clear that political parties are important factors in the 
domestic environment that influence foreign policy-making. 
Generally, therefore, Nigerian political parties contribute 
to foreign policy making through (a) initiating and proposing 
foreign policy objectives as possible government elect; (b) 
criticism and opposition of the government's foreign policy 
39. New Nigerian. June 11,1981, p. 3. 
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posture; (c) participation in policy formulation if elected 
into power and (d) through influencing policy in advisory 
capacity or by access to the corridors of power. Political 
party contributions and pressure or demand and support form 
only a part"of the inputs into foreign policy-making. When 
these are placed with other demands and support from the 
media, the trade unions, student organisations etc., then all 
inputs jostle for attention and consideration, thereby generating 
pressure on the foreign policy machinery. 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
Another important domestic source of input into foreign 
policy-making is the National Assembly. Like the political 
parties, the National Assembly came into existence for the 
limited periods of the first and second Republics, when 
Nigeria had constitutionally elected governments. The 
National Assembly is the legislative organ of the government 
in Nigeria. It is a glorified and honourable institution, 
made up of the widest possible representation of the people and 
its members are regarded as honourable citizens. The legislation 
occupies a revered institutional position in the political 
process. It can therefore be argued that it is a major part 
of the machinery of foreign policy-making while the opposite 
view is that the legislature merely exercises influence on the 
making of foreign policy (i. e. it is just a source of input). 
Essentially, the former believes that the Legislature 
has some statutory roles in foreign policy-making which make 
it a participant in the process. In Nigeria's first and second 
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Republics, the Constitution (1963) vested the parliament 
with the power to make laws "for the peace, order and good 
government of Nigeria"40 and N... for the purpose of 
implementing any treaty, convention or agreement between 
the Federation and any other country or any arrangement with 
or decision of an international organisation of which the 
Federation is a member". 
41 
This provision is incorporated 
in the 1979 constitution. The scope of the Parliament's 
constitutional function implied in the provision is wide. 
As Nigeria enters into a series of bilateral agreements with 
many countries on economic, scientific and cultural matters, 
the ratification of each agreement requires the consent of 
the Assembly. Nigeria's membership of ECOWAS, OAU, OPEC, 
Commonwealth, Non-aligned Movement and UNO from which various 
treaties and conventions emerge from time to time, implies that 
before any formal commitment of Nigeria is made, the Assembly 
has to scrutinize the particular instrument and thereafter 
decide to grant consent or not. It is argued that this-is 
in essence direct parliamentary involvement in foreign policy 
making. 
Article 77 of the constitution (1963) provided that 
"Parliament may make laws for Nigeria or any part thereof with 
respect to trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries 
and ... including the export of commodities from Nigeria, the 
import of commodities into Nigeria, the establishment and 
enforcement of grades and standards of quality for commodities 
40. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Lagos, 
1963, section 69. 
41. Ibid, section 74. 
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to be exported from Nigeria... ". It is thus argued that 
as economic considerations are integral parts of the foreign 
policy, the organ that makes law or defines the direction and 
nature of external economic activities of-the state is involved 
in foreign policy. Other statutory functions of the National 
Assembly tend to buttress this-argument. Article 5: 3 of the 
constitution (1979) provided that "(a) the President shall not 
declare a state of war between the Federation and another country 
except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the 
National Assembly sitting in session; and (b) except with the 
prior approval of the Senate, no member of the armed forces of 
the Federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside Nigeria". 
42 
The implications of these provisions are obvious. Specifically 
it makes the Executive depend on the approval of the Legislature 
in order to embark on the principal objective of Nigeria's 
foreign policy, which is "the defence of our sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity". 
43 It can be argued 
that whoever approves a given policy makes the policy, for without 
auch approval it will not become policy and Will have no effect. 
In a similar argument over the US congress, Lloyd Jensen 
wrote that the view that the Legislature has been systematically 
excluded by the Executive from all foreign policy arenas is not 
supported by the data. Although the trend in most states is 
one of ever-increasing power to the executive at the expense 
of legislative and other groups, legislative bodies, he said, 
"often share in the treaty-making process and approve foreign 
42. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Lagos, 1979, section 5: 3. 
43. Federal Ministry of Information, News Release No. 780, 
Lagos, June 29,1976. 
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policy appointments. They usually play an important 
role in the budgetary process and share in the ultimate 
decision to engage in war". 
44 Despite some variations 
between nations, Jensen said "the consensus is that the 
Legislative body plays a limited role in the making of 
foreign policy"* 
45 
The opposite view contends that foreign policy making 
is an executive responsibility while the Legislature acts 
more or less as an influencer through constitutional checks, 
parliamentary enactments, budgetary controls and committee 
debates on the foreign policy posture adopted by the Executive. 
It assumes that the views of the Legislature on foreign policy 
perhaps like other interest groups, may be accepted or rejected 
by the Executive. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the 
Executive to lobby and persuade the Legislature to agree with 
them. Another point is that the Executive in modern governments 
has become very powerful at the expense of the Legislature. 
This implies that because of the dominant influence of the 
Executive on state matters, the role of parliament in the 
making of foreign policy has therefore declined, as a world- 
wide phenomenon. Even in countries where parliamentary 
democracy flourishes, "the formal institutional functions 
of parliament have been reduced to approving or rejecting the 
government's policy and to influencing, in a very clumsy way, 
the formulation and execution of that policy". 
46 To illustrate 
the point, Keatinge cited the cases of the British government's 
44. Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1982, p. 120. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Keatinge, Patrick, *The formulation of Irish foreign policy" 
Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 1973, P. 41. 
215, 
0 
invasion of Suez in 1956 which caused parliamentary revolt 
and the American government's handling of the Cuban crisis 
of 1961 without due consultation of the Congress, as instances 
where governments have ignored parliament. 
In Nigeria, the role of the parliament in the political 
process has declined tremendously due to the frequent military 
interventions that have reduced the life of Nigerian Legislatures 
and also the dominant influence of the Executive over the Legis- 
lature as a global phenomenon. Based on this line of argument, 
the National Assembly (Nigerian Legislature) is considered here 
as an influencer (not maker) of foreign policy. 
In the first and second Republics of Nigeria, the National 
Assembly or Parliament as it was called in the first Republic, 
consisted of "the President, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives"47 and was vested with the power to make laws 
for Nigeria for the purpose of implementing any treaty, convention 
or agreement between the Federation and any other country, 
48 
To emphasis. the obvious, this provision is for the purpose 
of making laws to guide the makers of foreign policy in their 
formulation and practice of the country's external policy. The 
scope of Nigeria's external involvement coupled with its clear- 
cut, that is consistent, non-hypocritical, external behaviour, 
are such as not to necessitate frequent recourse to the National 
Assembly. Some incidents that could have clearly put the 
National Assembly into the foreign policy picture either 
occurred during the absence of the National Assembly or were 
47. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, 
section 41 and 1979, section 42. 
48. Ibid., sections 74 (1963) and 104 (1979). 
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left to run out of steam. Examples include Nigeria's 
signature to the non-proliferation treaty (1971), peace- 
keeping operations in Chad (1979), the Sarahawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) question (1984) and 
the border dispute with the Cameroun Republic (1981), 
referred to earlier. In the latter case, the parliament had 
a constitutional role to play if Nigeria was to take 
retaliatory measures against the Cameroun Republic. ''Article 
5: 3 of the constitution (1979) forbade the President from 
deploying any Nigerian soldier abroad without legislative 
approval. In that case the National Assembly could have 
prepared such a resolution as required by Article 5: 3 of the 
constitution and followed it up by a constitutional amendment 
deleting Article 5: 3 thus making it possible for the President 
to respond to such emergencies. Attention was drawn to this 
role but the National Assembly backed away from it* 
49 
Nevertheless there are many ways by which the National 
Assembly influences foreign policy-making. These include 
individual members taking various opportunities to articulate 
their views on foreign policy matters and being elected 
representatives; such views are-not totally ignored; also 
through the discussions and resolutions of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations as well as during the National Assembly debates 
on foreign policy issues. Claude S. Philips illustrated the 
role of parliament in the 1960s in foreign policy-making. He 
cited, for example, the debates in the House of Representatives 
on the Anglo-Nigeria defence pact; 
50 
on the relations with the 
49. Sunday Punch, June 14, 1981, p. 2. 
50. Claude S. Philipe, op. cit. 4L 
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USSR and other Communist countries; 
51 
on the adoption of 
the principle of non-alignment and Nigeria's African policy, 
etc. The debates an these issues in the House of Representatives 
helped to guide the government in its eventual adoption of 
foreign policy objectives. The indomitable and fearless 
opposition in the National Assembly was such that the Assembly's 
views on foreign policy could not be ignored. 
In the second Republic, the National Assembly was again 
more or lese divided into the government party and the opposition 
with the latter made up of almost the same group of people who 
formed the opposition in the first Republic. The Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the National Assembly debated exhaustively 
in 1980, issues like relations with Israel and South Africa. 
Some members led by Dr. Jaja Wachukwu, former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, wanted Nigeria to open diplomatic relations with 
both Israel and South Africa. They argued that such a relation- 
ship would afford Nigeria the opportunity to discuss and convince 
the governments of the two countries as to the futility of the 
policies of Zionism and apartheid. This proposal against the 
prevailing policy of no compromise with apartheid and Zionism 
might have accounted for Dr. Wachukwu being unsuccessful in his 
bid for the chairmanship of the Senats Committee on Foreign 
Relations. The Committee was essentially the Assembly's 
watchdog on the foreign policy activities of the Executives. 
Its discussions and criticisms or resolutions were referred to 
the Executive. 
51. Ibid., pp. ss-S9.6o-6yß, /0/_/06 
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Again the Committee on Foreign Relations played a 
major role in screening the Presidential nominees for 
Ambassadorial appointments. By this means of approving 
or rejecting the appointment of a principal envoy abroad 
the Committee influenced foreign policy-making and 
implementation. When the Committee's work is submitted 
to the National Assembly for debate, the issue is further 
elaborated and more parliamentarians take part in the 
debate. Views raised in the Assembly on relevant matters 
are passed for the attention of the Executive. In 
addition, there is in the Ministry of External Affairs, 
a National Assembly Liaison Unit whose staff go to the 
Assembly on a daily basis to record and report to the 
Ministry any debate on matters of external policy. There 
are also official records of the National Assembly debates 
and occasionally the Ministry it invited to send 
representatives to the Assembly when substantive matters 
concerning its work are to be debated. Through these 
means, the views of the National Assembly are fed into the 
machinery of foreign policy-making. 
THE ECONOMY 
The national economy is another important source of 
input into foreign policy-making in Nigeria. It determines 
how much money is available for foreign affairs. If 
Nigeria's economic capacity is low, there will be less 
money for the pursuit of foreign policy and if the economic 
position is high, then more money will be devoted to foreign 
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policy. A stable economic base is necessary for effective 
pursuit of the country's external policy. Nigeria has 
a tremendous physical resource base which supports its 
steadily growing, activist and purposeful foreign policy. 
As already indicated in Chos-2(i), Nigeria is well 
endowed with land area, natural and human resources necessary 
for rapid socio-economic growth. Its land area makes possible 
the production of a wide range of agricultural commodities and 
offers apace for development projects. According to Professor 
Adebayo Adedeji, Nigeria's population is made up of one of the 
most resourceful people that can be found anywhere. 
52 The 
government employs the foreign policy personnel from the country's 
large labour force. The supply of the necessary personnel is 
among the vital inputs into policy-making. The growth of the 
Nigerian population with abundant skilled labour is an indication 
of the country's strong economic capacity. Despite the drift 
to the private sector for more attractive remuneration and the 
massive retirements of 1975 and 1984, there has been a regular 
supply of qualified personnel to the foreign service. There 
are, however, problems arising from faulty methods of recruitment, 
placement and postings of foreign policy staff (see CI cipher 9A 
-t3(i) and (ii)). Another indicator of economic growth is 
the rapid increase in the production of goods and services in 
Nigeria. For example, at independence, the gross domestic 
product, Which measures total production of goods and services 
in the economy, was about #3,142.4 million. 
53 By 1970 the 
52. "Nigeria's Economic Position Today", text of a broadcast on 
the National Network of Radio Nigeria by Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, 
Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, 
on the occasion of the 13th Independence Anniversary of Nigeria, 
Lagos, in October 1973, p. 1. 
53. See Table 2 in Part I, Car 2. 
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GOP (at current factor cost) was 05,281 million and by 1980 
it rose to N43,280 million. 
54 This reflects a substantial 
growth of the Nigerian economy, from which funds are made 
available for formulation and implementation of the country's 
foreign policy. 
Despite the apparent economic growth, Nigeria's level of 
development, in comparison with the industrialised countries 
like the USA, USSR, Japan and UK9 is still quite low. For 
instance the j2er capita income in Nigeria is comparatively 
small. The standard of living is poor. According to Douglas 
Rimmer, "material welfare, even of the most elementary kind, is 
far from abundant in Nigeria, and that most Nigerians are 
relatively impoverished in their money-earnings, health, 
housing, sanitation and access to water and lighting". 
55 
There is also a very slow pace of industrialisation and 
technological development, due primarily to mismanagement and 
ill-equipped leadership which Nigeria has had since independence. 
The very low level of development in Nigeria affects to a 
considerable extent, how much attention and resources that 
government can devote to external affairs. 
However, there has been continuous effort by Nigerians 
to accelerate real growth in the economy. This-effort is 
reflected in the first post-independence Six-Year Development 
Plan 1962/68. The full implementation of that plan to 
revolutionise the economy and introduce structural changes, 
was interrupted by the military intervention and subsequent 
54. Central Bank of Nigeria: Economic and Financial Review, 
volume 19, No. 2, December 1981. 
55. Kirk-Greene, Anthony and Rimmer, Douglas, Nigeria since 1970 - 
A Political economic outline, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 
1981, p. 66. 
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civil war. At the and of the war (1970), the Federal 
Military Government launched the Second National Development 
Plan 1970/74. During the period, the economy made reasonable 
progress, aided by the sudden increase in the revenue from 
exports of crude oil, especially in the 1973-75 period* 
56 
As revenue continued to increase, there was greater determination 
and a general tone of optimism to force the pace of growth in 
the economy. Thus in March 1975, the Federal Military 
Government launched a thirty billion naira (third) National 
Development Plan, 1975-80. This plan was overshadowed by 
the coup of July 29,1975 and the new Military Government's 
preparations to return the country to a constitutionally 
elected government by 1979. By 1981, Nigeria had its fourth 
National Development Plan, 1981-86, which has been dominated 
by the unprecedented commitment of the national leadership to 
transfer the federal capital to Abuja. A substantial amount 
of Nigeria's revenue since 1980 has been purportedly diverted 
towards the development of the Abuja capital territory. The 
various economic programmes of the government appear ambitious 
but are indications of a healthy performance of the economy. 
Obviously there has been a massive increase in the revenue 
earnings of the Federal Government since independence, 
57 
but 
it has not resulted in a commensurate high level of industriali- 
cation and social services. However, it has given rise to a 
56. After the Yom Kippur War, October 1973, the Arab countries 
imposed an oil embargo against selected NATO countries. This 
led to scarcity and unprecedented increase in the market price 
of oil. Nigeria then increased its production of oil from 
which it received much revenue. 
57. See "Current Revenue of the Federal Government" in Central 
Bank of Nigeria. Economic and Financial Review, vol. 20, No. 1, 
June 1982, p. 74. Also vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, June 1970, pp. 128- 
136. Despite the glut in the oil market since 1982, rapid 
growth rate has become a feature of the Nigerian economy. 
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reasonable improvement on the 1960 level and the economy 
has acquired its own momentum for growth. The overall 
effect on policy makers of the huge revenues from the 
economy is the increase of optimism and confidence reflected 
in the country's external relations. Nigerials financial 
prosperity also explains the increased financial assistance 
to foreign governments and organisations (see chapter 10 on 
Nigeria's practice of foreign aid). 
Essentially, the low productivity of agriculture and 
slow pace of industrialisation constitute a major drag on 
the economy, and affect the amount of funds that would otherwise 
be available for policy planning and development. On the other 
hand, the huge proceeds from exports (especially oil) has made 
available substantial revenue for the formulation and imple- 
mentation of foreign policy. 
Generally, we have examined in this section five identifiable 
sources of input into foreign policy-making. These are mainly 
from the domestic environment. In the next chapter we will try 
to examine the sources of input from the external environment 
of Nigerian foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
As we noted in the last chapter, the environment of 
foreign policy-making is an all embracing, supra-system. 
But for the purpose of analysis, we decided to classify the 
environment into two - the domestic and external environments. 
The former has been discussed. So in this chapter, we will 
examine the external environment of Nigerian foreign policy, 
With a view to identifying and analysing the major sources of 
input and types of input into foreign policy making. Before 
that, we will try to explain what we mean by "the external 
environment" of Nigerian foreign policy. 
Nigeria is an actor in the international system and within 
the international system, there are many other actors. 
1 These 
include sovereign states, international organisations, multi- 
national corporations, stateless persona and liberation movements, 
who are participants in international politics. These actors 
relate and interact with one another bilaterally and multilaterally. 
A combination of multilateral and bilateral relations among 
these actors constitutes the international system. The 
international system itself and the actors in the system 
form the external environment of Nigerian foreign policy. As 
participants, the actors are in systemic interaction with 
Nigeria. As a result, Nigeria receives at times, through 
1. See "Actors in the Modern International System" in Ofosgbu, 
Ray; Foundation Course in International Relations for African 
Universities, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980, pp. 30-35. 
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some of their decisions and actions, considerable support 
and encouragement which enables it to operate as effectively 
as possible. At other times, they exert pressures or 
make demands that influence the decisions and actions of 
Nigeria an a variety of issues ýn the world, For example 
international organisations such as the UN, OAU, OPEC etc* 
influence the policies and behaviour of their member 
states through such organisations' decisions, agreements, 
resolutions and recommendations. In effect, the 
international system through the collective action of 
the actors in it, defines the norms of behaviour for 
actors in interaction, thereby setting the parameters 
of the environment within which members operate. To put 
it simply, pressures and demands arising from the inter- 
national system have considerable influence on an actor's 
decision to adopt a given position in external affairs. 
Nigeria, being an actor in the international system, 
belongs to some organisations and maintains certain relation- 
ships that have become dominant factors in its external 
environment. These dominant factors are the main external 
sources of input into Nigeria's foreign policy. They 
include: the ECOWAS, the River Niger Commission, Lake Chad 
Basin Commission, OAU, UNO9 OPEC, IBRD (World Bank), IMF, 
Commonwealth and Non-aligned Movement. Others include 
substantial bilateral relations especially with the big powers 
and Africa. All these can be classified into four spheres 
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of influence as: - the regional (West African), Continental, 
global and the bilateral spheres. However, we will discuss 
below a few of these external environmental factors. 
THE REGIONAL SPHERE 
The West African region is Nigeria's immediate external 
environment and a major sphere of influence. The region has 
been regarded as the most strategic area in terms of national 
security. If one accepts the dictum that. 'Charity begins at 
home', then Nigeria must, of necessity, take into account 
events in the immediate environment. It has to ensure amity 
and cooperation so as to avert the use of neighbouring countries 
for possible subversion or threat of it by any external 
aggressor. It is the view here that all countries in West 
Africa are strategically and economically important to Nigeria. 
Therefore, their relationship with Nigeria as well as extra- 
African powers are of vital interest to Nigeria. As earlier 
noted, Nigeria occupies a unique position in the region and 
that position imposes some obligations such as the need for 
close cooperation and collaboration with other countries in 
the region on international, economic, political and security 
matters, if the stability of the region is to be maintained. 
However, in the first Republic (1960-65) the Federal 
Government seemed not to attach much importance to Nigeria's 
immediate external environment. This is evidenced by the 
discrepancies among the political parties on the type of 
association to maintain with West African countries (see 
chapter 2). But since the end of the civil war in 1970, 
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Nigerian governments have shown increased'awarenesa of 
the vital importance of the region. According to Aluko, 
the Nigerian government's role in the formation of the Chad 
Basin Commission, the River Niger Commission and ECOWAS have 
shown clearly that Nigerian leaders are aware of the vital 
importance of this area. 
2 Recently the Head of State, Major 
General Buhari stressed the importance to national security 
and well-being of Nigeria's immediate neighbours. He said: 
"... the national economic and security 
interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
are inextricably tied up with the security, 
the stability and the economic and social well- 
being of our immediate neighbours. One of our 
principal priorities is to put on a more 
constructive footing relations with our 
neighbours with whom we share identical goals 
of regional stability and peace. 
This Administration has maintained a high 
degree of cooperation with the Republics of 
Benin, Niger, Chad and the Cameroun. The 
recent four-nation mini-summit. in Lagos 
embracing Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana 
is an extension of this inner circle of 
relationships to ensure our collective and 
individual security and prosperity". 3 
The statement shows that Nigeria's immediate external 
environment is of primary concern and consideration in the 
government's thinking. However, the countries in the region 
are economically and militarily weak. They depend to a 
considerable extent on external sources for the needs of 
national defence. As such, they are susceptible to external 
pressure on matters requiring united action. The implications 
of these are the major concerns of the Nigerian government, which 
consequently devotes much time and resources to improving relations 
with its neighbours and promoting economic development and 
2. Aluko, 0; Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy; Gorge Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1981, pp. 266-267. 
3. Buhari Muhammadu (Major-General); Annual Foreign Policy Speech, 
delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 
Lagos, 3 December 1984. 
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regional self-reliance. 
Efforts in this direction have resulted in the establish- 
ment of regional organisatione/commissions which have become 
dominant factors that also generate substantial input into 
the making of Nigeria's foreign policy. These are the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
River Niger Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. 
We will discuss these briefly below. 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) 
Nigeria's role in the formation of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) was a bold effort in regional economic 
cooperation, aimed at creating a common market of West African 
States. It has since become evident that most West African 
countries can achieve substantial material progress through 
regional economic cooperation. Since 1972, Nigeria and Togo 
have been in the forefront of the effort to bring about regional 
economic integration of West African States. In May, 1975, 
fifteen countries in the region signed the Treaty establishing 
the Economic Community of West African States. 
4 Member 
countries including Nigeria resolved to promote the harmonious 
economic development of their states through effective economic 
cooperation and collective self-reliance. Article 2(l) of 
the Treaty establishing the Community provides as its aims 
"to promote cooperation and development in all fields of 
economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
4. The original 15 members were Benin Republic, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea (Conakry), Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and 
Upper Volta. Since its inception, one other country, Cape 
Verde, has joined the Organisation bringing the membership 
to 16. 
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resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and 
in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising 
the standard of living of its peoples". This provision 
of the Treaty obviously summarises the overriding objectives 
and commitments to development of all West African States 
since their attainment of independence. The Community's 
pursuit of the principles of collective action and self- 
reliance or indeed the whole concept of regional economic 
integration of West Africa has been a subject of considerable 
discussion and debate in some economic and political literature. 
5 
Nigeria's decision to give full support to the-formation and 
growth of ECOWAS means that time and resources will be devoted 
to regional integration. This is evident in Nigeria's 
initiatives and direct involvements in resolving the barriers 
to integration and also by the large amount of Nigeria's 
resources devoted to the Community. Nigeria is the largest 
contributor to the budget of the Economic Community of West 
African States. It also contributes the highest amount to the 
Community's fund for development. According to the financial 
Controller of ECOWAS, Nigeria provides 31% of the annual budget 
5. Abangwu, G. C., "Systems Approach to Regional Integration in 
West Africa"# Journal of Common Market Studies XIII. 1975; 
Olofin Sam, "Trade Preferences and Economic Integration in 
West Africa"; unpublished paper presented at the 5th Annual 
Conference of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs, 
Nov. 20-22,1975. University of Lagos; Adebayo Adedeji, 
"Economic Community of West African States: Ideals and Realities"9 
Nigerian Trade Journal, 22 (April-June 1975) and Eghosa Osagie, 
"Monetary Disintegration and Integration in West Africa"9 
Nigerian Journal of International Studies, It July 1975 pp. 
12-27; Folayan Ojo, "Economic Community of West African States 
in the New International Economic Order" and Abdul A. Ialloh, 
"Recent Trends in Regional Integration in Africa" both in 
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 6 Nos. 1 and 2, 
1980. Also Ashok Kumar and Eghoso Asagie, "Problems of the Economic 
Community of West African States" and Okon Udokang, "Nigeria and 
ECOWASs economic and political implications of regional integration" 
both in Akinysmi (ed. ), Nigeria and the Worid# op. cit. 
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(Ivory Coast, the next largest contributor, gives 12.6%) while 
its (Nigeria) contribution to the fund for development stands 
at 32% (Ivory Coast 23%) of the total. 
6 These contributions 
are obvious demands on the limited funds available. Similar 
demands are made on the foreign policy structures which have 
to convince the government every year to allocate more funds 
to external affairs. 
On the other hand, *if the objectives of ECOWAS are achieved, 
Nigeria. hopes to derive some benefits that will boost its 
national economy and also prestige in the world. 
Having examined-Nigeria's role in ECOWAS, Dr. Okon Udokang 
argued that "Nigeria's national interests - the development 
and expansion of its economy, the raising of the standard of 
living of its population, and the future physical security of 
its territory- can only be effectively secured through joint 
programmes of balanced production, distribution and consumption 
of goods and services on a regional basis".? He pointed out 
specifically that Nigeria has been motivated by the realisation 
that regional free trade is a healthy stimulus to balanced 
economic development; that the Community will provide a ready 
market for its (Nigeria) industrial products; that it can 
invest directly in the production of raw materials, food and 
in secondary industries in other member countries of the 
Community (for example, in the iron ore project in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Guinea, to supplement local sources of iron 
ore for its Iron and Steel Industry). 
8 
6. Daily Sketch January 23,1979. 
7. Udokang Okon; "Nigeria and ECOWASs the economic and political 
implications of regional integration", in Akinyemi, A. 8. (ed. ), 
Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 
The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1978, p.? 6. 
8. Ibid., pp. 74-77. 
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Undoubtedly, all member states of ECOWAS could derive 
important economic benefits if the policies of the Community 
are implemented, like the elimination of tariff barriers 
and other trade restrictions. Before such benefits can be 
realised a number of problems must be resolved. These 
include the narrow range of products that could complement 
instead of compete with each other, the differences in 
monetary and fiscal policies of the member states, and the 
inadequate infrastructures that could impede the growth of 
inter-regional trade within ECOWAS. For example the internal 
and international road system within the ECOWAS area is not 
well developed. Existing harbours are inadequate for 
handling large imports and exports of goods. The posts 
and telecommunications systems are slow. Also banking 
systems are inefficient. Added to these, are abysmal internal 
and external political interests that constitute impediments 
to ECOWAS. To eliminate most of these problems demands from 
member states enormous sacrifices in human and material resources. 
It also demands both individual and combined efforts to improve 
the range of industrial products of the member states, the 
volume of trade and the purchasing power in the Community. 
Nigeria's interest in the region is far beyond a narrow state 
interest and includes the interests of other states in the 
region. 
THE RIVER NIGER COMMISSION 
The economic and geographical importance of the River 
Niger to Nigeria has made the River Niger Commission a major 
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factor in Nigeria's external environment. The Commission 
was started in 1963, with a view to establishing a regime 
for the River Niger. Membership of the Commission is 
composed of 8 states; Cameroon, Benin Republic, Guinea 
(Conakry), Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Upper Volta. 
However, Chad which used to be the 9th member, recently 
decided to withdraw. The Secretariat of the Commission 
is based in Niamey. There is no doubt about the importance 
of the River Niger to the economic development of the countries 
through which it flows, and in fact to the whole of the West 
African region. Nigeria is located at the tail and of the 
river and the important Kainji Dam is situated on this river. 
Much of Nigeria's agricultural export crops from the northern 
states are transported via the River Niger to the coast for 
shipment. Some fishing is also done on the river and its 
water is used for irrigation of surrounding farmlands. For 
these reasons, it is of particular interest to Nigeria that 
a Commission be established to monitor and control activities 
on the river. To realise this interest the Ministry of 
External Affairs' Department of International Economic Co-operation 
in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and 
Water Resources are directly involved in the activities of the 
Commission. Though the Commission has its problems, mainly 
financial and administrative, there is a determined effort 
by Nigeria to ensure that the Commission functions properly 
so as to achieve the economic benefits derivable from the 
river. 
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LAKE CHAD BASIN COPMISSION 
The Lake Chad Basin Commission is another important 
regional multilateral organisation in which Nigeria has to 
play an active role. The LCBC was established by the 
"Convention and Statute Relating to the Development of the 
Chad Basin", 9 which came into being in May, 1964, with its 
signing by the Second Chad Conference of Heads of State. 
The membership of the Basin Commission is composed of Cameroon, 
Niger, Nigeria and Chad. The Executive Secretariat of the 
Commission is at N'Djamena in Chad. The Lake Chad Basin 
Commission has been functioning fairly well in harnessing 
the resources of the Chad Basin in agriculture, animal 
husbandry, forestry and fisheries. The funding of the 
Basin Commission is through (i) recurrent budget contributed 
on the basis of equality of member states, (ii) Chad Basin 
Development Fund contributed in the ratio of 1/1,000 of 
each member's national budget - In 1974/75, Nigeria 
contributed 75% of the fund, (iii) external financial and 
technical assistance. 
10 The continued development of the 
Lake Chad Basin is in the national interest of Nigeria and 
its neighbours who stand to benefit by harnessing and 
developing the Basin's potentialities for increased food 
production. Nigeria's role according to Ofoegbu is a 
practical expression of its interest and involvement in 
African co-operation and it enables Nigeria to contribute 
in promoting the capacity of its neighbours to feed themselves. ll 
91 Federal Ministry of Justice; Nigeria's Treaties in Force, 
1960-1968, Lagos, pp. 217-224. 
10. Ofoegbu, Ray Mazi; "The Chad Basin Commission" in Akinyemi, 
A. B. (ad. ). Nigeria and the World, op. cit., pp. 82-3. 
11. Ibid., p. 91. 
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In a nutshell, Nigeria's membership of ECOWAS, the 
River Niger Commission and Lake Chad Basin Commission have 
implications for the country's foreign policy. 
12 First, 
a substantial part of the resources - personnel, money 
and materials, available for external affairs are directed 
towards the needs and demands of the regional organisations. 
Second, concerted diplomatic efforts are made to keep the 
members together and to ensure the success of the organisations. 
Third, membership of the organisations implies joint action 
by the states to safeguard the security of the region as well 
as the economic, political and social well-being of their 
peoples. In this regard, there is need for closer co-operation 
between the respective agencies of government and also need 
for restraint in their activities to avoid upsetting the 
already established relationships among the states in the 
region. Fourth, to attain the objectives of these 
organisations and maintain regional stability, entails 
constant surveillance of the activities of neo-colonialist 
agents and endeavours to avert extra-regional intervention. 
Thus any regional policy must take these facts into consideration. 
This means that Nigeria or indeed any other country, has not 
complete freedom of action in external affairs, even within 
its immediate external environment. 
12. See Okon Udokang, "Nigeria and ECOWAS: economic and 
political implications of regional integration", in 
Akinyemi, A. B. (ed. ), Nigeria and the World - Readings 
in Nigerian Foreign Policy. University Press Limited, 
Ibadan, 1980, pp. 57-81. 
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THE CONTINENTAL SPHERE AND OAU 
Africa is the cornerstone, some will prefer to call it 
the centre-piece, of Nigerian foreign policy. This means 
that Africa occupies a central focus in Nigeria's foreign 
policy formulation and execution. From this perspective, 
said one Nigerian, "our foreign policy can be described as 
the pursuit of a combination of all our national interests 
as well as the interests of Africa as a whole". 
13 Truly 
Nigeria has demonstrated substantial interest in African 
affairs through the Organisation of African Unity, assistance 
to liberation movements, peaceful resolution of inter-African 
disputes, fostering economic co-operation among African 
countries and aid. A close examination of Nigeria's role 
in Africa will highlight the magnitude of input from this 
environment into the country's foreign policy making. 
THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) 
The Organisation of African Unity has been an important 
factor, perhaps the moat dominant factor politically, in the 
external environment of Nigeria. It was established at Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963 by the Governments of thirty-one African 
States in the patriotic endeavour to ensure the survival of 
the continent as a viable economic and political entity. 
Nigeria is a founder member of the OAU and played a leading 
role in its formation, 
14 Since then, Nigeria has remained 
13, Osobase, L. S. M. (Ambassador), "The Place of Africa in Nigeria's 
foreign policy"9 being a lecture at the 17th Induction Course for 
newly recruited Foreign Service Officers, Lagos, 6th June 1979, p. 1. 
14. For more details about the OAU, see Thompson, V. 89 Africa and 
Un ityq Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, London, 1969. Also Cervenka 
Zdenek, The Oroen a of African Unity and Its Charter, C. 
Hurst & Company, London, 1969 and The Unfinished quest for Unity: 
Africa and the OAU, Friedmann Publishers Ltd., London, 1977. 
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committed to the survival of the organisation as the only 
rallying point for all African countries. The history of 
Africa as the most Balkanised and exploited of continents, 
and the urgent need for a high degree of co-operation among 
African states, if the continent is to achieve freedom and 
prosperity, have combined to make the survival and success' 
of the OAU a major objective of Nigeria's African policy. 
A close examination of the purposes and principles of 
the Organisation of African Unity will reveal its intrinsic 
appeal to Nigeria and why successive governments in Nigeria 
have reaffirmed commitment to the organisation. According 
to Article II of the Charter, 
"The Organisation shall have the following 
purposes: (a) to promote the unity and 
solidarity of the African states; (b) to 
co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation. 
and efforts to achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa; (c) to defend their 
sovereignty, their territorial integrity, 
and independence; (d) to eradicate all forms 
of colonialism from Africa; and (e) to promote 
international co-operation, having due regard 
to the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 15 
These are similar to the objectives of Nigeria in external 
affairs (see section 4). Nigerian leaders have been espousing 
them publicly at conferences before and after independence. 
Specifically, these purposes are in accord with the objectives 
of Nigeria's intra-African policy. It then means that 
activities of the OAU in these areas will complement those 
of Nigeria and vice versa. Thus, there is no doubt that the 
similarity in objectives added much to the commitment of 
Nigeria to the Organisation. 
15. Charter of the Organisation of African Unity; Purposes, 
Article II, Addis Ababa, May 1963. 
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The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 
imposes extra obligations on Nigeria for several reasons. 
It has been known that before the establishment of the OAU 
the Federal Government of Nigeria took the initiative to 
organise in Lagos a number of preliminary conferences of the 
Heads of African and Malagasy States Organisation (January, 
June and December 1962). The agreements at these conferences 
form the main body of the Charter. Hence it can be said that 
the OAU Was conceived in Lagos and born in Addis Ababa. According 
to Stremlau, "eighteen months before the GAU was formed, the 
Federal Government invited all independent African states to 
most in Lagos where, in Ghana's absence, a tentative agreement 
was reached on the formula for the OAU Charter. "16 He further 
indicated that the principles of the Organisation were prepared 
by Nigeria and adopted by the member-states as Article III of 
the Charter, as follows: 
"The member states, in pursuit of the purposes 
stated in Article II9 solemnly affirm and declare 
their adherence to the following principles: 
(1) the sovereign equality of all member states; 
(2) non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states; (3) respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each member state and 
for its inalienable right to independent existence; 
(4) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration; (5) un- 
reserved condemnation, in all its forms, of 
political assassination as well as of subversive 
activities on the part of neighbouring states or 
any other states; (6) absolute dedication to the 
total emancipation of the African territories 
which are still dependent; (7) affirmation of a 
policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs". 17 
16. Stremlau, John J., The Internal Politics of the Nigerian 
Civil War. 1967-1970, Princeton University Prese, New 
Jersey, 1977, p. 15. 
17. OAU Charter, op. cit., Article III. 
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Stremlau noted that with the exception of one principle, 
Which Was. replaced by that affirming "a policy of non- 
alignment with regard to all blocs", the seven points 
proposed by Nigeria reappeared almost verbatim as the 
principles of the GAU, 
is As Nigeria put so much into the 
establishment of the Organisation it therefore has an 
extra obligation to prevent its demise. Secondly, Nigeria 
being an architect of African unity through functional co- 
operation, is obliged to uphold the principles and purposes 
of the OAU, in order to encourage less committed African states 
to do the same. Third, Nigeria's advocacy of the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, restated 
in Article III(2)9 poses a serious problem for both the 
Organisation and Nigeria on issues requiring intervention (see 
next paragraph for examples). Although the essence of the 
principle in my view, is to emphasise the necessity for mutual 
respect and good relations among African states, the Charter 
failed to preclude actions by individual states that run counter 
to the principles and purposes of the Organisation and considered 
by the appropriate principal institution (e. g. the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government) to be detrimental to African 
unity. There should have been a provision for determining 
at which point an issue would cease to be a domestic affair 
and become one for OAU intervention. The absence of such 
provision helps to weaken the OAU, -to the dismay of the 
advocates of unity. Fourth, the Organisation imposes 
18. Stremlau, John J., ope cit., p. 16. 
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substantial financial obligations on Nigeria. It is one 
of the largest contributors to the Organisation's funds. 
Finally, because of the commitment and interest in the 
success of the Organisation, Nigeria is involved in almost 
all committees of the OAU and it is looked to for initiative 
in most inter-African affairs. These obligations and demands 
cannot but influence her external posture. 
Apart from the demands of the OAU, Africa's 'political 
fortune' and historical circumstances combine to make the 
influence of the continent on Nigeria's foreign policy a 
real necessity. The recognition of the implications to 
Nigeria of the enormous problems in Africa led to the provision 
in section 19 of the 1979 Constitution, under the 'Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy' that 
Nigeria will promote African unity as well as the total 
political, economic and cultural liberation of Africa and the- 
elimination of racial discrimination in all its manifestations. 
19 
The Federal Government has declared Nigeria's commitment to 
"the total liberation of Africa, the eradication of the inhuman 
system of apartheid, the social and economic well-being of the 
People of this continent and the defence of the independence 
and territorial integrity of African states". 20 But to 
achieve these objectives, Nigeria does not have complete freedom 
of action. It needs the co-operation of other African countries, 
Who may or may not be willing to do so. It will be difficult 
for Nigeria to try to ignore the rights and wishes of these 
19. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, 
Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos. 
20. Buhari, Muhammadu (Major-General), Annual Foreign Policy 
Speech, 1984, op. cit. 
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countries on many African issues, irrespective of the 
sincerity of its intention. Since Nigeria has to respect 
the sovereign rights of these countries to act one way or 
the other on any issue, their refusal to co-operate on a 
given issue will make it difficult for Nigeria to attain the 
particular objective. For example, one of Nigeria's 
objectives in Africa, as noted above, is "the defence of 
the independence and territorial integrity of African states". 
But if the independence of any African country is undermined 
as in the case of French intervention in Gabon (1964), in 
Tchad (1970-79), in Western Sahara where France supports the 
Moroccans, in Central Africa to remove Emperor Boksssa, or 
through the stationing of French military personnel in so-called 
Francophone Atrica, 21 Nigeria can prevent such neo-colonial 
activity only with the invitation or consent and co-operation 
of the African country directly involved. If there is no 
invitation or consent for Nigerian assistance, any attempt to 
defend the independence of the African country will amount to 
meddling in the internal affairs of an OAU member state, contrary 
to the provisions of the Charter. Thus, the fragmentation of 
Africa and continued neo-colonial activities there make the 
continent a difficult environment for Nigerian foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, a difficult situation is a challenge to a 
determined mind. Hence, on one hand, the multiplicity of 
problems in Africa and their implications for freedom, equality 
and development combine to generate concern and motivation for 
21. Chaliand, Gerard; The Struggle for Africa - Conflict of 
the Great Powers. The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982, p. 54. 
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effective and purposeful foreign policy. On the other 
hand, the magnitude of these problems - the fight to 
eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racism and neo-colonialism, 
the funding of liberation movements, aid to poor African 
countries, the promotion of co-operation and mutual security 
of the countries in the continent - and their effect on 
available resources constitute obvious constraints on 
Nigeria's external policy. Generally, the fact that 
Africa is the cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy, as 
noted above, explains the influence of African affairs on 
Nigeria's external policy considerations. 
Apartheid and racism in Southern Africa are the most 
disturbing factors in the environment and constitute a source 
of instability on the continent as well as a threat to world 
peace and security. 
22 According to the Director of African 
Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs, these twin evils 
constitute an affront to both Africa and the international 
community. "Obviously", he said, "the deplorable situation 
in Southern Africa is not one which Africa can reasonably 
be expected to tolerate for much longer. Regardless of any 
internal divisions in Africa, many African states are 
determined collectively and separately to intensify at every 
level the struggle against racism and apartheid. Nigeria, 
as the largest country in Africa, believes quite rightly that 
it has special responsibilities in this matter, and it is 
determined to fulfil its obligations fully in the struggle 
22. Osobase, L. S. M. (Ambassador), "The Place of Africa in 
Nigeria's Foreign Policy", being a lecture at the 17th 
Induction Course for newly recruited Foreign Service 
Officers, Lagos, 6th June, 1979, P. 2. 
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against racism and apartheid". 
23 Continuing, the Director 
stated, "In taking this stand, Nigeria believes that it is 
serving the cause of international peace and security, for, 
unless there is an irreversible transformation of the 
unacceptable situation in Southern Africa, and the speedy 
transfer of power to the majority of the people of those 
states, there will be no way of preventing an international 
conflict in Southern Africa. Nigeria's strong and determined 
opposition to racism and its support for the nationalist 
movements in Southern Africa iss therefore, in the interest 
of world peace", 
24 These statements amply illustrate that 
the situation in Southern Africa has a crucial influence on 
the making of Nigeria's African policy. 
Ambassador Osobass also outlined the point that "Nigeria 
has tried to foster Africals higher interests through the 
contribution of ideas in meetings of the Organisation of 
African Unity at various levels, material assistance and 
diplomatic offensive in favour of the liberation movements 
fighting for freedom in Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic 
of South Africa, the creation ofq and encouragement for, 
sub-regional economic organisations in the African continent. 
... We have, through the OAU Liberation Committee contributed 
and continue to contribute material and financial assistance 
to nationalist liberation movements fighting for freedom and 
independence from colonialism and white minority racist 
governments wherever they exist in Africa". 
25 
It was in the course of the crusade for the freedom of 
23. Ibid., p. 3. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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the black man in South Africa that Nigeria organised a 
world conference in 1977 to focus attention on the criminal 
acts of the South African regime and its supporters. It 
was in the same connection that Nigeria floated the South 
Africa Relief Fund through which various kinds of assistance 
are made available towards the cause of freedom and justice 
for the black man in South Africa. Besides African freedom 
and independence, Nigeria's policy is directed towards the 
achievement of economic self-reliance for Africa. In August 
1980 the Government of Nigeria hosted the first OAU Economic 
Summit devoted to finding ways of expanding inter-African 
economic co-operation. In addition to fostering African 
economic co-operation, Nigeria is committed to ensuring peace 
and stability in the continent by helping, through the OAU and 
at times unilaterally, to bring about peaceful settlement 
of inter-African disputes. All these concerns and commitments 
illustrate the influence of the continent on the foreign policy 
considerations of Nigeria. 
THE GLOBAL SPHERE-AND UNITED NATIONS 
The Nigerian government from independence has had great 
admiration for the international system and has been attracted 
to it. Also Nigerian leaders have placed great importance 
on international organisations for a variety of reasons (see 
chapter 2(iii)) including the maintenance of global peace and 
security and the promotion of mutual aid. 
26 Similarly international 
26, Nunn, Grady H; "Nigerian Foreign Relations" in Blitz, Franklin L, 
(ad. ), The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1965, p. 259. 
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organisations have literally maintained ideal purposes and 
principles, such as keeping international peace and security, 
upholding fundamental human rights, respectfor the dignity 
and worth of the human person, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states and acceptance of the sovereign equality of 
states etc. These high-sounding expressions make an irresistable 
appeal to both strong and weak states alike and are capable of 
attracting membership to international organisations. Thus, 
international organisations generally and especially the United 
Nations and its agencies, exert influence on the nation's foreign 
policy, as will be explained below. 
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION (UNO) 
0 
Nigeria was admitted into the United Nations on 7th October 
1960 as the 99th member of the Organisation. The United Nations 
was founded on 26th June 1945, in San Francisco and came into 
existence on 24th October 1945, after the ratification of its 
Charter by the requisite majority of independent states. The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral 
part of the "Charter of the United Nations". To appreciate 
the appeal made to Nigeria by the United Nations, it is necessary 
to examine briefly the purposes and principles of the UN as set 
down in the Charter. The purposes aret 
(i) to maintain international peace and security; 
(ii) to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples; 
(iii) to promote international co-operation in 
solving international economic, social and 
humanitarian problems and in encouraging 
respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction; 
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(iv) to be a centre for harmonizing the actions 
of nations in the attainment of these common 
ends. 27 
The Charter further provided that in pursuit of these 
purposes the Organisation and its members shall act in 
accordance with the following principles: 
(1) the principle of sovereign equality of all 
member states; 
(2) fulfilment in good faith of the obligations 
arising from membership as well as enjoyment 
of the rights and benefits resulting from these; 
(3) settlement of international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice are not endangered; 
(4) refraining from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integriý9 or political 
independence of any state etc. 
As can be seen, these provisions are quite fascinating, hence 
the Nigerian government embraced the United Nations with 
enthusiasm and has consistently reaffirmed faith in the world 
body. It must be emphasized, however, that the United Nations 
is neither a supranational authority nor an entity with sovessign 
powers. In actual fact, the main organs of the United Nations 
and all their committees and subsidiary agencies are composed 
of member states represented by their delegates. Therefore 
any decision, resolution or action of the United Nations is the 
collective responsibility of the members. The organisation 
has no powers to enforce its resolutions. As such, compliance 
with the principles and purposes of the UN, depends to a great 
extent on the willingness of each member state to do so. This 
is a major factor that weakens the organisation and causes 
27. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, United Nations, New York; Article I. 
28, Ibid., Article 2. 
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concern 
29 to Nigeria and other nations which have high 
expectations for the UN. 
In what specific ways has the UN been making impact 
on Nigerian foreign policy? Nigeria's acceptance of the 
principles and obligations of the UN entails some obligations 
which include abiding by the Charter, treaties and conventions 
of the United Nations. Such compliance creates limitations 
on the actions of member-states, for each will wish to avoid 
open condemnation on the floor of the United Nations for 
actions that are contrary to the principles and objectives 
of the Organisation. The nature of the United Nations, as 
a world body that offers the most popular and broad. - based 
forum for multilateral diplomacy, encourages states to 
participate and to be skilful and effective in the numerous 
activities of the organisation. Just as it offers opportunity 
for diplomatic victory so it exposes the hypocrisy of some 
states. Either way, some lessons are learnt that guide 
states in their decisions and actions. Furthermore, the 
United Nations is a source of encouragement to weak states in 
their dealings with the militarily stronger states. It 
29. For example, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner for External 
Affairs, said "Unfortunately, even a cursory review of 
the world situation will show that the rate of progress, in achieving the objectives set out in the organisation's 
own declarations, has been disappointing. You will 
permit me, Mr. President, to refer to the situation 
in the Southern parts of my own continent, Africa, to 
illustrate the continuing frustration of the ideals 
and goals to which we all are committed in this 
organisation, and which must be implemented in the 
interest of the United Nations and the whole of 
mankind". Statement at the 26th Session of UN 
General Assembly, New York, on Friday, let October, 
1971. 
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provides a forum for the militarily weak state to challenge 
with considerable success the actions of the stronger states. 
The existence of such a forum is a booster to the foreign. 
policy of states. 
Nigeria's membership of the United Nations imposes other 
obligations and responsibilities. It is expected to participate 
in the deliberations of the organisation and for this purpose 
a Nigerian Permanent Mission to the UN has been established and 
maintained, one in New York and another in Geneva, from where 
Nigerian delegates attend the meetings of the United Nations. 
The discussions and resolutions of the committees are communicated 
to the Federal Government in form of reports. The reports are 
fed into the foreign policy machinery and are analysed, evaluated 
and used, sometimes as a reference point, in the consideration 
of further policy alternatives. To this extent, the United 
Nations generates inputs of ideas into foreign policy making. 
Nigeria is an activist member of the UN and participates in 
almost all committees of the UN. In addition to the main organs 
of the UN9 there are many committees and sub-committees as well 
as subsidiary agencies, in which Nigeria has to be represented. 
This makes enormous demands on the human resources of the 
country. Usually experienced and capable diplomats are 
chosen to represent Nigeria at the UN. Nigerian soldiers 
have also been involved in United Nations peace-keeping 
operations. Nigeria's contingent to Congo and Lebanon were 
among the largest. 
The UN makes financial demands on Nigeria. Its 
contribution to the United Nations' budget annually is greater 
24?. 
than that of many other African countries. Nigeria also 
contributes to the funds of the specialised agencies of 
the UN. 
On the other hand, the Federal Government tries to 
benefit from its membership of the organisation, by using 
the various agencies of the organisation to advance the 
objectives of its foreign policy. On most issues at the 
UN since 1960, "Nigeria's position has been consistent with 
its general foreign policy: independence in judging cold war 
questions and vigorous opposition to colonialism and racial 
discrimination". 30 It is therefore clear that earnest 
consideration and preparations are made for Nigeria's 
participation-in the meetings of the UN. 
In pursuit of its foreign policy objectives at the UNS 
Nigeria's behaviour is restricted by the activities and interests 
of other members of the organisation, whose objectives on certain 
issues are at variance with those of Nigeria. For instance, 
as a member and chairman of the UN Special Committee Against 
Apartheid, Nigeria tries to mobilise the world support for 
economic and military sanctions against South Africa so as to 
make the South African government abrogate its apartheid laws 
and policies. To make any such resolution effective, the 
support of all member states is necessary. But there are 
member countries of the UN that have significant political 
and economic interests in South Africa and therefore have been 
reluctant to vote with Nigeria for mandatory sanctions against 
30. Nunn, Grady H. op cit., pp. 259-60. 
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South Africa. This poses a major constraint on the foreign 
policy calculations of the Nigerian government. 
OTHER FEATURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Besides the encouragement and responsibilities arising 
from membership of the United Nations, the global environment 
contains ideological rivalry and military blocs which directly 
and indirectly affect Nigeria's position on some international 
questions. From the end of the Second World War in 1945, there 
emerged the cold war between the USA and USSR in their ambition 
to divide the world into two camps for (US/USSR) effective 
hegemony but under the guise of ideological purification. The 
cold war features have been aptly described by Ray Ofoegbu, thus: 
"the major powers involved in this war 
established military blocs and bases; each 
imposed severe restrictions on trade between 
it, its allies and friends on one hand, and 
its Cold War adversaries on the other; each 
side practised brinkmanship and the USA adopted 
the policy of massive retaliation with nuclear 
weapons at times and places chosen by the USA 
irrespective of whether or not such places con- 
stituted part of any immediate provocation for 
the retaliation; each power group developed 
destructive capabilities in the form of atomic 
and hydrogen bombs; each side indulged extensively 
in spying on the other side; and there was 
ideological warfare between the capitalist 
liberal democracy of the West, and the 
Communist proletarian democracy of the East". 
By 1960 when Nigeria regained independence, the cold war was 
very much in existence with these features. Nigeria's 
foreign policy decision-makers were inescapably affected by 
the prevailing tensions, instability and crisis in the 
international system. In particular, they had the difficult 
31. Akinyemi, A. B. (ed. )# Nigeria and the World, op, cit., p. 117. 
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problem of establishing desirable objective relations with 
the West and East blocs. Another obvious effect of the cold 
war was Nigeria's adherence to non-alignment as a guiding 
principle in its relations with the blocs. 
Another feature of the global environment was the 
privileged positions assumed by the old actors in the game 
of nations. The countries of Europe and north America were 
determined to take advantage of the newness of the emergent 
states of Africa including Nigeria. Thus according to 
Ofoegbu and Ogbuagu, the material consideration was not what 
Africa wanted but what the so-called developed countries 
wanted Africa to have, and the decision by 1960 was to keep 
Africa within the general economic, political, military 
and cultural sphere of especially the West. 
32 As a result of 
the relative youth of Nigeria in the international system, 
there have been deliberate efforts by the older actors to 
underplay or to brush aside actions and demands of Nigeria, 
particularly where such are at variance with the wishes of the 
old actors. For example, in the early sixties, Nigeria 
endorsed UN activities in the Congo and consistently supported 
the Secretary General, but with severely limited understanding 
of the underlying ideological interests and the influence of 
a rival bloc on the Secretary General of the UN. Nigeria 
also was led to resist the Soviet "Troika" scheme for 
reorganising the UN Secretariat. 
33 Again in the early 
r 
32. Ibid., p. 118. 
33. Nunn Grady H., op. cit., p. 259. 
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aixtiee, Nigeria called for allocation to Africa of a 
permanent seat in the Security Council of the UNt 
34 but 
the idea was brushed under the carpet. In the early 
seventies, Nigeria was led into signing the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty which was to give a few older 
actors the total monopoly of nuclear power. There are 
many examples of such deliberate acts of deception by the 
older actors, which have helped to undermine the efforts 
of Nigeria. 
The international economic condition since 1960 has 
its own influence on Nigerian foreign policy. This has 
been discussed in chapter 9 (see factors that affect the 
practice of foreign policy). Generally, all Africa was 
perceived as a vast area of raw materials and markets for 
the processed products of the industrialised countries. 
With world-wide economic depression, rising standards of 
living, increasing demand for scarce resources, high inflation and 
the insatiable appetite of European economies"v 
35 there 
began the unprecedented exploitation of the newly independent 
poor nations by the older rich states in the system. Various 
financial institutions and multinational corporations emerged 
88 effective actors purposely, as we have noted, to exploit 
and undermine the activities of the new nations. These are 
some of the features of the international system in which 
Nigeria makes its foreign policy. 
34, Mr. Prime Ministerg op. cit., p. 60. 
35. Oyebode, Akindele B., "Towards a new policy on decolonization", 
in Akinyemi, A. B. (ed. ), Nigeria and the World. op. cit., p. 97. 
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INFLUENCE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS 
Another source of influence on Nigerian foreign policy 
is its bilateral relations with other countries. As already 
noted, one of the declared purposes of Nigeria in external 
affairs is "to remhin on friendly terms with all nations". 
36 
This implies acceptance of obligations arising from friendly 
relations and avoidance of acts which are capable of endangering 
auch relationships. To Nigeria, every friendly relationship 
is important and deserves to be strengthened through diplomatic 
intercourse and mutual co-operation in economic, scientific, 
technical and cultural activities etc. To do this, demands 
enormous sacrifices of resources and time of the state, which 
in turn influences the general consideration of how to allocate 
available resources to most the demands of each relationship. 
Nigeria's desire to remain on friendly terms with every 
country has the obvious implication of giving Nigeria's foreign 
policy a gradualist or moderate character, for every foreign 
policy decision is carefully examined to weigh the effects on 
the friendly countries involved. A sincere consideration of 
the effect of a given action on a friendly country can cause 
such action to be deterred or even abandoned altogether. To 
illustrate the influence of bilateral relations on foreign 
policy, Aluko noted that Nigeria has been unable to take a 
stand over the conflict in the Middle East because of her 
relations with Egypt and Arab countries. 
37 Other examples 
36. Mr. Prime Ministers op, cit., pp. 51-59. 
37, Aluko 0., Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, op* cit., 
p. 267. 
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are relations with USA, USSR and Britain. That such 
bilateral relations have influence on Nigerian foreign policy 
is evident in the 1984 annual foreign policy speech of Nigeria's 
Head of State, Major General Bahari. He said, inter alia, 
"Our bilateral relations with certain countries 
outside the African continent have been of great 
concern to us. Britain, which has for so long 
been regarded by Nigerians as a traditional 
friend, has caused us once again in recent 
times to doubt the genuineness of this 
friendship just as we did in the 1960s when 
our young nation faced the greatest threat 
to its national unity and in the period 
immediately following the senseless assassi- 
nation of General Murtala Mohammed in the 
abortive bid to replace the federal military 
government in February 1976. 
... The Government and people of Nigeria are 
prepared without prejudice to our national 
interest to work in genuine friendship with 
Britain, which is Nigeria's largest trading 
partner in Europe and shares with us the bonds 
of membership of the Commonwealth! '. 38 
Similarly, Nigeria's relations with the USSR and USA exert 
substantial influence on the external posture of Nigeria. 
These are influences arising from expectation of support on 
international political questions and co-operation in economic, 
scientific and technical spheres in which Nigeria has interests. 
Being super-Powers, their support for Nigeria on say Southern 
Africa, will hasten the realisation of Nigeria's objective in 
Southern Africa - the abrogation of racism and apartheid in 
that part of Africa and the emergence of a government of the 
majority black people of the region. On the other hand, 
their refusal of support for Nigeria will delay the realisation 
of the objectives. In making some foreign policy decisions, 
therefore, consideration is given to the likely reaction of 
38. Buhari, Muhammad (Major General), Annual Foreign Policy 
Speech, 1984, op. cit. 
253, 
Nigeria's other friends and how best to obtain their agreement. 
Such concern and consideration are not limited to relations 
with the big powers. Even with smaller countries in 
Africa, there are also considerations of their likely reaction 
to given situations. It will be foolhardy to take any 
sovereign state for granted in international politics. 
For example, on any issue before African states which requires 
voting, the vote of Botswana or Lesotho or Cape Verde is as 
important as that of Libya or Egypt or Zaire. Since the 
objectives of Nigeria's African policy can only be attained 
with the co-operation and collaboration of other African 
countries, then the level of bilateral relations with these 
countries becomes a significant factor in making policy 
decisions. 
PART IV FOREIGN POLICY MAKING : ILLUSTRATION AND EXPLANATION 
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(b) the departments of government; (c) the pluralists 
comprising various influential groups and parties inside 
and outside the government; and (d) the agencies of public 
control such as elections and the mass media. His work 
offers a useful insight into the search for the machinery 
of making foreign policy in a given country. Although 
Barber included both the Pluralists and the Agencies of 
public control2 in policy-making, he was aware I think, 
of the distinction between "those who influence policy" and 
"those who make the precise decisions". He may therefore 
uphold the view here that formal responsibility for policy 
making lies with the executive arm of the government. 
Similarly, Lloyd Jensen3 noted that the Executive branch of 
the government (and within its the top decision-makers - the 
president, prime minister or chancellor) has the primary role 
in the making of foreign policy, while others like the 
bureaucracy, the military, political parties and interest 
groups are also involved. Again, there appears to be no 
clear distinction between the machinery directly involved in 
making foreign policy and the environmental factors that 
merely influence the machinery. Another Writer David Vital 
distinguished between "The Machinery" - the group of individuals 
within the state who have the effective authority and respon- 
sibility for foreign policy-making; and those groups and 
2. Ibid., pp. 66, -89-919 101. 
3. Jensen, Lloyd; Explaining Foreign Policy. Prentice-Nall, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 116-150. 
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personalities who may be neither part of the Executive nor 
of the government but which form part of the environment of 
the foreign policy makers and therefore influence the process. 
4 
To him, the making of foreign policy is the business of the 
Executive and for all practical purposes the Executive is 
unfettered in its exercise of this function. 
5 To a large 
extent, this view is true of Nigeria. In actual fact, foreign 
policy generally, is made within and by the executive machinery 
of government. The machinery consists, as noted above, of 
persons in institutional positions formally or constitutionally 
responsible for foreign policy and these include: the cabinet, 
the foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service 
6_ that are 
actually in charge of the formulation of major policy. 
In the pluralist perspective, foreign policy making involves 
diverse and conflicting interests and views of the politically 
active parties and groups inside and outside government. It 
is not restricted to a particular section of the government. 
It argues that it will amount to a deliberate refusal to 
appreciate the vast range of participants and issues which 
are involved, and the variety of levels at which these issues 
are handled, if one thinks that "making foreign policy is the 
business of the Executive". According to Barber the pluralist 
assumes that 
4. Vital, David; The Making of British Foreign Policy. George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1968, p. 49. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., p. 89. 
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"There exist in society competing centres with 
different bases of power and influence. ... 
Policy does not emerge as a single stream from 
a central source. It is built up incrementally 
by a series of decisions, recommendations, 
pressures, and debates in a continuous dialogue 
between government, parties and groups". 7 
This view has its merit. It is obvious that some important 
elements outside the executive arm of the government, like 
pressure groups, political parties, and agencies of public 
control, are involved in making foreign policy. The scope 
of such involvement may not be easily quantified. It is 
believed that some times and on some issues, the role of this 
group outside the Executive arm of the government, may be 
decisive. A close obseruption of the role of Congress in 
U. S. foreign policy, or of Parliament in the development of 
Nigerian foreign policy (1954-65), will likely justify the 
inclusion of the Legislature within the machinery of policy 
making. The same may be true of the military and some 
economic institutions/corporations, which are increasingly 
involved in the making of foreign policy because of the growing 
concern in many countries with national security and economic 
progress. By the same argument, some scientists form part 
of the machinery. A moment's reflection on the role of the 
nuclear scientist in the laboratory, in the shaping of the 
foreign policies of states involved in the armament race, will 
reveal how decisive can be the role in policy making of some 
groups outside the structure of government. 
Contrary to the pluralist view, Max Beloff argued thus - 
7. Barber, James; op. cit., p. 65. 
258. 
"Foreign policy cannot emanate from the 
electorate. In this field more than in 
any other the citizen is in the last resort 
dependent upon Government, if it blunders 
either in the selection of goals or in their 
execution, there is'little he can do to put 
things right - even if he has to pay with 
his life for their blunders". 8 
Also both Joseph Frankel9 and Patrick Keatinge respectively 
held that foreign policy is clearly made by government and so 
the latter identified the machinery to be - the Cabinet and 
its leadership, the Department of External Affairs and its 
Minister, and the Diplomatic Service. 
10 
In Nigeria, similar departments/agencies of government 
are directly involved in making foreign policy. To say that 
they alone make foreign policy can readily be challenged. As 
a result of changes in political circumstances like frequent 
military intervention, coupled with the widening. scope and 
complexity of the country's external affairs, there have 
developed increasing involvement in foreign policy making of 
various departments, parastatals, non-governmental organisations 
and also the military, which traditionally was an instrument 
to further the aims of foreign policy, especially during wars 
and international crises. To illustrate the point, we recall 
earlier reference (chapter 3) to the role in foreign policy 
of the Department of Immigration (on the expulsion of illegal 
aliens from ECOWAS states), the Ministries of Trade and Industry, 
Information, Transport and Aviation, the Nigerian Chamber of 
8. Beloff, Max; The Future of British Foreign Policy. 'Sacker 
& Warburg, London, 1969, P. 144. 
9. Frankel, Joseph; "The Making of Foreign Policy", op, cit., p. 20. 
Dismissing the pluralist view, he said, even in well established 
democracies, the idea of open politics does not fully govern foreign 
policy. 
10. Keatinge, Patrick; "The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy", Institute 
of Public Administration, Dublin, 1973, p. 41. 
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Commerce, the Nigerian Medical Association, the Bar Association 
and Football/Athletics Associations etc. The widening scope 
of foreign policy is due largely to the increasing competition 
for scarce resources of the world, the growth of interdependence 
of nations, and the spread of internationalism. These necessitate 
the involvement of more departments and agencies of government and 
national organisations/associations in the formulation and 
execution of foreign policy, at different times and various 
levels. 
While accepting that various organs of government and groups 
in the country are involved directly or indirectly in foreign 
policy, in our view, it is essential to distinguish between the 
policy-maker and those who influence policy. For while the 
former is consistently performing and ready to perform, as duty, 
the function of making foreign policy, the latter's influence 
varies as much with issues as with the responsiveness of policy- 
maker or the prevailing international situation. Second, the 
policy-maker has a responsibility for policy-output and perhaps 
effects. He is also accountable to the public for such policies. 
On the other hand, the influencer of policy has no responsibility 
for policy output and effect and is not accountable to the public. 
The involvement of the institutions and groups in this category 
are indirect and incidental to their main functions. There are 
obviously some organs and departments/agencies of government that 
have statutory responsibility for making foreign policy and have 
it as their main function. These constitute the machinery that 
have to be identified for examination in order to understand the 
process of making foreign policy. 
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To identify the machinery of foreign policy making in 
Nigeria, one has to take into consideration, the various 
changes in government (already discussed in part one) followed 
by changes in governmental structure and nomenclature. Some 
of the changes have not meant changes in function as will be 
indicated below under each structure. More often such changes 
reflect more replacement of some personnel by another. We-will 
try to highlight some of these governmental structures to the 
extent that they were different from the other and involved 
directly in foreign policy making. Thus, in Nigeria the 
machinery of foreign policy includes: 
(1) The Presidency (Head of State/Government and 
his/her assistants and advisers) 
(2) The Supreme Military Council 
(3) The Federal Executive Council 
(4) The National Council of States 
(5) The Bureaucracy - the Ministry of External 
Affairs and the Diplomatic Missions 
(6) The Bureaucracy - the other government Ministries/ 
Departments- 
(7) The Military 
THE PRESIDENCY 
In the first Republic, Nigeria had a parliamentary form of 
government with a President (Head of State) and a Prime Minister 
(Head of Government). Under the military rule (1966-69)9 the 
posts of President and Prime Minister were abolished and in 
their place emerged the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces. The incumbent combined the functions of 
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the President and Prime Minister, In performing these 
functioneq the military Head of State was not under any 
constitutional obligation to act "in accordance with the 
advice of any other authority or institution. " He nevertheless 
acted in consultation with the Supreme Military Council and 
the National Council of Statesq on various affairs of the Statee 
In the second Republicq which had a Presidential form, the 
Constitution (1979) vested on the President the executive 
powers of the Federation (sections (1) (a)), After it came 
another military rule (1984 to date) with the Head of State 
performing the functions of the President. The term "President" 
therefore is used here to represent incumbent of the highest office 
of the Federation whether under constitutional or military rule. 
"The President" and "The Head of State" will be used interchange- 
ably, bearing in mind that our concern here is about the role of 
the incumbent of that position in making Nigeria's foreign policy. 
In a general senseq the Presidency determines the country's 
foreign policy and has ultimate responsibility for such policy. 
If the foreign policy is judged successful the credit goes to 
the President and if a failure, the blame goes to the President 
also. The President is the Chief Executive of the State. He 
is aided and assisted by Ministers, advisers and a host of 
assistants, in managing the Affairs of the state. All as a 
team constitute the Presidency. To be specific, in Nigeria, 
the Presidency is made up of the Head of State/Government, 
the Vice-President or its military equivalent called the Chief 
of Staff of Supreme Headquarters and all staff of the State 
House and the Cabinet Office ranging from the Secretary to 
ýP. 
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Federal Government to the most junior staff therein; 
Statutorily the President has a clearly defined role 
in making national (including foreign) policy for the country, 
According to the Constitution (1963). 11 chapter iv section 349 
the President shall be "the Head of State of the Federation 
and Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Faderation"a 
This provision puts him above every other person in the country 
in determining national policy. He was also vested with the 
executive authority of the Federation (section 84 -(l)), including 
the power to appoint the Prime Minister and other Ministers of 
the Government of the Federation (section 87 - (1) and (4) ). It 
further statedt "The Presidentacting in accordance with the advice 
of the Prime Ministerg may assign to the Prime Minister or any 
other Minister of the Government of the Federation responsibility 
for any business of the Government of the Federation, including 
the administration of any department of government (section 91). 
This means that the President has power to appoint the Minister 
of External Affairs and the Ambassadors, As the Commander-in- 
. chief, he also has some authority to commit Nigeria's Armed 
Forces to military action abroad, These are clear enough 
authority vested on the President for the control and direction 
of national policies and foreign policy in particular. The 
constitution gives no greater authority to any other important 
and influential institution in Nigeria that is involved in the 
making of foreign policy. Neither the Prime Minister nor the 
11. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963. 
ý.. ý: ý 
263, 
Ministry of External Affairs has its role in foreign policy 
so much defined in the constitution. If by any arrangement - 
act of omission or commission - any other authority or 
institution performed a major foreign policy function, that 
would be deemed for and on behalf of the President of the 
Federation. 
It can be argued that the President had no real powers 
since in all these functions he had to act in accordance with 
the advice of the Prime Minister. Hence many critics blame 
the Balewa government for lapses in foreign policy. Although 
here we combine the functions of the President and Prime Minister 
in foreign policy, it can be said in fairness to that government 
that the President had its share of the blame to the extent of 
its constitutional powers. Section 93: 3 of the constitution 
made it clear that "by this constitution the President is 
required to act in accordance with the advice of any person 
or authority, the question whether he has in any case received 
or acted in accordance with such advice shall not be enquired 
into in any court of law". 
12 By this provision, the President 
was granted unquestionable right to make authoritative and 
binding decisions. It allowed him freedom to act independently 
of the advice of the Prime Minister or other authority in the 
country on any matter in respect of the Federation. By same 
token, it allowed him the power to determine national policies. 
To buttress the power of the President and ensure that his 
decisions were implemented, the constitution further provided 
12. Ibid. Section 93: 3. 
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in section 94 that "The Prime Minister shall keep the President 
fully informed concerning the general conduct of the government 
of the Federation and shall furnish the President with such 
information as he may request with respect to any particular 
matter relating to the government of the Federation"13 From 
these provisions, one can clearly infer that the President 
had the ultimate authority and responsibility for making 
overall national policy and foreign policy in particular. 
Whether or not the authority was utilized and to what extent 
is a matter of judgement. We can assume here that the 
President and Prime Minister jointly performed their foreign 
policy role. 
Generally, the President controls and co-ordinates foreign 
policy, performs representational functions, makes major foreign 
policy speeches (declaratory functions), with the concurrence 
of parliament or military council, -has power to sign treaties 
between Nigeria and any other countries, and acts as a balancer 
of rival interests in policy making, etc. These functions can 
be explained briefly. 
The President controls the making of foreign policy in two 
ways@ The first is through the appointment of the Minister of 
External Affairsq the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry and 
the principal representatives of Nigeria abroad. These officials 
hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and are 
therefore responsible to him. They submit to the President 
for consideration and approval all major foreign policy proposals* 
13, Ibid. Section 94, 
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The President reserves the power to agree or disagree with 
any such proposal. It is only when such policy proposal 
receives the Presidentla approval that it becomes policy* 
Secondq the President controls foreign policy-making through 
fiscal measures. By releasing or withholding funds for 
certain involvementaq the President determines whether or 
not a particular policy is worth being maintained. Although 
the National Assembly/Military Council approves the budgetq 
the decision to release given amount of funds to specific 
projects or events, is usually made by the Executive. 
Co-ordination of the making of foreign policy is another 
function of the President. This function is performed through 
committeesq which the President or Vice-President is the chairman, 
The Committees consist of representatives of the relevant Ministries 
or departments and some experts on the particular issue in question. 
They most from time to time to examine and advise an major events 
in the external environment. Under military governmentag 
committee meetings have been frequentt for in the absence of 
adviserag political parties and National Assembly members to 
consult an various issuesq the government resorts to frequent 
4 
consultation, often in committees9 with experienced senior 
staff of the bureaucracy. In the Committee, the President/Head 
of State is briefed about the major activities of the Ministries/ 
departments while the President's directives are passed on 
through representatives of the Ministries/departments to the 
appropriate officials for implementation. 
14. To illustrate the regularity of committee meetings, if one 
" visits the office of a Minister or Permanent Secretary, maybe 
for an appointment, it is common to be told: "He has gone to 
the State House for a meeting". 
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The Head of State performs diplomatic and symbolic 
functions in foreign policy. Nigeria's ever expanding . 
external relations have had the effect of involving the 
President more personally in international diplomacy and 
representational functions. He attends summit meetings of 
heads of State and government during which he talks and bargains 
with other heads of State/government about elimination of 
apartheid and racismv trade, oil priceaq transfer of technologyq 
regional conflicts and world peace. Sometimes, some summit 
meetings and state visits are purely ceremonial, Usually the 
decision to attend or not rests with the President, With 
increasing involvement in African affairs and the changing 
economic fortunes of the countryq the Head of State has had 
to initiate some summit meetings to discuss with his counterparts 
in person, prevailing problems and how to resolve them, in which 
case he must personally attend the summit. 
is 
In making foreign policy, the President plays the role of 
a balancer between competing interests in the domestic environ- 
ment on one hand and between the domestic and external forces 
on the other, In the event of divergent ideas an a given issue 
being put forward by different policy makers at the top-level, 
the president acts as the power-broker, His choice of, a given 
policy is usually respected in the country, At the international 
level, the task of balancing forces between the domestic and 
external environment is perhaps more intricate. He is bound 
15. Examples include the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference 
in Lagos in January 19669 the UN Special conference for action 
against apartheid hold in Lagos, August 19779 the OAU special 
economic summitv Lagost April 1980 and the meetings in Lagos 
by the Heads of State of ECOWAS member states* 
,e. 
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to resist emotional pressures, accommödate criticisms, weigh 
possible options in relation to their implications and decide 
on policies which he considers more beneficial and lese costly 
to the nation. Whenever there is a conflict with another 
country, there are outbursts of emotions from some Nigerian 
citizens urging the President to take drastic action of one 
form or the other. The ability of the President to temper 
emotions with objective facts and to manage such situations 
at minimum cost to the country and to existing relationships 
is indicative of his responsibility for foreign policy choices 
at the top-level. 
THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL 
Since the advent of military rule in Nigeria in January 
1966t the Supreme Military Council (SMC) has been one of the 
major governmental structures* It has been the highest 
legislative organ of the military governments, the SMC 
exists only under military rule and each successive government 
has retained this organ as the highest ruling military council. 
Until August 279 19859 the name remained "the Supreme Military 
Council". Following the changes of government at the end of 
August 19859 the name of the council was changed to the Armed 
Forces Ruling Council - AFRC (similar to the ruling military 
Council in Ghana)* 
After each successful coup, the Supreme Military Council 
is reconstituted and usually comprised of the Head of State 
(President) as chairman, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, 
Service Chiefs, the Inspector General of Police and military 
0 Ad. ý6ý 
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governors of States, 
16 
Others in the Supreme Council include 
divisional military commanders and representatives of senior 
officers in the armyq navy and air force. In theory the SMC 
is the supreme policy making body of the military governments 
but in practicaq the Federal Executive Council (to be 
discussed below) has been the real decision-making body. 
Essentially, the Supreme Military Council has the function of 
"providing the general policy guidelines within which the affairs 
of the nation must be conducted"* 
17 It has responsibility for 
all matters of national security and defencep including the 
power to declare a state of emergency or war, The SMC also 
has the power to set up and appoint members of the other two 
decision-making organs called the Federal Executive Council 
and National Council of States. 
The policy-making function of the SMC must be limited as 
the decree establishing it provided for it to most at least four 
times a year, Although it could most more often this is hardly 
enough time to deal with many policy issues of the government. 
There is also a clear distance between the SMC and the specialist 
ministries/departments of government that examine most policy 
matters. As a result, the SMC unlike the FEC9 may not be quite 
familiar with all the relevant aspects of certain policy matters, 
Thusq with a few exceptions like the decisions to recognise the 
MPLA Government and to send Nigerian peace-keeping force to Chad 
(see chapter 8), the Supreme Military Council's function in policy 
making has been occasionalv perhaps involving more ratification 
16. After July 19759 following a change of governmentp military 
governors and civilian commissioners were excluded from the 
Supreme Military Council. 
17. Muhammad Murtala; A Time for Actiong Federal Ministry of 
Information, Lagos, 19809 p, 11, 
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of broad policy guidelines on major issues. On many other 
issues, the SMC is kept informed of the decisions by the responsible 
organs of government. According to an official of the Cabinet 
Officat the SMC provides the general direction of the military 
governmentg it does initiate policies and give directives to 
other organs of government but in terms of the magnitude of 
functions of a modern governmentv the SMC is perhaps the one 
organ of government with the highest power and least functions* 
is 
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
As earlier notedg foreign policy making is essentially an 
activity of the executive arm of government. In Nigeria, the 
executive body responsible for the conduct and direction of the 
affairs of the Federal Government if the Federal Executive 
Council. 
19 
It is the equivalent of the Cabinet in the British 
system of government. In the first Republic of Nigeria, it 
wab known as the "Council of Ministers for the Federation" 
established by article 89 of the Constitution (1963) and assigned 
the function "to advise the President in the government of the 
Federation% Under the military governmentag the Federal Executive 
Council remained as the central executive organ of governmentv being 
reconstituted by each successive government. The only difference 
being in composition with some soldiers replacing civilians. While 
inaugurating the Council an August 139 197S9 the Head of State 
clearly spelt out the structure and function of the Council. He 
said: 
180 Interview. 
190 Under military rule, two other bodies are noteworthyg namelyg the 
Supreme Military Council and the National Council of States. The 
function of each complemented the otheraq but the Federal Executive 
Council was centrally and ideally charged with formulating policies 
and executing decisions of government, 
After a military coup an 27th August 1985 the name changed to 
the National Council of Ministers, 
A_; Nil. 
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"This Council as reconstituted is deliberately 
made up of both military personnel and a large 
number of civilians . ** As one of the three 
main organs of the Federal Military Government, 
the Federal Executive Council will formulate 
policies and execute decisions within the 
framework of the guidelines which 'the Supreme 
Military Council and the National Council of 
States will lay down from time to time. The 
deliberations of this council will lead to the 
best decisions in the interest of the nation as a 
whole. We all have collective responsibility for 
the decisions we reach", 20 
Thus contrary to the name, the Council has both policy and 
executive functions in government. 
The Constitution (1979) also defined the functions of this 
Council as a central policy-making body without specifying its 
name. Section 136 -(2) provided thus: 
"The President shall hold regular meetings with 
the Vice-President and all the Ministers of the 
Government of the Federation for the purposes of - (a) determining the general direction of domestic 
and foreign policies of the Government of the 
Federation; 
(b) co-ordinating the activities of the Presidentq 
the Vice-President and the Ministers of the 
Government of the Federation in the discharge 
of their executive responsibilities; and (c) advising the President generally in the 21 discharge of his executive functions,,, 
It can be observed that every successive government of Nigeria 
has recognised the importance of the Federal Executive Council 
as a central policy-making body. 
The Council usually consists of Ministers/Commissioners of 
the government of the Federation who are responsible for various 
businesses of the government, including the administration of 
the Ministries. Between 1967 and 1975, some Permanent Secretaries 
20* Muhammed Murtala (General)q A Time for Actiong op. citot ppo 
13 and 15, 
21., The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, 
Section 136 -(2): a-c. 
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were co-opted to participate in the deliberations of the 
Council and to advise the Council an certain issues emanating 
from their departments, Later this was considered to be 
open involvement of the civil servants in politics, with 
dangerous implications for the civil service in general. 
Permanent Secretaries were then barred from Council meetings 
except in advisory capacity at the request of their 
Commissioners/Ministers. The Head of State is usually the 
Chairman of the Council, Most matters of national importance 
come before the Council for deliberation and decision. Such 
matters can be initiated by any member of the Council or by 
the Ministry/department of government that is immediately 
concerned with the issue* Decisions reached in the Council 
are considered to have the widest possible support. Matters 
for the Council are usually put in the form of a memorandum 
and the presenter makes sure that such matters are included 
in thatCouncil Agendal for a particular meeting. 
The Federal Executive Council is trusted with perhaps 
more policy-making functions than any other organ of governme nt, 
This is because (1) the Council is a large body comprising of 
the political heads of all Ministries of government; (2) it 
covers a wide range of government activities; and considering 
experiences/expertise of its members in politics and administrationg 
the Council is a useful forum for exchange of ideas about the 
complex issues of modern governments; (3) its meetings are in 
private and its decisions are either classified or labelled 
"top secret"; (4) decisions of the Council are considered binding 
that neither the Head of State nor any Minister/Commissioner Will 
_-- Ate: 
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ignore or attempt to circumvent without cause shown, The 
overwhelming role of the Executive Council in policy making 
is illustrated in the frequent reference by senior officials 
of government to "the decision of the Council" or "directives 
of the President-in-Council"t as the source of authority for 
given actions, Most Heads of State of Nigeria also have 
relied to a great extent on decisions reached in Council* 
As in any other countryy no leader is said to be an expert 
in all aspects of modern governmentg especially on issues 
like inflationt unamploymentp oil market prices# nuclear 
technology9 avistiong maritime laws etc, Consequently 
frequent recourse to Council meeting becomes necessary in 
order to pull together the expertise of members to form the 
basis of government action, The Head of State/Prosident 
relies on the collective wisdom of the Federal Executive 
Council an many state matters, Each Minister/Commissioner 
relies an the support of his colleagues in Council to put 
through his Ministry's proposals. The Federal Executive 
Council has the unique role of receiving proposals from all 
government ministries/departmentsg determining their acceptance 
or otherwiset and co-ordinating activities of all government 
units. The Ministries/departments are guided by the 
conclusions (directives) of the Federal Executive Council. 
These are few indications that the Council has a central role. 
in policy-making. 
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATES 
Prior to Ouly 19759 there were two military governmental 
structures in Nigeria - the Supreme Military Council and the 
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Federal Executive Council. Following the military coup of 
that yearg the new Head of the Federal Military Government, 
Brigadier (later General) Murtala Muhammad announced an 
July 309 1975 the introduction of a third structure of the 
governmentg namely "The National Council of States". The 
NCS consisted of the Head of State as chairman# the chief of 
Staff Supreme Headquarterst Service Chiefsq the Inspector 
General of Police and the military Governors of the States, 
Subsequent military governments have retained this organ, 
According to Muhammad this Council was set up "to provide 
a forum for state representation in the discussion of matters 
affecting their interests". 
22 The underlying motive included 
a determination to reduce the influence and involvement of state 
governors an national issues. Under Gowonq the military 
governors were also members of the Supreme Military Council, 
They soon became very influencial and arrogated to themselves 
much power to the affect that "the states were being run as 
private estates"* 
23 Consequentlyg there were vociferous demands 
for their removal but due to their influence and presence in the 
Supreme Military Councilv Gowon could not effect their removal. 
The subsequent military administration decided to give the SMC 
control over the state governors by excluding them from the 
Supreme Council and also by creating a subordinate structure for 
states' representation. The decree establishing the councils 
made it clear that "the National Council of States is subject to 
24 the overall control of the Supreme Military Council,,, "t and 
22* Muhammad Murtalaq ape cite, pe lle, 
23. Ibid*g pp. 7-8. 
24, Basic Provisions Decree 1975 in Official Gazette (Supplement) 
no* 529 vol, 62t Lagost 23rd October 19759 p. A149. 
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excluded from participating in making-national policies. In 
effect, the policy-making function of the National Council of 
States has been limited to matters affecting the states. 
THE BUREAUCRACY - THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL 
AFFAIRS AND THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS 
THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
It is perhaps obvious that the Ministry of External Affairs 
is an arm of the bureaucracy which has primary responsibility for 
matters of foreign policy. The political head of the Ministry 
25 is the Minister of External Affairs and the administrative 
head is the Permanent Secretaryq who is also the Accounting 
Officer of the Ministry and responsible for the direction, 
supervision and co-ordination of the work of departments and 
units in the Ministry, In an attempt to cope with increases 
in sizeq function and new demandsp the Ministry has undergone 
some reorganisations 
26 
over the years, Rearganisation is 
likely to be a continuing exercise in a dynamic foreign service 
like that of Nigeria with tremendous opportunities for improvement 
in its structure and organisation. Every re. -organisation results 
in some adjustment to the structure and organisation of the Ministry, 
The re. -organisations almost correspond in frequency with changes 
in government and subsequent changes in the political leadership 
of the Ministry, The obvious implication is the difficulty of 
analysing critically the organisational structure. It is 
also difficult because most of the documentary materials are 
25. Sometimes designated "Commissioner for External Affairs",, 
26. These include: reorganisations of 1966 directed by Ironsi; 
1972 under O. T. F. Iyalla; 1976 following Adedeji Foreign 
Policy Review Report; 1981 which abolished the poet of Permanent Secretary and created Directorates; 1983/84 which restored Permanent Secretary post and established more Departments, 
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classified and not accessible. 
According to Professor Alukop the Ministry of External 
Affairs is organised partly an a geographicaig. and partly an 
a functional basis. 
27 He identified ten divisions which 
after the rearganisation of 1972 became ten departments and 
six special units as follows: Administrationg Africat Americaq 
Asia and Pacificq Protocolq Consular and Legalq Economicq 
Europeang Information and Culturalt International Organisationt 
and Research Departments, 
28 
The six special units were: 
Policy planning and co-ordinationg Pilgrimage Commission, 
overseas Communication Serviceg Passport and Travel Controlq 
Inspectorats Serviceq and Internal Liaison Unit. 
29 The 
Ministry has since been restructured. Under the now arrange- 
mentv there are seven Directorates: (i) Service Matters 
(Administration and Establishment matters)l (ii) Policy Planning 
and Staff Development; (iii) African Affairs; (iv) Regions; 
(v) International Organisations; (vi) International Economic 
Cco-operation; (vii) Consular Affairs. Within each directorate 
are some departmentse For exampleg the Directorate of Regions 
has three departments - Americap Asia and Pacific, and European. 
Each Directorate is headed by a Director-General who 
reports directly to the Minister of External Affairs. The 
- . 1ras 
is basically Permanent Secretary 
30 
regarded as vremua inter. 2 
the head of the Directorate of Service Matters and responsible 
27, Olajids Aluko; Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd. 9 Londong 19819 p. 154e 
28. Ibid, q p. 170. 
29, Ibid. 
30. A post abolished in 19810 under the leadership of Professor 
Ishaya Auduq and restored in October 1983* 
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for general administration and accounts of the Ministry. 
Below the Director-Generals are the various heads of 
departments and their deputy headsq assisted by policy 
staffq generally known as "Branch A Officers" or External 
Affairs Officers, Another category of staffq usually more 
numerousq are the executive cadreq designated as "Branch B", 
31 
All categories of staff work in co-operation for the performance 
of the functions of the Ministry. If the names of the directorates 
are anything to go by# they indicate the major spheres of activity 
performed by the Ministryq some of which are policy-making, 
Names/designations can sometimes mislead but following the 
frankness that characteriss African governments' approach to 
international relationag names often, as in this case, refleqt 
true intentions or functions. The spontaneous nature of certain 
events in the world demand initiativat quick decisions and action. 
In which caset the Ministry or its outpost i. e. the Diplomatic 
Missions abroad cant relying an experience and precedence, make 
policy decisions and inform the President accordingly. Most 
foreign policy papers (proposals) are initiated and drafted by 
the Ministry, When proposals that have implications for foreign 
policy emanate from other branches or departments of governmentg 
the Permanent Secretary or Director of the appropriate Directorate 
in the Ministry of External Affairs is usually invited for advice* 
Many Ambassadors/High Commissioners and other principal represen- 
tatives abroad are given direct access to the Head of State and 
31. Prior to 1981 rearganisationt there were four categories of 
staff in the Ministry of External Affairs, designated Branch A- 
consisting of External Affairs Officers; Branch 8- Executive 
Cadre; Branch C- Secretaries and Typists; and ' 
Branch D- Drivers, 
Messengersq Chancery guards. See Aluko op. cit-9 p. 154. After 
1981 branches B, C9 0 were merged to 8 and so there are only two 
categories now. 
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are sometimes invited for consultation an major foreign 
policy issues, In many cases the positions adopted by the 
foreign Ministry have not been ignored, with some exceptions. 
For example, in the early sixties the Ministry of External 
Affairs persistently argued that the Anglo. -Nigerian defense pact 
was a sharp contradiction of the decision to be non-aligned on 
cold-war matters, In line with the views of many nationalistsq 
political partiess trade/student Unions and media, this view 
prevailed and the pact was abrogated* One notable exception 
is the Ministry's opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
32 
which the government ignored to sign the Treaty in 1971, On 
the other hand, the Ministry's submission for non-retaliatory 
action against Fernando Poo in 1974 (case already cited) led 
to the conciliatory stance of the federal Government over the 
crisis. Ranging from regional matters like the policy about 
ECOWAS9 to Nigeria/Cameroun border disputeg sending of peace- 
keeping troops to Chad, the sale of oil at concessionary 
prices to African statesq issues in bilateral relationsv 
expulsion of Libyan Peoples. Bureaug and the recognition of 
the Sarahawi Arab Democratic Republic (Polisario Front), atc. - 
the Ministry's views have prevailed, Not all the decisions 
have been seen as laudable. For example the expulsion of the 
Libyan Peoples Bureaut which caused internal opposition in the 
Ministry between the radicals in support of Libya's revolutionary 
ideas and the conservatives opposed to radical changest has been 
32. Interview with officials from the Ministry confirmed 
thist and it was reflected in the speech by Nigerian 
delegation to the general conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency held in New Delhi, 4-11 December 1979. 
See tReport of the Conference'. 
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criticised outside government circles, The Ministryls 
position - (that which the political head favoured and 
submitted to the President-in-Council for approval) - was 
in favour of sending the bureau out of Nigeria and this 
prevailed* In the recent expulsions from Nigeria of illegal 
aliens, who had not complied with the provisions of ECOWAS 
treaty an the free movement of peopleg the role of the Ministry 
of External Affairs in making the decision is not yet fully 
known, But its submissiong urging for caution and avoidance 
of maltreatment of ECOWAS citizenst was accepted and implemented. 
33 
The basic point being made here is that the Ministry of External 
Affairs is a major part of the machinery of making foreign 
policy in Nigeria. 
NIGERIA'S DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS 
The Diplomatic Missions play a very important role in. the making of 
foreign policy. Some of the scholars referred to earlierg such 
as Kestingeg identify the diplomatic mission as a distinct part 
of the machinery, In the Nigerian case the mission is just an 
outpost of the Ministry of External Affairs, Although in some 
diplomatic missionsv staff of other Ministries than External 
Affairs work together with foreign service officers# usually 
under the supervision and control of the Ambassador or Principal 
Representativet the diplomatic missions are an integral part 
of the parent Ministry of External Affairs, whose functions as 
considered above include those of external missions. It is 
recognised that each Mission has discretionary powers to take 
33. The Federal Government provided transport and security 
guard to protect the persons and properties of the aliens 
an departure, 
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important decisions an behalf of the Federal Government in many 
issues but such powers are determined and controlled by the 
Ministry of External Affairs to which every diplomatic Mission 
looks for guidance on every major issue. While recognizing 
the importance of the Missions in supplying valuable information 
through Despatches, Reportag telegrams and Briefs for broad 
policy considerationg it seems to me that diplomatic missionsq 
if viewed distinctlyq are more involved in the conduct of foreign 
policy than in its making. But as an arm of the Ministry, the 
Missions are equally involved in the Ministry's policy-making 
functions. 
THE BUREAUCRACY - THE OTHER MINISTRIES/ 
DEPARTMENTS 
The bureaucracy in Nigeria is involved in the making and 
implementation of foreign policy. It is made up of several 
government ministries and departments. Each Ministry is 
headed by a Minister/Commissioner with a Permanent Secretary 
in charge of general administration. The bureaucracy is the 
largest organ of the governmentt covering virtually every 
field of government activity, Its large size and scope of 
activity make it appear to be the natural centre for policy 
activity# while in reality it is one of the executive organs. 
The bureaucracy is organised in a hierarchical structuret 
reflecting the shape of a pyramid, At the base, are the 
junior civil servants who perform minor but essential services. 
At the middle of the pyramid are the intermediate staff who 
initiate most policy proposals in their respective spheres of 
activity. At the apex of the structure are the Permanent 
Secretaries and Ministerst who make certain policy decisions 
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within iheir authority and act as the link between the 
Ministry and the Federal Executive Council and other policy- 
making bodies. 
We consider the bureaucracy as a whole to be an 
important part of the machinery of making policy because in 
the conýuct of government business the activities of the 
Ministries and Departments do overlap* A good many foreign 
policy issues are handled by other Ministries then External 
Affairs Ministry, The Federal Government's recognition of 
both the overlapping of many foreign policy issues and the need 
to harness the expertise of other federal ministriesp resulted 
in assigning to some home ministries joint responsibility (with 
External Affairs Ministry) for some foreign affairs matters as 
follows: 
1. Ministry of Finance - External borrowing; external 
financial aid; relations with international financial 
institutions; reconciliation of federal applications 
for external technical assistance. 
2. Ministry of Defence - Liaison with armed forced of other 
countries; clearance of foreign military aircraft and 
warships; visits of foreign service chiefs; and visits 
of defence and war colleagues. 
3, Ministry of Economic Development (now called National 
Planning) - Co-ordination and presentation of Federal 
and State applications for external technical assistance; 
relations with UN Economic Commission for Africa; Economic 
and Social Committee of OAU, Commonwealth Economic 
Committeep and the ECOWAS. 
4* Ministry of Information - Materials for external publicity 
and the projection of Nigeria's image abroadq e, g, pro- 
duction of filmst documentary and statistical materials 
about Nigerial publication of factual information about 
investment and market opportunities in Nigeria. 
5, Ministry of Trade - External trade; trade fairs and exhibitions. 
6* Ministry of industry - Foreign investment in Nigerial import 
substitution through industries; and industrial coý-ordination 
and co-operation with other African countries. 
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7. Ministry of Education - Co-ordination of external 
aid for educjýion; overseas study; and relations 
with UNESCO. 
In particular# the Ministry of Petroleum perheps has been 
more involved than any other Ministry in the activities of OPEC* 
The Ministry of National Planning (formerly Economic Development) 
has been conspicuously involved in decisions and actions regarding 
Nigeria's role in ECOWAS, The same can be said of the military 
towards Nigeria's peace-k8eping role* Also in drafting 
treaties and bilateral agreementsq the Ministry of Justice 
plays a major role, just as the Ministry of Finance is directly 
involved in determining Nigeria's relations with the World Bank 
(IBRD) and IMF. Thust several Ministries and departments are 
involved at various levels and an various issues in making 
foreign policy. Such involvement is inevitable and entails 
co-operation and sometimes conflict within the bureaucracy. 
There are a number of ways by which the bureaucracy makes 
policy* They include: 
1, initiating policy-proposals based on its knowledge of 
events in the country's domestic and external environmento The 
proposal may originate from any staff at a level in the hierarchy 
and moves vertically to the levels above for consideration. 
Some policy-decisions can be made at levels below the Permanent 
Secretary, Many others reach the Permanent Secretary and from 
him to the Minister, both of whom make considerable policy 
decisions. Each Ministry in effect has considerable authority 
34, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazetteg no, 33t vol. 
52 of 9th April 1965 an "Assignment of Responsibilities to 
Federal Ministries" pp. 650-53; also in Idang Gordong 3*9 
Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-19669 
Ibadan University Preset Ibadan, 1973, p. 115. 
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to take certain decisions and actions an behalf of the 
government, If an issue and its implications are beyond 
the authority of the Ministryq then the Minister will take 
it to the President-in-Council. for consideration and decision. 
If the matter involves (as it often does) the activities of 
other Ministries, the views of such Ministries will be sought. 
Usually because of differences in perception and interestsq 
there will be some areas of conflict, even where they agree 
an the basic issue. On receipt of study-papers from relevant 
Ministriesq the Council will then deliberate and decide one 
way or another, 
2. Preparing policy-papers for the Chief Executives is another 
way by which the bureaucracy helps to make policy. Moat 
Ministors depend on the information and advice of the 
bureaucrats for much of thbir work. Ministers have sometimps 
been selected from among people who have had no previous 
experience in government, Such Ministers usually rely on 
(or echo) the ideas of the bureaucrats. Even among those with 
some experience in governmentq when assigned to different 
Ministries or functions# they would need to understand the 
intricacies of the new Ministry before effectively facing the 
task, In the meantime they would depend on the work of the 
bureaucratat to the effect that sometimes policy-decisions 
are made and passed to him for endorsement. Againt Ministers 
tend to be preoccupied with day-to-day matters as to have no 
time for long term policy planning, As a result the civil 
servant has to do the planning and propose the policy for the 
Minister. When therefore a Minister takes a memorandum to 
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the Council for deliberation, it contains sometimes entirely 
the ideas and work of the civil servants* 
35 
3* The bureaucracy makes some policy-decisions in the process 
of implementing major foreign policy. Usually some directives 
from above are either too broad or vague, It is within the 
bureaucracy that such directives are put into context for 
easy implementation. This involves making a number of 
other important decisions, Sometimes it involves major 
alterations that almost change the original policy, 
A few observations about the Bureaucracy are worth 
making. Due to the overlap in functions of Ministries/ 
departmentat rivalry has become a common feature in bureau- 
cratic decision-making. As foreign policy becomes more 
complexq involving political, economicq technical and cultural 
factorst there follows a substantial increase in the number of 
other bureaucracies which deal with foreign policy matters. 
The result is that in Nigeria defencep economic and information 
Ministries etc* have come to challenge the pre-eminent position 
of the Ministry of External Affairs in the making of foreign 
policy* The rivalry cited earlier, which has continued since 
the mid-sixtiest between External Affairs and Information over 
responsibility for external publicity is one example* Recently 
(1980)9 the Ministry of Internal Affairs succeeded in taking 
over the issuance of passports and continues to insist on 
deploying its staff abroad for the purpose of issuing visas* 
35. For instance a former Secretary to the Federal Military 
POV8rhment, Mr, Allison Ayida claimed that the Nigerian 
civil servants were the originators and innovators of all 
major policy decisions in the countryg in "An address to 
the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Societyq 
1973". 
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Sometimes through bureaucratic delays some rivalries are 
allowed to run out of steams Others are resolved through 
inter-departmental/Ministerial regulations or by the President- 
in-Council. Despite rivalryl, the bureaucracy remains a 
constant pillar of successive governments in Nigeria, 
0 
Another observation an the bureaucracy is that in 
theory it is made up of $obedient servants' of the Minister 
and the governmentq who keep recordsp advise ministers and 
carry out their directives. But in realityq civil servants 
are very powerful in government. They participate in policy 
making and its execution* Civil servants are practically 
involved in all activities of the government, They are 
collectively a reservoir of past-actions and precedent upon 
which current decisions are based. They provide expertise, 
initiate policies and advise Ministers an the merits and 
demerits of given policy optionev which considerably determine 
what is acceptable as policy. In fact# civil servants are 
involved in making moat decisions in government, they organias 
the structures involved in the procesag they follow policies 
throught and maintain continuity. Although Ministers have 
substantial authority and their directives have to be obeyedg 
it is believed to be in their best interest to carry along the 
civil servants in the exercise of such authority, A Ministarls 
success or failure is largely measured by the performance of 
his departmental duties, which in turng is largely dependent 
on his subordinate staff's ability and willingness to got things 
done. 
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In a nutshell, a number of important policy decisions 
are made within the bureaucracy if both Ministers and 
bureaucrats possess sufficient knowledge and experience. 
Where a matter is to be decided by the Federal Executive 
Councilq the bureaucrats prepare it in the form of a 
memorandum (study paper) to form the basis of Council 
discussion* This is a general procedure for all 
Ministries. At the Council lsvelq the Ministers are 
assisted by bureaucrats who also afford expert advice 
to facilitate consideration of some policy proposals, In 
summaryq the bureaucracy is involved in foreign policy 
making through policy decisions at various levels of authority 
in the administrative hierarchy# through inter-ministerial 
consultationg and co-ordination of policy decisions and 
actionst and through the activities in Council of the 
political heads of the Ministriese 
THE MILITARY 
The role of the Military in making Nigerian foreign 
policy is not in doubt. Prior to 19669 the Military had 
no identifiable influence in policy making but since then 
it has been very much involved in making national policy, 
of which foreign policy is an aspect. The involvement is 
due to the fact that the military has been in government 
for a much longer time than the politicians. Under military 
rule, the Head of State is an army officer; the Supreme 
Military Council - which is the highest organ of the Military 
Governments - consists of mainly top-ranking military officers; 
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and the Federal Executive Council already discussed consists 
of both military officers and civilians, The Councils 
most under the chairmanship of the Head of State or in his 
absence the Chief of Staffp who are military personnelg to 
deliberate an national issues* Foreign policy decisions 
made during military rule obviously have direct participation 
by the military. Between 1975 and 1979, top military 
personnel hold the post of the Commissioner (Minister) of 
External Affairs and by virtue of that position* were 
undoubtedly involved in making foreign policy. 
The increasing consciousness about national security 
has given the military in Nigeria, as alsewherst greater 
prominence than hitherto in foreign policy decision-makings 
Hance the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria established a National 
Defence Counc It 
36 
made up of the Chief of Defence Staff, the 
Head of the Armyq the Head of the Navyq and the Head of the 
Air Forceq generally referred to as "the Service Chiefs"t with 
the statutory role "to advise the President on matters relating 
to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
37 
of Nigeria" . By this provisiont the military has been 
given the power to determine what constitutes a threat to 
the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria - which 
as we know is the cardinal objective of its foreign policy. 
They also have the power to determine the appropriate response 
to such threat* With the military having the instrument of 
coarciong it may not only "advise" but may insist that its 
36* The Constitution (1979)9 Third Schedule Part I-E, 
37, Ibid. 9 item 10. 
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ideas prevail, For examplev in the Nigeria/Cameroun 
border dispute, referred to earlier# the President held 
hours of meeting with the National Defence Council to 
deliberate on the crisis. It is strongly believed that the 
advice of that Councilq among otherat for a conciliatory 
approach prevailed against the opposite views in favour of 
retaliatory measures. Another evidence of the role of the 
military in national policy making is the high position of 
the Chief of Defence Staff in the National Security Councils 
38 
He comes next after the President and Vice-President. Also 
section 197 -1(a) and (b) of the Constitution assigned to the 
military the function of "defending Nigeria from external 
aggression" and "maintaining its territorial integrity and 
39 
securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air" . 
If these functions are to be formed properly, the military 
has to be involved in the formulation of overall national 
security policYp which is inextricably linked with foreign 
policy. This link perhaps explains the presence of Defence 
Attachess in some Nigerian Embassies/High Commissions* 
With the military as the alternate government of Nigeria 
(as at the moment), it therefore becomes a regular participant 
in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Whether 
the continuing involvement of the military directly in making 
f oreign policy is more in the national interest than in its 
38. Ibid, q Third Schedule Part I-H, 
39* Also see: Princewellq I, E, (Lt, Commander NN) on "Protecting 
the Nigerian Territorial Waters"; and Omojokun S. K, (Colonel)q 
on "The Role of the Army in Nation Building"; being lec , 
tures 
delivered to the now entrants to the Nigerian Foreign Service 
in Lagos an 20th June 1979. 
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interest as an institution remains debateable, 
Generallyt we have identified and examined seven major 
institutional structures that are involved directly in 
making Nigerian foreign policy, These structures very in 
their levels of authority. The scope of responsibility for 
foreign policy making also varies with each structure. 
Essentiallyt the functions of one compliment the others* 
Having discussed the role of each structure in making foreign 
policy, we will illustrate in the next chapter the process of 




In the last chapterg we identified and examined the machinery 
of foreign policy making in Nigeria. Here we will try to explain 
how the machinery works in making foreign policy. Put differentlyg 
we will try to answer the question - how is foreign policy made 
in Nigeria? A summary answer to the question is that foreign 
policy is made through harmonization of inputs of support and 
demands from the domestic and external environments of Nigeriag. 
by persons in institutional positions having statutory responsibility 
to do so in accordance with given principles,, for the purpose of 
attaining the objectives and goals of the country, Such an 
answer incorporates the componpnt parts of the. subject as discussed 
in this work. We still need to illustrate the process of 
harmonization in decision-making. 
EXPLAINING THE PROCESS 
Ono common way of explaining "the how" of policy making is 
to represent a formal orgenisation chart with little boxes and lines 
showing the vertical and horizontal flow of communication between 
formal office holders. The chart could be used to illustrate the 
hierarchical structure of government organisation with authority 
varying from apex to the bass of the structure, It will show 
lines representing flow of information and advice moving in a 
vertical direction from base, iese the low level bureaucratsp upwards 
through heads of sections/departments to the Permanent Secretary 
and the Minister* from there to the Federal Executive Council and 
the Presidency. A corresponding line will represent a downward 
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flow from the apex of directives that are to be carried outs 
The chart will also show a horizontal line of relationship 
between the Ministry of External Affairs and other Ministries 
that share with it joint responsibility for some external affairs 
mattersp thereby portraying formal co-operation and collaboration 
of all ministries/agencies of government on all matters. 
In theory the description of orgenisation chart is correct* 
In practice the little bores and lines are not linked in the way 
the chart shows. The fact is that foreign policy decision-making 
has domestic and external environmentsq and human beings (with 
differing talents and idiosyncratic tendencies) are involved, not 
abstract boxes and lines. Secondq it is the interaction between the 
human beings in the environments and those in policy-making positions 
(i, s, which constitute the machinery) that set the process in motion. 
Thirdt there are various levels of policy-making in any organisation. 
The level at which a policy is made depends mainly on the value and 
interests attached to the issue under consideration so that policy 
making is not exclusively done at the top of the arganisation. 
Fourtht various units of the machinery (government agencies/ 
departments) involved in policy* making have overlapping functions)q 
giving rise in some cases to co-operation and collaboration and 
in others to conflict and rivalry. Therefore communication flow 
and co-ordination are not as smooth and easy as the chart lines 
show, Nevertheless, an organisation chart is a useful shorthand 
notation of government administrative structure, It helps in 
understanding the relative positions of the structures and the 
power relationshipsv especially if it is accompanied by a careful 
explanation of how things got done. 
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In gensralg, as noted abovet how a policy issue is processed 
depends at what level it originates in the hierarchical structure 
of the arganisationg the amount of interest it elicits and value 
attached to it by the policy makers. At every level of the 
organisation there are policy makers who make policy decisions 
commensurate with their level of authority, This point becomes 
clearer if it is understood that a policy is not a single decision 
but consists of many decisions made either at a given level or 
different levels and geared towards the roalisation of certain 
objectives and goals. For our purpose here, three categories 
of policy corresponding with three levels of authority can be 
identified thus: 
1) High level policy decisions# 
2) Middle level policy decisionst and 
3) Low level policy decisions. - 
One must bear in mind that there is no strict compartmentalisation 
of each category. The low level policy decisions are usually on 
minor routine matters arising within the general framework of policy 
of the government, Every matter in a Ministry or its department 
does not reach the Minister and not even the Permanent Secretary 
or Head of Department, As no person can alone carry out the entire 
work of a Ministryt there is inevitable delegation of duties to 
various departmentsy sections and grades of staff, so that even 
the clerical staff have their respective schedule of duties within 
which they take decisions and handle policy mattersp no matter how 
minorp an behalf of the Permanent Secretary* 
I 
le Usually most decisions of a Ministry are assumed to have been made 
by the Permanent Secretary or an his behalf by a subordinate member 
of staff acting with his full knowledge and consent. But with some 
delegation of authority and the hope that other staff understand 
the general policy and thinking of their superior# several decisions 
are made without the prior consent of the Permanent Secretary* 
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Middle level policy decisions are made by officers in the 
middle of the hierarchyq generally known as the policy staff. 
In the Ministry of External Affairsq they are designated as 
External Affairs Officers and include the Ambassadors# Heads 
of Departments and Permanent Sscretaryq while in the home 
Ministries, the y are designated as Administrative Officers. 
The staff in this category are believed to possess appropriate 
knowledge and experience to understand the programme of their 
Minister and the government in power at a certain time, and 
can therefore make suitable decisions that will enhance such 
a programme. They are expected to know the limits of their 
autharityq beyond which they can only make recommendations of 
policy options to the Minister or through him to the President- 
in-Council for approval. Many policy decisions are mado at the 
middle level of the hierarchical structure of government, This 
is because this level is made up of bureaucrats, many. of whom have 
varied experience and skills for dealing with foreign governments, 
Unlike the Head of State (President)q the Ministers and their 
advisers who are usually transitoryq the bureaucracy, as stated 
earlier, has parmanencog expertise and maintains records of 
past action and current information vital for developing and 
implementing forsign. policy. According to Lloyd Jenseng the 
bureaucracy "makes decisions at each level as to what information 
and which issues will rise to the next level of decision making". 
2 
The same is true of the Nigerian buresucracyg hence# as we noted 
earlierg the former Secretary to the Federal Military Government 
claimed "the Nigerian federal civil servants were and are likely 
2. Jenseng Lloyd, Explaining Forging Policy, Prentice Hall# Incep 
Englewood Cliffsq New Jersey, 1982, p, %* 
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to remain the originators and innovators of most major policy 
decisions in the country"o 
3 
If an issue emerges at any point on this level of government 
9tructures either through the initiative of an officer or through 
pressure from the domestic or external environm8nt,, the issue 
is put forward in the form of a minute to another officer(s) 
higher in rankt for considerationo A decision may be taken 
and the matter concluded if it. is within the competence of the 
officer to do so and if such matter does not have wider implicationso 
But if the matter is beyond the authority at that level, it will 
then be expatiated upong highlighting the various implications and 
possible alternativesp in another minute to the head of department 
for consideration or decision, Ageing depending on the head of 
department's assessment of the issuag he could take a decision 
and give directives on what should be done next. The head of 
department could also decide to refer the issue to the Permanent 
Secretary for decisiono After thatq directives are given for 
implementationo 
The high level policy decisions are made by the Minister, 
the Council (Supreme Military and Federal Executive) and the 
President jointly or separately after due consultations* Foreign 
policy issues considered at this level may be initiated by any of 
the personalities in the groupq or come from a memorandum submitted 
by other government agencies or departments in the middle stratum 
of government hierarchy. They may also arias from direct pressure 
from the domestic or external environment, From whatever soureaq 
such foreign policy issues are discussed jointly and decisions 
taken and forwarded to the appropriate agency/department for 
implementation. 
3* Ayidat Allisong An address to the annual conference of the 
Nigerian Economic Society, 1973, 
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From the foregoing explanationag it is apparent that the 
foreign policy process follows an identifiable pattern in 
which a policy issue is initiated at a point in the organisational 
structurst and moves to another (higher) point for consideration, 
After that a decision is made either at that point or another 
higher level. The decision is usually accompanied by some 
directives for implementation. Then the impact of such decision 
will be assessed in relation to the intended objectiveg the type 
of response it elicits and other feed-back emanating from there* 
This general trend in foreign policy making in Nigeria can be 
represented as in the figure below* 





This figure is perhaps simple and illustrative enough of the 
stages which every policy passes through during formulation, it 
shows the ordering of activities in the foreign policy process, The 
scheme illustrates that-the foreign policy process has an environment 
within which exist factors (already discussed) like cultural 
institutionst public opinion, the National Assemblyq political 
parties (in the domestic environment)g ECOWASg OAUq Commonwealthq 
UN09 IBRDq IMF (external environment) that exert pressure and 
influence the functioning of the machineryq the policy outputs and 
295. 
policy outcomes. It is clear from the trend that policy making 
begins when an issue is initiated or enters the policy structure 
at a point where it receives attentione The issue then moves- 
from the point of entry or initiation through consideration to 
decisiong and from thereq if a final decision is to proceed with 
a course of actiong to implementation and evaluation. This is 
virtually how every foreign policy decision is made. 
For examplat every. day several despatchest reportst tologramy 
aides memoires and notes verbale pour into the Ministry of External 
Affairs, reporting events all over the world - viz. a coup d'stat 
has occurred in Liberia; Israeli forces have invaded West Beirut; 
Thatcher invites to Britain Pik Botha of South Africa; Moscow 
denies a Nigerian student permission to marry his Soviet girl friendq 
etco These are cases that capture the attention of government 
officials who decide to report on them. There are many other 
cases which are of equal interest to the Nigerian government but 
which have not received the attention of the appropridto officials. 
As the reports reach the Ministryq they are sent to the specialist 
Ministries/Departments for consideration. Each report will then be 
examined and analysed in the light of some general conception of 
the Nigerian interests an which the events may impinge. Proposals 
for action or inaction may be put forward to another group of 
officials higher in the hierarchy of government for further 
consideration and decision. Sometimes some proposals are 
decisions that need the concurrence of the immediate superior 
to become authoritative and binding. At other timesq some 
proposals have to pass through many levels of authority for 
consideration before a final decision can be made at the top of 
the hierarchy. Once a decision is reachadt it is passed to the 
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appropriate Ministry or department for implementation. After 
that the impact will be evaluated. 
A few case studies of foreign policy decision-making will help 
to make the process clearer* These include (i) the decision to 
sell Nigerian oil at concessionary prices to African countries; 
(ii) Nigeriats decision to accord recognition to the MPLA 
Government of Angola; and (iii) Nigeria's peace-keeping operations 
in the Chad Republic* We will explain how these decisions were 
made, the agencies/departments of government that took the decisional 
and why the government made such decisions, It must be noted that 
among the criticisms of case studies is the tandencyg according to 
W, I, Jenkins, to present a partial and incomplete view of the 
4 dynamics and totality of the policy process. Part of the reason 
is that some writers focus attention on few personalities while 
negating the organisation as a whole and the variety of participahts 
in the policy process as well as the environmental pressures an the 
machinery. Our reader must therefore note that in the examples 
belowq we will try to amphasise the organs and departments of 
government that participated directly in making the decisions rather 
then the individual whose role might have been to endorse the ideas 
of others in subordinate positions. 
THE DECISION TO SELL NIGERIAIS OIL AT CONCESSIONARY 
PRICES FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
In early 3uly 19749 the Federal Military Government of Nigeria 
decided to supply crude oil to African states at a reduced rate of 
US $, 9 a barrel while the posted price from OPEC for Nigerian oil 
4e Jenkins, Meg Policy Analysis: A Political and Orqanisational 
ParsPective, Martin Robertson, London, 19789 pp. 19-20* 
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was US X14.191 per barrel, 
5 
The decision was in response to 
demands by some African countries for Nigerian crude oil at 
cheaper rates than the prevailing prices in the world then. 
To appreciate the uniqueness of this decisiong we will have a 
quick look at the background of Nigeria's oil pricing policy. 
0 
BACKGROUND OF OIL PRICING POLICY 
Crude oil has been in production in Nigeria since 1956 when 
the first oil well was discovered at Oloibiri in the eastern part 
of Nigeria. 
6 From that timag the major policy of the Nigerian 
government was to attract and encourage foreign companies with 
expertise and equipment for oil prospectingt exploration and 
production* As part of the inducementt the early companies 
were granted liberal concessions to produce and market Nigeria's 
crude oil. By 1959 the Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance was 
introduced and it provided for 50%-50% profit sharing with the 
oil companiesp of which the companies determined the profit to be 
shared. In effectv the oil companies determined the quantity of 
oil to be producedg fixed and varied the prices at which oil was 
sold without government supervision or control. Profits were 
based on realised pricest which fluctuated widely from company to 
company and from oil shipment to oil shipment. It became obvious 
to the rederal Goverment of Nigeria that the country was losing 
much revenue from the oil-profit arrangement, 
5, Central Bank of Nigeriag Economic and Financial RaviewAL vol, 20t 
no. 11 June 19829 p. 11. 
6. The search for deposits of crude oil in Nigeria was begun by 
Shell-DtArc, -y Exploration Parties in 1937, It was only in 
1956 that a team of drillers from Shell-BP Development 
Company of Nigeria struck oil at Oloibiri in Eastern 
Nigeria. 
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From 1966 to 1971, Nigeria based its calculation of the 
oil companies' tax payments on the posted prices from other 
oil-producing countries whereby any better terms given to a 
producer country was automatically demanded by Nigeria. 
7 The 
Ministry of Mines and Power which had statutory responsibilitý 
for supervising and co-ordinating the activities of the petroleum 
industry had then few people with professional knowledge of the 
industry, This made it difficult to formulate a coherent 
petroleum policy and petroleum price policy. By 1970 it was 
clear that Libya and Algeriev both of which countries have a similar 
quality of crude oil as Nigeriag were earning more per barrel than 
Nigeria, As a result and coupled with the desire to learn from 
the experiences of other oil-producing countries, Nigeria joined 
OPEC in 1971. In that same year, the Federal Government established 
the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) but it did not function 
until 1973. The Corporation was assigned the responsibility to 
exploreq prospect9 produce# staraq transport and market crude 
petroleum and its refined products* When NNOC started operation 
early in 19739 the government had no definite oil pricing policyt 
except to implement OPEC resolutions on prices. Howeverg NNOC 
had many technical problems and was reorganised in 1977 into a 
agency known as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
The oil price escalation in the world market from 1970 to 
1974,, due to an increase in demand for crude oilq led OPEC members 
to introduce significant changes in the structure of oil prices and 
in tax and royalty rates. The new pricing formula was based on the 
official selling prices rather than posted price* 
8 Individual 
7* Central Bank of Nigeriag op. cit., p. 6. 
Bo Ibid, q p. 16. 
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exporting countries were allowed to determine the prices of 
particular crude oil using OPEC approved formula. For exampleg 
Nigerian oil with low sulphur content is considered to be relatively 
superior to others with high sulphur content and therefore attracts 
a higher price in the international oil market, As a resultq 
the Federal Military Government became more interested and 
involved in marketing Nigerian crude oil* Revenue from oil 
tripled. 
While Nigeria was benefiting from the oil price escalationg 
many non-oil producing countries of Africa were unable to pay the 
high price of oil and therefore were hard-hit by the energy crisis. 
Consequently there were external bilateral pressures on Nigeria to 
help poorer African countries in need of crude oil, The earliest 
demands come from neighbouring countries in West Africa - Ghana, 
Sierra Loonev Togo and Liberia# asking for oil at cheaper rates, 
Since there was no definable Nigerian pricing policyg it was 
difficult to respond meaningfully to these pressures. In the 
wake of the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, the world energy 
crisis increased. The war-affected oil producing Arab countries 
placed embargoes on their oil being sold to certain countries 
including the USA, Netherlands and South Africa. Arab countries 
organised a cutback in their oil production* The effect was a 
substantial increase in the demand for available oil and market 
prices rose sharply. Trulyt the US and some West European 
countries wore badly hit by the energy crisis but the non-oil 
producing African countries were more affected because they had 
not enough foreign exchange to pay the very high oil prices. 
Consequently many African countries stopped up their demand for 
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Nigeria's oil at concessionary rates. Nigeria then decided 
to sell crude oil to African countries at reduced rates* Thus 
a formal Nigerian oil pricing policy started with the world 
energy crisis of 197t-74. 
INFLUENCES ON DECISION-MAKING 
A number of internal and external factors influenced Nigeria's 
response to the demands of African countries. Among the internal 
factoraq the first is the altruistic tendency of Nigerian policy- 
makersq who feel psychologically and morally bound to help other 
African countries. The concept of altruism has been explained 
in chapter five* Secondt the phenomenal increase in oil production 
which in that year was at an average of 2*3 million barrels a dayq 
putting Nigeria as the sixth largest world oil producer, encouraged 
Nigeria's policy-makers to consider the demands sympathetically 
in the hope that about 3 per cent of the oil which would be 
demanded by African countries might not affect adversely Nigeria's 
development plans, Thirdt there was in that yearg a remarkable 
rise to about US $1 billion in Nigeria's earnings from oil and 
also the prospect of more oil revenue in the years ahead, The 
fourth factor an the other side of the pendulum were Nigeria's 
internal economic necessities like the demands for reconstructiong 
renovation and rehabilitation of civil war damagest and the much 
needed funds for Nigeria's Third National Development Plan (1975-80) 
estimated to cost Wra 53 billion. To many Nigerians at the timeq 
just as it appeared that their country's revenue was rising$ so it 
appeared that demands on the revenue were enormous* It was thus 
difficult from the beginning to determine the nature of concessions 
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to be given to African-countries* The decision was at every 
stage controversial. 
External pressures on Nigeria also had an impact an the 
decision process. There were bilateral pressures from African 
countries such as Ghanaq Sierra Leoneg Liberia and Togo, Others 
include Botawanaq Leaothog Swaziland and Zambiav whose conditions 
were quite patheticq and which needed to be rescued to minimiae 
dependence on South Africa which had then come under Arab oil 
embargo, Pressures on Nigeria also came from the Organisation of 
African Unity* The DAU expressed concern for the hardship of non- 
oil producing African countries and so urged both Nigeria and 
other oil producing countries to aid these African states, By 
1973, the DAU had set up a committee of seven member states to 
approach oil producing states to help the hard-hit African 
9 
countries.. Another influence an Nigeria arose from the actions 
of the oil producing Arab states. The Organisation of Arab 
10 Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) instead of preferential 
oil prices for African countriesq resolved to set up an Arab Bank 
for Industrial and Agricultural Development in Africa as part of 
their contribution to general development, To some extent, this 
was seen as a challenge to Nigeria, as an oil producing country 
in Africaq to show its concern for the hardship occasioned by the 
energy crisis, Other pressures an the federal military government 
came from the UN General Assembly (sixth Special Sessiong April- 
May 1974)9 the World Bank and IMF9 urging OPEC member states to 
9" Alukoq 09 Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy* George Allen 
Unwin Ltd, t Londong 1981t po 203o 
10. The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries consists 
of Algeria, Libyaq Egyptq Syria, Saudi Arabiaq Kuwaitt Bahraing 
Qatar and United Arab Emirates. 
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assist the oil-importing developing countries. Amidst these 
demands and pressureaq decision-makers in Nigeria started to 
search for the best way to help alleviate the hardship of other 
African states arising from the energy crisis. 
THE DECISIDN-MAKERS 
The major participants in the decision in 1974 to sell 
Nigerian crude oil to Africaý countries at reduced rates were 
(1) the Head of State# General Yakubu Gowon and his advisersq 
aided by the senior staff of both the State House and the Cabinetý 
office, chief among them being the Secretary to the Federal Military 
Government. Since the Head of State has over-riding responsibility 
for the country's foreign policy, he thus exercised supreme authority 
over the decision to sell Nigerian crude oil to Africaý countries; 
(2) The Federal Executive Councilq 
11 
as already atatedv is the 
central policy-making body for the country. It was in the 
Council that differing views and concerns about Nigeria's oil policy 
were harmonized; (3) The Ministry of Mihes and Powerg and its 
arm - the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC)o The Ministry 
had statutory responsibility for petroleum exports and for co. - 
ordination and control of the activities of the oil companies. 
It was therefore directly involved in initiating petroleum policy 
proposals; (4) The Ministry of External Affairaq with primary 
responsibility for co-ordinating Nigeriats external relations and 
foreign policyq was thus involved at all stages in the decision- 
making process; (5) The Ministry of Finance had an indispensable 
11. M6mbership of both the Supreme Military Council and Federal 
Executive Council overlapped at the time. For reasons 
already explained, the Federal Executive Council exercised 
the power to make policy for the country, 
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role in the decision because it has primary responsibility 
for co-ordinating the country's fiscal plans and policies* 
Although other Ministries and Departments of government were 
involved in the decision-making especially through their 
Commissioners in the Federal Executive Council, the five 




THE DECISION PROCESS 
The earliest requests for Nigerian oil at concessionary 
prices came in mid-1972 through diplomatic channels to the 
Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos* These were from the 
High Commissions of Sierra Leone and Ghana in Lagosq followed 
later in the year by the Embassies of Liberia and Togo, Similar 
requests were also made through Nigerian diplomatic missions in 
these countriesp as reflected in their despatches to the Ministry 
of External Affairs. Copies of the notes/despatches were forwarded 
to relevant departments/Ministries for consideration and necessary 
action, The subsequent decision to sell Nigeriats crude oil to 
African countries at concessionary prices passed through all the 
stages in the process of foreign policy makingg shown in figure Xg - 
above, The decision was perceived from the beginning to be likely 
to attract several interests and so the government allowed full 
participation of all relevant Ministries/departments* In the 
Federal Executive Council there was lengthy debate and deliberation 
on the memoranda submitted by the appropriate Ministries regarding 
the demands of African countries. Some official sources reveal# 
12. For details of some dominant personalities from the organs/ 
Ministriesq see 0* Alukoq ape cite$ pp, 20D-202* 
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contrary to the impression-given by Aluka, 
13 that the Federal 
Military Government did not turn down the request of any 
African country for Nigerian oil at reduced rates. Ratherg 
at the time the earliest-requests were made, there was hardly any 
Nigerian oil pricing policy. 
14 This was partly responsible 
for the delay in responding to the requests. Another reason 
for the delay was because the relevant Ministries responsible 
for initiating action on the demands were at the time undergoing 
some reorganisationo 
15 In additiong the earliest requests scarcely 
received any detailed examination due to inadequate information 
about the country's oil production level at the timet the scope 
of the oil market, the pricing system and future prospects of the 
industry, 
In actual fact, the process of the decision only began in 
earnest in late 1973 when as a result of continued pressure from 
African countriesq the w orld oil crisist and government take-over 
of control and supervision of the oil industryg then the Ministry 
of External Affairs asked its departments of African Affairs and 
International Economic Co-operation# to bring up for consideration 
the previous reports and renewed requests for crude oil at 
concessionary prices. At this timep the relevant departments 
had some experienced senior officers with good technical knowledge 
and the Ministry also had collected some essential information 
about the oil industry and pricing system. A report was 
therefore initiated by a rirst Secretary in the Department of 
13. Ibid. p pp. 202-204. 
14. Interview. 
15* There was the 1972 reorganisation of the Ministry of External 
Affairsq resulting ing among other things, strengthening of the 
Departments of African Affairs and International Economic Co- 
operation, There was a similar rearganisation aýd upgrading of 
the Department of Petroleum in the Ministry of Mines and Power 
and the reinforcing of NNOC for a more effective role. 
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African Affairaq summarising the demands by African countriest 
summing up the quantity of Nigerian oil likely to be required 
by the countries and the estimated valust which the report said 
would not be substantially different from Nigeria's projected 
expenditure on aid to African countries* The report concluded 
with an assessment of the political and economic advantages and 
disadvantages of selling Nigerian crude oil at reduced rates 
to African countries* It was then submitted to the Head of 
Department-for consideration and he in turn recommended the 
report to the Permanent Secretary for sympathetic consideration* 
The Department of International Economic Co-operation was in 
agreement with the submission of African Affairs Department and 
urged that because the demand will rise over timeg any oil price 
concession must be considered as part of the total aid that 
Nigeria could afford with minimum burden an the national economy, 
From the Permanent Secretary the report went to the Minister of 
External Affairs for consideration* In the end, the Ministarg Permanent 
Secretary and other senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs 
were unanimous in supporting concessionary sales. 
A similar procedure was followed by the Ministry of Mines and 
Power in considering the implications of the requests, Meanwhile 
the Head of State and other members of the Federal Executive Council 
were quite aware of the demands by some African countries for Nigerian 
oil at reduced rates and so wanted the relevant Ministries to examine 
the requests, Before submitting the report formally to the Head of 
State-in-Council, some lateral consultations took place between the 
Ministries. ror example# the Ministry of External Affairs notified 
the Ministries of Mines and Powerg Economic Development and rinance 
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of its (MEAts) position on the matter and the intention to 
present it to the Federal Executive Council for consideration 
and approval, At the same timev MEA was seeking the support 
of these Ministries for the proposal. Through such lateral 
consultationsq the respective Ministries were aware of the 
points of common agreement as well as of reservatione All the 
Ministries were sympathetic to the plight of the African countries 
. 
but there was expressed concern about the state of Nigeria's 
economy and the extra burden to be imposed on it if such 
concessions were granted in addition to the annual provision 
for aid to African countries. - 
At the Federal Executive Councilq the memoranda from the 
relevant Ministries raised other significant issues includingg 
for exampleg the possibility of some countries reselling the oil 
at higher prices an the open market, It was difficult to reach 
a decision without detailed consideration of the issues. With 
some adjournments9 the Council deliberation lasted for weeks, 
Although minutes of the Council meeting remain classified, it 
appears that Council members were unanimous on the need for 
Nigeria to help alleviate the hardship of African countries but 
differed on the modality for such assistance. Consequently the 
FEC resolved to allow for further consideration of the requests, 
It therefore set up a working group to study the implications of 
selling oil at reduced rates to African countries and to make 
suitable recommendations to the government, The group consisted 
mainly of representatives of the Ministries of Mines and Power# 
External Affairsq Economic Development and Fina6ce. 
By mid-1974, the working group submitted its report which was 
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presented in a memorandum to the Federal Executive Council 
for deliberation and decision* The report favoured the sale 
of Nigerials oil at concessionary prices for African countries 
and provided that such concession be given to African countries 
that have refineries and have promised that the oil will be for 
local consumption. It argued that such a gesture is in line with 
Nigeria's policy of aiding other African countries, and that only 
a small percentage - according to Aluko, "less than 3 per cent 
of Nigerian crude oil exports would be affected", 
16 The 
Federal Executive Council had a considerable debate on the 
proposal. In the end the memorandum was adopted aýd passed to 
the releva6t Ministries for implementation. 
Thereafterg the first stop was to inform through diplomatic 
channels the African countries that had asked for Nigerian oil 
at concessionary prices. Then the government announced publicly 
on 18th Ouly 1974 its decision to sell oil at reduced rates to 
17 African countries. The process involved in the above decision 
confirms our representation of the general trend of the foreign 
policy process at figure X9 above. Essentiallyp the decision 
process started in earnest from the lower level in-the hierarchy 
and moved upwards through other levels to the Federal Executive 
Council which made the final decision. From there it moved 
downwards for implementation, 
NIGERIAIS DECISION TD ACCORD RECOGNITION TO 
THE MPLA GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA* 
Nigeria announced its recognition of the MPLA government 
on 25th November 19759 almost two weeks after the declaration of 
16. Aluko, a., op. cit., p. 197. 
17. Press statement by Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Mines 
and Powerv Mr, Philip Asiodu an 18th July 1974. Also DailY Tim8St 
19 July 1974, 
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Angolan independence* The decision was a reversal of Nigeria's 
earlier stand, in line with the Organisation of African Unity 
for a government of national unity in Angolao The announce- 
ment of the recognition was sudden and against the expectations of 
some of Nigeria's friends like the United States and its NATO 
allies who were suspicious of MPLAIs link with USSR and therefore 
wanted in Angola a government other than by the MPLAO The 
concern and interest which Nigeria's recognition of MPLA aroused 
made the decision appear unique. What circumstances and pressures - 
internal and external - influenced the decision-makers? Who made 
the decision? How was the decision made? These are the questions 
we will address ourselves to below# bearing in mind that our answers, 
to them will# of necessityq be circumscribed because the documents 
on this decision are still classified and not acces6ible. 
EXPLAINING THE EVENTS 
Angola became independent on llth November 1975 after the 
withdrawal of Portuguese forces without a formal handover of 
powere Three major liberation movements which had been fightiýg 
the Portuguese for many years for the independence of Angolaq were 
left to fight amongst themselves for the formation of an independent 
government in the country* The three movements were - the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the National Front for 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA); and the National Union for Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), There were other small liberation 
movements 
18 
and many ethnic/regional movementeg with the most 
notable being the Cabinda movements 
19 like CAUNC9 CRCq FLEC and 
18. For a list of Angolm Nationalists Movements see Marcumt John A,, 
The Angolan Revolutiong vol, II, The Mit Prosag Massachusettag 
19789 pp* 318-320, 
19-* These include IComite' dtAction d'Union Nationals des Cabindain" 
CAUNC9 "Comite Revolutionaire Cabindais" - CRC; "Frente pars, libertacý 
do Enclave do Cabinda" - FLEC; and I'Mouvement pour la Liberation do 
'MIZI 
1/Enclave de Cabinall - MLEC. Ibid, g pe 319* 
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MLEC9 who were not fighting for independence per. 2s, but for- 
the secession of the oil-rich Cabinda Province from Angola, 
At independenceg thereforeq Angola was torn by these Liberation 
Movements, The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) made 
unsuccessful efforts to reconcile the three major (plus FLEC) 
movements to form a government of national unity* The Federal 
Military Government of Nigeria had been in support of the CAU for 
a government of national unity, As would be expected in such 
a situation# the proposal was rejected by the warring factions. 
Shortly before independencaq the MPLA had Occupied Luandat with its 
forces guarding all strategic locations. Having established 
control of the capital territory the MPLA proclaimed the "People's 
Republic of Angola" 
20 
and so celebrated independence in Luanda. 
On the other hand# the FNLA and UNITA# having lost control of 
Luanda# formed an alliance in August 1975 against the MPLA* The 
Alliance moved to the town of Huambo from where it celebrated the 
independence of what it called the "People's Democratic Republic 
of Angola". 
21 It is apparent from this short account that MPLA 
was in a dominant position vis-a-vis other liberation movements, 
Other events at the time helped to give the Angolan crisis 
its peculiar dimension. The struggle for power by the liberation 
movements became exacerbated with the involvement of foreign powersq 
notably the USSR9 USA9 China# South Africa and Cuba, The MPLA 
received massive support from USSR and Cuba, while the FNLA/UNITA 
had the support of USAt the Peoples Republic of China and South 
Africa* By late August 1975 South African soldiers invaded Angola 
20* Legumg Coling and Hodgesq Tonyq After Angola - The War over 
Southern Africa* Rex Collins, Londont 1976t p. 83, See 116r. 
Agoatinho Nato's Independence Day Speech". 
21. Ibid. 9 p. 82. See FNLA's President Mr, Holden Roberta's Proclamation of Independence at the 15th March Square of Ambriz. 
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in aid of the FNLA/UNITA alliance to stop the advance of MPLA 
forces southwards to occupy more territory. It was also 
learnt that France and Zaire were aiding the Cabinda 
secessionist movements. 
This then was the prevailing situation in Angola at independence, 
0 
Each liberation movement therefore became involved in a dual struggle 
to secure political base at home and diplomatic recognition abroad. 
The OAU and African countries were therefore lobbied for support, 
The CAU adopted a compromise stance of bringing all the parties 
together to form a national government. Nigeria was in line with 
the OAU and later the policy-makers decided to support one of the 
movements - the MPLA* Howeverg before Nigeria's recognition# the 
MPLA government had been recognised by about 30 stateaq including 
some one-third of OAU's 46 members like the four former Portuguese 
coloniest Congog Guineaq Somalia and Algeria as well as some East 
European countriess 
22 
THE DECISION MAKERS 
Before probing into why the decision was madeq we will wish 
to know who took the decision to recognise the MPLA government. 
Following the change of government on 29th July 1975, a new military 
governmentl headed by Major-General (then Brigadier) Murtala 
Muhammad came to power in. Nigaria. While the ousted government 
had two principal organs, the new government established three 
organs. 
23 These were the Supreme Military Council (SMC)q the 
National Council of States and the Federal Executive Council. The 
22. Ibid. t p. 17 and pp. 9-41 for more background details* 
23* The ousted government of General Yakubu Gowan had the Supreme 
Military Council and the Federal Executive Council. The 
Muhammad government introduced a third organ called "National 
Council of States", See A Time for Actiong op, cit, 9 p, 4, 
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Head of State was the Chairman of the three Councils* The 
Supreme Military Council was the highest body in the hierarchy, 
providing the general policy guidelines within which the affairs 
of the nation was conducted, 
24 Its functions show that it must 
have given the lead in the decision to recognise the MPLA government* 
The reconstituted Supreme Military Council comprised the Head of 
State Major General Murtala Muhammedq the Chief of Staff Supreme 
Headquarters (than Brigadier) Olusegun Obasanjo; the Chief'of Army 
Staff (than Brigadier) T-Y. Danjumag Chief of Naval Staff Commodore 
M. A, Adelanwag Chief of Air Staff Col* John Yisa-Doko, the Inspector- 
General of Police Mr, M. D* Yusufug all divisional military commanders 
and selected senior officers in the Army, Navyq Airforce and the 
Police. 25 Altogether,, there were twenty-two members. Unlike 
previouslyq the Supreme Military Council under Muhammad wielded 
much power# leaving subsidiary powers to the Federal Executive 
Council and the National Council of States. 
Under Muhammad the National Council of States was next to SMC 
in the hierarchy of governmental structure. The National Council 
comprised of the Head of State as chairmang key members of the SMC 
26 
and the military governors of states. This Council was concerned 
with matters affecting the states. its activities were subject to 
the general supervision and direction of the Supreme Military Council. 
The Federal Executive Council which under Gawon was the central 
policy making body for the countryt was under Muhammad relegated 
to the third level in the hierarchy of governmental structure* 
Its function was limited to execution of the policy of the 
24. Ibid, q pp. 10-11. 
25. Ibid, q pp. 4-5. 
26, The key members of the Supreme Military Council were the Head of 
State# Chief of Staff Supreme Headquartersq Service-Chiefst 
Commissioner for External Affairs and Inspector General of Police. 
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Federal Military Government, 
The office of Head of State is another important part of 
government that plays a key role in decisioý-making. At this 
time, it comprised the Head of State Major General Murtala 
Muhammedq the Committee of Advisers, 
27 
the Secretary to Federal 
Military Government Alhaji Ademu Ciroma with outstanding 
experience in government, and senior officers in the State 
House and Cabinet Office, Collectively, these contribute 
to the ideas and image of the President or Head of State, 
Whenever there is a change of government, the new leader relies 
considerably on the staff of this Office to understand the 
rudiments of the Presidency. Since with the exception of 
Murtala Muhammed who was briefly a federal Commissioner for 
Communicationg members of the other three organs already 
discussed had almost no previous experience in government, the 
staff of the State House/Cabinet Office and Advisers were therefore 
most useful. 
From this account of that government's top decision making 
organs,, it is apparent that two major organs - the office of the Head 
of State (Cabinet Office) and the Supreme Military Council - were 
directly involved in the decision to recognise the MPLA government. 
The Ministry of External Affairs also must have been directly 
involved in the decision process, especially as recognition is a dip- 
lomatic action, At the head of the Ministry was Commissioner for 
27. These were from the Universitiest Press, Nigeria; Society of 
International Affairs and the Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs, aýd include Dr. Bolaji Akinyemit Dr. Bala Usman and 
Haroun Adamu, Their role in the decision to recognise MPLA 
was invaluable* Some of them, like Dr, Bolaji Akinyemi who 
was the closest adviser to both Joe Garba and Muhammad/ 
Obasanjo, remained as advisers an foreign policy matters 
until 1979, 
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External Affairs Major General (then Colonel) Joseph Garbat 
who was also a member of the Supreme Military Council. He 
was assisted by a Permanent Secretary Alhaji M, Ae Sanusiq 
former Nigerian Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Others 
involved include the Director and staff of the Ministry's 
Department of African Affairs as well as the Nigerian diplomatic 
missions in Southern Africa, The collation of informationt 
preparing reportaq briefs and proposals on the situation in 
Angola, done by the Ministryq formed the basis of debate and 
deliberation of the government. Having considered the 
decision-makers# 28 the next question isl what circumstances and 
pressures infIuanced the decision-makers? 
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION-MAKERS 
A number of events occurred both*within and outside Nigeria 
that year which facilitated Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA 
government* 
Internal Factors 
The main internal factor is political - General Murtala, 
Muhammad becoming Nigeria's new Head of State. In a tele0ised 
broadcastq he expressed the desire "to give the nation a new lease 
of life, and sense of direction" 
29 
and was prepared to maintain a 
tough stance an various national issues, 
30 Having organised a military 
coup and seized power from General Gowan who had fought successfully 
to keep Nigeria united and also had achieved popularity abroadq it 
28, In addition to the Head of State and his office staffq the SMCq 
and Ministry of External Affairs, there were Ministries of Defence 
and Financeq and the militaryq involved at different stages of 
of the proqess. 
29* Muhammad Murtala, A Time for Actio n. Department of Information# 
Federal Government of Nigeriat Lagos# 19809 po 2* 
30* Every military government in Nigeria since 1966 hadq on assumption 
of officeg adopted a tough stance as a means of winning domestic 
support/warding off opposition, but only to relax such stance later" 
sia. 
became compelling for the new government to win popularity 
at home and abroad by demonstrating its superiority over the 
previous administration* In effectq the now government was 
anxious to establish its presence an the world scene and the 
situation in Angola offered the opportunity, The government 
believed that to take a different position from its predecessor 
in the Angolan case would-certainly attract more attention* 
Public opinion in Nigeria has always been against 
colonialism and imperialismg symbolised by the capitalist 
countries of Western Europet who are believed to have been 
responsible both for the underdevelopment of Africa and for many 
of the existing problems and conflicts in the continent. The 
consequence is the suspicion and distrust of virtually every 
Western design in Africa, Therefore# any party/movement supported 
by the West is regarded as imperialist agent. Every now leader 
perceives foreign policy to be concerned with the protection of 
the independence and rights of all black people against their 
oppressors and usually begins with an attack on colonialism and 
imperialism. In so doingt public support is assumed. Indeed, 
all through the war against Partugalq enlightened opinion in 
Nigeria urged the Federal Government to give every possible 
assistance to the liberation movements 
31 
to defeat Portuguese 
colonial forces. 
At independenceg public opinion in Nigeria acclaimed the 
collapse of Portuguese colonial rule and while expressing hope 
for better political development in Angola# called on African 
countries to prevent further imperialist intervention by taking 
31, All three liberation movements had maintained close relations 
with Nigeria (FNLA since 1960s) and received assistance in 
one form or another* 
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the necessary action to restore normality in Angola* For 
examplev Now Nigerian 
32 
and the Daily Times 
33 drew attention 
to South African and United States intervention as undermining 
the efforts of CAU to resolve the crisis in Angola. The 
newspapers urged the Federal Military Government to take 
appropriate action to prevent a repeat of the Congo debacle 
in Angola, The Sunday Times of November 16,1975 was quite 
specific in asking the Nigerian Government to recognise the MPLA 
government* A few Nigerian academics favoured MPLA among 
othersg while denouncing the proposal for a government of 
national unity as being conciliatory, Howevert the extent 
to which public opinion influenced the decision-makers is not 
known but under the peculiar political circumstances of the new 
governmentg public opinion could not have been totally ignored, 
The military and economic capacity of Nigeria do not seem 
to have had particular influence an the decision to recogniss 
the MPLA government, But the significant increase in the 
country's revenue in the period due essentially to the phenomenal 
rise in the prices of oil might have added to the general confidence 
and tons of optimism of Nigerian leaders in international relations, 
External Factors 
The main event outside Nigeria that influenced the governmentla 
decision was the South African intervention in Angola. There were 
reports of South African occupation of parts of Angola in a bid to 
oust the MPLA government. The federal government authorities in 
Lagos were indignant at the news of South African activities in 
32. New Ninerian, g 6 September 1975. 
33, Dai y Times, 20 November, 1975, 
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Angola, Having learnt that the other liberation movements 
FNLA and UNITA had links with the apartheid government of 
South Africa which provided them with military assistance 
against MPLA, the Nigerian government then concluded that 
FNLA and UNITA were not real nationalist movements. It was 
arguedv and very strongly toot that "if we recognise any 
movement in Angola that dines with Africa's number one enemyt 
then our hope for the liberation of Zimbabweq Namibia and South 
Africa from apartheid and colonialist regimes in that regiong 
would have been dashed". 
34 * Thus# it was the collaboration 
with South Africa that disqualified FNLA and UNITA in the 
consideration of the Nigerian governmentt while the Cabinda 
movements were seen as separatist groups and so did not come 
into consideration, 
The MPLA's apparently superior position vis-a-vis the other 
liberation movementsq might have influenced the decision of the 
Nigerian government, The-MPLA had shortly before independence 
occupied the Angolan capital of Luanda and was thus in control 
of the country's political and administrative contra, This 
was very advantageous. Militarily its forces were strong 
enough to drive out of Luanda the other two liberation movements 
and occupy strategic positions in defence of the territory. The 
MPLA also organised a strong resistance against the South African 
soldiers. Its display of military strength and courage commended 
it to the Nigerian government, Politically it was believed to be 
a foremost nationalist movement that could identify with the 
aspirations of Nigeria, and OAU for the total liberation of the 
continent from colonialism and apartheid. 
34. Interview. 
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Finally some of the radical African states had recognised 
the MPLA government on the day of independence, These include 
Guinea (Conakry)q Algeria, Congo and the newly independent 
Portuguese-speaking African countries of Mazambiquqq Guinea 
Bissau and Cape Verde. These recognitions might have influenced 
the government of Nigeriaq hitherto grouped among the conservative 
African statesq which decided to act in line with the radical 
states by recognising the MPLA government. Having examined 
some of the domestic and external influences on the Nigerian 
decision to recognise the MPLAq we will proceed to consider 
how the decision was arrived at. 
THE DECISION PROCESS 
The Nigerian decision to recognise Angola has been seen by 
some commentators including a few Nigerian leaders as the making 
of General Murtala Muhammad. In a lecture an "The Role of the 
Army in Nation Building". a senior Army Officer attributed what 
he described as "Nigeria's achievement in Angola" to the bold 
initiative and dynamic leadership of the Head of State at that 
time,, General Muhammed, 
35 A Nigerian scholar also wrote thus: 
"The decision to recognise the MPLA government 
was taken between November 20th and 25th - the 
date it was announced* There was no doubt that 
Muhammed took the decision himself, He later 
involved the SMC. Some of the members of the 
SMC, including the Commissioner for External 
Affairsq did not agree with the decision*n 36 
Even Professor 0. Aluka noted "It was widely believed that the 
late Heed of State unilaterally took the decision to recogniee 
the MPLA government late in November 197511,37 Such a view is 
35, From a talk to a group of newly recruited foreign service 
officers on Induction Courset Lagosq 1979* 
36. Sotunmbiq Abiodun 09 Nigeria's Recognition of the MPLA 
Government of Annole 
,: 
a case-study in Decision-Making and 
Implementationg Monographt Series No* 9, The Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairsq Lagosp 1981t pp, 22-23. 
37, Alukot Olajideq op, cit, # p, 247, fn, 49, 
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quite simplistic and difficult to accept for the available 
facts and sequence of events leading to the recognition prove 
that the decision was not made by one man alone, In facts 
the decision followed the general process from initiation to 
considerations decisions implementation and evaluation* it 
also involved the participation of appropriate governmental 
institutions and officialag some of which have been discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Moreover the decision was not a 
five day affair as Sotunmbi wrote. This will be explained 
briefly* 
The emergence through a military coup of a new governmentg 
at the end of July 19759 made up of persons with little or no 
previous experience in government has obvious implications* 
(1) The fear of possible counter-coups implied that none 
of the new leaders could taice each other for granted at that 
early stage and that they therefore would seek consultation and 
ccp-operation on substantive issuesq of which the recognition 
of MPLA was one* (2) Among the reasons advanced by Muhammad 
for overthrowing Gowan's government was "lack of ccnoultation" and 
disregard of official advice. 
38 Arguably it would be absurd for 
the same Muhammad to take a unilateral decisiong 
39 
within a few 
months of assuming office, on a foreign policy issue of great 
importance. (3) Given the limited educational background and 
experience in government of the military leadershipq it might not 
have been possible to make such a decision without proper briefing 
an the history of the Angolan revolution, the strengths and 
38. Muhammadq Murtala, A Time for Action, op. cit. 9 pp. 19 2. 
39* To disprove the theory of unilateral decisions by Muhammedq 
General Obasenjo (next in command to Muhammad) confirmed Itthe 
collective character of the administration which succeeded the 
Gowon regime" when he said "It wasq and still isq an adminis- 
tration that believes firmly in collective responsibility" - 
Daily Sketch June a. 1976, p. 16. 
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weaknesses of the multiplicity of the (over 80) liberation 
movements in Angola as well as the nature and scope of foreign 
intervention in Angola. Above allq there must have been some 
discussion and debate on the implications of competing options 
for Nigeria in Angola. Unless it is argued that the decision 
to recognise the MPLA government was made without considering all 
these facts or that it was blindly madeq which I think was not the 
case,, it will be hardly convincing to say that Nigeria's decision 
to recognise the MPLA government was a one-man decision. 
The argument here is that the decision was jointly made by 
a number of governmental institutions, already discussed and for 
ease of referencev these include the Supreme Military Counci4 the 
Cabinet Officep the. Ministries of External Affairst Defence and 
ftnance and representatives of the armed forces. Alsog the decision 
involved the established process of initiating briefs (i. e. policy 
proposals in form of memoranda) from the ministries to the Cabinet 
Office for consideration and from there to the SMC for deliberation 
and adoption of the preferable policy option. These views are 
supported by events in the early months of the new regime and the 
process of the decision to be explained below. 
Due to the collapse of the transitional government provided 
by the Alvar Agreement 40 signed in the Portuguese town of Algarve 
an 15th January 19759 and the failure of the OAU's Nakuru Agreement 
41 
reached under the chairmanship of President Kenyetta on 15th June 
19759 there was an end to any hope of forming a government of 
national unity before the date for independence (November) that 
year* Even the DAU summit meeting in Kampala at the end of July 
40. For some details of "The Alvor Agreement" and "Nakuru Agreement" 
see Legum and Hodges, op, cit,, pp, 47-55, 
41, Ibid, q pp, 47-55. 
320, 
1975 (which Gowon was attending when he was overthrown) 
recognised that the hitherto local power struggle had turned 
into full-scale civil war. From that time, all the four 
major liberation movements in Angola were concerned with winning 
foreign military and political support. 
With the emergence of a new government in Nigariag the 
FNLA# MPLA and UNITA quickly sent their representatives to Lagos 
to explain their respective positions and to try to win the support 
of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The FNLA delegation 
arrived in Lagos during the third week of August followed the next 
week by an MPLA delegation. By the and of-September a UNITA 
delegation was in Lagos, All were received in the first instance 
by senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs. Later 
they met other top government functionaries. As a result of 
the unrelenting pressure from the three major liberation movementst 
there emerged among Nigerian officials, some informal lobby groups 
for each liberation movement, 
42 Meanwhile summary records of the 
discussions with representatives of the Angolan liberation movements 
had been passed to the Head of State's office. 
As the pressure continued to mount, the Head of State-in- 
Council asked the Minister of External Affairaq Ooe Garba, to 
submit to the Council a comprehensive brief an the situation in 
Angola, The Ministry's submission is still classified but it is 
said to have summarised the background of the Angolan crisisq and 
drew attention to the strengths and positions of the Liberation 
Movements, the efforts by OAU and Nigeria to bring the factions 
together to form a government of national unityt and the involve- 
ment of foreign powers like the USSR, USA9 the Peoples Republic of 
42o Interview. 
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China, South Africa# Zaire etc,, which it said helped to 
undermine OAU efforts to find a comppomise solution in Angola. 
The Ministry further drew the attention of the Council to the 
fact that the previous administration (headed by Gowon) gave 
its full support to GAU efforts to bring about a government 
of national unity, The Ministry's paper formed the basis 
of Council deliberation on the issue, This was so because 
(as already stated) most members of the Supreme Military Council 
were new and had limited knowledge and experience of international 
politics and foreign policy. Characteristicallyq the options 
were laid open for the government to choose, 
43 
These include 
the choice (1) to try to bring together the major movements to 
form a government of national unity# in accordance with the proposal 
of the CAU; (2) to support one of the movements to take effective 
control of the situation in Angola and then call for reconciliation 
later; (3) to withhold recognition in the meantime. The Ministry's 
paper also highlighted some possible implications-of each option and 
the likely remedies. 
The new government was determined to take a different posture from 
its predecessor* It therefore needed further elaboration on the 
implications of other available options. Every bit of information 
an the issue at the time was valuable to the Supreme Military Council, 
To be sure of choosing the right options, the military government 
co-opted some intellectuals (see footnote 27) to be informal 
advisers on foreign policy matters, The role of the Advisers in 
the decision to recognise MPLA cannot be easily estimated. it 
is understood that they advisadq among other thingsg against the 
43. Interview. 
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option of withholding recognition. The government was 
therefore left with the choice of supporting one of the movements. 
The difficult decision then was to determine which of the move. - 
ments to support, There was a conrensus (based on the various 
papers submitted) that support should be given not to a puppet 
or neo-colonialist agent but to the identified nationalist who 
would be supportive of the struggle to liberate the remaining 
dependent territories in Southern Africa. Given that there 
were already indicationsin the submissions of both the Ministry 
of External Affairs and the Cabinet Office, of ilignment of the 
movements in Angola with external forcest the decision could have 
been easy, 
Howeverg before it reached a final decision the Federal 
Military Government went further to send special fact-finding 
missions to Angalev one shortly before and the other immediately 
after the country's independence. 
44 The two delegations comprised 
of military officers* The reports of the two missions were in 
favour of the MPLA* Both confirmed among other things that the other 
liberation movements - FNLA and UNITA - had links with the apartheid 
government of South Africa which provided them with military 
assistance and had also invaded parts of Angola in a bid to oust 
the MPLA government, Finallyq based on these revelationsg the 
SMC disqualified FNLA and UNITA, and having taken into consideration 
other factors discussed abOV89 upheld MPLA as the only nationalist 
movement in Angola that could live up to the expectations of Africa 
in the ongoing struggle against colonialismg apartheid and racismo 
A4* Sotunmbit Abiodun Deg ape cite, pp. 2&-21o 
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Consequentlyq without regard to its ideological posture 
and without consideration of extracting any economic or 
strategic advantage, the Federal Military Government decided 
to recognise the MPLA Government of Angola on 25th November 
1975. Being its first major foreign policy action, the 
government was conscious of the implications of according- 
recognition to a government that could crumble soon after@ 
It was therefore considered that if recognition is to be 
accorded to MPLA, it must be followed by material support, 
necessary to assist in the survival of that government. Thus 
the Supreme Military Council (SMC) decided to give maximum 
support financiallyq diplomatically and militarily to the new 
government of independent Angola, To determine how much 
financial assistance could possibly be given$ the Ministry of 
Finance became directly involved in the process, Based 
essentially on the Ministryss briefaq the Council decided to 
give a sum of US $20 million as an outright grant to the Angolan 
government. 
45 In less than two weeks from the date of recognitiong 
the cheque for this amount was handed to the Angolan Prime Ministert 
Lopo do Nascimento who was then an an official visit to Lagos. 
On the nature of diplomatic support to be provided, the SMC 
decided to lobby other friendly countries and to use the next extra- 
ordinary summi-t conference of the OAU an liberation struggles in 
Africa to be hold in Addis Ababa an January 119 19769 as a forum 
to campaign for the recognition of the MPLA government by the OAU 
And all member countries. The possibility of giving military 
assistance to Angola was also considered by the Supreme Military 
Council. On this aspectq the Ministry of Defence and representatives 
45, Press Releaset Federal Ministry of Informationg Lagosp 
8 December 1975. 
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of the Armed Forces were directly involved in determining the 
possible scope of involvement, the logistics and cost-benefit 
effects etc, The SMC decided that Nigeria could provide some 
weapons and other military equipment. These were supplied to 
Angola! 6 From the analysis so farg it is clear that the process 
of the decision vas influenced by various domestic and external 
factors and involved initiation of proposalst consideration and 
decision, 
It is worthy of note that a month after Nigeriats recognition 
of MPLA governmentp certain events occurred that made the recognition 
appear unique and spectacular* As the African states were preparing 
for the DAU extra-ordinary summit, the United States and Soviet 
Union were also preparing along for the same summit, Before the 
opening of the summit both super powers had begun a flurry of 
diplomatic activities in Africaq aimed at sponsoring rival 
movements in Angola for recognition by African states. The 
Soviet government sent a note to the Chairman of the DAU, then 
President Idi Amin of Ugandat urging the Organisationts support 
for the MPLA in Angola. 47 The United States Presidentq Gerald 
rordt sent a similar note to the then Nigerian Head of State, 
the late General Murtala Muhammadq urging Nigeria to insist an 
with withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban advisers as a pre-condition 
for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. 
48 The 
United States supported rNLA - UNITA coalition at whose invitation 
46. The MPLA was reported to have renewed request for military 
aid but the Federal Military Government did not consider 
full military involvement to be necessary since the USSR 
was supplying the major weapons and the Cubans were already 
helping in the fighting. 
47* Sotunmbig Abiodung op. cit., p. 15. 
48* Muhammedq Murtalaq A Time for Action, op* cit*9 p, 54* 
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the South African forces came into Angola. 
49 Both Idi Amin 
and Murtala Muhammad denounced publicly the attempt by the 
super powers to influence unduly the CAU in the settlement of 
an African problem. The Nigerian Head of State unequivocally 
condemned "the unedifying role" of the United States in African 
liberation struggles, a cause which led to the American War of 
Independence. The Nigerian Head of State dismissed the US 
President's letter as "a most intolerable presumption and a 
flagrant insult on the intelligence of African rulers". 
50 Urging 
other African leaders at the DAU summit to ignore President Ford's 
lettert General Muhammad argued that the United States had been 
collaborating with Portugal and South Africa to undermine the 
Angolan People's struggle for independence and that the US renewed 
interest in Angola was to instal a puppet regime there through 
which to manipulate the affairs of Africa. On the other hand, 
Murtala Muhammad stressed that the Soviets and Cubans in Angola 
who had been helping all along in the liberation struggle were 
genuine friends invited by patriotic forces to assist in maintaining 
national sovereignty and defending territorial integrity, 
51 
It was Muhammad's undisguised expression of reaentmentfbr the 
US role in Africa which made that singular foreign policy action 
appear spectacular. In terms of substancet it is in line with 
Nigeria's African policy of opposition to colonialism and foreign 
intervention, Contraryt therefore, to the impression that 
Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government was a unique change 
49. Legumq Colin, and Hodgesp Tonyt op. cit., pp. 25-27. 
50, Muhammedg Murtala, A Time for Action,, op. cit. 9 pe 54* 
51. Ibid. 9 p. 55, 
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in foreign policyq it is upheld here that the decision was in 
conformity with already established African policy and followed 
almost the usual process of policy making in Nigeria as illustrated 
in the chart at the beginning of this chapter. Howeverg if 
compared with the preceding case study on the decision to sell oil 
at concessionary prices to African countries in which the Federal 
Executive Council played a central role. it is a glaring fact that 
the Supreme Military Council (not the Federal Executive Council) 
had a central role in this case. Also in the oil case, the 
bureaucracy (ioee the Ministries of Mines and Powerg External 
Affairs and Finance) had a greater role then in the Angolan case 
in which it (the bureaucracy) had a lesser role, Also, in the 
latter, the Military was conspicuously involved through the SMC 
and the two separate fact-finding delegations to Angola, Finallyp 
on the decision to recognise the MPLAq the process started from 
the top of the hierarchy (SMC) downwards to the Ministry and then 
upwards to SMC# which made the final decision, 
NIGERIAIS PEACE KEEPING OPERATION IN CHAD REPUBLIC 
The Federal Government of Nigeria has been-in the forefront 
of the effort to restore peace to its crisis-ridden neighbour - 
Chad* As part of this effort Nigerian soldiers were sent into 
Chad for peace-keeping operations 
52 between March 23 and June 4.1979, 
The cost of this operation was substantial, given the logisticg 
financial and administrative requirements of the force. The 
exact amount is not yet known but was borne by the Nigerian 
government. Thus Nigeria's ppace-keeping role in Chad made 
52. For explanation see Ogenet F, C. (Dr. )t "Peace-keeping as conflict 
resolution by pacific settlement": A paper presented at a national 
seminar on Nigeria's peace-keeping in Africae Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs# Lagos, 19819 p, 22* 
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enormous demands an the human and mdterial resources of the 
country (Nigeria)* 
Apart. from the"costst the decision was a swift change from 
diplomatic effort to peace-keeping activity, It signified greater 
involvement and responsibility of Nigeria in Chad. Moreover being 
a member of the CAU Standing Commitýee on Chad, when neither that 
Committee nor the CAU had resolved to send a peace-keeping force 
to Chad the decision of Nigeria to do so alone makes necessary 
a study of the decision process, What were the reasons for 
Nigeria to send a peace-keeping Mission to Chad? Who took the decision? 
These are the questions that we will try to answer belowv starting 
with an examination of the general background of the conflict and 
the quest for resolution* 
BACKGROUND EVENTS 
Right from independence on August 11,1960t the Republic of 
Chad has been going through a series of crippling political conflicts 
arising from internal ethnic and religious differences and aggravated 
by imperialist interventions. Many sister African countriesq moved 
by the sad state of affairsp had on a bilateral basis sought ways 
and means of restoring peace and normalcy to Chad. In additiont, 
the DAU Standing Committee consisting mainly of Chad1s immediate 
neighbours (including Nigeria) had for quite some time been 
preoccupied with the problems in Chad. After each attempt at 
mediationg the crisis became exacerbated to the concern of many 
of Chad's neighbours and other African countries. 
Chad is one of Nigeria's immediate neighbourst sharing a 
common border on the north-eastern part of Nigeria* Chad is a 
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land-locked countryq larger in area than Nigeriag but with a 
scanty population of about 4.5 milliong which is unevenly 
distributed and characterised by overlapping ethnic and 
religious cleavages. There are problems of unequal development 
between the Sudanic and Muslim peoples in the north and the more 
Negroid and Christian peoples in the southq giving rise to the 
animosity between them, The French colonial administration 
associated itself mainly with the Christian south at the expense 
of the Muslim north# with the result that the former became more 
developed than the latter* Chad's economic condition compounded 
its problems* Chad has a predominantly agricultural economy in 
which cattle and cotton are the major sources of foreign exchange, 
It is perhaps one of the poorest countries in Africa. 
At ihdopendence in 1960, the country was under President 
NIGarta Francois Tombalbaye# of the Sara tribe. of southern Chad and 
leader of the majority Chad Progressive Party (PPT), 
53 
allegedly 
helped to power by the former colonial mastarg Francev for some 
political and economic concessions in Chad. Accordinglyq President 
Tombalbaye granted France concessions to retain French military bases 
at Fort Lamy and Fort Foreau as well as for military operations in 
the north of Chad up to 19659 when as a result of differences between 
officials of France and Chadt French troops were withdrawn at the 
request of Chad. 
54 
53. In a bid to forge a cultural and political unification of 
the country by 19739 PPT was replaced by a new organisation - 
the National Movement for Cultural and Social Revolution 
(MNRCS). The attempt at cultural revolution accompaniedv 
as in the case of Zairet with the adoption of indigenous names 
for individuals and places. 
54* Banksq Arthur S, Politi . cal Handbook of the Worlds MacGraw-Hill 
Book Companyq New Yorkq 1976# p* 65, 
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In that year (1965) there grew strong northern opposition 
-to Tombelbays's government leading to the formation in 1966 of 
the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT)t led by Dr. Abbe 
Siddick. As a result of FROLINAT's relentless attempts to 
destool the Tombalbaye governmentg the President had to recall 
the French troops by 1968 to help suppress the rebellions 
Laterg Tombalbaye quarrelled with the French again. To 
compound the problems9 Chad was besieged by the disastrous 
Sahelian drought of 1972 which resulted in a colossal loss of 
livestock and almost economic disaster, Meanwhile a faction 
of FROLINAT 
55 led by Hissene Habre broke away in 1972 to launch 
its own campaign against the southern government, Tombalbaye's 
government found it difficult to withstand the mounting problems, 
By April 1975v the government was overthrown and an army general, 
Felix Malloumq took over the rains of power, 
As a Christian from the southq he more or less inherited from 
his predecessor the problems of ethnic and religious antagonisms, 
especially between the north and southo in Chad as well as its 
economic crisis. Essentiallyt northern leaders were opposed to 
southern domination of the political system and use of this 
domination to ensure the distribution of the political "spoils" 
to their own favour, 
56 
Muslim political leaders in the north 
of Chad generally perceive southern administrators as representing 
55, By 1979 there were over half a dozen factions of FROLINAT, 
including (i) FROLINAT ORIGINAL led by Dr, Abbe Siddick; 
(ii) FROLINAT REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL led by Mr* 
Acyl Ahmed; (iii) FROLINAT POPULAR FORCE OF LIBERATION led 
by Abba Seid; (iv) VOLCAN FIRST ARMY led by Abdoulaye Adoum Danes; 
(v) FROLINAT FONDAMENTAL led by Mr, Hajaro Adim Al Sanusi; (vi) 
POPULAR ARMED FORCES (FAP) led by Goukouni Weddeye; (vii) the 
ARMED FORCES OF THE NORTH (FAN) led by Hissen Habra* 
56, Vogtt M#A, q "Chad in Inter-State African Politics" in Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairsp vol, 79 nos. 1 and 29 19819 
pe 142. 
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an alien culture, In order to halt southern domination of the 
governmentq FROLINAT leaders started a campaign to win the 
support of various Arab governments especially in Tripolit 
Algiers and Khartoum. Such support was. readily available 
because of the perception of cultural and religious affinity 
between the peoples of northern Chad and the Arabised Berber 
countries of north Africa* An article in the Sunday Standard 
newspaper noted the assistance to FROLINAT by these Arab countries 
and highlighted that "In factq the year 1978 witnessed the untiring 
efforts of Libya to unite the warring factions in FROLINAT so that 
they can present a formidable front against the government of 
General Malloum in N'Djamana". 57 The paper further pointed oUt 
that "In the Chad Republic# it is clear that a faction of the FROLINAT 
wants to seek a compromise with the central government led by Malloum. 
However, the radical wing backed principally by Libya does not favour 
a compromise and will rather see greater autonomy being given to this 
Moslem north". 
58 
Thust the new military government of General Felix Malloum had 
the two principal problems of how to conciliate the ethnic and 
religious antagonisms in Chad and how to improve the economy of 
the country, In setting up the provisional governmentg General 
Malloum called on all factions to participate in the government, 
When the government was sat upt it comprised of equal numbers of 
the military and civilians and an equal number of Christians and 
Muslims. Yet some factions of FROLINAT rejected Mallaum's call 
for reconciliation on the ground that Malloum's government was "a 
conservative military dictatorship with no ideological direction. 1159 
57. Sunday Standard# 18 March 19799 p. 4. 
58. Ibid, 
59, V09tv M. A, v opo citt P* 144o 
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General Malloum's governmentg like its predecessorg remained 
weak and unable to establish effective control over a large part 
of the country* As a resultq the government became desperate 
to reconcile with FROLINATe Attempts at reconciliation were 
made under several auspices but failed owing to one reason or 
the other, By mid 1978 the then Chairman of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), who happened to be President El Numeiri 
of Sudang a party to the conflictq made an attempt at reconciliation* 
He invited to Khartoum the Chadian General Malloum and a faction of 
FROLINAT under Hissen Habra for talks. At. the end, it appeared 
each party took advantage of the other's peculiar circumstance 
(i*e. the central government's weakness and a rupture in relations 
between Habra and Goukhouni factions of FROLINAT) and an agreement 
was reached; Hissen Habra joined President Malloum's administration 
and was made the Prime Minister. 
60 Consequently Habra came to 
N'Djamena (the capital) with his army to be merged with the national 
army4I Soong President Malloum and Prime Minister Habra began to 
disagree over several policy matters. There were accusations and 
counter-accusations like Habra accusing Malloum of interfering with 
his administrative duties and Mallcum accusing Habre of dictatorship, 
The situation continued to deteriorate and the government became 
polarised between southerners loyal to Malloum and northerners 
loyal to Habra. At the same time, there was a disintegration of 
the Chadian army along tribal lines. By early February 1979, events 
came to a halt and there was renewed fighting between Malloum forces 
and Habra forces. Evidently the Khartoum Agreement had failed* 
Goukhouni forces fighting from the Tibesti mountains were at this 
60, Daily Times, Wednesday, 21 February, 19799 p. 3o 
332, 
time advancing southwards to N'Djamena, 
Two reasons for the failure of the attempt by President 
Malloum and Prime Minister Habreq to achieve unity and stability 
through sharing powers have been put forward thus: - "First with 
President Felix Mallaum and Prime Minister Hissen Habre being two 
strong-willed meng both with their own ideas of how Chad should 
be administered, a personality clash was bound to develop in what 
was really a government of compromise between two warring factions. 
The second factor is the presence of French troops on Chadian sail 
and Mro Hissen Habre's strong and consistent objection to this"* 
61 
In the fighting that ensuedv this time on the streets of the Chadian 
capital N'Djamenag there were many casualties including a Nigerian 
diplomat who sustained bullet woundse Several properties were 
62 damagedg including Nigerials Chancery in NIDjamena, Following 
the fightingg Nigerians in Chad Republic were evacuated, Many 
Chadians ran away from their country to become refugees in neigh- 
bouring countries* There were about eight thousand Chadian 
refugees in Nigeria. The implications of these an Nigeria are 
obvious. 
On 18th February 1979, the Federal Military Government of 
Nigeria embarked on diplomatic efforts to and the fighting in 
Chad., According to the New Nigerian newspaperg "Major-General 
Henry Adefopsq External Affairs Commissionerg flow out of Murtala 
Muhammad Airportq Ikejaq yesterday an the order of the Head of 
Statet Lt, -General Olusegun Obasanjop to assess the situation and 
hold talks with leaders of the warring factions. .,, Major-General 
General Adefope's conciliation mission is to persuade the leaders 
61, Ibid, 
62. Federal Ministry of Informationt Government Press Release 
No* 263, Lagosj 19 Februaryq 1979. 
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to attend a meeting with our Head of State in Lagos% The 
newspaper indicated that "Our Head of State feels disturbed 
and sad to learn about the turn of events in Chad and wants to 
use his influence to bring about peace in the true African 
tradition". 64 The two parties accepted the invitation of 
the Nigerian Head of State and so attended the peace conference 
in Kano (March 10-14,1979) usually referred to as "The First 
Kano Conference". the outcome of which was a peace treaty known 
as "The Kano Accord", Thus began a number of Nigerian effortst 
including two peace-keeping operations by Nigerian soldieraq to 
achieve reconciliation and a return to normalcy in Chad Republic* 
As will be noted below# the first of the peace-keeping 
operations in 1979 was exclusively under Nigerian auspicesq while 
the second of 1982 was under the auspices of the Organisation of 
African Unity (DAU). This study is an the 1979 peace-keeping 
operation solely undertaken by Nigeria* Who took the decision to 
send Nigerian peace-keeping force to the Republic of Chad? 
THE DECISION MAKERS 
In the foregoing accountq some Nigerian government officials 
were mentioned and these were the Head of Stateg Lto General Olusegun 
Obasanjoq the Commissioner for External Affairs Major General Adefope 
and the Nigerian Embassy in N'Djamena, whose reports generated 
much sympathy* By the early morning of 11 February 19799 a message 
from the Nigerian Embassy in Chad was received in Lagos telling of 
renewed fighting in N'Djamsnaq the previous dayq between forces loyal 
to President Malloum and those of Prime Minister Habre. The Embassy 
63, New Nigerianp Mondayt 19 February 19799 p. 1. 
64. Ibido 
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was convinced that the six months "honeymoon" between Malloum 
and Habre was over, It sent in regular reports on the Chadian 
situation. One of the reports was on the shooting and subsequent 
hospitalisation of an official of the Nigerian Embassy, Others 
included requests by the warring factions for Nigerials assistance. 
On this, it is learnt that the Embassy was quite persuasive in 
urging the Federal Government to mediate in the Chadian crisis. 
The others involved at various stages in the decision process 
include the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquartersq Major General 
Shehu Yar'Aduaq who was the Chairman of the Chadian reconciliation 
conferenceaq the Chief of Staff of the Army Lt. General T. Y* Danjumat 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commander of the Navyq the 
Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs and the Inspector General 
of Police. As indicated in the two preceding case studies, we are 
not going to discuss the individual personalitieaq their background 
and character formation as factors influencing their role* Ratherg 
their role in the decision will be viewed in the context of the 
institutions or organs of the government which they represented* 
Thesev thereforeq include the Cabinet Officaq the Supreme Military 
Council, the Federal Executive Council, the Military, the Ministries 
of Defenceq External Affairs including the Embassy in N'Djamena, 
Internal Affairs including the Police, and Financ8e 
The general features and functions of these government organs 
have been discussed earlier in chapter seven* Although the 
Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs were not specifically 
mentionedg they are parts of the bureaucracy. The MOD has the 
primary role of collating and co-ordinating information for the 
making of defence policies, It also provides military logistics and 




to send Nigerian peace-keeping troops to Chad was therefore important, 
The same can be said of the Ministry of Finance because of the huge 
costs involved in maintaining the troopaq the support staff9 
procurement of equipments transport vehicles# and general 
administrations which costs were underwritten by Nigeria* 
All these organs participated in one form or the other in 
the decision-process but the primary responsibility for the 
final decision rested with the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
which statutorily had powers to control the armed forces of Nigeria 
including their deployment in and outside Nigeria for combat 
operations. 
65 
It also had powers over all the other decision- 
making bodies. Therefore, it was the SMC that could have made the 
final decision to send a Nigerian peace-keeping force to the Chad 
Republic, 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE DECISION 
There are many internal and external factors that influenced 
Nigeria's involvement in the search for peace in Chad Republic. 
The internal factors include (a) Nigerian national security 
considerationsg (b) the economic implications of the influx of 
Chadian refugeeat (c) altruismt and (d) public opinion* The 
external pressures were from Libyaq Sudang Algeria; France, the 
OAU and Chadian leadersp especially the then Presidentq General 
Malloum. 
Internal Factors* 
The need to prevent the Chadian crisis from constituting a 
threat to the national security of Nigeria was perhaps a crucial 
65. (Basic Provisions) Decree establishing the Council in Official 
Gazette, No. 52, vol. 62; October 239 1975, Part At pe A9149, 
336. 
factor. The rederal Government of Nigeria has been quite 
apprehensive of the spill-over effect if the crisis in 
Chad continues unabated. Such apprehension is becauseq as 
mentioned earlier, Nigeria has a common border on its north-eastern 
sector with Chadq through which effects of the conflict# if not 
the conflict itselfq can be carried across to Nigeria. ror 
instancog any of the warring factions can discreetly set up its 
bass inside Nigerian territory at the border and if this is 
discovered the opponent may assume the connivance of the Nigerian 
government and therefore has the option to attack that part of 
Nigerian territory* Moreover# arms can-also be smuggled through 
the common border# giving the impression, albeit arronsouslyg of 
Nigeria's aid to one of the factions. There is also the more 
serious danger if extra-African powers were to be directly involved 
militarily in the Chadian conflict. This will expose Nigeria to 
very close military surveillanceg regular espionage activities and 
possible threat of attack by external forces. 
Generally it is not in Nigeriats security interest to live 
with neighbours involved in long and protracted conflict or who 
are only puppets of other states and who'se decisions may have a 
negative affect an Nigeria. Hence the rederal Government undertook 
to mediate and preserve peace in Chad. 
The influx of Chadian refugees into Nigeria was another factor 
that influenced the more direct involvement of the Federal Government 
in the search for peace in Chade The escalation of the conflict 
led many Chadians to seek refuge in neighbouring countries and 
continued escalation was to increase the number of such refugeesq 
with obvious economic implications. Nigeria therefore wanted to halt 
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the escalation and to restore peace in that country. Moreoverg 
there was a similar experience in 1974/75 when drought forced 
thousands of Chadians to flee to Nigeria, the social consequences 
of which were left for Nigeria. 
66 During the Chadian civil war in 
early 1979 there were about eight thousand Chadian refugees in 
Nigeria, Most of them were employed by construction companies 
while the BornugGongola and Kano state governments employed some 
of them as agricultural workersv teachersq doctorst technicians 
and engineers, An investigation carried out by the Now Nigerian 
some months afterwards showed that about 60 per cent of the total 
labourers engaged by construction companies in Maiduguri were 
Chadians, 67 many of whom even today are not prepared to go back 
home because of the gloomy economic situation in that country. 
This is the situation the Federal Government was trying to prevente 
Altruistic considerations influenced to a significant extent 
Nigeria's decision to preserve peace in Chad Republic. The decision 
to mediate in the crisisq to invite the warring factions to Nigeria 
and keep them in hotels at Nigarials expense, to provide conference 
facilities for the four conferences (two in Kano and two in Lagos)q 
to send a Nigerian peace-keeping force into Chadq with all the 
costs borne by Nigeria can be beat explained by no other factor 
than altruism, This is more so as Nigeria did notq like Libya, 
France and USA (to be explained below under 'external factors')q try 
to extract any economic, military or political concession from Chad 
as a pre-condition, Such enormous fraternal assistance spitamises 
a cardinal feature of altruism which is "being one's brotherts 
keeper". Hence the Nigerian leader felt "disturbed and sad to 
66. See Sunday Observer# February 25,19759 p. 5. 
67s New Nigerian, 12 June 1981, p, 16, 
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learn about ... our African brothers killing themselves". 
68 
(See chapter 5(1) for more discussion of altruism)* General 
Obasanjols expression of the desire "to bring about peace in the 
true African tradition" underlines the influence of altruism on 
this decision* The same factor perhaps influenced some 
traditibnal rulers who urged the Federal Government to mediate 
in the crisis. For instance in 1979t as already citedq the 
Shehu of Bornu called an the Federal Government to intensify 
efforts to bring about peace in Chad. 
Public opinion in Nigeriat is another important factor of 
influence on decision-making. Given that public opinion is 
active in Nigeria, as argued in chapter 5. the government's 
peace-keeping function which is a form of military operation 
outside Nigeriag cannot escape the praise/condemnation of 
public opinion. Reviewing the input of public opinion in 
Nigeria's peace-keeping involvement in Chad# Cyovbaire observed 
that "there was little or no public awareness generated or made 
to genera te"r39 because the military government "did not provide 
the necessary institutional context for articulation of public 
support as compared to the handsome context which the presidential 
70 party politics and government provides" , Howeverg he noted that 
that the nature of peace-keeping is that "it is usually conceived# 
organised and executed in a cloud of secrecy by an elitist, 
bureaucratic caucus in the highest echelons of government, Hencev 
68, New Niqeriat February 19,19799 p, 1, 
69s Oyovbaire (Dr, ) S, E, 9 "Public Support for Nigeria's Peace-Keeping 
Role" in Peacekeeping A summary of papers presented at a National 
Seminar on Nigeria's Peacekeeping in Africaq by the Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs# Lagosq 1981t pp, 65-66, 
70, Ibid. 9 p. 66. 
339. 
fundamentally peace-keeping defies the structures of public 
opinion It . 
71 
On the contraryq public opinion especially the pressy made 
considerable effort to enlighten the people about the events in 
Chad Republic. The New Ninerian, carried a number of articles and 
editorials ong for examplaq "THE ROOTS OF THE CHADIAN CRISIS". 
The Daily Times, of February 289 19799 wrote an "THE FEUD IN CHAD% 
The Daily Sketch of March 12,1979, on its front page highlighted 
"CHADIAN CRISIS NEEDS AFRICAN SOLUTION% The Sunday Standard 
of March 189 1979 drew attention to "THE CHADIAN IMBROGLIO", All 
these tried to bring to focus the history and general trend of the 
crisis in Chad* A number of other Nigerian newspapers were 
forthright in urging the Federal Government to play a more 
effective role in the search for peace in Chad. For examplet 
The Daily Times1wrotex 
"From the point of view of our own security, 
Nigeria must continue to maintain an interest 
in Chad, Disturbances in Chad couldq after 
all, easily overflow into our borders, ,, 
We ought also to stress our disapproval of the 
presence of French soldiers on African soil# 
a presence repugnant to the overei2nty and 
independshce of African nati: ns", 7 
The Sunday Observer on "CHAD: A SERIOUS AFFAIR FOR NIGERIA" pointed 
out thats 
"Nigeria's action so far on the Chadian issue 
has not gone far enough. The point is that the 
Republic of Chad is not just another country. 
It is a country in Nigeria's immediate north 
eastern sector. Thereforeq our attitude to that 
country has to be more positiveg more direct, 
more involving and more vocal". 73 
71. lbid, 
72. Daily Times, t Wednesday 21 February, 1979, po 3, 
73o Sunday Observer. 25th February 1979, p. 5. 
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71, Ibid, 
72. Daily Timast Wednesday 21 February, 1979, p. 3, 
73* Sunday Dbeervert 25th February 1979, p. 5. 
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An article an the Chadian crisis by Aneno in the same newspaper 
highlighted several courses of action feasible for Nigeria and 
said inter alia, 
"In the sale and auctioning of Chad, Nigeria 
has a strong national interest to protect* 
eee A much more positive intervention in Chad 
is what Nigeria needs now* Or elsep the fire 
over our north-eastern border will engulf us 
all - all too soon", 
74 
There were also some individuals especially from the Universities 
who wrote letters direct to the Federal Government urging that one 
form of action or the other be taken to de-escalate the crisis 
in Chad* Such letters are usually confidential and therefore not 
easily accessible. It is however understood that in one of such 
letters the attention of the Federal Government was drawn to the 
large number of foreign troops in Chadq aiding one faction or the 
other* In additiong it indicated a plan by the USA and France 
to intervene militarily in Chad as wall as a similar Soviet and 
Libyan design* The writer cautioned that 
"This state of affairs, if left unchackedo 
could make a Middle East of this region of 
Africa", 75 
These represent the type of pressures generated within Nigeria 
as a result of the escalation of the Chadian crisis in February 
1979* 
External Factors, 
The Federal Military Government of Nigeria was also under some 
external pressures to mediate in the Chadian crisis. These wares- 
Invitation from Chadian Leaders: According to Colonel Magoros 




the Chadian authoritiesp and on the appeal of the French 
President". 77 As a result of the renewed violence in February 
I 
1979, the Chadian Presidentl General Malloum visited Nigeria 
essentially to solicit the assistance ofIthe Federal Military 
Government to bring down the rebellion against his government 
in Chad, There had been requests for Nigeria's assistance by 
some factions of rROLINAT9 notably the Popular Armed Forces (FAP) 
which later became the Army of National Liberation (ANL) led 
by Goukouni Weddeye, The Nigerian government's response is not 
known but it is likely to have consisted of the usual altruistic 
platitudes about peace through reconciliation. That is, it 
indicated a wish to mediate between the warring factions rather 
than support one faction against the other. As it became obvious 
then that no faction could win outright victoryg the government 
of Malloum agreed to mediation by Nigeria, 
French Intervention: As far as Nigeria is concernedg , France has 
always been part of the problem to be solved in Chad", 
78 France 
has had its military presence in Chad since the latter's independence 
in 1960* For most of the time# France supported the central 
government of Chad. For instancev but for the intervention of 
French troopsq Weddey's forces would have captured N'Djamena in 
1978. At other times, the French supported a faction of FROLINAT 
led by Habre against the central government. It was said that 
French arms were supplied through the Cameroun to Habre's forces. 
79 
77, Magaro, Mo (Col, )q "Nigeria's Peace-Keeping Role in Chad" in 
Peacakeepin. qv op. cit,, p, 61, Colonel M. Magora was the 
commander of the Nigerian peace-keeping force in Chad. 
78. Niqerian Forum, vol. lt No. 1. March 1981, p, 10, The Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairag Lagosq 1981. 
79. Ibide Due in part to anti-Libyan crusade (as Weddey is assisted 
by Libya)q France and USA have increased their support for Habra 
since 1980, Yet by 1984 Hissen Habra alleged that the French 
are also supporting some elements in the south against his 
government* 
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It was therefore felt that France's attempt was to keep the 
conflict going at a level which would not pose any problems 
for France but whichq at the same timev could be used as an 
excuse to permanently maintain French presence in Chad. The 
French game was understood in Nigeria and the government became 
interested in helping to find a solution to the crisis. 
The 1979 crisis had a wider dimension. France therefore 
appealed to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to try to 
mediate in the crisis in its neighbouring African country. 
Three reasons could account for the French appeal, Firstq the 
management of the crisis was becoming too expensive and France 
did not want to commit any more of its resources than hitherto. 
Secondq' with the involvement of Libyan forcesp France wanted to 
maintain good relations with Libya (especially for its oil, at 
a time when relations between France and Algeria were at a low 
ebb). Thirdq the French were determined to contain the growing 
American influence in Chad by nominating an African candidate to 
mediate* Howeverg the extent to which French appeal influenced 
Nigeria's decision cannot be estimated. 
Libyan Role:, Libya has maintained a significant interest in Chad. 
It had annexed a part of Chadian territory - the Aouzou strip - 
an area of 809000 square kilametres where iron and uranium have 
been discovered. It claims the area became part of Libya before 
the Second World Warg as a result of the Laval Treaty between Italy 
and France (former colonisers of Libya and Chad), Libya had for 
long assisted FROLINAT to fight against the central governments of 
both President Tombalbaye and General Felix Mallaum. About 
4tOOO Libyan soldiersq ostensibly assisting FROLINATO have been 
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occupying the northern Tibesti Region of Chad since 1976o There 
were also reports of Libyan attempts to induce FROLINAT leaders 
to accept a merger of Libya with Chad, 
80 These gave the 
impression of a determination either to expand the Libyan 
Republic at the expense of the weak sub-Saharan African states 
or to instal a pro-Libyan regime in N'Djamena. While dismissing the 
merger plan as unrealisticq the Federal Government felt concerned 
at the possibility of a minority government and puppet of Libya 
being imposed an Chad. 
The United Statesl influence: The United Statest perception of 
the conflict in Chad has been a reflection of its characteristic 
global economic and ideological posture* First the US was 
attracted by the economic prospects of the discovery of iron 
and uranium in the Aouzou strip and petroleum deposits in the 
Lake Chad region* - US companies have been prospecting for minerals 
in Chad since the mid-seventiesq and by 19799 the US-had spent 
about $25 million in exploration which has not been sntirely 
fruitless. 81 Another US company, Essoq has been given concessions 
to prospect for oil in the area around the Lake Chad, As a result 
the USA is interested in the type of government that emerges in 
Chad. Secondly, the ideological interpretation usually given to 
such conflicts was only being muted in intelligence circles by 
1979, There was therefore anxiety in Nigeria about the crisis 
being given ideological tune, Howeverg "with the advent of the 
Reagan Administrationt Libya is being projected as a Soviet 
surrogate with boundless expansionist ambition in Africa and 
the Arab world which has to be fought at all levels and everywhereq 
80e By 19819 it was announced in Tripoli that Goukouni Weddeyaq who 
was then an an official visit to Libyat had signed an agreement 
with the Libyan authorities aimed at merging Chad with Libya* 
81. Sunday Standard, 18 March 1979, pe 4* 
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including Chad". 82 Hissen Habre who hasq in recent yearst been 
vocal and militant in his opposition to Libya's occupation of 
the Aouzou strip, has therefore become an ally of the United 
States. The US has continued to supply Habre with arms and 
ammunition as well as the surveillance service of two AWACS 
aircraft stationed in the Sudan, In additiong Zaireq a US allyq 
stepped in to supply 2,000 troops to Habre to help him guard 
N'Djamena and Israel sends weapons to Habre through Zaire, Thus 
the hitherto civil strife has gradually assumed an international 
dimension which Nigeria did not want in the region and sought 
to prevent* 
Having now examined some of the internal and external 
influences an Nigeria's decision to mediate and preserve peace 
in Chadt there will follow below explanations of how the decision 
was made. 
THE DECISION PROCESS 
The decision to send Nigerian soldiers to Chad Republic for 
peace-keeping operations was a sequel to the agreement reached by 
the parties to the conflict in Chad during a reconciliation conference 
hold at Sagauda Lake Hotel in Kanog Nigeria. The agreement is 
referred to as THE KANO ACCORD. To appreciate the process of 
the decision requires an understanding of the Accord reached by 
Chadian leaders themselves, their unanimous request for a neutral 
force to help preserve peace in Chadq and the response to the 
request* 
As already notedg with the deepening of the Chadian crisiev there 
was an expressed belief by Nigerian leaders that the conflict is an 
82. Nigeria: bulletin an foreign affairs, vol. 11, no* 19 published 
by Nigerian Institute of International Affairsp Lagosp January 
19849 pp. 98-99. 
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"African problem which needs an African solution". 
83 Therefore 
the Head of State, Lt, General Obasanjo invited all the warring 
factions to Nigeria in order "to help them mould themselves 
back into a formidable whole". 
84 The Chadian President General 
Felix Malloum and leaders of the three major opposing factions 
accepted the invitation and came to Nigeria for mediation, The 
conference was held in Kano from l0th-14th March 1979 under the 
chairmanship of the Nigerian Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters# 
Major General Shehu Yer'Adua and was attended by representatives 
85 
from Cameroun, Niger, Libya and Sudan who witnessed the Agreement, 
The role of Nigeria at the conference was stated thus: "our neighbourly 
involvement and that of any other foreign or extraneous influences 
must be limited to bringing together the various pieces or factions 
and creating an atmosphere free from violenceq intrigues and threatsq 
so that they could frankly and sincerely talk over their problemst- 
hopes and aspirations* We must not lose sight of the fact that in 
the final anslysiag only the collective and brazen will of all the 
people of Chad can bring lasting peace to Chad". 
86 This perhaps 
reflects the political impartiality of Nigeria's Chadian policy 
which in both conception and application was equally fair ta'all 
the parties concerned end was not aimed at extracting any economic 
or political concession from Chad, The Kano Accord therefore was 
81, Daily Sketch, 12 May 19799 p. 1. 
84. Ibid. 
85. These were Mr. Sadou Doudoug Minister of State in charge of the 
Armed Forces, the Republic of Cameroun; Dr, Ali Abdelsalaam Treikit 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Libya; Mr. Moumouni Djermakoye Adamoug 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Niger; Mr, Izzeldin Hamidq Minister 
of State for Council of Ministersq Sudan; and Major-General Adefopeq 
Commissioner for External Affairsl Nigeria, 
86, Obasanjo, 0 (General); Opening address to the delegates for the 
conference on national reconciliation in Chad held in Keno--Nigeria, 
March 10,1979, This was read on his behalf by the Chief of Staffq 
Supreme Headquarters, Major General Shehu Yart Adua* 
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an agreement by the Chadian leaders themselves for the 
Chadians. 
According to the Accord the Chadian leaders agreed 
(article lta) "To hereby proclaim an immediate ceasafire and 
to pledge ourselves to maintain the ceasefire throughout Chad" 
and (article ltd) "To the establishment of an effective neutral 
force which shall be provided by one country, namely, Nigeriap 
the size of which force shall be determined by the Nigerian 
Government". The other highlights of the Accord includeq the 
demilitarisation of NýDjamena and the withdrawal of troops to 
at least 100 kilametres outside the capital; the granting of 
amnesty to all political detaine8s/hostages# the dissolution of 
all existing political organisations including the presidency, 
the defence and security councilst the integration of a truly 
national army made up of the forces of all the Chadian factions 
who participated in the conforence;. the formation by all Chadian 
parties signatories to the accord of a transitional union goveri-p- 
ment which will prepare a programme for the democratic election of a 
national government. 
87 Article 9 of the Accord provided that the 
agreement shall come into effect in Chad an March 23,19799 i. e. 
the following week, 
88 
From the provisions of the Accord, it is clear that Chadian 
leaders demanded Nigerian soldiers for peace-keeping operations 
in Chad, They also demanded the Federal Military Government's 
response and action in less than one week so that the peace-keeping 
force would have been in Chad by the date the agreement was to come 
into effect, It therefore seems that the decision of the Federal 
87, See text of THE KANO ACCORD published in Lagost March 1979; 
also Daily Times, 17th March 1979, p. 9. 
OB* Ibide 
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Military Government was a hasty one, 
As already notedg Nigeria's Commissioner for External 
Affairs Major-General Adefope was in attendance at the recon- 
ciliation conference and the Chief of Staffs Supreme Headquartersg 
Major General Yarl Adua was the Chairman. It is likely that 
before the Chadian proposal was adopted and incorporated in the 
Accordt the Nigerian representatives gave consent in principle 
pending the agreement of the Supreme Military Council and the 
Head of State, Lto General Olusegun Obasanjoe Both Yarl Adua and 
Adefope were members of the Supreme Military Council and the former 
had tremendous influence in government as the next in command to 
the Head of State* Moreover# the Head of State was kept informed 
daily of the proceedings at the conference. It is also likely that 
other members of the SMC were informed and there was extensive 
coverage of the conference by the media. 
At the end of the reconciliation conference in Kanot a full 
report and copy of the Accord were submitted to the Supreme Military 
Council in Lagos by the Commissioner for External Affairs, while the 
Chief of Staff was in the chair as Vice-President of the Council. 
This does not mean that the provision in the Accord for a Nigerian 
peace-keeping force in Chad was accepted as a fait accomoli,. After 
the report, the Commissioner for External Affairs presented to the 
Council a formal proposal for the deployment of some Nigerian 
soldiers for peace-keaping operations in Chad during the period 
of the transitional union government there. There was debate and 
discussion an the proposal. It is understood that some members of 
the Council objected to the proposal for only Nigerian troops to 
be sent to Chad, They argued that troops from other Chadian 
348, 
neighbours who participated in the conference should have been 
mentioned in that provision to work side by side with Nigerian 
89 
soldiers. 
The other issues raised in the Council include the size and 
component of the force to be deployedg cost of their maintenanceg 
the type of weapons to be provided for the force and other questions 
of military logistics. The SMC asked the Ministries of Defenceq 
External Affairs and Finance to submit their views an the issues 
without delay. The Service Chiefs were also asked to consult 
representatives of the major military divisions on the possibility 
of the operation being undertaken and the basic requirements of 
the force* When the Council re-convened two days latert all the 
reports had been submitted and after a lengthy deliberation it agreed 
that'Nigerian soldiers would be sent to Chad for peace-keeping. 
Having noted the concern about non-inclusion in the accord 
of the armed forces of other neighbouring countries that participated 
in the conferenceg for the peace-keeping operationg the SMC upheld 
that (1) it is in the interest of Nigeria's national security 
(particularly in terms of minimising the spill-over effect) to 
maintain peace in Chad; (2) the presence of Nigerian. peace-keeping 
force will reduce the chances of direct foreign military intervention 
in the region; (3) the preservation of peace an the continent (which 
Chad is a part) is an inextricable part of Nigeria's African policy; 
(4) the demand for peace-keeping operation is an outcome of the 
diplomatic effort already embarked upon by Nigeria and therefore 
should be seen as a challenge which the Federal Military Government 
has to face; (5) Nigeria's total armed forces of 1739000 is large 
89, Interview* 
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enough to perform the dual function of external peece-keeping 
and internal security, 
90 
The Head of State-in-Council therefore advised the service 
chiefs to co-operate with the Chief of Staffq Supreme Headquarterso 
Major General Yart Adua in setting up the peace-keeping force 
to be lifted to Chad by the Nigerian Air Force not later than 
March 229 1979, The Head of State also advised the Ministries 
of Defence and Finance to make available the logistic support 
and funds respectively for the operation. The decisions were 
implemented with appreciable precision and by 21st March 1979 
the Nigerian soldiers were in the Chadia6 capital N'Djamena to 
preserve peace, The peace-keeping force under the command of 
Colonel M. Magaro of the Nigeria Army remained in Chad until 
Oune 41 l979 when it was recalled by the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria* 
While in Chad the functions of the force which were spelt 
out in the First Kano Accordt were described by Colonel Magoro 
as being (a) demilitarisation of N'Djamena and the surrounding 
district up to 100 Km; (b) control of the Chadian Air Force; (c*) 
security of all important Chadian personalities; (d) enforcement 
of ceassfire; (a) ensuring free movement of civilian population 
throughout Chad; and (f) establishment of a buffer zone between 
the troops of the major adversaries. 
91 
The other peace-making 
functionst he saidt were providing a forum for the parties to 
90. The military force is made of army 160,000, air force 79000 
and navy 6,000 - altogether the third largest force in Africa. 
That ist after Egypt with a total military force of 395tOOO 
and Ethiopia with 221,600. Next to Nigeria are Morocco 9890009 
Algeria 88,000 and Sudan 62tOGO. South Africa has 63,250. See 
Adeksont Bayo 3,9 "Nigeria's Preparedness for Peacekeeping Role 
in Africa" in PeacekeepiMe The Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairsq Lagoýq 1981t p, 54, 
glo Magorop M. Colot "Nigeria's Peace-Keeping Role in Chad"t lecture 
in Peacekeepin(j, op, cito, p. 62, 
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negotiate and discuss through daily conferences under the 
Nigerian Force Commandere It is learnt that General Forestv 
the French Force Commanderg attended these conferences as an 
observer. 
92 In the performance of these functions, the 
peace-keeping force encountered a number of problems, For 
example in the attempt to demilitarise N'Djamena "some of the 
guerilla fighters instead of moving out to 100 kilnmetreag simply 
removed the military outfitt changed to mufti and remained among 
the civiliansv waiting for the least opportunity to spark% 
93 
Also while negotiations were still proceeding an the modality 
of a transitional governmentt three of the factions led by 
Goukouni Ueddays teamed up to form a "Mransitional Union Government 
of Chad" at the exclusion of the other factions and contrary to 
the Kano Accord. 
Consequently a second Kano Conference was convened almost two 
weeks afterwards, It hardly achieved anything because of the 
upwillingness of the Chadian leaders to come to a compromise. 
Meanwhile many other Chadian factions had come to accept the Kano 
Accord and to be signatories to it, In continuation of the search 
for a peaceful solution to the crisiso a third Chadian conference 
was held in Lagosq the Federal capital of Nigeriag from 25th-27th May, 
19799 also under the chairmanship of the Nigerian Chief of Staff, 
Supreme Headquartersq Major General Shehu Musa Yarl Adue. The 
participating countries were as in the first and second Kano 




for the first tiM8), Six of the twelve Chadian factions 
94 
attended the Lagos conference while the three factions that 
proclaimed the Transitional Union Government in N'Djamena 
did not attend an the excuse that they did not receive early 
notification about the conference* 
Nevertheless the conference discussed the reports of the 
Conference chairman and the Monitoring Commission on the general 
events which had arisen since the second Kano conference. it 
condemned the formation of the Transitional Union Government in 
NIDJamena as*a violation of the Kano Accord and appealed to the 
transitional government to dissolve itself forthwith and seek 
accommodation and co-operation with other signatories to the Kano 
Accord with a view to forming. a legitimate Transitional National 
Union Government in Chad, 
95 The conference also warned that ifq 
by the 25th June, 1979, the various factions in Chad failed to 
comply with the Kano Accordt "the participating countries will 
nd longer feel that they have any more moral obligation to continue 
their search for a just and lasting solution of the problem of 
Chad". 96 Howevers before that date the Nigerian peace-keeping 
94, These include (1) FROLINAT ORIGINAL led by Dro Abbe Sidick; 
(2) FROLINAT Revolutionary Democratic Council led by Acyl 
Ahmed; (3) FROLINAT Popular Force of Liberation led-by Abbe Seid; 
(4) VOLCAN First Army led by Abdoulaye Adoum Danaaq (5) FROLINAT 
Fondamental led by Mr. Hajaro Adim Al Sanusio The six 
mediator-countri8s at the third Chadian conference in Lagos 
were Cameroung Central African Empireq Libyaq Niger, Nigeria 
and Sudano 
95. Federal Ministry of Informationt Press Releaseq Noe 8239 
Lagosq 28 Mayq 1979. 
96, Ibid, 
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force had been withdrawn from Chad. The Conference also 
resolved to apprise member countries of the OAU through the 
Secretary General of the Organisation the main obstacles in 
the search for a solution to the Chadian crisis. 
On receipt of the report, the CAU urged the participating 
countries to intensify their efforts at finding a solution to 
the crisis. As a result a fourth conference an Chad was held 
in Lagos from 10th-18th August 1979* A total of eleven Chadian 
factions participated as wall as all the neighbouring countries 
involved in the previous conferences. At the and, another peace 
treaty was signed known as the "Lagos Accord", It provided among 
other things, for an interim government 
97 
and an DAU peace-keeping 
forceg made up of troops from Bening Congo Republic and Guinea. 
Nigeria was not included in the operation. 
98 It is important to 
note that all the four conferences on Chad held in Nigeria were 
organised and financed completely by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria# without trying to extract any concession from Chad. This 
again underlines the altruistic nature of Nigeria's foreign policy. 
In comparison with the two earlier case studiesq the process 
here began from the top of the hierarchyt i, e, the Supreme Military 
Council and almost remained at that level until a final decision was 
mades This process is almost 6imilar to the decision to recognise 
the MPLA Government of Angola but different from the decision to 
sell Nigeria's oil at concessionary prices for African countries. 
97. All factions elected Goukouni Weddeye as President of the 
interim government, Col. Kamougue was elected Vice. -President 
and Hissen Habre as Defence Minister. 
98. At the next DAU peace-keeping operation in Chad in 19829 Nigerian 
soldiers went there for the second time-* 
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CHAPTER 9 
FACTORS AFFECTING NIGERIAIS PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY 
In this chapterv we are going to examine a number of 
factors that affect Nigeria's practice of foreign policy. 
These can be classified into two groups* The first group 
consists of those factors that emanate from within Nigeria 
and the second are those that are outside Nigeriaq all having 
influence on the practice of foreign policy and its impact. 
Internal Factors 
1. Economic factors: a variety of economic factors affect 
Nigeria's practice of foreign policy. We shall hare discuss 
three of them. 
(i) Constraints of a developing sconomyl 
The foreign policy of Nigeria is influenced by its national 
economic circumstances. Nigeria is a developing country with 
a developing economyq characterised by a weak economic baseq 
poor infra-structure and low economic capacityq which often 
exercise a negative influence on its foreign policy. Since 
national economic capacity enhances a country's international 
stature and influence$ any state without a strong economic 
capacity is therefore unlikely to exert influence commensurate 
with its skill in state craft displayed on international issues* 
Thuaq Nigeria's external image is circumscribed by its economic 
capacity. Although it possesses a variety of humang agricultural 
and mineral resources and could under wise management become 
economically developedg Nigeria is not at the moment a wealthy 
country in comparison with America or European countries with 
354* 
which it interacts in the global system. Its rating by 
these countries will therefore be commensurate with its 
national economic capacity. 
As a developing countryq there are problems in transforming 
its rich potentials into a viable economy mods, As a result 
it suffers lose of substantial revenue annually and capital 
formation is difficult. For instancev Nigeria's total annual 
revenues of LN13790109000 (1961)9 LN14806389000 (1962)9 
LN1549418#000 (1963)s LN16899719000 (1964) and LN192,188*000 
(1965) 1 fell below the needs and requirements for effective 
sectoral development of the nation's economy. However# with 
the emergence of oil on a significant commercial quantityg 
there has been a substantial increase in the country's revenues 
since the seventiest e. g. -K. 578.2 million (1973)9 *3t340*3 million 
(1974)9 45,252,3 million (1975)9-N59756.2 million (1976)# 
*7,652,5 million (1977). N69815*2 million (1978)g *11.809.1 million 
(1979)9 *15,234*0 million (1980). *14,745,7 million ý1981). 
*11,748.8 million (1982)9 *109947,4 million (1983). 
2 The 
increases in revenue have been from one source - petroleum, 
With the oil glut in 1982 and 19839 there was a major decline 
in Nigeria's revenue. Nigeria's heavy dependence on oil revenue 
is not a good sign of a healthy growth of the economy. Despite 
the increases in revenue, Nigariats economy is still charecteriaed 
by the low level of infra-structurml devalopmentg poor communication 
networkq slow pace of industrialisetiong and inadequate social 
services. These show that the revenues are insufficient relative 
le Central Bank of Nigeriat Economic and Financial Reviswg 
various issuseq 19719 1974 and 1981, 
2. Ibid. 
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to the demands of the Nigerian economy. Thus the problem 
of low revenue has been a dilemma of every Nigerian government, 
It has militated against development plans and economic growth* 
The implication is that Nigeria does not produce a wide 
range air industrial and commerical products to enable it to 
participate effectively in the international competition for 
scarce materialaq markets and profitable trade. Such 
international economic competition helps to foster greater 
inter-relationships of states and form a vital part of a 
country's foreign policy. In fact economic contests and 
relationships generate motivation and incentive in the practice 
of foreign policy. Their absence makes the letter more routine 
particularly to countries not involved in military alliances and 
ideological rivalry. The constraints of Nigerials developing 
economy have also made external investment difficult. Nigeria 
does not sponsor its citizens to do business abroad. It does 
not even encourage them to engage in meaningful external tradeq 
except importation of finished consumer products like rice and 
canned foodstuffs* 
In the sixties at least there were exports of some comercial 
crops like palm oil and kernels of about 6009000 tons$ groundnuts 
507#000 tonst cocoa 1139000 tonsq cotton 719000 tonev rubber 
40#000 tons annually. 
3 These fine crops accounted for 95 percent 
of agricultural exports, There were in addition mineral export 
products like ting columbits and coal. The government might have 
been motivated by the search for marketaq profitable trade and 
3. G. K. Helleinerv Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic 
Growth In NiasrLa rH-omewoodg In. s R. D. Irwing 1966). Chap* 
-4 and Table IV-A-7 (pp. 502-3). 
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monitoring of market trenýs of these commodities. Such 
motivation and interest could account for the rapid growth 
of the foreign service and the expansion of Nigeria's external 
relations in the first Republic. But since the seventisev with 
petroleum as the major export productq Nigerian governments 
have been more concerned with the political aspect of external 
relations than the economic* Consequentlyq a vital and stimulating 
aspect of foreign policy practice involving international economic 
competition does not feature significantly in Nigeria's practice 
of foreign policy. 
(ii) Limited funding of foreign service: 
Closely related to low economic capacity is the problem of 
funding the conduct of foreign policy. The cost of maintaining 
foreign relations is exharbitant, Nigeria being a developing 
country has severely limited annual revenue (notwithstanding the 
oil boom since 1973) of which only a small fraction can be 
allocated for external affairs, The Federal Governmentle annual 
revenue in 1980 of N159234.0 million (L12,180 million) the highest 
in twenty yeareq is almost equal to the British defence expenditure 
of L11#182 million for the same period. The problem of funding 
the foreign service would have limited the scope of expansion but 
Nigerianeg with their gregarious natureq have persistently maintained 
their physical presence in 120 posts all over the world. The result 
in that most of the Posts are poorly funded. This in turn limits 
foreign service staff in their coverage of events. For instance, 
in most Nigerian missions very little is provided for local 
transport and travel, The small amount provided is often only 
utilized by the Head of Mission. Other staff may not have the 
opportunity to know any other city than that in which the chancery 
* The conversion is based on mid-1980 exchange rate of L. 80 to Nl. 
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is located. They will therefore depend on second-hand 
information about events in other parts of the host country. 
The point we are trying to make here is that financial 
constraints affect efficient conduct of foreign policy* 
(iii) Lack of incentivess 
Complaints of lack of incentives are common among staff 
of Nigerian foreign service who claim these have demoralising 
and frustrating affects on them. 
4 Apart from the comparatively 
poor conditions of service# there is the absence of job-securityg 
which they intimated was the major attraction in the first 
instance. The civil service (including the foreign service) 
was thought to be the most secure employment and this idea 
encouraged most Nigerians to join the service. In the procesag 
many of them became dedicated and devoted to the service of their 
country and made tremendous personal'aacrifices. The wave of 
changes in government brought about changes in the conditions of 
service and some public officers were rewarded for their service 
with dismissal or retirement without any previous notice or cause 
shown* 
In 1975 after a coup that changed the leadership of the 
military governmentg the Ministry of External Affairs was purged 
of some of its hard-headed and experienced officers. In 1980, as 
a result of disagreement between the Minister of External Affairs 
and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministryq the latter with his 
outstanding experience in statesmanship, dynamism and devotion 
was relieved of his post with humiliation, -Recentlyq in 1984# 
after another military coup, the Ministry of External Affairs had 
4. Interview with some foreign service officers of Nigeria. 
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another purge in. which about 113 staff were either dismissed 
outright or retiradq 
5 
again without any previous notification 
or cause shown. Some of those affected in the recent purge 
to whom I spoke lamented at their sudden dismissal and were 
conspicuously worried as they had no savings or investment at 
the time of dismi-esal.. - Their condition is aggravated by the 
absence in Nigeria of any unemployment benefit scheme or social 
security services. 
Two immediate and direct effects of these unstable conditions 
are obvious. First the service in deprived of its staff whose 
experience over the years would be useful in the conduct of 
foreign policyl and secondly it has a discouraging effect on 
employees of the Foreign Service. Nigerian foreign service 
officers are continually haunted by the fear of sudden 
dismissal. This discourages them and sometimes diverts their 
attention from the actual practice of foreign policy to other 
endeavours in preparation for the $rainy day'. 
2. Political Factors 
(i) The federal structure: 
In the first Republicq regionalism made a serious impact 
an Nigeria's foreign policy. At that timaq both the Federal 
and Regional governments were involvadq contrary to the provisions 
of the constitutiong in the conduct of external relations. We 
have noted the differing positions of regional governments 
vis-a-vis the federal government on issues like Middle East crisiss 
5. Sunday Now Nigerian, March 259 19849 p. 7: "Ministry of 
External Affairs - Retirement Balance. -Shest". 
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a West African Uniong military alignment etc. Regional 
governments' interference-in external affairs made Nigeria 
appear to have contradictory foreign policy. It also created 
problems for the federal government which had to work hard 
to persuade the Regional governments to take their hands off 
foreign policy and to rely on the central government for the 
protection of their interests abroad* Incidentallyq since the 
seventies regionalism has never existed as a rector of influence 
on Nigerian foreign policy. Rather the federal government has 
had the sole responsibility for the country's foreign policyq and 
Nigeria now speaks with Nona voice" on international affairs. 
Nevertheleseq some of the attributes of the federal structure 
of Nigeria still affect policy formulation and execution, As 
earlier indicatedg the federal arrangement itself is a recognition 
of the differences (socio-cultural and political) between the 
component states of Nigeria. And the differences have been 
institutionaliaed and perpetuated by the federal system of 
government and the constitution. Hence these differences 
constitute a constant feature of Nigerian government and politics 
as well as a source of distraction in policy formation. For 
example in deciding an a policyq public officials have of necessity 
to consider not only national needs and requirements but also 
the implications to certain regions or states in the federationg 
who may be disadvantaged because of their peculiar circumstances. 
The process of trying to harmonise or strike a balance between 
these differences are long and arduous, Thus Nigerials diversity 
is a source of frictional drag on policy-making and execution in 
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the country. Foreign policy being an aspect of the national 
policy is similarly affected by the frictional drag or delay 
arising from the process of harmonising outstanding differences 
(in this case) of the federation* 
The heterogeneity of the Nigerian federation gives rise 
to a series of other problems which affect foreign policy 
practice. There are instances of doubtful loyalty# unhealthy 
rivalry and sectionalism among government representatives. To 
illustrate the case of doubtful loyaltyq we could perhaps recall 
the activities of some practitioners of Nigerian foreign policy 
during the civil war. There was the case of the Nigerian 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union who organisad in his official 
residence a party to celebrate the birth of Biafra. 
6 There 
were many other Nigerian diplomats of Eastern Nigerian origin 
who absconded from their posts to serve the interests of the 
saccessionist Biafran government, 
The effects are noticeable of sectionalism and unhealthy 
rivalry among the component groups competing for position and 
influence in the foreign service. For example the appointment 
of the Minister or the Permanent Secretary generates intense 
lobbying an different sections would went to see their own man 
occupy the post. In the event of a person from a rival section 
7 being appointed# some would gang up against, the appointee 9 thereby 
making more difficult the tasks of the office. 
(ii) Influence of political parties: 
Rivalry among Nigerian leaders and political parties also 
affect the practice of foreign policy. In the early years of 
6. Stramlaug John J,, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil 
1967-19709 Princeton University Press, Now Jerseyq 19779 p, 80n, 
7, 'goo Sunday Tim November and December 19799 "Grapevine Column" lost 
an criticisms of the External Affairs Ministry. Sometimes official 
discussions and decisions an certain matters are leaked to the 
Press in order to embarrass the incumbent of the office* 
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indepandencep there were outstanding differences among leaders 
and parties as to what should be the substance and form of their 
country's foreign policy. Fortunately the major parties were 
able to come to agreement on a number of essential points. Their 
agreement was vital to the determination of the country's foreign 
policy, Althoughq thersaftert the politicians continued to 
criticise the foreign policy statements of their rivalaq one 
could assumeq according to Claude S. Philips, that there were 
no longer any basic differences among the major parties. 
a There 
were nevertheless differences in emphasis and style which perhaps 
were to produce different features of foreign policy practice. 
Based an the activities and statements of the parties and the 
official attitude of the leaderaq it could be said for instance 
that the NCNC was to adopt the Western capitalist national style of 
conducting relationsv which perhaps would have made Nigerian 
foreign policy substantially self-seekingg expodient and 
exploitative. On the other hand, the Action Group appeared 
to be in favour of a style more akin to that of the East European- 
Communist stateaq which would have made Nigerian foreign policy 
self-seekingg radical and aggressive. 
Then the NPC denounced the above two approaches in preference 
to the African nations' altruistic tradition and practice based 
on the philosophy of live-and-let-livaq goodwill and humanitarianism. 
This would make (as it perhaps did) Nigerian foreign policy idealiatieg 
pragmatic and egalitarian. The uniqueness of this practice is 
that unlike the othersq it is mars African and derives from the 
8. Claude S. Philipap Jr. 9 The development of Nigerian Foreign 
Policyt 
North Western University Preseq USAt 19649 p. 21* 
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traditional African social philosophy of altruism. These 
differences in style formed the basis of criticisms and opposition 
to the government on foreign policy. It was the ruling party's 
(NPC) preferred style and direction of foreign policy practice 
that prevailed and gave the country's foreign policy its 
peculiar characteristics, This is not to say that NPC formed 
Nigeria's foreign policy. At the risk of repatitiong we 
recall here that decisions on the substantive issues of Nigerian 
foreign policy were arrived at through debates in parliamentq 
meetings of political parties and the effort of NPC-NCNC 
coalition government* In effectq the theme and the standard 
structure and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy were decided 
at independence through all-party consultations* Thereafter 
the style of- practice of the country's foreign policy was to a 
great extent determined by the ruling party, 
It is argued here that whatever style or method adopted 
by the federal government was with good intentions. The motive 
then was to establish Nigeria's image and presence in world 
affairs generally and in particular to assort a role of 
influence and authority in those matters that are of special 
interest to the country. But whether the chosen style and 
method had more than a proportionate effectq positively or 
negatively# on foreign policy output and impact are yet to be 
determined. The obvious thing is that the ruling party defined 
the method and direction of the country's foreign policy. 
The influence of political parties did not exist during 
the thirteen years of military rule. In the second Republic 
of Nigaring 1979-1983, political parties did not exert much 
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influence on the practict of foreign policy. This was 
partly because of their pro-occupation with domestic politics 
and partly because Nigeria's foreign policy had before then 
assumed definable characteristics. 
(iii) Leadership roles 
Presidential or Executive leadership is a very important 
factor in the conduct of foreign policy. Leadership's role 
in foreign policy varies with the type and quality of a President 
(Head of State or Government)9 for a President who possesses 
the expertise for leadership is more likely than a mediocre one to 
give the country's foreign policy the degree and kind of content 
and direction necessary to achieve its external objectives. We 
are not going to discuss here the typologies of Presidencyg but 
to note that there are certain qualities necessary for the 
incumbent of the highest office of a state, be it Nigeria# United 
States or China. Such qualities make the President an asset 
to the countryo According to Richard E. Neustadt's view which 
I think applies as well to Nigeriag 
"The Presidency is not a place for amateurs*... 
The Presidency is a place for men of politics. 
But by no means is it a place for every politician, 
Besidesq past office-holding is no guarantee that 
any man brings with him to the Presidency the 
degree and kind of feeling for direction that can 
help him once he gets there. And more experience 
however relevant is no assurance that a President 
will find the confidence he needs just when he needs 
it most* Political experience must be combined 
with an insight into the sources (and essence) 
of Presidential power and authority.... The 
Presidency seems to be the province not of 
politicians as 9a class 
but of extra-ordinary 
politicians . 
9. Naustadtq Richard Eq Presidential Power - The Politics of 
Leadershin from FDR to Carter I John Wiley & Sons Inc*9 Now 
Yorkq 1980, pp, 133-4, Expertise knowledgeg foresightg 
experience and political will among other qualities combine 
to make up the personality of the extra-ordinary politician. 
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He insists that a President must possess the expertise for 
leadership to enable him to see beneath the surface if it is 
to help him weigh what is there. In Nigariag the selection of a 
national leader is not based on any objective criteria or 
identifiable qualities of leadership but an some sentimental 
considerations such as one's ethnic origin mid wealth or the 
ability to distribute money to the electorate, I think the views 
of Philip W. Quigg an the election of the Prime Minister in the 
first Republict aptly describes the selection process then as well 
as in the second Republic of Nigeria* He wrotes 
"In a land where political parties are 
divided along regional and tribal lines 
rather then upon iasueep Sir Abubakar became 
Prime Minister not because he was the leading 
political figure at the time of independence 
in 19609 but by virtue of being'the parlia- 
mentary leader of the largest party in the 
largest region with the largest tribes". 10 
Similarly, after President Shagari's visit to the United 
Kingdom in 19819 the magazine Root quoted The Times of London 
thuss 
"President Shagari of Nigeria has lived up 
to Britain's assessment of him as a patient 
and pragmatic man who can take no for an answer. 
This is a good thingg because an absolute or 
qualified 'no' is what he has received from 
British leaders an every main political request 
of his visit". 11 
These views may not be absoluteg but they most certainly represent 
impressions of some people about the quality of Nigerian leadership. 
Under military regimesq the process of selecting a national 
leader is more crude* This is obvious as such regimes come to 
10. Quiggs Philip W, 9 Africa -A Foreign Affairs Readerg Frederick 
A. Praeger, Now Yorkq for Council on Foreign Relationst Inc. 9 
19649 p, 302. 
11. Root Magazine, 1981 Special Issue "to commemorate the state visit 
of His Excellency Alhaji Shagari President of Nigeria" published 
by Root Publishing Company Limited# Londong 19819 p. 6. 
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power through violence. In the circumetanceaq it in difficult 
to estimate the degree of expertise which Nigeria's Heads of 
State and government bring with them to that office, hence 
"Presidential power* in policy making and implementation appear 
to be non-existent. In addition,, having come to power through 
unpopular meansq Nigeria's leaders devote much time to trying 
to secure their position and lass time for vital national 
objectives. Thereforeq leadership role and influence which 
ought to generate impetus and dynamism in the practice of 
foreign policy have almost always not been pronounced* 
3. Organisational FactIrs 
(i) Recruitment Procedures 
The method of recruitment into both the pol-itical administration 
and the foreign service are factors that affect the conduct of 
foreign policy. . It is the method that defines conditions for 
recruitment and also helps determine who is recruited. And the 
person recruited decides or influences the way policy is practised. 
In Nigeria recruitment into the foreign service has been 
characterised by the principle of federal character and federal 
balance, This simply means that all states in the federation 
must be equitably represented in the federal service. The 
objective is to ensure that no one state or language group in 
the Federation could dominate the service at the expense of the 
other states. 
In effect the original aim of the initiators of these ideas 
was to make it possible for people from the disadvantaged areas 
who most given criteria for employment to be given priority 
consideration in the event of competition from the more developed 
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areas which already had many people employed in the federal 
service. In the course of time, howevert the meaning changed 
to what ia'often referred to as "a quota system of representation" 
which makes it more or lose automatic for some Nigerians to be 
appointed or promoted to certain posts irrespective of their 
experience and relative qualifications for the job. Thuss 
the ideas of federal character and federal balancaq as applied 
to certain areasq have come to replace meritq with state 
representation as a yardstick for recruitment and placement 
in the national political process. This means that there is 
no standard criteria for every Nigerian to be recruited intof 
the political process and the foreign service; rather different 
conditions for recruitment are applied to people from the less 
developed areas. , 
Perhaps the uniqueness of the Nigerian federation makes 
the formula tolerable in so far as it helps to maintain stability, 
foster exchange of ideas and harmony in the servicat but not to 
the extent it affects efficiency and productivity* The application 
of this formula in some respects causes acrimony and low morals 
in the Nigerian foreign service. The implications are obvious. 
Staff of Nigeria's foreign ministry interviewadq cited cases of 
recruitment of persons relatively junior in rank and lose 
experienced who are placed over other staff with similar or 
better credentials and longer experience. 
12 There are also 
instanceaq they said, of persons converted from -brtmeh - 
OBi -(i. e. 
the clerical and executive cadres) to branch W (i. e. the 
diplomatic and policy cadre) who mainly perform routine 
12. Among the examples cited include the transfer and conversion of 
a stenographer to External Affairs officarg level 12, Reference 
was also made to recruitment into level 14 of a University 
lecturer with less than five years teaching experiencet in 
preference to others with similar qualifications and longer 
experience in the foreign service who were one or two grades below. 
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administrative duties both at posts abroad and at headquarters. 
The selection of persons to convert ieg understandablyt influenced 
more by sentimental considerations than by the objective factors 
of need and ability to perform in branch A, In some cases, 
this amounts to 'putting a square peg in a round halo' which 
results in some complications and diminishing output. 
(ii) Method of placement and posting of-staffs 
The posting and placement of staff to cuitposts for. the 
implementation of policy are important aspects of the practice. 
In deciding where to deploy members of staffq usually done by 
a Committeep the principle of federal character and federal 
balance also applies. In a discussion with an Ambassador who 
was at one time chairman of the posting committest I gathered 
that some members of the committee submitted lists of names of 
people to be posted to certain areas regarded as asaft_postsn. 
13 
Each list normally consists of names of the committee member's 
favourites 14 and when'their interests clash,, then some bargaining 
will take place* If any area of the country is not effectively 
represented in the committes, it is likely that more people from 
that area in the foreign service will be posted to "hard-posts" 
during that period. 
The absence of a systematic way of deployment creates other 
difficulties. As a result of the perennial criticisms of almost 
13. The terms "soft-post" and "hard-post" are commonly used by 
foreign service officers to describe the conditions of life 
in foreign countries as they perceive it. 
14. It is common in Nigeria to have someone -a godfather - who 
would intervene an one's behalf to secure certain privileges. 
The more highly placed and influencial a 'godfatherl isq the 
privileges the godson enjoys. Without a 'godfather$ one is 
bound to be an easy victim and may be unjustly dismissed or 
retired from a jobv redeployed at short noticog denied promotion/ 
incrementq and in the business sphere one is not likely to secure 
a contract without 'somebody on the spot'. 
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every posting exercisev too much attention is devoted to it 
at the expense of job classification and description as well as 
proper orientation of staff toward their assignments. The 
consequences are that too many people are sometimes sent to 
a particular Mission 
15 
at much cost to the government. Some 
of the staff never know the type of assignment they would be 
doing and others spend a full tour without justifying their 
deployment and earning, 
In some Missions the presence of many underemployed staff 
causes confusion as some of these dutifully engaged are 
discouraged by looking at their other colleagues. The Ministry 
of External Affairs makes it the responsibility of a Head of 
Mission to classify jobs at posts and to use his discretion to 
assign officers accordingly. While this appears good in 
principlaq some Heads of Mission are political or military 
appointees with severely limited experience of the foreign 
servicep and some others allow their emotions and sentiments 
to override their sense of dutyq resulting in very little 
attention being given to job classificationsv effective deploy- 
ment and performance, These affect the conduct-of foreign 
policy. In addition it is a problem for even a well-meaning 
Head of Mission to effect major changes in staff deployment 
at his mission. If a Head of Mission asks for a redeployment 
of under-employed staffq then he risks criticisms and condemnation 
from the apostles of federal character. 
15. Ref. U. K. diplomatic list. For exampleg in 1983 Nigeria had 
in the U*K, 107staff in comparison with U, S, A, (75 )q USSR (42 
China (46 )q Canada (54 )q Australia (39)9 India (60)9 NoZealand (25), 
All these other countries could be said to have more advantages 
than Nigeria in their relations with Britaing vizo strategic/ 
military interestag volume of investmentag trade valust technical 
collaboration, cultural and racial affinityq ideological pursuits 
and in terms of preferences given to "most favoured nations". 
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Ageing in some arsasq assignments are given without 
0 
regard to one's abilityq specialisation or training* For 
example in 19809 there was a case of a misunderstanding between 
a Head of Department and a member of the policy staff under him. 
As a result the head of department sought to frustrate his 
subordinate by ordering the latterts redeployment out of the 
policy line into the executive line in a passport office in one 
of the remote states of Nigeria. To make matters worse for the 
subordinate officarg he was given four days within which to vacate 
his official residence in Lagos and to resume duty at the now 
postq despite reports of acute problems of accommodation and 
transport which the Ministry could have solved for him, it 
became obvious that the redeployment of the officer was a deliberate 
attempt at victimisation. 
16 There are other similar cases. All 
these combine to affect output generally, 
(iii) Communication gaps 
Another factor that affects Nige: ials practice of f6reign 
policy is the inadequate communication system between the 
governments and organisations in Nigeria and between them and 
Nigerian missions abroad, There is a noticeable gap in communication 
due partly to dependence-on imported communication equipment/ 
mechanisms and partly to the red-tape of the bureaucracy in a 
developing country* Available means of communication like 
the telephone and telex hardly function effectively in Nigeria 
because of irregular network and frequent cuts in supply of 
electricity. In places where these functiong if any fault 
16. Interview. According to this source the affected officer 
protested, The sectional head (discipline) who examined 
the case told this researcher that his findings and recommendations 
were ignored$ apparently because the 'big boss' insisted on having 
his way against the subordinate officer. 
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develops, it takes a long time to repair or replacat as the 
spara-parts have to be imported. As a resultv there is no 
smooth communication channel between the Ministry of External 
Affairs and other agencies of governmentq whose input into 
policy making and execution are desirable. This is worsened 
by the 'snail-spo. od' at which Nigeria's Posts and Telecommunication 
deliver letters. Againg satellite communication is not yet 
established in Nigeria. 
The paucity of communication between the governments of the 
federation and Nigerian Missions abroad could be illustrated by 
the cases in which some states send out information two of three 
weeks in advance to alert a Nigerian Embassy about a visit to its 
host country by the atatels delegation but only to note that the message 
never reached the Embassy or High Commission by the time the delegation 
arrived there. Similarlyq when Nigerian missions or delegations 
abroad are confronted with matters requirLng information or 
clarification from any of the states in the federations they 
often do not attend to such matters because they cannot immediately 
communicate with the state by telephone or telex* The only 
alternative will be by letter through a chain of bureaucracy which 
will only produce a reply months after the question was first 
raised. Briefly puts the problem of communication in Nigeria 
militates against effective co-ordination and practice of foreign 
policy. 
(iY) Limited external information and propaganda programmes: 
Information and propaganda are notable psychological instruments 
of policy employed by governments for the furtherance of (their) 
national interests and objectives. Incidentallyq the Nigerian 
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government has no effective external information programme 
or organised foreign propaganda to boost its activities in 
international affairs, The effort to practise external 
publicity has been riddled with problems since the early 
sixties. The problems have arisen from the conflict between 
the Ministry of External Affairs and the rader6l Ministry of 
Information over which has the statutory responsibility for 
external information. Details of the conflict are contained 
elsewhere 
17 
and need not be repeated hares but the affect 
has continued to make difficult the development of a coherent 
programme of external publicity and propaganda to inform and 
influence public opinion abroad about Nigerials interests and 
objectives. 
The psychological instrument of statecraft is utilised most 
effectively by modern governments to highlight the attributes of 
their respective countries; to rationaliss or play down its 
shortcomings and failures; and to sell at premium values the 
national ideasq philosophiseq beliefs and aspirations. 
18 
Governments use propaganda to try to influence the public 
opinion in other states and to make others look at given world 
issues through their own eyes. Nigerian leaders reject 
propaganda in preference to "appeal to moral principles" as 
an instrument of statecraft. The implication is a lose of 
the impact which the former makes on behalf of the sponsoring 
state in international relations. Indeed# the major task 
17. Koroyaq P*B-# "The Role of the External Information and 
Cultural Departmentq being an address during an Induction 
Course for Now Entrants to the rareign Serviceg 1979, On the 
question of responsibility for external publicityg it can be 
observedv for examplaq that in a country like Britaing the external 
service of the BBC is controlled by the roreign and Commonwealth 
Office. Its annual financial allocation is included in the vote 
of r. c. o. 
18. Ibid. 
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of the psychological instrument is to inform and influence 
public opinion abroad so as to make the sponsoring country's 
policies acceptable to the statesmen of other nations. This 
is not to sayq howeverg that propaganda is now a substitute 
for an intelligent and purposeful foreign policy. Ratherg 
effective information and propaganda aids the conduct of 
foreign policy and can forestall the efforts of opposing 
forces to frustrate external policy objectives, The 
psychological instrument is more effectively employed when 
it is utilised in close conjunction with all the other 
instruments of foreign policy. 
19 
Perhaps the relevance of information-and propaganda in 
the practice of foreign policy could be illustrated by the 
information programmes of Britaing the United States and the 
Soviet Union. For instance the British Broadcasting Corporation 
External Service is essentially devoted to the propagation of 
faith in Britaing its aims and achievements. It endeavours 
to influence opinion by presentation of facts and views as 
seen by London. In addition to the routine programmaq the 
British are also known to have employed covert propaganda. 
Activities along this line have included such procedures as 
the use of special news serviceeg the operation of secret 
or clandestine radio stations, and the spreading of reports 
19. Padelfard# Norman 3. and Lincoln# Georgs. Aq International 
Politicas Foundations of International Relationeq The 
Macmillan Company, 19541, p, 451, These services have 
continued to the present. In 1980-81 the total allocation 
of Llt452986lt650 was made to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. Of thisq L549645tOOO went to BBC external service 
"for external broadcasting and monitoring services"o In the 
1981-82 fiscal yearg BBC external service got L6198989000- 
See FCO, Supply Estimates 1980-81 and 1981-829 House of 
Commons Papers 470-11 and 190-11. 
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and rumours", 
20 The United States has a com* prehensive 
information and cultural relations programme attuned to 
the nation's foreign policy. The programme of USIE referred 
to by President Truman as the "Campaign of Truth" was essentially 
"to promote mutual understanding between the people of the United 
States and other countrieng and to correct misunderstandings 
0 
about the United States abroad" . 
21 
Similarly the Soviet propaganda instruments are designed 
to present to persons in other countries the good features of the 
USSR9 its aims and objectiveaq and to enlist their support of 
Moscow's policies and interests in the world. Soviet instruments 
of propaganda include the radio Moscow that beams its programmes 
in many languages to every corner of the worldl the official 
news agency TASS9 Soviet newspapers PRAVDA and IZVESTIAI and 
Soviet films. The skilful use of these propaganda instruments 
has contributed to the growth of communist partisev governments, 
agencies and organisations throughout the world. 
The inference to be drawn from the above in that effective 
external information and propaganda enhance the practice of foreign 
policy. The absence or weakness of such psychological instruments 
has the opposite effect. Nigeria has neither an effective external 
information agency nor any organised propaganda programme. it 
20* Ibid, q p, 453* A Cabinet committee daterminea the general 
lines of British information policies. Operating under the 
directives of this committee the Foreign Office guides most 
of the overseas publicity, Aside from its own News Departmentg 
it also exercises considerable influence over the nominally 
independent British Council and the overseas broadcasts of 
the BBC. 
21. Ibid. 9 p. 454. The US has over 200 Information Service Contras 
in the world. It also employs high-powered radio transmitters 
(The Voice of America); films and publications; American 
international schools; librariseq with American bookag periodicalso 
government publicationeq and reference materials; the educational 
exchange of studentsq teachers, scientists; etc. 
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therefore relies9 albeit too heavilyq on its diplomatic 
channel of communication with foreign governmentag while 
negating desirable support that could be afforded by effective 
external publicity and organised propaganda. This makes Nigeria's 
role and influence appear to be subdued or seen by some as not 
commensurate with its size, and weight* 
External Factors 
There are also some external factors that affect Nigeria's 
practice of foreign policy, These will be examinadq like the 
internal factorag under the same headings - economicq political 
and organisational. 
International economic conditionst 
Recession and inflation that have characterised the world 
economy markedly since the Second World War have resulted in 
adjustment by states of their international economic policies 
to maximiss the benefits of both bilateral and multilateral 
economic cc-operations. The world economic condition appears 
to have been aggravated by the emergence of many now nations in 
the international systemg resulting in substantial increases in 
demand for the scarce resources of the world but without a 
corresponding increase in output or productivity* This means 
increase in competition for the limited resourceaq of which 
states with more developed and streamlined economic infra- 
structures would have enormous advantages over the less 
developed areas. 
The higher comparative economic advantage of the developed 
countries over the developing ones has risen to a level at which 
the letter countries appear to be dependent an the former ones* 
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Thi's phenomenon explains the apparent over-dependence of 
Nigeria; oh trade with the industrialised nations. It is in 
the light of such competition too that one sees (a) the 
reluctance by some friendly countries to co-operate with 
Nigeria in its effort to industrialies; (b) the proliferation 
of unfair treaties and trade agreements that open the way to 
sedulous and uninhibited exploitation of Nigeria; (c) the 
activities of some multi-national corporations as agents of neo- 
colonialism and imperialism, These three factors (to be 
discussed briefly below) among others combine to retard 
Nigeria's economic growth and to give the country a marginal 
economic propensity in international bargaining. For exampleg 
despite the revenues from oilq Nigeria still borrows from external 
sources to finance major domestic projects. - Such borrowing 
undermines the image of the country. In the recant (1982-85) 
attempt to borrow from the IRF9 in which Nigeria is a sharsholderg 
the conditions presented to Nigeria include what it must da with 
the loan if granted and how it has to govern/operate its economy 
in future. If Nigeria were to have a strong economic capacity 
for effective bargainingg like say the USA or UK9 perhaps it would 
have had lose stringent conditions imposed on a loan. On the 
other hand, if international economic insti-tutions were to uphold 
respect for the sovereign states to determine their economic 
Priorities,, then there would be no need for such conditions that 
undermine the economy and sovereignty of a state. 
M Reluctance of industrialised countries to co-operate 
with Nigeria in the effort to industrialises 
Nigeria has emerged in world affairs at a critical juncture 
when it seems necessary to rely on imported technology if it in to 
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most the demands of a contemporary world. Acquisition of the 
technology, it is believed, will boost its global image while 
failure to do so will have the opposite effect. Nigeria wants 
to industrialiss but Nigerians and their Governments have gone 
about it perhaps in the wrong way by falling to the temptation 
to rely an importation of the know-how and at the same time 
adhering religiously to foreign patent devices which (are supposed 
to) make the acquisition of technology difficult. The government 
hopseq perhaps erroneously, that eventually good will may prevail 
and so makes adjustments here and there in its policy in order to 
nurture the hope. Nigerials foreign policy therefore has almost 
always been tampered with moderation in the hope of continuing 
to elicit the good will and co-operation of its induatrialised friends9 
most of whom are conservative and do not favour radical changes. 
Nigeria's hope to secure the collaboration of the governments 
of some industrialised nations could be understood from the statement 
of Prime Minister Balews: 
"The reason why I personally went to see Nigeria 
taken into the Commonwealth is thiss I know very 
well the immense opportunities and the great need 
for development in our country,... At present 
we are an under-developed country. In order to 
expand our economy we must seek investments from 
the richer and more developed countries invest- 
ments both of money and technical ski119 22 
The extent to which these hopes have been realised is open 
to assessment. We do know that Nigeria today imports even the 
basic food requirements of its people and its exports are 90 percent 
oilq unlike the period before and after independence when Nigeria 
was essentially an agricultural country and self-reliant in food 
22. Mr. Prime Ministerl A selection of speeches made by Alhaji the 
Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewaq Federal Ministry 
of Informationg Lagosp 19649 p. 37* 
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production, It then produced 80 percent of local food needs 
and its exports consisted of various cash crops and minerals. 
It is apparent that Nigeria's effort-to industrialise 
has produced the opposite Offecto as it opened the gate for 
the flow into the country of finished industrial products from 
Europe and America. The effect being that instead of becoming 
industrialisadq Nigeria has become a dumping ground for excess 
foodstuffs and goods from the industrialised countries. The 
result is the constant drain an the countryls foreign reservesp 
despite the income from oil, 
The reluctance of the industrialised countries to cc-operate 
with Nigeria to industrialiss could be illustrated with the country's 
forty years of effort to establish a steel industry - *conceived 
in the 1950a but only*embarked upon at the end of the 197009 
23 
with completion to drag on up to 19959 Nigeria proposed to set 
up an iron and steal industry in the 1950a at Enugu near the coal 
fields. The first feasibility study was produced in 1957. It 
sought the co-operation of Western steel experts who cautioned 
that Nigeria could not achieve steel production "because of 
uncertainties about the quality of the are deposits and the 
sources of the coking coal". 
24 The experts enumerated the 
"horrific difficulties" to be encountered before such industry 
could begin production and estimated that Nigerian stool in 
likely for many years to be twice as expensive to produce as 
the international stool. The ideaq thereforeq was that "because... 
it is usually cheaper to import such goods than to produce them 
23. Financial Timesq Mondayq January 23,19849 p. 12. 
24. Financial Times,,, November 30,19829 p. 29. 
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locally"q the government should "put the entire programme 
in mothballs until Nigeria can really afford to embark upon 
it", 25 
However by 19679 Russian steel experts advised that steel 
production in Nigeria is possible and more economical, The 
Nigerian government thus awarded the contract to Soviet 
Technoexport to carry out the geological survey. Nigeria is 
today building an iron and steel industry at Ajaokuta with the 
collaboration of Soviet steel experts. 
Other areas of the industry sector reveal similar reluctance 
to co-operate in developing the sector, Nigeria's industrial 
partners registered and licanced in Nigeria as industrial 
manufacturers have for many years ; emained salso-representatives 
of the large industrial complexes of Europe. Having been under 
several pressures to commence manufacturing their products in 
Nigeria or close downs they started only recently to open plants 
for local assembling of imported goods and equipments rather 
than the actual designing and manufacturing of such industrial 
products and the processing of domestic raw materials. For 
examples in Nigeria there are several licensed commercial vehicle 
manufacturers like Ford Motorag Leyland at Ibadanq Steyr in Bauchi, 
Fiat in Kanog the Federated Motors Industries (Lagos)9 General 
Motors (Lagos)9 Anamco (Enugu)9 Nissan Patrol and Toyota Landcruiser 
(Lagos)9 etc. Some of these have been in Nigeria since independence 
25, Financial Times, q January 239 1984, See also survey articles 
captioned "Domestic steel industry faces'formidable task" and 
"Dream that could turn into a nightmare*v ibid. # November 309 
1982. In the later# the newspaper wondered "whether it is an 
act of faith or folly to be building steel works when the 
developed world is agonising over further cuts in capacity". 
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in 1960 and yet no motor vehicle is manufactured in Nigeria 
but hundreds are sold in the country by each company every year. 
Fundamentallyq the reluctance of foreign industrial partners 
to cco-operste meaningfully has retarded industrial development 
and what exists now are *basically series of assembly shops for 
imported goods". According to the Financial Times 
"Nigeria's manufacturing sector is cheracterised 
by high import dependence, low value-addadq poor 
linkages and high production Casten. 26 
The overall implications of all these include making Nigeria 
dependent on the industrialised nations, a drain an the country's 
foreign reservaq undermining of the country's international economic 
staturaq and a week bargaining position due in the main to the 
absence of tradso-offs in diplomatic negotiations. 
(ii) Activities of multinational corporationst 
The activities of multi-national corporations also affect 
the Practice of Nigerials foreign policy. Some multi-national 
corporations operate as agents of colonialism and imperialism 
by undermining the efforts of a sovereign state. Firstq they 
engage in economic exploitation of their host country without 
making any significant investment to help sustain the economy* 
To illustrate the deliberate policy of exploitation, a personal 
observation is relevant. In 1979 a friend and I wanted to buy 
a car each and we were confronted with the decision to buy the 
cars in our host country and send them to Nigeria or to buy 
them in Nigeria, on our returnt from the dealers there* This 
led us to a comparison of the prices-of three different cars. 
269 Financial Timpej November 30,, 1982. 
380, 
We obtained (through a rigorous process) 
27 
the comprehensive 
price list of these care and compared the prices. It was 
discovered that quoted factory prices of the cars in two 
countries were substantially different from the quotations 
an similar cars in Nigeria. At the moment (October 1984) 
the price in Nigeria of any a Peugeot 504 GR in the showroom 
is N109780 (L100000) as against L59000 in the UK and USA, and 
L59500 in Portugal. Also the showroom price of a Volvo 244 OL 
in Nigeria is N1890OD(LI79000) as against L89000 in UK9 $109000 
(L9,550) in USA and Escudos 1.4 million (Z79000) in Portugal* 
A number of commodities are sold to Nigerians at exhorbitant 
priceep often at twice the price in a naighbouring African 
country and three times the price in the country of origin. 
The implications of this phenomenon an the balance of payments 
position of Nigeria are obvious. 
Second, p multi-national corporations also try to undermine 
the Political activities and policies of their host countries 
with damaging implications an the global image, Two examples 
would make the point clearer. The Nigerian government's anti- 
apartheid policy is well known and it is involved in all United 
National resolutions on sanctions against South Africa, In 
furtherance of this policy, the government called on all business 
entities operating in Nigeria to choose between continuing to do 
27. At our first request for price lists, the salesman asked 
and was told that we are Nigerians. He retorted by saying "We are not allowed to give out the price list" but that if 
we tell him how much we could afford, he would suggest the 
models within that price range and thereafter show us some 
of the models in the company's showroom with their prices 
displayed. Despite cpjr insistence he refused to give out 
the price list. We had similar experiences in two other 
companies and in ones we were told frankly that it would be 
no use giving us the price list because the prices of the 
vehicles vary in some countriesq of which Nigeria is one* In 
actual facts there are artificially higher prices for some 
goods exported to Nigeria. 
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business in Nigeria and boycott apartheid South Africa or 
to boycott Nigeria and do business with South Africa. This 
was unequivocally stated by General Dbasanjo at the World 
Conference for Action Against Apartheid hold in Lagos in 
August 1977. He made it clear that Nigeria will not harbour 
multi-national companies that violate UN economic sanctions 
against South Africa. But some companies like Barclays 
Bank Limited and some oil companies continued to operate in 
both Nigeria and South Africa. By 1979 there was a publication 
in the Platte Oilqram News entitled 'South Africa reported in 
secret supply arrangement$ with Nigeria. As a follow-up an 
20 Marchq 19799 the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
informed representatives of mass media that the apparent act of 
piracy was a meticulously planned high-powered propaganda campaign 
against Nigeria. 
28 The news of Nigeria's crude oil to South Africa 
did not only alicit criticisms of the government at home and in 
some African countries, it also tended to make Nigeria's anti- 
apartheid policy a more hypocrisy. The Federal Government quickly 
denounced attempts by agents to South Africa to pirate Nigeria's 
crude oil from her portag while noting that "South Africa's oil 
game is aimed at falsifying Nigeria's international image". 
29 
(iii) Unfair bilateral economic agreem entst 
A number of bilateral economic agreements entered into by 
Nigeria place serious limitations an the conduct of foreign 
policy and affect its impact. Some agreements are bogus and 
allow exploitation of one party by the other. Usually such 
28, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporationg Press Release# 
March 209 1979. 
29. Federal Ministry of Information, News Focusq No. 629 
23 May 1979. Also in "Nigeria: bulletin an foreign affaira"g 
Vol. 99 no. S. May 1979, p, 3, 
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agreements lack adequate provision for remedying the excesses 
of a partner. Although we will not cite specific agreementag 
many Nigerians are worried that such agreements encourage 
the dumping of excess food and industrial goods into the country 
from abroad at very high prices. Along the streets of the major 
towns of Nigeria and in every shop where these goods are displayed 
for saleg one finds various commodities from many countries in 
which no Nigerian product is found in their markets. 
The table overleaf of Nigeria's trade relations with ton 
countries in ton years (1971-80) is illustrative of the imbalance 
in Nigeria's external trade relations. It can be*aeen for example 
that in the periodq Nigeria has imported several millions of Naire 
worth of goods from Japan every year over and above Japan's 
imports from Nigeria, With thpLexception of 1974, as the table 
showag when the value of Japan's imports from Nigeria of N238.0 
million was higher than the value of Nigeria's imports from Japan 
of N160.2 million, it is clear that Nigeria has sustained 
consecutively for the ton years huge deficits in its trade relations 
with Japan. Also in the trade relations between Nigeria and West 
Germanyt the latter has maintained favourabla trade relations 
consecutively for the ton years against Nigeria. Again the only 
exception was in 19749 when the value of West Germany's imports 
from Nigeria of N413.0 million was higher than Nigeria's imports 
from there of N264.7 million. Similarly China's trade relations 
with Nigeria has been in favour of China for the ton year period. 
The only reason for this state of relations is because Nigeria 
tries to implement its part of a trade agreement by importing 
from the other country in the agreement whils that other country 
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does not import from Nigeria, It is certainly not a 
question of the goods not being available but of the lack 
of demand for them. This means that existing trade 
agreements encourage a one-way traffic in which foreign 
goods are imported into Nigeria without the necessity of 
exporting Nigerian goods to foreign countries. 
As a result of continuous dumping of all sorts of 
commodities, there begins a-change in the taste and 
orientation of the consumersq i. e. Nigerianag who then tend 
to negate local products in preference to imported ones. 
This in turn discourages local production of both farm and 
industrial products* Dr. S. 0, Olofin discussed the 
implications of what he aptly described as "ultra-imparted- 
30 biased-taste in Nigeria's external trade relations" . He 
said that the country's trade arrangements have bean 
-characterised 
by "a pseudo-outward-looking policy in imports 
which is not matched by a corresponding outward-looking-policy 
with regard to exports". He argued that this has given rise 
to "an asymmetry in tastst in which efficiency and sophistication 
in consumption or demand for final product is emphasisadq without 
a matching taste for efficiency and sophistication in production. 
This unhealthy asymmetry in taste, almost bordering on seeking to 
live beyond one's meansq has led to a continuing and increasing 
dependence an the rest of the worldq which is assumed to be 
always there to satisfy the country's taste for goodies, ranging 
30. Olofing S, O, g "Ultra-imparted-biased-tasto in Nigeria's 
external trade relations" in Akinysmiq A, B, g Nigeria and the World - Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policyq University Press 
Limitedq Ibadan in association with Oxford University Prsssq 
19809 pp. 32-44. 
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from canned beer to pro-packaged technologioaq as long as 
there is the foreign exchange to import them. It has also 
led to an almost absurd equating of anything imported with 
'superiority' and of anything domestically produced with 
'inferiority$* Illustrations abounds in market women who 
prefer imported textiles to domestically produced textiles# 
in the government functionary led to believe not only that 
foreign1experts' possess all the answers but that they must 
be preferred to domestic 'experts'. The list can be multiplied* 
31 
The point being made here is that Nigeriate trade agreements 
have contributed to the gradual shifting of the country's economic 
bass from being agriculturally oriented to an import-dependent 
economy. This is because such agreements are ill-conceived 
and ill-drafted# to encourage unfair bilateral economic relations. 
Instead of the agreements to encourage increase in produc- 
tivity of certain products to most external demands for them* 
they discourage productivity by encouraging reliance on imported 
goods. In some of the agreements the basic articles of trade 
of each party are listed at the annexq but the actual trade is 
in one directiong because while Nigeria demands the goods of sayq 
country OXI and imports them,, country OXI does not demand goods 
from Nigeria. Instead it may import such goods even at higher 
prices from another country where it hopes perhaps to gain 
some political advantages. The obvious implication is the 
continuous unfavourable balance of trade and payments against 
Nigeria. Another flaw in Nigeria's bilateral trade agreement 
sustaining trade agreements is the absence of automatic 
31. Ibid. 9 pp. 37-38. 
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adjustment clause providing that in the event of a party 
to the agreement sustaining trade deficit consecutively for 
three or four yearaq the value of all trade activities 
between them for the following year will be applied to 
obviate a definite percentage of the deficit. An agreement 
should also provide for monitoring and exchange of information 
an its implementation. Even where such clause is providedq 
some country's prefer to keep secret some information about 
their trading activities with Nigeria. 
Howeverg part of the problem is attributable to Nigerians, 
In negotiating such agreements, no proper preparation is made 
in advance and delegates are selected on the basis of federal 
character rather then professionalism and expertise on the 
subject. They therefore arrive at the conference ill- 
equipped. The result is that agreements are reached based 
substantially on the partner's draft proposal prepared to 
satisfy the sponsor's objective and invariably place the other 
party in a disadvantageous position. The consequence is that 
much of Nigariq's revenue is siphoned out leaving the country 
with a weak economic bass. As we have argueds a sound 
economic bass provides much of the desirable nourishment 
for foreign policy and without itv foreign policy practice 
is like a tree in the desert. 
External Political Constraints 
(i) Influence of super-powerst 
The dominant role and influence of the super-powers in 
world politics seem to dwarf those of the lesser powers like 
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Nigeria. As a result of the overwhelming military and economic 
capacity of the super-powers# they have come to acquire the 
dominant position and influence in world affairs. Consequently 
both politicians and academics tend to see super-power behaviour 
as a model by which the policies and practices of other states 
could be measured. Even the pattern of international relations 
today is characterised by the degree of affinity of other states 
with either of the super-powereg hence nations align thapselves 
in subordinate positions to the auper-powere and world statesmen 
speak with pride of their close connection with Washington or 
Moscow. A diplomat in the Embassy of Czechoslovakia during a 
meeting spoke eloquently of the dignity of Soviet leadership of 
the Communist countries similar to a British (Conservative) 
Government's admiration of United States$ leadership of NATO. 
Using the super-powers as modeleg creates difficulty in assessing 
and equating the performance of a country like Nigeria. Given 
its youthful economy and several political and social constraintag 
Nigeria's activities and performance in world affairsq no matter 
the accuracy and effect9 are bound to be dwarfed by the over- 
whalming influence of the super-powers;. Having a vary effective 
instrument of propaganda, the super-power mobilizes it to her 
advantage while undermining the opposing views of a lesser power, 
A way by which the super-powers influence the practice of 
Nigariats foreign policy is through their unending search for 
allies, and the tendency to discriminate between allies and non- 
allies* They often land their weight and influence in support 
of the allies at the expense of other countries. The countries 
that do not have close alliance with the auper-powers are 
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generally not credited fully for their achievements in world 
affairs. 
32 
Non-aligned countries are usually in a more 
serious predicament for if the government shows greater 
inclination towards one super-power on any issueg that non- 
aligned government will be criticised and condemned by the 
other super-power and its allies. For exampleg at the 
beginning of 1976 when a Nigerian government policy came into 
conflict with that of the United States in Angola, the United 
States "tried its hand at destabilising propaganda by starting 
the rumour in intelligence circles that Nigerians had been 
paid off by Soviet gold* . 
33 And when the then Nigerian Head 
of State General Murtala Muhammad was assassinated the next 
month (February 1976)9 "rumours were rife in Nigeria that the 
United States might have been involved", 
34 This partly accounts 
for the cautious approach in foreign policy of the Obasanjo 
administration* 
Thirdlyq the conflicting interest of the super-powers in Africa 
undermines the effectiveness of Nigeria's African policy* Nigerian 
leaders have been concerned about the dangers of importing super- 
power ideological rivalry into the continent and therefore have 
tried to keep such rivalry out of Africa. From the crisis in the 
Congo to those in the Horn of Af ricaq Chadq Western Sahara (SADR) 
32, Virtually all countries outside the two goo-political axis are 
grouped and disposed as the "under-developed" or "developing" or 
"third world" countries while all eastern and western countries 
are generally classed as "developed". even weak states like Portugal 
and Greece in the west and Czechoslovakia and Rumania in the east. 
33. Akinysmi Bolajiq "Nigariari. -American Relations Re-axamined" in 
Oyediranq 0 (ed. )q op. cit., p. 105. He also noted that Jeremy 
Thorpaq then leader of the British Liberal Party, sponsored the 
rumour in British media circles about an African leader being paid 
off in Soviet gold for his recognition of the MPLA, Similarlyq in 
Uganda as in Libyaq former President Idi Amin and Colonel Gadaffi 
at one time enjoyed the support of the US and its allies but when 
their relationships with the USSR became more cordialq the two 
leaders became discredited as "dictators" by Western propaganda, 
34. Ibid. See also Daily Timesq February 18 and 20t 1976 and 
Daily-Sketchq February 179 1976. 
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and Southern Africaq the concern for likely misinterpretation 
of the issues by the super-powers as the guise for direct 
involvementt has always been a stumbling block to Nigeria's 
policy in these areas* Since in almost all these conflicts 
the super-powers have taken opposite sides, an indication of 
the likelihood of making Africa a theatre of warg Nigeria 
therefore becomes more conscious in its policy in order to 
prevent such from materialising. This consciousness makes 
Nigeria appear sometimes to be indecisive and non-specific in 
action. 
(ii) The influence of Britain: 
Nigeria's relations with the United Kingdom also affect 
its (the former's) conduct of foreign policy, Successive 
Nigerian governments repose much hope and confidence in the 
relations with Britaing leading to a somewhat excess reliance 
on the latter to provide a magic solution to all the former's 
problems. But in reality, Britain has no magic solution to 
Nigeria's problems -a factor that angers and frustrates many 
Nigerians. Howeverg such reliance has some influence on the 
practice of foreign policy. -To understand the basis of the 
reliance and the effect an the practice of foreign policy 
requires to examine Nigeria's colonial link and orientation 
as well as subsequent events in Nigerian-British relations. 
35 
According to Moses Ihonde: 
35. See Umunnaq Orjiakag "Anglo-Nigerian Relations: 1979-1981" 
in Nigerian FoLumt vol. 1. no. 2, April 1981t pp. 49-56. 
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Britain is a major factor in Nigeria's foreign 
policy. It was Britain that fashioned our 
tripartite systemg which in turn has determined 
the type of governmentt its composition and 
policy. In the first Republict British colonial 
influence dictated the employment of Peter 
Stallard (a Briton) as Secretary to the 
Federal Government of independent Nigeria* 
He was at the same time the closest foreign 
policy adviser to the Prime Minister. Our 
first batch of foreign service officeraq some of 
whom are still in the servicev were trained in 
Britain or British embassies elsewhere. Hance 
our foreign policy practice acquired a conaer- 
vative character and reflected a leaning towards 
old friends. 36 
Thus because most of Nigeria's policy makers were either 
trained in Britain or have had a long-standing relationship with 
that countryq there developed an acceptance of British valusel 
traditions,, tastes and fashions. The colonial connection and 
orientation also brought about a change in the attitude of 
Nigerians towards Britaing for 
". the attentions, loyalties and hopes of its 
(; igarials) citizens gravitated towards Londong 
and to visit the metropolis became a symbol of 
status and the ultimate aspiration of many of 
our countrymen. It is a very sad commentary 
on Nigeria's twenty years of independence that 
its citizeneq especially university studentaq 
top civil servants and businessmen* recall with 
so much nostalgia the last time 11 spent my 
summer in LondonIq or 'when I was in Londonts, 37 
The extent to which Nigeria relies on Britain and expects 
British co-operation has made the latter a factor in the former's 
external milieu. Some activities in Nigeria-British relations 
reinforce the preponderance of British influence on Nigeria's 
external policy. rirst is the ever-increasing number of 
Nigerians in the United Kingdomq from about 900 in 1960 to over 
36, Interview with Ihondeq Moses 09 Nigeriats former Consul 
General in Atlentaq Georgiaq U, S, A. 
37, Umunnaq Drjiako, op. cit., p. 49. 
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30,000 in 1979. Although by 1983 the number reduced-v with 
a substantial drop in the Nigerian students' population to 69000 
(as against 21#000 Nigerian students in the USA during the 
period)q in the first two decades of independence there were 
more Nigerians abroad in the United Kingdom than elsewhere. 
It is estimated that 2009000 Nigerians go in and out of 
0 
Britain every year. Secondq Nigeria's external reserves in 
convertible foreign currency were for many years the pound 
sterling. 
38 Thirdq Nigeria's leaderaq especially in the 
first Republic as during the Gowon administration and in the 
second Republicq have attached the greatest importance to 
relations with Britain as evidenced in their spescheaq 
acquiescence with reports of continuous deficit in Nigeria's 
trade with Britaing the number and value of contracts awarded 
to British nationals in comparison with other countrieng and 
above all# in the priority and unrivalled publicity given to 
their state visits to Britain, 
39 
Arguablyq as a result of 
38. Ieong, C (Dr. )q "Nigeria's External Finance" in Nigerian 
3ournal of International Affairs, Val. It no. 19 July 1975, 
p. 50. The foreign reserve was later broadened to include 
the US dollart and more recently small holdings of Deutsch 
market French francst Canadian dollar, Japanese Yang Dutch 
Guilder# Swiss francs and Belgian francs, 
39. A number of Nigeria's state-visits to Britain are on 
record but the British monarch was last in Nigeria in 
1966 and it is not known when a British Prime Minister 
visited Nigeria last, It is recalled that soon after 
Dimka's abortive coup in February 19769 his first place of 
call was to the British High Commission in Lagos to solicit 
co-operation and recognition from the UK government. 
* 
In 
less than six months of coming into officst in March 19819 
President Shagari went to Britain on a state visit. The 
Niqerian Tribune of March 17# 19819 commented on the visit 
thust "We readily recognise the temptation of Alhaji Shagari 
to want to winev dine and shake hands with the British 
monarch .., in his unhidden desperation for international 
recognition for his regime". 
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Nigeria*s close relations with Britaing the British influence 
inevitably directed Nigeria's foreign policy orientation 
towards a pro-British flavour. 
On the other handq Nigeria's ruling aliteg in the 
process,, leaned too heavily and placed high hopes an 
relations with Britain. There was hope in 1960 that 
Britain would dissuade France from testing its atomic bomb 
in the Sahara Desert; there was hope that Britain would supply 
the arms needed to prosecute the Nigerian civil war; there has 
been hope that Britain would transfer a large part of the 
technology that Nigeria needs; there has been hope that'Britain 
would support Nigeria to bring pressure on other imperialist 
countries to grant independence to all colonial peoples; it 
has been hoped that Britain would support Nigeria's anti-apartheid 
policy and therefore join hands in the fight against the apartheid 
regime in Namibia and South A? rica, In other wordev Nigeria 
has hoped that in the pursuit of its external objectivesq it would 
secure the patronage and support of the old friend but British 
policy an most of the issues has been at the opposite and to that 
of Nigeria. Thus a Nigerian scholar observed thati , 
Nigeria's childlike trust and confidence 
in the United Kingdom has hardly ever been 
reciprocated by a parent-like awareness of 40 concern for Nigeria's needs and interests". 
All these illustrate the point here that the United Kingdom is 
a major external factor which affects both the internal and 
external objectives of Nigeria. 
In an article published in the Now Nigerian an 6th Augustq 
1970t the author lamented that the British government and the 
40, Umunnat, Grjiakov "Anglo. -Nigerian Relations"q op. cit-9 p. 49. 
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other western leaders who have been massively arming South 
Africa know perfectly well that South Africa's military 
weapons are solely used against Africans inside and outside 
the republic. Also another writerg 
41 
pointing at "the 
fantastic arms build-up in South Africa actively aided by 
all the major western nations"q draw attention to the British 
government's sale of L4009000 worth of Vauxhall military 
vehicles to South Africa in June 1965; the sale of eight 
Buccaneer bombers in October 1965 and the aborted sale of 
eighteen Beagle 206 aircraft to the South African air force 
in December 1967* 42 Early in 19709 there was the dealq 
between the British Atomic Energy Commission and the South 
African Atomic Energy Board# for the mining and processing of 
uraniumq which will speed up South Africa's nuclear programme, 
43 
As a resultt the Nigerian government is confronted with a real 
threat from the apartheid regime armed with effective weapona 
to strike at any part of Africas At the Commonwealth conference 
in October 1985 in Bahamasq when Nigeria hoped that all member 
states would agree to economic sanctions against South Africav 
Britain was the only country that opposed the resolution. In 
affect, British collaboration with South Africa undermines 
41. Yusufu Sala Usman# For the Liberation of Niqerie, t New Beacon 
Books Ltd, q Londong 1979, p, 138. 
42. The sale of the Beagle 206 aircraft was only stopped because 
of American pressure against the deal as the Beagle would 
compete with their own Cessna aircraft which they had been 




Nigeria's African policyq especially the effort to liberate 
Africa from colonial and apartheid regimes. 
(iii) The French influence in Africat 
The influence of France in Africa is another factor 
that affects Nigeria's foreign policy practice. Such French 
influence in recent years came through the Francophone countriaeg 
whose responses to events in Africa are sometimes at variance 
with Nigeria's African policy. We would also recall here 
the French governmentts decision to test its atomic bomb in 
the Sahara Desert in spite of protests from the government 
and people of Nigeria who were really very concerned that the 
test would cause a lot of harm to the people of Nigeria and 
Africa at large. When the test was conductadq in disregard 
of African protestaq Nigeria was the only country (in Africa) 
that severed diplomatic relations with France in 1961 and 
banned French vessels from using Nigerian ports and airfields. 
44 
Contrary to expectations, all the other African countries 
succumbed to French influence, 
There is the feeling that France has maintained its 
economic and political control of the independent French speaking 
African countriesq through a co-ordinated imperialist strategy 
like the creation of the French Communityt sponsorship of regional 
and sub-regional blocs of countries, e. g. 'Communautg Economique 
do I'Afrique do lIOuastIq 'Conseil do VEntentelp and 'Union 
Monetaris Ouset Africains'. 45 To the extent French involvement 
44. Mr, 
--Prime 
Minister, q op. cit. t pp. 82-83. 
45. Ashokt Kumar and Eghosaq Osagiev "Problems of the 
tconomic 
Community of West African States" in Akinyemiq A. S. (ed. )v 
Nioaria and the Worldt op. cit. 9 p. 46. 
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in these groupings reflect continued colonial control of those 
African countriesto that extent they are incompatible with 
the objectivps of Nigeriats policy an decolonisation. Ageing 
the extent to which the groups pass problems for political 
cco-operation and economic integration of African statseq like 
the initial opposition to the formation of ECOWASt to that 
extent they undermine Nigeria's African policy. Since the 
presence of France in Africa is understandably to preserve 
its imperialist interests# therefore any African decision 
that detractsq as it ought to, from such imperialist objectivaq 
would likely elicit France's opposition and counter-pressure 
through its allies in Africa. In such a situation the conduct 
of a given policy an an African issue will proceed with cautiont 
and sometimes delay to ward-otf the undesirable implication of 
the opposition. The most outstanding of French influences in 
Africa is its increasing military presence. France has 
extensive military links with the independent French-speaking 
countries in Africa. It has defence agreements with 18 African 
46 47 
countries and a large number of French troops in the continent, 
These are in contradiction of the principles of non-alignmentq 
independence and security of Africat to which Nigeria is 
committed. The presence of French troops undermine the role 
of African states in strengthening international peace and 
security and likely toog to negate the demand to keep Africa 
a nuclear-free zone. 
48 
46. Imobighe, T. A. 9 "African States and Defence Agreement with Foreign Powerst The Negation of Non-Alignment" in Ninerian 
Journal of International Affairaq vol. 7j nose 1 and 29 19819 
P. 81. 
47. Ibid, q p. 88, 
48. Ibid.; Ajalaq A*9 "The Organisation of African Unity and 
Non-Alignment". p. 104. 
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France's military intervention in various conflicts 
in Africa undermines African and Nigeria's diplomatic 
efforts and peace initiatives. While Nigeria advocates 
peaceful settlement of disputes within or between African 
atatesq if necessaryq through the machinery of the DAU9 
France on the other hand has a vested interest in ensuring 
that the government that assumes power in its former colonies 
would be supportive of French interests there. 
There have been France's intervention in Cameroun in 
1960t 1961 and 1983, Gabon in February 1964, in Mauritania 
against*the Polisario Movement of Western Sahara, in the 
Central African Republicq in the Shaba Province of Zaire and 
a number of occasions in Chad. In most of theseq France used 
fares either to effect the removal of an. un-cooperative regime 
and to instal a more accommodating one or to assist a pro-French 
regime that was faced with the threat of popular insurgency* 
49 
In all these cases of intervention, the French policy was in 
direct opposition to that of Nigeria. For example in Chadp 
according to Margaret Vogtq Nigeria's interest is to ensure that 
a stable government able to bring an and to the conflict is 
established in that countryl and to minimise the spill-over 
effect on Nigeria of the influx of refugees from Chadq 
50 but 
the Frenchq she saidq have a vested interest in ensuring that 
only the government that would accommodate French interests 
could assume power in Chad. 
51 Given the situation* Nigeria 
49. Vogtq R. A. t "Chad in Inter-State African Politics". ibid - 




and France would clash over the choice of a viable regime 
to govern Chad. If one recalls that Nigeria had organised 
at much cost three conferences in Nigeria to reconcile the 
warring ? actions in Chad and that Nigeria had maintained 
a peace-keeping force there and after their withdrawal came 
the invading troops and subsequent French military involve- 
ment, then the concern will be understood about French 
interference in Africa and the challenge it pages to 
other sovereign states in that continent. In particularg 
the increasing influence and involvement of France in Africa 
are believed to influence the conduct of Nigerials African 
policy. 
3, Organisational Deficiency in the International System 
Another set of factors that affect foreign policy practice 
by Nigeria and indeed all the now nationag derive from the 
difficulties of establishing a just and equitable world order. 
These include (a) the absence of a central authority to curb 
the excesses of states and to determine the parameters of good 
conduct by which the behaviour of states can be measured; (b) 
the ineffectiveness of existing international organisations to 
enforce international code of conduct9 resolutionag and sanctions; 
(c) the weakness of existing international law. 
The present world organisations are not intended tog nor 
could they conceivablyq make binding decisions and legislations. 
They cannot either establish acceptable measures and standards 
for the control and determination of states' behaviour. As 
a resultg the international system is replete with inequities 
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and imbalances which enable the older nations in the-systam 
to dominate privileged positions and seize important benefits 
of that system to the disadvantage of the now nations. The 
ongoing debate on the possibility of a now international 
economic order and the negotiations for concessionary trade 
terms between ACP and EEC countriseq clearly illustrate the 
point. Furthermorep since there is no universal standard 
of right and wrong behaviour of a statep there exists a 
subjective assessment of foreign policy practices based an 
the power and influence of the sponsoring country. This 
presupposes that the foreign policy practice of a state is 
proportional to its perceived military and economic capacity. 
This type of assessment has degenerated to a point where the 
practices of the most powerful and richest statest whether 
imperialistic or not, justifiable or illegal, peaceful or 
in breach of the peace, are used as models of foreign policy 
-practice. Under such conditioneq a now nation without a 
counter-balancing power and influence would make lose impact 
with even the beat policy. This is the predicament of 
Nigeria* 
As we have notedt Nigeria's foreign policy is altruistic 
and based an the philosophy of live-and-let-liveg respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all statesq 
adherence to the cause of international peace and security, 
the enthronement of freedom and democracy (legitimate government 
of the people) everywhere in place of colonialism and imperialism# 
the elimination of racism and apartheid so as to facilitate 
mutual respect for human dignityq and to encourage functional 
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co-operation of all states and peoples in the industrialp 
commercial and scientific spheres. By incorporating the 
United Nations principles of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states# and by bringing morality to bear 
in its view of world politicsq Nigeria could be said to have 
pursued ideal foreign policy. Yet it cannot be given any 
more credit because the international system reflects various 
attitudeaq persuasions and value systems. ror the same 
reasonag more credit may be given to states that violate 
the sovereign and territorial rights of others or to states 
that threaten international peace and security in pursuit 
of imperialist ambitions or ideological pphere. As a result 
of the complexity of the international systsmq therefore, the 
appreciation and assessment of Nigeria's practice of foreign 
policy is influenced by the differing persuasions and value 
systems of its observers as well as by the absence of a 




THE PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY (1960-19851) 
In this chapterg we will try to review the general trend in 
Nigeria's practice of foreign policyq highlight possible changes in 
the perceptions of policy makers and the resultant changes in the 
pattern of relations as well as in the choice of strategy, In 
doing so, it is important to beer in mind that Nigerian foreign policy 
is characterised by altruism (see chapters 3 and 5). It is devoid 
of impsrialist machinations and has as part of its objectives the 
realisation of a new international political and economic order 
1 
(ese chapter 4)* . 
Given these factoraq it will be argued-that Nigeria's 
practice of foreign policy has enhanced its stature and made a 
considerable impact an the international system. 
While domestic politics have been characterised by instabilityq 
crisis and violent changes in governmentp foreign policy in spite 
of its constraints has been characterised by consistencyq steady 
growtht dynamism and purpose* Certain general facts bear evidence 
to this view, Within twenty five years of indepandenceg Nigeria 
has made a significant impact in world affairs. It has friendly 
relations with almost every countryq with the exception of South 
Africa,, Nigeria at present (1985) has its diplomatic presence in 
about 120 countries, including concurrent accreditationso This 
tepid growth in external relations, is indicative of a high profile 
foreign policy, Nigeria has remained committed to the liberation 
of the remaining dependent territories and oppressed peoples in 
Africa and elsewhere in the world,,. - It has stood firmly in 
1. The quest for a new political order begun many years ago is 
reflected in the effort to secure the freedom and independence 
of all colonized and oppressed peoples, to promote respect for the 
sovereignty of all states and for all human beings irrespective of 
raceg colour or creed. The search for a now economic order started 
only in the 1970s. 
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the fight against colonialism# apartheid and racism. This is 
shown in its substantial contribution to the OAU Liberation 
Committ8a and solid support for the liberation of Angolaq 
Mozambiquat Guinea Bissaug Cape Verde and Zimbabweq which has 
continued for Namibia and South Africa, Nigeria is a leading 
member of the non-aligned countries movement and an activist 
participant in almost all committees of the United Nations 
Organisatione It has insisted that reason and rationality 
should prevail over might and intrigue in conducting relations 
between nations. 
2 Nigeria's performance in world affairs has 
distinguished it as a great country and a source of pride to its 
citizens and the world's new nations. 
On the other hand# some scholars and observers of Nigerian 
foreign policy have not been very enthusiastic about the country's 
performance* While reflecting on the practice of foreign policy 
in the first twenty years of independence# Kirk-Greens and Rimmer 
described three phases of Nigeria's foreign policy as "the lmo-key 
conservative period of the 1960ag the bruised and withdrawn time 
during and after the civil war and the assertive and interventionist 
era since the mid 1970s"e 
3 One could add here the fourth period, 
according to one commentatorg of a conservative and woolly foreign 
policy of the second republic. 
4 Another scholar, Olatunde Ojo, 
wrote that Nigeria's external relations since 1960 have been 
characterised by two salient and apparently contradictory featureag 
2. "Nigeria flatly contradicts modern history as received today 
and makes morals and religion in Europe and America largely 
hypocrisy'19 in W, E, B, Dubois; The World and Africa; Kraus 
Thomson Organisation Ltd. t Millwoodq Now Yorkq Reprint 
edition, 1976, p. 326. 
3. Kirk-Greenet Anthony & Rimmerg Douglas, Nigeria Since 1970 -A 
Political and Economic Outlineq Hodder and Stoughtonq London 1981, 
po, 46, 
4. West AfriC89 No. 3454 of 24 Octobarg 19839 p. 2437*. 
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notably "continuity and change". 
5 
He argued that "despite several 
changes in regime-leadership and regime-type *,. there has been an 
amazing continuity in the substance of foreign policy". Although 
he continued# "most analysts find the performance of each 
succeeding regime to be so much more dynamic than its predecessor's 
as to constitute a now foreign policy"q such dynamism# he arguadv 
reflects more changes in style. 
6 Insisting that the pattern of 
relations and international interests have remained unchanged since 
independence in 19609 Dre Gja hold that "fundamentally Nigeria's 
external relations have remained status quo in orientation" to the 
extent that "1984 is not so different from either 1974 or 1964". 
7 
These views are noteworthy but undoubtedly are influenced 
by both the orientations of the scholars and the tendency to employ 
extraneous yardsticks (based perhaps on the US or USSR or the 
British) to measure the foreign policy practice of Nigeria, 
Incidentallyq these countries respective cultural values and 
socio-sconamic and political circumstances are different from those 
of Nigeria. Their perception of events and objectives in foreign 
policy are different. Nigeriats problems are different. 
The demands of Nigerians on their government are also different 
and so is the type of support they give to their government. As 
such, the output has to be different. There is also the tendency 
S. Olatunde JJ, Ojoq "Nigeria" in Shaw, Timothy M. and Alukoq 
Olajideq The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy. Gower 




to describe governmentag particularly African governmentaq and 
their external policies as being conservative or radical according 
to how close or far away their leadership is to the former colonial 
power or to either of the ideological blocs. This tendency is 
misleading, 
A balanced view of Nigeria's foreign policy will take into 
consideration as already stated its altruistic culturet history and 
sconomyp the international political environment (see chapter 99 external 
factors affecting Nigeria's practice of foreign policy)# the relative 
short period of Nigeria's emergence in the world sceneq those events 
in which it has been involved since then and the intended objectives. 
Thusq contrary to the views of "radical pessimists" of the political 
economy school# Martin Lynn has maintained that "Nigeria in 1984 is 
a good deal more independent then in 1964. If the longer term 
perspective is taken ... Nigeria# in spite of all the limitationag is- 
clearly moving towards becoming a major continental power". 
8 Lynn 
in fact was in agreement with Andrew Young's judgement that "Nigeria 
is in important respectsq Africa's most powerful nation". 
9 We should 
accept that Nigeria's opinion is regularly sought and continues to 
count in African affairs -a measure of its importance* Furthermore 
there can be no doubt that its international standing within the United 
Nationst for instancog has gained in prominence as shown in its regular 
nomination to serve on important UN bodies: Nigeria was appointed 
chairman of the UN Concilliation Committee during the Congo crisis; 
Nigerian troops participated in UN Peacekeeping operations in the Congot 
Middle Eastq Kashmir and Lebanon; Nigeria was elected a member of the UN 




Decolonization Committda and the UN Special Committee Against 
Apartheid of which she has been chairman since 1972; others include 
UN Institute for Training and Researchq International Law Commissiont 
ECA9 WHO9 UN Development Programme$ the UN Environment Programmev and 
the Commission on Human Rights etc. If we accept this to be a 
spectacular record of 
; 
chiavements for a young state whose highest ever 
national revenue in 1980 was only equal to the defence expenditure of 
Britain in that year (as indicated in chapter 9)t then it is arguedt 
contrary to the views of its critics cited above, that Nigeria's 
foreign policy has been of a high profileg progressive and purposeful, 
Nigeria is one of the significant aid doncra in the world* From 
independence to this date it has been giving aid to both African and 
other countries. Yet Nigeria is neither one of the worldIs richest 
countries nor politically a very big power involved in the struggle 
for ideological supremacy or hagemonist sphere. Nigeria is perhaps 
the only country in the world that gives aid without strings -a factor 
that helps to illustrate the. altruistic(cultural and religious) content 
of Nigeriats foreign policy. Nigeria has implemented a number of aid 
programmes through bilateral arrangements and multilateral aid programmes 
such as the Commonw8slth Development Programmet IBRD, UNDP9 WHO9 OAUq 
etc* In 1963, Nigeria with other independent African countries provided 
a sum of L19000tCOO to aid various national Liberation Movements in 
Africa. 10 After 19739 with the growth in national income# Nigeria's 
aid increased and has been largely administered through the African 
Development Bank (which it made the largest single contribution of NSO 
million or 13.4% of the total by 1975)q the Nigerian Trust Fund (set 
up in February 1976 with an initial capital of N50 million replenished 
10, PhilipsqClaude S. 9 The Development of Niqerian Foreign Policy; 
Northwestern University Press, 19649 p. 97. 
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with the equal sum of N50 million in 19801 and the African Trust 
Fund* From all these sourcesq several countries in Africa have 
been given assistance for a variety of purposes, Nigeria hass 
in additiont given to the various Liberation Movements financial# 
military and material assistance estimated to be slightly above 
N60 million between 1975 and 1979 
!1 
At the bilateral level, 12 Nigeria has offered significant 
bilateral aid to many countries including the Republic of Benin 
(1972). drought affected African countries (1972)9 Mozambique - 
FRELIMO (1972)9 Republic of Guinea (1973)9 Guinea Bissau-PAIGC (1973)9 
Sudan (1973)9 Somalia (1974)9 Zambia (1974)9 Granada (1975)v Angola (1975). 
Romania (1977)9 Zimbabwe (1980) ate 
13 The comprehensive list of 
recipients with actual figures of Nigeria's aid is not yet available 
for quantification as a percentage of the GNP, However it is likely 
that Nigeria is one of the few countries in the world that devotes up 
to one per cent of its GNP for assistance to poorer countries. As 
already stated, a distinguishing feature of Nigeria's foreign aid 
practice is that it is without strings -a unique departure from the 
prevailing practice of other aid donors, For instance the Nigerian 
government has been making substantial contributions to Liberation 
Movements in Africa without attempting to interfere with the future 
governments in the territories, Nigeria's, generosity amidst its own diffi- 
culties may seem idiosyncratic to the capitalist with a primary desire to exý 
ploit the weaknessof others in every relationship but to the altruist it is 
proper to do so. Thess different value systems are sometimes ignored by some 
critics* Howeverg it is admissible that Nigeria is making definite 
ill Fafowura, 0. (Dr. ), formerly Deputy Director of African Affairs 
Department, Ministry of External Affairaq Lagos in a lecture during 
Induction couraeg 1900* 
12, See also the sale of Nigeria's oil to African countries at 
concessionary prices in chapter 8 of this work* 
13. For a list of some aid given by Nigeria between 1970 and 1979 see 
Tyoden G* Sonniq "Development Strategies and Foreign Policy in peri- 
pheral states: the Political Economy of Nigeria's external relations 
w6n_197911: PheD. Thesiag University of Lancaster, 1980. 
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contributions to the world both by aiding the needy countries and 
by bringing humanism and morality to bear in world politics - thus 
making its foreign policy liberal and purposeful. 
Changes in the pattern and perception of fOrsiQn policy 
Six broad patterns of change are visible: 
(1) There has been a remarkable growth in Nigeria's externar relations, 
which accounts for its enhanced stature as an international actor* This 
is shown by Nigeria's above-mentioned involvement in many international 
issues and its regular consultation an many African affairs, 
(2) There have been changes in the tempo of foreign policyq 
corresponding with changes in regime and regime-leadership, These 
changes have also corresponded with favourable changes in the economic 
circumstances of the country. The growth in revenue has made possible 
the country's increasing representation and involvement in many 
international issues, The fact that Nigbria is widely hold by many 
writers and commentators (some of whom have been cited) as a very 
important (it has been saidq leading country) in Africa, is indicative 
of the increasing role and prominence of Nigeria over the period. 
(3) There have also been changes in the direction of foreign policy 
especially under the military regimes. Since the seventies the direction 
of policy has been markedly towards Africae There has been an increasing 
interest towards the East. Whereas in the first Republic of Nigeriag 
relations with the Communist countries could be said to have been an a 
very low-keyt under the military regime# relations with the Communist 
countries grew significantly with prospects of being intensif iedp as a 
close study of Nigeria-Soviet relations will reveal* 
(4) There have been considerable changes in policy towards the Westv 
evidenced by the series of rifts in relations due to differences on 
some political issues e, g, conflicting policy on South Africa. 
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(5) Closely related to the change in direction is the 
reinforcement of Nigeria's non-aligned status* 
(6) There have been noticeable changes in the tactics and 
strategy of Nigeriats foreign policy. Whereas in the first 
Republict Nigeria was more rhetorical and adopted a strategy 
of verbal condemnation of what it considered unjustq during the 
military regime some definitive political and economic actions 
were taken to defend the countryts national interests, These 
include the initiative in the formation of ECOWAS costing 
Nigeria a huge sum of moneyq the diplomatic battle against the 
United States over the Angolan independence as well as the use 
of "nationalisation" as an economic weapon against Britain over 
the independence of Zimbabwe. 
Howeverg one must admit also that Nigeria has made some 
obvious mistakes is the course of acquiring experience in 
foreign affairs. These include its initial (1960s) lukewarm 
attitude to Pan-African issuseq rejection of radical approaches 
to regional integrationg and the belief in a just world order 
in disregard of the dangers of the international environment 
and the political machinations of foreign powers* 
14 Other 
mistakes include acceptance at face value of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and signing of it (1971)9 acceptance 
of the paternalistic concession of temporary seats in the UN 
14. Such belief is evident in the declaration of Nigeria's 
absolute commitment to the cause of world peacog the 
sovereign equality of statest non-intervantion in the 
internal affairs of other states, peaceful settlement of 
disputes and the employment of rational diplomatic persuasion 
as a weapon to achis i ve 
these ends. See Mro Prime Minister,; 
A selection of speeches made by Alhaji the Right Honourable Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balawag Federal Ministry of Informationg Lagost 
19649 ppe 50-57. 
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Security Council in place of Africa's permanent seatt and the 
unrealistic expectation from industrialised countries of a 
formal transfer of modern technology instead of harnessing indigenous 
manpower and technological skills as well as the adoption of patent 
laws that will suit its purpose* However the foreign policy of 
every country in the world today is replete with alternating 
successes and woeful reverses, The point here is that both 
have to be objectively balanced and analysed in an assessment 
of the general conduct of the country's external relations, It 
is indeed apparent that its foreign policy successes outstrip 
by far its reverses, 
To appreciate further Nigeria's practice of foreign policy 
involves identifying changes in the policy makers# perception of 
the domestic and international environments and the resultant changes 
in the definition of policy objectives, the order of priorities and 
selection of strategic instruments. For example in the 1960a Nigerian 
policy makers' perception of the domestic political environment as a 
potential source of crisis influenced its attitude towards external 
affairs, hence according to Grady Nunnq it either remained aloof or 
adopted an essentially conciliatory position on a good many issues* 
is 
Indeed the government's rejection of radicalism and preference for 
gradual changes in the pattern of political and economic relations 
were in part dictated by the inherent problems of the Nigerian 
federation, Since 1966, that influence has reduced significantly 
resulting in a different perception and attitude to foreign policy* 
These are shown in the innovative actions of subsequent Nigerian 
governments in foreign affairs like increased interest in Pan- 
African issues (Bog. diplomatic initiatives to reconcile Ethiopia 
15. In Blitzq Franklin L. (ed. )9 The politics and Administration of 
Nigerian Government. Sweet & Maxwellq Londong 19659 pp. 163-4. 
0 
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and Somaliat peace. -kesping in Chad, and assistance to liberation 
movements) and active involvement in regional integration (e, g. 
the formation of ECOWAS). 
Government's perception in the 1960s of the historical link 
with the United Kingdom and its (UK) likely role in Nigeria's future 
development led it to maintain a strong attachment to both London 
and the Commonwealth* The government then relied heavily on 
Britain, accepted British advice an many issues and even counter- 
manded decisions of the GAU Council of Ministers that African states 
should break diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia's 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence* It repeated the same 
when African members of the Commonwealth decided to demonstrate 
their disenchantment with Britain over Rhodesiaýrl The idea then 
was to maintain close friendship with Britain in order to persuade 
it and other members of the Commonwealth to co-operate with 
Nigeria in the effort to industrialis8 and develop-its economy. 
17 From 
the mid-1960a this attitude changed. Britain became constantly 
accused of noccolonialist and exploitative activities in Nigeria 
as well as of supporting colonial and apartheid rule in Southern 
Africa. The Commonwealth also came to be viewed as a more 
association of friendly countries for exchange of views on matters 
of mutual interest and a forum for mustering pressure on Britain 
to accept the obligation imposed an it by history to free the 
remaining dependent countries in Southern Africa from colonial 
and apartheid rulee This change in perception was reflected in 
169 Ofoegbuj Ray Maziq and Ogbuagut Chibuzo, S*A*q "Towards a new 
philosophy of foreign policy for Nigeria" in Akinysmit A. S. (ed. )v 
Nineria and the World: Readinqs in Ninerian Foreign Policy, Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairsq-Uýsity Press Limitedq Ibadan 
in association with Oxford University Press, 19789 pe 125. 
17, Mr, Prime Minister, op, cit, s pp, 36-39, 
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Sir Abubakar's colourful performance at the Commonwealth 
Conference of Heads of State in January 1966 in Lagos (the 
first of its kind to be held outside London) at which pressure 
was brought on South Africa to withdraw from the Association. 
This was followed by Gowon's similar performance at Singapore 
in 1971 and Ottawa in 1973 over Britain's sale of arms to 
Rhodesia. The strategic instrument on these occasions was 
purely diplomatic. Also at the Commonwealth Conference at 
Lusaka in 19799 Nigeria's Foreign Minister Adefopeq in 
co-operation with other Commonwealth leaderaq succeeded in 
urging the British government to work for majority rule in 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The strategic instrument used by 
Nigeria in this case was the nationalisation of B, P, assets 
in Nigeria. These performances have reinforced Nigeria's 
consciousness of the Commonwealth as a worthwhile association 
Of friendly countries* 
The international community was perceived by Nigerian policy 
makers at independence as a bipolar system in which Nigeria must 
guard its newly won independence jealously while contributing to 
the relaxation of tension in the world by discharging her 
international obligations honestly. Upon admission to the 
United Nations on October 8,19609 Nigeria declared its total 
support for the principles of the Charter and absolute commitment 
to the course of world peace, Relying on its size, populationg 
strategic locationg military and industrial potential as was the 
leadership's "moderate and responsible" position on many issuesq 
1B 
18* Blitzq Franklin L. (ad. )# op. cit. # p. 164. 
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it hoped to win for itself respect as a credible African 
power and a dependable force in international politics* 
The government had also hoped that through diplomatic 
persuasion and settlement of disputes by negotiation African 
countries under colonial rule would be granted independence* 
This hope faded with the intransigence of Portugalq South 
Africa and Ian Smith of Rhodesiag while the United Nation's 
action was limited to mare resolutions. Consequently 
the Federal Government reinforced Nigeria's African policy 
and directed it towards the annihilation of the anti-social 
forces - colonialism, apartheid and racism. The government 
came to accept liberation movements as legitimate representatives 
of colonized peoples and to support freedom fighters. 
From 19719 Nigeria entered a new phase of belligerent 
diplomacy, This is manifested in its increased involvement 
in political groupings like the UN African Group, the Group of 
1779 the non-aligned Mavementq the UN Council for Namibia and 
UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. Nigeria's speeches 
on colonialism# apartheid and the now international economic 
order have been more strident and militant! 
9 It has been 
repeatedly assertedt for instance, that the existing international 
system is weakened by structures of exploitation and control 
consciously and actively maintained by the technologically 
advanced countries* Thus since the 1970s international 
Sesq for example# General Obasanjols speech at the UN 
Special Conference for Action Against Apartheidq held 
in Lagosq August 1977, 
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politics has been dominated by attempts to redefine 
the patterns of economic and political relations 
between states. Emphasis is ihcreasingly placed on 
the economic line between north and south rather than an 
the ideological line between east and west, This is a 
significant change in the substance of external policy. 
Indeedq Nigerian policy makers have become more 
conscious of the dangers inherent in the unstable international 
system due particularly to persistent inequality of power and 
wealth* Consequently Nigeria's external interests have been 
redefinedt with strategies reselected on a continuous 
basis and patterns of relations continually adjusted. 
These are reflected in for example the 1972 indigenisation 
of certain sectors of the sconomyp 
20 
and the effort 
towards regional economic integration (ECOWAS), Two 
recent events helped to sharpen the policy makers' 
consciousness. First the diplomatic confrontation 
between Nigeria and the US over the former's recognition 
20. See 'The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 19721. 
It reserved exclusively for Nigerians certain retail 
trades, small scale enterprises and manufactures. 
In some cases it enables Nigerians to take over 
foreign enterprises or to acquire equity share 
thersing thereby promoting business partnerships 
to a greater degree than ever before. In 1977 
Nigerian ownership in some industries was increased 
from 40% to 60%. 
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of the MPLA Government of Angola in 1975 (888 chapter 8 (11)). 
Secondq Nigeria's present economic crisis due to the rapid 
decline of its foreign reserves since the last quarter of 1976, 
The country's foreign reserves of N5.7 Billion in 1975 dropped 
to N3,7 billion by December 1976 and continued to fall throughout 
1977, By October 319 1977# the Central Bank of Nigeria's 
statement indicated that Nigeriats reserves then stood at 2.6 billion 
naira and by let July 1978 this fell sharply to 1 billion naira* 
The Obasanjo government was forced to introduce a series of economic 
austerity measures like an embargo an import of many commodities 
and in June 1979 drastic reduction of staff in Nigeria's missions 
abroad# resulting in no significant increase in the level of reserves. 
Howeverg with the increase in sales of oil between 1979 and 1980t 
Nigeria's reserves rose to. N5.5 billion by December 1980. But 
by December 1983 the foreign reserves had fallen to only N885.2 milliont 
just enough to pay for one month's import bill? 
2 
only to go up by the 
and of 1984 to about 1.5 billion Naira, 
This unfortunate economic condition has been attributed in part 
to high costs of Nigeria's imports while the prices of its exports 
are artificially low9 and to the increasing burden of servicing 
international loans ý3 Consequently its economic status is being 
eroded and the government forced to reassess its development plans 
and national prioritiest leading to the policy makers' perception 
of the international environment as inhospitable to Nigeria's interests 
and progress, According to one: 
21* Nigeria: bulletin an foreign affairs, vol. St no* 99 September 1978o 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairst Lagost 19789 p, 210, 
22, Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
1981-83, 
23. By April 1984 when Nigeria's currency notes Were changedg it was 
estimated that about N4 billion was circulating illegally in Europe (with N2.6 billion in UK alone) and N1,7 billion in neighbouring 
African countries. These were believed to constitute part of 
Nig8rialS external debts9 for which interest is demanded. 
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"The positive attribute of the present crisis, 
howeverp consists in the reactivation of our 
consciousness of the dangers of the international 
environment, ana hence our redefinition of it. 
While we continue to maintain our traditional 
friendship with the Westq we are now engaged 
in efforts to diversify our economic relations 
with the outside world". 24 
To further determine whether the changes in perception have 
given rise to corresponding changes in the direction of Nigeria's 
external relationsq lot us examine briefly (a) the pattern of its 
diplomatic relations and (b) its external economic activities, 
Policyand Revresentation 
Exchange of diplomatic missions is usually an reciprocal 
bases. The willingness to send and to receive such missions is 
a significant measure of foreign policy practice, The pattern 
of distribution of a country's diplomatic missions is an indicator 
of the direction of foreign policy. Howeverg it can be argued 
that more diplomatic presence in a country is no evidence of the 
importance of a relationship between two countries. This may be 
true of an imperialist foreign policy but not of the altruistic 
foreign policy which (as noted in chapter 3) values long term 
friendly relations more than short term expediency* 
From independenceq Nigeria's diplomatic relations grow rapidly, 
from six embryo-missions in 1960, to forty 25 in 1965 while it hosted 
24. Nigeria: bulletin an foreign affairsq vol, 89 no* 9; Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairsq Lagoag September 1978, pe 211. 
25, These were AFRICA: Abidjanq Accra, Addis Ababaq Bamako, Bathurstq 
Busag Cairoq Conakry, Cotonoup Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam# Freetown# 
Fort Lamy# Kampalaq Khartaumq Leopoldville, Lome$ Lusakaq 
Monroviaq Nairobiq Naimeyq Santa Isabelq Yaoun0se ASIAt Jaddahv 
New Dslhiq Karachi and Tokyo. EUROPE: Londong Dublint Brusselsq 
Bonnq Romeg Moscow# Edinburghq Liverpool and Geneva* NORTH 
AMERICA: Washingtong Now York (Consulate). SOUTH AMERICA: 
Nil, OCEANIA: Nil* OTHERS: UN Permanent Mission NY and 
EEC9 Brussels. 
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fifty-six missions from other countries and organisationse 
By the end of 19799 the number of Nigeria's diplomatic 
missions abroad rose to seventy-eight and foreign missions 
in Nigeria increased to 124. At the end of Nigerials 
second Republic (December 1983) there were 126 foreign 
missions in Nigeria while it had 90 abroad (excluding 
concurrent accreditations)o The pattern of distribution 
of the missions over the period is shown in the tables 
belows 
Table a 
Nigeria's Diplomatic Relations by Continents as 
at December 1965 
N& Lent 
Africa Asia Europe America- S. Americs Oceania Others Total 
Nigerian 23 4 9 2 2 
. 
40 
missions East 1 
Abroad West 7* 
Neut 1 
Foreign 
Missions 16 11 18 2 1 1 7 56 
in East 5 Nigeria West 8 
Neut 5 
Three of the seven missions were in UK alone* See footnote 25* 
Source: Nigeria Year Book 1965. A Daily Times publicationg Lagos, 
19659 pp, 239-255o 
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Tabla b 
Nigeria's Diplomatic Relations as at December 1979 
Africa Asia Europe 
No & Cent 
America S. America Oceania 
Others Total 
Nigerian 37 11 19 7 1 1 2 78 
Missions East 4 
Abroad* West 12 
Nout 3 
Foreign 37 22 32 a 6 1 18 124 
Missions East 'a 
in West le 
Nigeria Nout 6 
AFRICA: Abidjanq Accraq Addis-Ababa, Algiersq Bamakoq Bangui, 
Banjulq Bissau, Brazavillog Busaq Cairoq Conakryt 
Cononou# Dakarq Dar-Es-Salaam, Doualaq Freetown# 
Gaborone, Kampalaq Khartoumq Kinshaseq Librevillev 
Lomeq Luandap Lusakat Malabog Moputog Mogadishut 
Monroviaq Nairobi# Ndjamena, Niamey, Nouakchott, 
Ouagadougouq Rabats Tripoli, Yaunds, - 
ASIA: Ankeraq Bagdadj Bsirutq Djakartat Kong Kongq Islamabadq 
Haddahq Now Delhiq Pekin, Tehran, Tokyo* 
EUROPE: Belgrade# Berneq Bonnq Br4sseleg Bucharestq Dublint 
Edinburgh# Hamburg, Liverpoolt Lisbonq Londong Madridq 
Moscow, Parisq Rome, Stockholm# The Haguet Vionnat 
Warsaw, 
No & CENTRAL AMERICAt Havannas Kingstong New York (Consulate)q 
Ottavaq Port of Spain, San Francisco, Washington DC. 
SOUTH AMERICAs Brasilliao 
OCEANIAt Canberra. 
OTHERS: Permanent Mission. Genevaq Permanent Mission-Now Yorko 
Sources: (1) Directory of Nigerian Missions 1979. 
(2) Federal Republic of Nigeria, Diplomatic and Consular 
Liatt Ministry of External Affairsq April 1980. 
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Tablo c 
Nigerials Diplomatic Relations as at December 1983 
Africa Asia Europe N& Cent America 
S, 
America Oceania Others 
Total 
Nigerian 33 13 22 a 5 1 3 90 
issions East 6 
Abroad West 13 
Nout 3 
Foreign 37 22 32 7 1 19 126 
Missions East 8 
in West le 
Nigeria Nout 6 
Sourcess (1) Directory of Nigerian Missions, 1983* Twelve now 
missions opened in 1980 worst Atlantaq Atheneq Berling 
Buenos Airseq Caracasq Jaddah (Consulate General)v 
Manilaq Mexico Cityp Pragueq Rio do Janeiro# Harare 
(Salisbury)q and a permanent delegation to UNESCO. 
(2) Federal Republic of Nigariag Diplomatic and Consular 
Listq Ministry of External Affaireq Lagosq September 
1983, 
Table d 
A comoosite table of states represented abroad 
Africa Asia Europe N. & Cent S. Oceania Total America America 














A comoosite table of states represented in Nigeria 
Africa Asia Europe N. & Cent. S. Oceania Total America America 












The distribution pattern shows that the largest number of Nigerian 
missions has been in Africaq perhaps an indication that every regime 
recognised the primary importance of Africa in Nigeria's foreign 
policy. It however reveals the absence of Nigeria's diplomatic 
missions yet in about a dozen African countriesq despite the claims 
that Africa is the centre-piece of its foreign policy. Perhaps 
I 
of more interest in determining the direction of policy is the 
distribution of missions between the rival ideological blocs. This 
shows that in aggregate terms there have been more Nigerian missions 
in the West then in the East but in percentage termeq Nigeria 
has had since the seventiesq more missions in the eastern bloc 
countries than the West, For example, the percentage representation 
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of Nigeria in (eight) eastern bloc countries were 12.5% (1965)9 
50% (1979). and 75% (1983). and the representation of the eastern 
bloc countries in Nigeria were 62,5% (1965)9 100% (1979) and 100% 
(1983), On the other handq the representation of Nigeria in the 
(sixteen) western bloc countries were 31.2% (1965)9 56,25% (1979) 
and 62.5% (1983)9 and percentage representation of western bloc 
countries in Nigeria were 50% (1965)9 75% (1979). and 81,2% (1983) 
(see tables d and 9), This means that there has been a significant 
growth in the relations between Nigeria and the Communist countries 
of eastern Europeq with the implication of enhancing Nigeria's 
non-aligned status* 
Trade and foreign policy Practice 
The pattern of external economic activities is another 
indicator of the direction of foreign policy. Economic 
activities may sometimes be determined by expediency and desire 
for profitp in which case the pattern will not be a measure of 
the level of importance attached to a given relationship. Yet 
such activities provide the additional tangible basis for 
quantification and classification of bilateral relations. 
Thus the tables below of Nigeria's external trade in the 
first Republic and under the first military regime will 
help to illustrate the pattern of economic relations. 
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Table f 
Direction of External Trade (1963-1965) 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
Countries 'LN millions and per- LN millions and per- 
centage of total centage of total 
1963 1964 1965 1963 1964 1965 
UK 57.7 64,4 70,5 62,5 66,5 84., 3 
34,6% 31.1% 31,2% 39.8% 37.1% 37,4% 
Other 6,7 9,5 10.5 4,4 9A 4,, 6 
Commonwe 4,0% 4,6% 4.6% 2,, B% 5,2% 2,1% 
Countriesi 
EEC 36,8 48,, 3 56 0 54,5 64,6 81.8 
22% 23,3% 24: 8% 34.7% 36.0% 36.3% 
USA 14,0 23,8 26 1 14.7 11.6 21.8 
8,4% 11,5% 11: 5% 9.3% 6.5% 9.7% 
Japan 20.1 23.5 21.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 
12,0% 11,4% 9,4% 1,3% 1.3% 1.0% 
Eastern SIB 6,2 6 5 1.1 4.2 7.5 
Europe 3*5% 3.0% 
;% 
21 0*7% 2.4% 3.3% 
Others 21,9 2716 31,8 170 20.1 22o9 
13.1% 13o3% 14ol% 11.0% Ilo2% lOo2% 
Sourcet Central Bank of Nigariat Annual Report and Statement 




Direction of External Trade (1977-1979) 
IMPORTS (non oil sector) EXPORTS (non-oil) 
Million (coiofe) and -14 Million (f, o, b, ) and 
percentage ercentace 
Countries 1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979 
Africa 81.18 80,7 86 9 17,4 23,2 2S,, G 
1*2% 1.0% l.; % 3,11a 3,5% 3,7% 
Asia 19152.2 19423.4 19267,4 17., 4 4,1 6,0 
16,5% 17*6% 17.5% 3,1% 0*6% 0.9% 
UK* 19513e7 lt780*5 19596.8 171*3 185,5 186,, 3 
21*9% 22*0% 22,1% 30,7% 28oO% 27,8% 
W. Europe 49638e3 59348*7 49769 0 440,3 519,9 521,3 
66o3% 66.1% 65o; % 78,9% 78o5% 77., B% 
E. Europe 175*4 1600 130,, 4 lBo2 28,0 27o3 
2,5% 2,0% i.. B% 3,3% 4.2% 4ol% 
Americas 926,3 lt072oO 970,, 5 60,9 85,7 87o7 
13o3% 13,2% 1%4% 10,, 9% 12o9% l3ol%, 
USA* 776,0 8850 789,4 60.7 79.1 81,. 6 
1 1111% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9cia 1109% l2oVa 
Figures for UK and US are included in those of Wo Europe and 
Americaa reapectivelyo 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts for the year ended 31st December 19799 Lagos# 
pp. 74-75o. J 
From the above, it is clear that Nigeria's external trade 
activities with Western Europe and the United States have been 
dominant relative to similar trade activities with any other group of coun- 
tries, There has however been a noticeable increase in Nigeria's 
trade with the countries of Africap Eastern Europeq and Asia* The 
obvious explanation for the dominance of the West in Nigeria's 
economic relations is the long history of association between them 
from colonial timeaq resulting in the adoption of a capitalist mode 
42% 
. 
of life and development of tastes for western goods. However, 
under the military regime in Nigeria, political considerations 
more than economic ones influenced the country's external relations* 
There is some evidence for this in the siting of half of Nigeriale 
missions in countries without significant economic ties. 
Britain has been the largest trading partner of Nigeria in 
terms of both imports and exports. Nigeria had more trade with 
Britain in the early 1960s than with all the EEC countries together 
This changed from the mid-1970s and the EEC countries together began 
to take a larger share of Nigeria's trade. In terms of single country 
tradeq the USA comes next to UK in trade relations with Nigeria, 
It can be observed that in the early 19609 Nigeria imported a 
sizeable amount of goods from Japan while the latter did not buy 
any significant amount of commodities from Nigeria* This trend 
continued throughout the 1970s as illustrated in chapter 9. Due to 
the one-sided pattern of trade, loss importance has been attached 
to relations with Japan* 
Other sconomiev cultural and social factors are important too 
in determining the direction of external policy. In the early 19609, 
the Federal Government had a number of co-operation agreements with 
both the UK and USA, Throughout the sixties British companies 
invested more than others in Nigeria, The UK generally accounted 
for 51,, 5% in 1961 and 36.9% in 1978 of foreign investments. 
26 
Since 
the seventiesq there have been wide fluctuations in not flow from the 
UK due to disinvestment. The USA and some Western countries have 
also made some investments in Nigeria, The involvement of the USSR 
26. Central Bank of Nigeria; Economic and Financial Review Vol. 189 
No* 19 19809 pp. 11-159 vol. 199 No. 2. December 19819 p. 14. 
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and other Communist countries in Nigeria's economic development 
really -started only in the 1970s., 
27 Howeverg a Czechoslovak/Nigerian 
Export Company - CNEICO - has operated in Nigeria since 1946. That 
country's technical experts have been involved since 1978 in some 
development projects like the development of a water supply system 
in Kaduna and Katsina. The Soviet Union abrogated in 19649 during 
the first UNCTAD sassiont all customs tariffs on the exports of 
the developing countriesq 
28 thus providing favourable conditions 
for Nigerian exports to the USSR. Nigerian exporters have not 
yet taken advantage of the opportunity. The USSR has been involved 
in building heavy industry projects like the Iron and Steel complex 
at Ojaokutaq the metallurgical education complex and the Petroleum 
Institute* In comparing the number of investments in Nigeria by 
the two blocsq it has to be barns in mind. that Communist countries 
denounce the capitalist made of investment in developing countries 
as exploitative. The Communist states are involved through 
contracts irt the establishment of industries and construction of 
various projects in the developing countries, It is symptomatic 
that no project of this nature is the property of the Communist 
state but all become the national property of the country where 
they have been built. 
29 
For exatiple a Bulgarian firm was awarded 
a contract to build the National Arts Theatre at Igamu-Lagoso On 
27, However a Trade Agreement was signed between Nigeria and Czechoslo- 
vakia in 1962 and a cultural Agreement in Septemberg 1978t Nigerias 
bulletin an foreinn affairs vol. 8, no. 99 19789 pp. 6-7 and 104-105* 
Others include Nigeria/Rumania Air Services Agreement and Trade 
Agreement 1978; Nigeria/Rumania Economic Co-operation Agreement 
signed in 1978; Nigerian/Polish Trade Agreement 1961 and 1978; and 
Nigerian/Bulgarian Economics Scientific and Technical Cco-operation 
Agreement etc, Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No. 
7479 Lagoa# June 19 1978 and No. 787 of June 89 1978. 
28, Daily Sketchq Thursdayt November 1.19799 po S. 
29. Ibido 
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completion of the Theatre* it turned out to be the most modern 
monument of its type in tropical Africa. The work was completed 
in time to make the theatre available for the "Second World Black 
and African Festival of Arts and Culture" - FESTAC - hold in Lagos 
in 19779 to the great delight of the Federal Military Government. 
The Iron and Steel factory at Ojaokuta being built by the Soviets 
will also become Nigerian property on completion. 
In terms of cultural contactq many Nigerians have been educated 
in the West especially in Britain and the USA* Many still are 
being educated there. Howeverg since 1980, as a result of the 
increase in fees for foreign studentsq the number of Nigerian 
students in the UK has sharply fallen to about 69000 an against 
20,000 in the USA, 
30 A number of Nigerians also have studied 
in the USSR and many are still studying there* Soviet-. scholarships 
are awarded annually to Nigerians to study in the USSR. 
31 All 
the scholarships are allotted within the framework of economic 
assistance. Exchange visits between Nigerian officials and 
their counterparts in other countries have been an the increase, 
While it had been a routine for various Nigerian dignitaries to 
visit west European countriseq unlike the east, it almost became 
a routine during the thirteen years of military rule for Nigerian 
state officials to visit east European countries. The most out- 
standing of these were the visits to Moscow by Generals Gowan (1974) 
and T, Y9 Danjuma (1979), General Obseanjo also visited many east 
30* Estimate obtained from the Nigerian High Commission in London# 
1984e 
31* In 1978, for examplep the USSR Ministry-of Higher Education 
awarded 200 scholarships to Nigerians to study in higher and 
specialised educational establishments in the Soviet Union, 
This was 40 scholarships more than the stipulated quota for 
the year, The addition was in response to requests from 
Nigeria* Daily Times# August 19 19789 po 9o 
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European countriest a, g* Romania and Poland (1978)032 State 
visits were made to Nigeria by the President of Poland in early 
1977 and the President of Romania later the same year. There 
were also several high level ministerial visits to Nigeria from 
communist countries. 
33 It is equally significant that the four 
military leaders (not including the present leader Babangide) did 
not consider state visits to Britain and the USA as vital for 
external support and co-operation with their regime, In fact 
Generals Ironsiq Muhammad and Buhari did not undertake any such 
visit outside Africao General Obseanjo after two years in office 
then accepted a state visit only to the USA, The contrary was 
the case in the first and second Republics, President Shagari's 
state visit to Britain was decided in the first six months of his 
coming into office. Howeverg the largest number of state/official 
visits between 1970 and 1985 were within Africao By 1983 Nigeria 
had had diplomatic relations with all autonomous communist seat 
European countriesq with increasing co-operation in the trade and 
technical fields. 
Thus despite the level of economic relations with the West,, 
Nigeria's foreign policy has become substantially non-aligned, 
Nigeria now maintains a comparatively high level of relations 
with the two ideological blocs. It does not necessarily favour 
or sympathise with one rival ideological group more than the other* 
Perhaps the consciousness of reflecting the quality and character 
of non-alignment in Nigeria's foreign policy# amidst its capitalist 
orientation and historical link with the Weat9 led subsequent 
Nigerian governments to encourage the expansion of relations with 
32* rederal Ministry of Information# Press Release No* 7929 Lagosp 
Oune 1978* 
33* rederal Ministry of Information News Releaseq No* 12349 October 49 
1976e Press Release Nose 1243 and 1244 of September 2g 19789 
Daily Sketchl September 19 1978. 
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the USSR and other Communist countries. This is showng as already 
statedg in the level of diplomatic relations and political co-operationt 
the growth rate of economic activities and the scope of technical and 
scientific co-operation between Nigeria and the Communist countries* 
The Orderinn of Niqerian relationships and interests 
In order to highlight further changes in the pattern and direction 
of the country's foreign policy practicet we will here design a pattern 
of its external relationships/interests using a concentric circle 
device. Within each circle will be grouped clusters of relationships 
(interests) of approximately equal importance. The main considerations 
will be the level of diplomatic relations and political co-operationg 
the value of economic activities, the scope of technical and scientific 
co-operation and other activities in the relationship between 
Nigeria and other countries as discussed in both the previous and 





THE OROERING OF NIGERIA15 RELATIONSHIPS ANO INTERESTS 1960-1965 
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The diagram above shows that in the innermost circle of 
Nigeria's relationships were the United Kingdomq the Commonwealth 
and the United States of America. At the diplomatic levelt 
Nigeria had three missions in the UK and two in the USA as single 
countries while as a groupt Commonwealth countries came second 
after Africa, Economically there were more Nigerians in UK and 
USA than in any other foreign country during the period. The value 
of investments from the two countries and trade with them were the 
highest, The cordial relations between Prime Minister Balewa and 
former British Administrators in Nigeria (see chapter 2) added to 
the most favoured nation place of Britain in Nigeria's scheme. The 
same could be said of the USA due to President Kennedy's interest in 
Nigeria and Africat as orchestrated during Balewals visit to the US. 
it was therefore no accident that UK and USA occupied very high 
positions vis--a-vis other countries in Nigeria's foreign policy 
consideration. In the case of the importance attached to the 
Commonwealth (and UND), one is inclined to believe that the essential 
consideration was political: (1) to assert Nigeria's presence in the 
community of Nations and (ii) to mobilise world opinion against 
colonLal and apartheid regimes in Africaq especially Portugal and 
South Africa. Also one member of the Commonwealth and UN, Britaint 
remained the dominant colonial power whose co-operation would facilitate 
the dismantling of the apartheid system in Southern Africa and the 
ultimate end of colonisation in Africa. It was believed that the 
Commonwealth would provide the forum for inducing British co-operation 
to that end, 
The second ring of the concentric circles includes countries of 
Af rice, the OAUq UNDt EEC and Saudi Arabia with the other moslem states. 
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In the third ring of the circle were USSR 9* non-alignment and 
the other countries in the world system. The diagram reflects the fact 
that both ideologically and in terms of directiont foreign policy under 
Balewa was essentially pro-West, 
Between 1966 and 19750 the ordering of the country's foreign 
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The ordering of Nigeria's foreign relationships and int8rests 1966-75 
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The above diagram indicates that there was a change in the 
direction of external relations with Africa coming into the 
innermost ring of the concentric circle* The USSR and the United 
Nations were next to Africa in importance to Nigeria. Countries 
that were in the innermost circle of friends during the first Republic 
declined in their importance and were placed at the peripherye Between 
1970 and 19759 howevert there was a marked improvement in relations 
with USA and EEC due to increased bilateral co-operation especially 
in commercial and technical fields* The change in the direction 
of foreign policy is in favour of relations with the Eastern 
European Communist countrisag with an obvious boost to Nigeria's 
policy of non-alignment. 
This trend continued between 1976 and 1979 thus: 
_tastem 
The ordering of Nigeria's foreign relationships and interests 
(1976-1979) 
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With the return of Nigeria to civilian rule under a 
predominantly conservative governmentq its relationship with UK9 
the Commonwealth and Islamic states improved thus: 
4p 
The ordering of Nigeria's foreign relationships and interests 198G-1983 
This trend continued up to the and of 1985, However Nigeria's 
relations with the United Kingdom were strained in 1984 as a result of 
(1) the attempted abduction from Britain of Nigeria's fugitive Mr, 
Umaru Dikka and (ii) the refusal by the British government to return 
the fugitive to Nigeria to face charges of corruption and economic 
sabotage, The effect of the incident was only noticeable in the 
lowering of the level of diplomatic representation in Lagos and London* 
The other areas of relations were not affected and so the general 
position of UK in Nigeria's order of external relations was relatively 
unchanged, 
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In summaryq the foreign policy practice of Nigeria is 
constrained by many internal and external factors - mainly 
sconomicq political and orgenisational as discussed in chapter 
nineq resulting in apparent weakness or inaction an certain 
issues. By far the biggest constraint is the inability of 
Nigerians to provide a stable polijbiftl order internally as a 
necessary foundation for effective practice of foreign policy, 
The failure of the electoral process# the aeries of military coups 
and coup attempts combine to undermine both the image of the 
country abroad and the efforts of its foreign policy practitioners. 
Howeverg Nigerian foreign policy practice does not necessarily 
change with changes in regimep hence it has maintained a remarkable 
record so fare The success of Nigeria's foreign policy practice lies 
in the fact that it has risen within a relatively short period 
(twenty five years) to a prominent position in the community of 
nations. Nigeria has made an outstanding impact on the global 
system and has gradually and steadily become a force to be reckoned 
with in African and world politics. Its success exemplifies changes 
arising from an increasing perception of the need for Nigeria to 
realize its objectives in its practice and an increasing capacity 
to do so* Changes in the pattern of relations are reflected both 
in the changing perceptions of policy makers and in the broad 
areas of policy itselfg notably non-alignment and Nigeriats 
continental roleq diplomatic representation and economic diplomacy 
which are covered in this chapter* 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from this analysis of the foreign policy process 
of Nigeria that the political system is characterised by instability 
and crisis that are capable of undermining the policy process. 
This state of affairs is reflected in the constant failure of 
the electoral systsmq the civil war and over half a dozen military 
coups/attempted coups atc. 9 all within its twenty-five year history. 
It has been argued that the causes of crisis and instability in 
Nigeria include the structural imbalance in the faderationg 
regionalism and ethnic minority problems. The central issue 
however is the struggle for the spoils of office or "share of 
the national cake" and this struggle increases in intensity as 
the national revenue fluctuates disproportionately with aggregate 
demands of the population* However the political crises appear 
to have been confined to domestic issues and the changes they 
bring about have tended also to be in the domestic sphere. The 
governments that emerge from these changes have also mainly been 
concerned with political and policy issues in the domestic arana. 
They turn to foreignpolicy lose from a preconceived notion of 
desirable changes in external relationev than to make an image 
for their regime, To do so they rely greatly on the 
bureaucracy, As a result the process of making foreign policy 
in Nigeria does not necessarily change with changes in regime, although 
the activities of each regime contribute to some extentq as we have 
seen in chapter twoq to the formation of Nigerian foreign policy. 
The foreign policy process of Nigeria has some discernible 
patterns and principles that have been identified in this study* 
434* 
The principles include national protectiong economic gr, owtht 
cultural identityq national aspirations African fresdomq security 
and cooperationg non-alignmentq and promotion of international 
peace and cooperation* These have been definedg explained 
and illustrated in chapter four, An attempt has been made 
to distinguish principles as the general guidelines which 
govern decisions and actions in external affairs, while "decisions 
and actions" aim at objectives and goals* An objective refers 
to the set of values and expectations which generate policy and 
lead to its ends* It (objective) is part of a goal while a 
goal is the summation of objectivesq which consummate policy. 
Differences in political outlook will lead to different 
explanations of the terms. The explanation here is that 
principles guide policy and objectives generate it while goals 
consummate policy. By distinguishing the guiding principles of 
Nigerian foreign policy# it is hoped we have shown that there 
exists a rational and realistic basis for the country's external 
behaviourt which (basis) according to Professor Aluko has never 
been spelt out together before* 
1 
As this study showag Nigerian foreign policy making has an 
environment which for analytical purposes is divided into domestic 
and external environments. The pattern of foreign policy making 
in the country reflects a close link between the environment and 
the structures that make policy. This link is in the form of 
1. Alukop Olajideq Essays an Nigerian foreign policy,. George 
Allen & Unwing Landong 198lg pp, 264-265, 
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an input-output relationship in which demands and supports 
from both the internal and external envirorments are channelled 
to decision making structures of the government for use in 
making policy. As this study revealaq Nigeria has a very 
active environment for policy making* Indeed the environment 
is much morsý active than many writers had imagined (see 
chapter five). This is reflected in the many sources and 
variety of inputs generated from the environment an any given 
issue. The main sources of input include traditional 
institutions# the presev National Assemblyq political partiess 
trade unionag other pressure groups and economic institutions 
(domestic environment); international organisationst state actors 
and multinational corporations (externil environment), These 
are generally very active in generating inputs into policy making, 
It is observed that Nigeria's growth in stature and increasing 
involvement in external affairs result in almost proportional 
increase in input (demandsp support# expectations) from the 
environment. 
Howeverg of all the influences on foreign policy making, 
altruism is the most dominant from which the country's foreign 
policy derives its distinguishing characteristics (see chapter 
five)* Altruism tends to shape the policy makers' world viewq 
hence the tendency to insist on such abstract factors as justicaq 
moral conscience and world peace, In particulart it influences 
the making of foreign policy choices: to be genuinely helpful or 
exploitative; to maintain long term friendly cooperation or 
"permanent interest" and expediency, etc. Altruism influences 
also the selection of strategic instruments in foreign policy: 
436 * 
to employ vile and hostile propaganda or to appeal to reason; 
war or diplomatic negotiationg etc, It encourages peaceful 
settlement of disputes through negotiation and appeal to moral 
conscience# while discouraging the use of force or agents such 
as the CIA9 KGB or M16 for clandestine activities in foreign 
countries. Unlike the capitalist and communist statesj, 
Nigeria's foreign policyýis not necessarily based on pure 
calculation of advantages or how to exploit the weakness of 
friendly countries* It is rather a long term policy of mutual 
cooperation and assistance. For example in the case studies 
in chapter eight, the Nigerian policy makers apparently ignored 
the possibility of securing for Nigeria some economic, political 
or strategic advantages. There was the opportunity to secure 
certain products and markets in Africa in exchange for Nigerian 
oil at concessionary prýcsaq but the Federal Government did not 
do that* There was the opportunity to establish a Nigerian 
military presence in Angola (which could have been a clear 
warning to then Ian Smith's Rhodesia and South Africa) but the 
Federal Government refused to do so, Similarlyq with the Chad 
Republicp Nigeria had the opportunity to influence the type of 
government to rule that country but it was considered improper 
and a betrayal of trust to impose Nigerials Will on Chadians, 
So the decisions were made in the interest of African unity and 
fraternity, 
Nigeria's practice of foreign aid without strings also 
reveals the extent to which altruism influences policy-making 
in the country, Indeed altruismq usually overlooked by many 
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writers# is a major cultural determinant of Nigerian foreign 
policy decisions and actions* 
2 The view here is that a proper 
understanding of the influence of altruism on Nigerian policy- 
makers is necessary for one to understand both how foreign policy 
choices are made and the country's behaviour. As a result of 
the preponderant influence of environmental demandsq values and 
expectations on policy decisionsp the conclusion is that the 
environment is an important component of the policy making process* 
In effectq whether under civilian or military governmentq making 
foreign policy in Nigeria is not done in a vacuum or in isolation 
of public demands and expectations* This is illustrated further 
by the Federal Military Government's recent (December 1985) decision 
in accordance with significant public opinion in Nigeria, to reject 
an IMF loan. and its conditionalities. 
3 The variety of sources 
(societal and governmental) and. types of input that emerge an any 
major external issue and are involved directly or indirectly in 
decision makingg reflect a measure of pluralism in policy making 
in Nigeria* 
Howeverv this study makes a distinction between those who 
influence policy and those who make the precise policy decisions. 
It argues that while many organs of government and agencies of 
society are sometimes involved in making foreign policyq some of 
them do so not as their primary responsibility, The organs of 
2, For a general explanation of the impact of "societal determinants" 
and belief systems on foreign policyq see Oensen Lloyd; Explaining 
Foreign Policyt Prentice-Hall Inc. 9 Englewood Cliffsq New Jerseyq 19829 pp. 45-69 and 101-105. 
3. West Africat No, 3565 of 23/30 December 1985t pp. 2677-2678* 
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government that have statutory responsibility to do so include 
the Presidency (Head of State/Government and the assistants)q 
the Supreme Military Council (currently renamed Armed Forces 
Ruling Council)q-the National Council of States, the Federal 
Executive Council (now National Council of Ministers)q and the 
bureaucracy especially the Ministry of External Affairs. These 
are essentially the executive organs of government and constitute 
the foreign policy making machinery (see chapter 7). They have 
the primary responsibility and determine what views and influences 
will be tolerated in policy making and moreover bear the blame 
for lapses in Nigerian foreign policy even when such are caused 
by the action of the other organs of the state. They do not 
however get the credit for any good performance in external affairs* 
It is however clear that in Nigeria, foreign policy is made by the 
executive arm of the government consisting of the Presidency 
Federal Executive Council - Ministry of External Affairs column. 
The Ministry of External Affairs in particular is the organ 
that has remained constant and indispensable in the foreign policy 
processe It is both a major link between the past and present 
governmenteg and a reservoir of information and records of activities 
of the government that are an essential guide to decision making, 
With the politicians (civilian or military) depending largely 
an the bureaucrats for professional advice on technical/public 
issues in which they (politicians) possess limited knowledge and 
experienceg the Ministry's role in making foreign policy is continuous 
and ever increasing, In virtually all cases the Ministry has the 
primary responsibility for defining issuseq highlighting consequences 
and proposing policy alternatives. The Ministry of External Affairs 
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like the British FC09 may not be easily circumvented in forsigh 
policy making and implementation* Its views may not always 
prevail but will always be sought on issues of Nigeria's external 
relations, Given the interdependence between the Ministry and 
the Federal Executive Council on one hand and between the Council 
and the Presidency an the other, the making of foreign policy 
in 
Nigeria is therefore a group activity, This is the case in both 
civilian and military regimes. 
The case studies in chapter eight clearly illustrate this 
point and show that the processes of foreign policy making are 
similar to those usually ascribed to the developed countries* 
4 
However the period of military rule has often been represented 
as an era of dictatorshipq hence the impression# for examplev 
that Muhammad alone took the decision to recogniss the MPLA of 
Angolat 
5 
and also the view of some writers that foreign policy 
making in Nigeria is highly personalised. 
6 This study argues 
that such views are mistaken, A process of foreign policy 
making in Nigeria involving a series of consultations and the 
participation of a number of organs of government in initiation# 
consideration and deciaionq has become popular among Nigerians 
4, In spite of the prolonged military rule in Nigariag there 
is still a high degree of collective responsibility in policy 
making. 
5. SatilLnmbig A*O. j Nigeria's Recognition of the MP 
Monograph Series No* 9* The Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairsq Lagosq 19819 pp, 22-23. 
6, Clapham# Christopher (ade)q Foreign policy making in 
developing states: a comparative approach, Farnbarough: 
Saxon Houseq 19779 pe 87* 
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as a means of involving many influenbial groups including ethnic 
groups in making national policy and therefore cannot be easily 
ignored by any leader. The diversity of the Nigerian federation 
and the attendant difficulty of ruling the country imply that 
dictatorship cannot thrive in Nigeria, 
Thus the decision to sell Nigerian oil at concessionary 
prices to African countries started from the lower level in the 
hierarchy and moved upwards through other levels to the top of 
the hierarchy* The decision was initiated in the Ministry of 
External Affairaq where it passed through a number of levels up 
to the Minister* At each level additional information was 
collected and analysed, Then from the Ministryp a memorandum 
was passed to the Federal Executive Council for consideration. 
In doing so the Council called for the view of the Ministry 
responsible for petroleum, Yet to make the decisiong the 
Council needed further information and analysis. It then 
set up an inter-ministerial committee to review available 
information and submit an independent proposal on the 
desirability or otherwise of selling Nigeria's oil at 
concessionary prices for African countries* The Committee's 
proposal like other proposals from the relevant Ministries, 
was sympathetic to the requests of African countries, The 
FEC adopted the proposal and the Head of State gave approval 
to it, then it became government decisiong and was passed 
downwards for implementation. 
In the decision to recogniss the MPLA government in 
Angolat the decision process started from the top of the 
hierarchy (SMC) downwards to the Ministry of External Affairs 
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which provided basic information and proposed policy alternatives. 
The proposals then were sent upwards to the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC), which (like the rEC in the oil sales decision) 
appointed two special fact-finding missions to Angola for more 
information and analysis, The proposals were considered by 
the SRC which made the final decisiong approved by the Head of 
State and sent down the hierarchy for implementation, A 
similar process was followed in the decision to send Nigerian 
soldiers to Chad for peacekeeping operations, All the case 
studies show that foreign policy making in Nigeria is a 
collective responsibility in the sense of participation of many 
organs of government in the policy process, They also show 
that policy making in Nigeria reflects not only the views or 
interests of the ruling group but also of the others in its 
environment* It is also clear from this study that foreign 
policy making in Nigeria has some discernible patterns and 
processes that are popular with both civilian and military 
regimes. 
From this study, one can identify a few differences between 
the foreign policy process of Nigeria and those of the more 
advanced countries. These arise from (1) the impact of 
idiosyncratic factors such as psychological predispositions 
and individual belief systems in the making of foreign policy, 
and (2) the impact of ideology* 
7 For examplaq while capitalist 
7* Ideology is a belief system likened to a prism through which 
decision makers view reality* It determines for its adherents 
the scope of foreign policy options and provides the means for 
rationalizing policy choices. Sao Jenseng Lloydq Explainina 
Foreign Policy; Prentice-Hall Inc, q Englewood Cliffsq Now Jerseyq 19829 ppe 72-74, 
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considerations influence foreign policy options and choices of 
Western countries and communist considerations influence those 
of east Curopean countriesp foreign policy making in Nigeria is 
influenced by altruist considerations (see chapters 5g 8 and 10)e 
Thus altruism is a major factor that distinguishes Nigerian 
foreign policy from those of the advanced countries, The 
differences, as already noted$ manifest in the output not in 
the process of policy making* There are also differences in the 
nature of difficulties in policy making. This depends on a variety 
of factors including the amount of human and material resources 
available to policy makers of a country on a given issue. 
Some of the major difficulties in making Nigerian foreign 
policyt similar to those that affect its practice, have been 
analysed in chapter 9 of this work, These include inadequate 
fundingg lack of incentives, poor communication system etc. To 
many Nigeriansq however, the major difficulty lies with the nature 
and type of naticnal leadership, According to Chinua Achebe 
"The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of 
leadership". a It has been said that Nigeria needs a more 
enlightened national leadership with fare-sightq who can provide 
desirable initiatives and directions vital in making foreign 
policy. Theta are in particular problems with political input, 
namely (a) lack of clear# unbiased decisions by leadership 
(Ministerg Head of State); (b) apparent attachment to objectives 
which are too vague to be reached and/or impossible for Nigeria 
Be Achebeg Chinua, The Trouble with Nigeria; Heinemann Educational 
Books Ltd. t Londong 1984* 
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to realize (e, g. objectives (iii)v (iv) and (v) in chapter four); 
and (c) lack of strong political will and, to a certain degreeg 
incompetence* These are compounded by similar difficulties 
arising from the composition of the principal organs of government 
responsible for policy making. As already stated in chapter nineg 
the application of "federal character and federal balance" at 
every level of government has resulted sometimes in putting square 
pegs in round holes* The implication is that policy making is 
9 
dominated by less skilled individuals*, Instances abound of filing 
clerks and typists without the benefit of a formal education rising 
remarkably fast to very high positions of policy making (mainly 
to represent a certain state or group at a given level) in the 
hierarchy of government. Such persons are sometimes unable to 
cope with the complex considerations ihvolved in high policy making 
and at other timeaq they use the autharity'of their positions 
negatively by making policy ineffective. As a result dissatisfaction. 
and discontent spread# leading to general laxity9 hence the delays 
in getting things done in government offices in Nigeria. 
Another difficulty that besets foreign policy making in 
Nigeria is the constant rivalry between the ministries on overlapping 
matters of external policyt viz. External Affairs and Information 
over external publicity; External Affairs and Internal Affairs over 
passports, visas and border policy regarding ECOWAS citizens; 
External Affairs and Economic Development (now National Planning) 
over policies towards ECOWAS9 OPEC and other international economic 
organisations and institutions; External Affairs and Education over 
responsibility for Nigerian students abroad, etc. The rivalries 
hinder broad based policy planning and development. 
9. See West Africat No. 35589 4 November# 19859 pp. 2297-2299* 
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Closely related to internal rivalry is the problem of 
inadequate co-ordination, The activities of many policy 
making organs of government are not well co-ordinated due 
essentially to leadership problems already discussed-and 
communication difficulties. The importance of good 
communication network need not be stressed. 
There are many areas in which this study of the foreign 
policy process of Nigeria can contribute to the understanding of 
international relations in general and foreign policy analysis 
in particular. Being, as we have seen, a country with about 
a hundred million people (the sixth most populous country in 
the warld)t rich mineral resources and a growing aconamyq a large 
military force of about 27000009 a key country in the continent 
of Africa and on-important actor in the international systemq 
Nigeria's position and role in the world are bound to attract 
the attention of both scholars and actors alike. It is hoped 
that such an analysis of the principlesq structures and processes 
of its foreign policy will facilitate an understanding of its 
external behaviour* 
Most African states do not approach Nigeria's sizag population 
or resources, None of them probably has produced the educated 
and skilled manpower that exists in Nigeria today, Militarily 
with the exception of Egypt perhapsg Nigeria possesses the largest 
force in Africa. Thus Nigeria has the capacity to influence the 
positions of many African states in world affairs and as a result 
is a major factor in the African international sub-system. A 
knowledge of the dynamics of its policy making is therefore 
important both in understanding the foreign policies of African 
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states and in comparative studies* 
In terms of global powerg Nigeria is however a small power 
but its leaders feel that they have achieved a real bargaining 
power in the international community which can be used to project 
the image of Nigeria and Africa. Nigeria's image of herself and 
its effect on her attitude towards the big poweraq have combined 
(with other states) to introduce a now element in the global 
power equation, Hitherto international politics was seen as 
the creature of the major powers and the small powers were 
thought to have no role in it, and would never exert any 
influence in their relationships with the major powers. But 
as a result of the increasing bargaining capacity of the small 
powers in their overall relationships with the major powers, the 
relationships have been seen to change and the small powers have 
come to play important parts in international politics and the 
global balance of powers While there is no doubt that the small 
powers suffer certain basic disadvantages in their relationships 
with the big powers,, some,, like Nigeria, possess significant 
leverage in their dealingsýwith major powersq which imposes 
limitations on the big powers in their overall relationships with 
the now states* It is hoped that this study will faster an 
understanding of the basis of the power of small states and the 
elements involved in the big power - small power relationships. 
This research has been conducted with the perspective of 
an insider and it reflects a level of development of the 
structures and processes of foreign policy making in Nigeria. 
It also reflectsp perhapaq an in-depth knowledge of the interaction 
between the structures and institutions of the society and policy 
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making organs of the government, It further reflects the 
growing optimism among Nigerian policy makers of their ability 
and determination to meet the challenges of this century. 
The exposition here attempts to reject a number of 
superficial and orthodox studies on Nigerian foreign policy. 
Superficial because they are based less on facts than on one's 
political stance and orthodox in succumbing to a preconceived 
notion of underdevelopment and dependence, A point of departure 
therefore is the insistence that Nigeria deserves to be presented 
in a better light as a state actor in its own right. Like other 
sovereign stateev its decisions and actions on external affairs 
at any time are the results of the policy makers' perception of 
both the given issue and the prevailing circumstances in the domestic 
and external environments of Nigeria, 
This study disagrees with the view that Nigeria is heavily 
dependent on the West and therefore cannot exercise a truly 
affectivd and independent foreign policy. It rather argues that 
dependency in international relations is reciprocal. The West 
depends as much on Nigeria as the latter depends on the former. 
It may be the fact that Western economyq almost at its optimum 
capacity and tending towards diminishing returns, needs the 
Nigerian market more than Nigeria needs Western products. 
Therefore Nigeria cannot be easily blackmailedg particularly 
as it pays for its imports. Unless it can be proved that the 
needs of the less numerous urban inhabitants and "the new 
auxiliary capitalist class" are the dominant factors in the 
formulation and execution of Nigerian foreign policy (which 
is obviously not the cass)q the dependency theory is therefore 
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misleading. This study will have served a major purpose if 
it advances an independent and objective analysis of the foreign 
policy of African states in general and Nigeria in particular, 
rinally the emphasis hers, is on the institutional rather 
than on the personal characteristics of policy makers and an 
process rather than an content of foreign policy. The process 
analysed here can compare with similar studies an USA and USSR or 
India and Brazil. In other wordsq contrary to the impression 
that exists about political process in developing countries, the 
foreign policy process of Nigeria is not very different from that 
of the developed countries of Europe and America, If there is 
a significant differencog it lies in the amount of information 
and resources put into policy makingg which reflects in the content 
of policy while the process is basically the same. 
10 As this 
study has showng foreign policy making in Nigeria has been a 
collective responsibility and actual policy dose not necessarily 
depend an the character of a particular regime, This agrees with 
the general foreign policy trend that the essence and nature of it 
does not warrant frequent changes with changes in regime, 
I 100 See for example Vitalq David, The Making of British Foreign 
Policv# George Allen & Unwin Ltd, q London, 1968; Bloomfield 
P, Lincoln, The Foreign PolicV Process: A Modern Primer, 
Prentice-Hall Inc. 9 Englewood Cliffsq Now Jersey, 19827' 
Schwartz, Morton, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic 
Factasp Dickenson Publishing Companyq Inc,, Encinoq 
Californiag 1975; Keatingav Patrickq The Formulation of Irish 
Foreign Policyt Institute of Public Administrationg Dubling 
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